Miscellaneous Market Notes

Quite a few things going on.

1) With the rejection of the Canfor offer, the stock went from $15 to $12, but recovered to $13 as I’m writing this. Many investors are probably engaging in the Canadian version of Buffett-following, which is “if Jim Pattison thinks it’s worth buying at $16, surely buying at $12 or $13 isn’t that bad.”

I do agree with general market sentiment that Canfor was lowballed, but the forest industry is cyclical and most definitely we are in the low part of the cycle. When things will emerge again remains to be seen. The good news with Canadian lumber is that it is one of our few economically competitive exports and doesn’t require a pipeline to transport. In addition, environmental groups have shifted their political focus in the last couple decades from antagonizing forestry to fossil fuels, which gives them some breathing room (for now).

In British Columbia, hardly a month goes by without hearing some news about mill shutdowns and the like. The industry is really suffering right now. The renegotiation of NAFTA and expiration of the previous softwood lumber agreement (October 2015) did not help matters at all.

2) Cineplex (TSX: CGX) getting taken out at CAD$34 is a gift to CGX shareholders. A British firm, Cineworld, apparently has too much money and has spared Cineplex owners from taking future losses. As you can tell by the tone of this paragraph, I did not perceive Cineplex’s future business chances as being particularly rosy. The business did have value but not at the price they were trading at. I’ve written about it a few times in the past and will leave a chart here for historical purposes:

3) Another takeout which I thought would go through was HBC (TSX: HBC), which (at $10.30) was withdrawn by the proponents (Baker Group and others, 57%), and a subsequent $11 offer by another significant minority shareholder group (Catalyst, 17.5%) was rejected by the shareholders offering $10.30. This is a gigantic corporate governance mess, but what was interesting was the posting of all the real estate appraisals on their investor relations site. Get some commercial quality information for free!

4) I’ve actually been active taking small stakes in various companies in late November and December. The range of companies is widely varying. For the first time in quite some time, I’ve deployed some capital south of the border.

Options Education Day – Vancouver

I do not write about options that much, nor do I use them that often. This post I wrote last year illustrates my thoughts and they have not evolved much since then. Options are expensive to trade, both from a commission and spread perspective, and they are much less liquid than their equity counterparts.

On a whim, I decided to attend the Montreal Exchange’s Options Education Day in Vancouver last Saturday. Once in a blue moon, I try to attend something in-person to just get a feel for the environment and see if I can learn any tidbits of information. Since this conference was sponsored by the exchange itself, I figure that it wouldn’t be too scammy in terms of having people promote perpetual money-making machines. This assumption was somewhat true – there was some reflection on risk, but not too much. The cost to get in was $55 plus HST, so that probably filtered out the completely degenerate. It was at the Fairmont Vancouver and included a (average) buffet lunch, and all the coffee you could drink. I had no problems with the venue – it was spacious and the service was excellent.

After the end of the presentations, which went for the better part of the morning and afternoon, I did not learn too much that I didn’t know already. In no particular order here are some tidbits:

* CIBC (one of the sponsors of the event) is still struggling to come up with an investment brokerage platform that can compete against Interactive Brokers. Their interface looked oddly early 2000’s in look and feel as they were navigating through it in a presentation.
* I was left with the impression that selling covered calls and puts was effectively free money. It is mostly certainly not. In particular, one presentation was mostly dedicated towards the notion of selling puts instead of purchasing stocks through limit orders and “generating a 1/2 to 1 percent discount per month on your order”. What they conveniently omitted was the fact that if the stock goes under the strike price, in a limit order you will get your fill right there and then, while on a short put option trade you pretty much have to wait until expiry in order to figure out whether you’re going to be owning the stock or not, and this time difference is materially crucial.
* I was left with the impression that taking a long call option (at varying strike prices) in a low volatility option with two months to expiry can lead to similar upside and lower downside compared to just flat-out buying the stock. The analysis of this particular presenter was reasonably good, but what was missing was that a low volatility option would not be expected to have the underlying stock go plus or minus 10% in the first place in a couple months.
* One particular example focused on a short-term option in Manulife. I forgot the exact strikes but it effectively involved paying 20 cents extra for exposure on a $20 stock, but they conveniently forgot to mention that Manulife paid out a 25 cent dividend between the hypothetical purchase price and expiry of said option, which changed the “no-brainer” proposition and made it effectively more expensive.
* There was no discussion at any time of the actual mechanics of trading options, including costs of trading, and dealing with the awful bid-ask spreads on most of the issues trading on the Montreal Exchange (which desperately needs competition).
* There were about 65 people there, about 55 of them were men, definitely skewed toward those that have more grey hair than I do.
* There does seem to be an obsession about “yield” and “income”, which I think is true for the overall market.
* At no time did the notion of fundamental analysis of the underlying securities ever factor into any discussion, nor, more relevant for options trading, any relevant discussion as to what determined the implied volatility or factors that could change volatility. Almost all the discussion on trading was of a technical analysis nature.

In general, I could easily see without more foundational knowledge, how less educated investors could be convinced that options trading could be beneficial for them, and probably over-engage with it. Options trading seems to solve a problem in people’s portfolios that they do not have – guess whether the stock is going up or down is difficult enough, let alone trying to figure out the probability distribution of future prices over time!

I’d be much more curious about how the market makers fare and get insight from their perspective. I know Interactive Brokers’ market making division (Timber Hill) got out of the options market making business a few years ago, citing that they were not able to make money because they got killed by people that had more information than they did on underlying companies.

Why Marijuana producers will all go to zero

Here’s an interesting press release from a marijuana producer company Alefia (TSX: ALEF, ALEF.DB) – the relevant snippet I’ve quoted below:

2019 OUTDOOR HARVEST HIGHLIGHTS

10,300 kg of dried flower harvested
1,000 kg per acre yield in Zone 1, which was planted in June 2019
$0.08 cash cost per gram to harvest (unaudited)
$0.10 all-in cash cost per gram to harvest, including facility capital costs (five-year amortization) (unaudited)
Cannabinoid content (THC and CBD per gram) of harvested flower was strong, at levels near to the cannabinoid content in identical strains harvested indoor
Quality assurance testing to date is successful, including for microbial content, pesticides and contaminants

“Our inaugural 2019 outdoor harvest was successful due to the commitment and capabilities of our team. I’d like to thank our on-site growers who navigated the challenging environment of starting the cultivation season late into the year and ultimately delivered an excellent harvest that we are measuring in tons,” said SVP of Production Lucas Escott.

The key line here is the $0.10 per gram “all-in” cost per gram to harvest, which bakes into some “half-baked” amortization scheme (pun most definitely intended).

Simple math follows.

1 kilogram (kg) is 1,000 grams.

So this batch of 10,300 kg of dried flower marijuana cost $1.03 million using their numbers.

How much is 10,300 kg?

Apparently 5.2 million Canadians have consumed cannabis over the past three months.

Consumption statistics are not that easy to find, but apparently in 2017 (when Marijuana was still technically illegal in Canada) the annual consumption was about 20 grams per user (with the distribution of consumption highly skewed towards the high frequency user in a typical Pareto distribution – I’d argue that these people are more likely to have their own sources, but let’s ignore this for now). This works out to 104,000 kg per year of consumption (if legal).

The latest statistics (link 1 – October 2018 to June 2019, link 2 – July and August 2019) show the annualized consumption at around 155,000kg (medical and non-medical usage – the pretense of medical usage has gone completely away after legalization).

So let’s say it is 155,000kg and rising. What I find particularly amusing is that if distributed evenly among 37 million Canadians, that’s 4.2 grams for every man, woman and child – apparently this is good for about 10 joints per individual.

Of course, not every Canadian is going to smoke marijuana. Statistics suggest that about 1 in 6 Canadians use it. The addressable population for Cannabis is about 6 million people in Canada – or about 26 grams per person. Assuming this 1 in 6 number is constant (I don’t see how non-smokers can convert into smokers too easily), that works out to about 26 grams per smoker – how much higher is this going to go?

Later in Alefia’s press release, we have the following:

Based on the 2019 results, the Company estimates that it can produce 1,200 kg per acre for a total of 102,000 kg of dried flower in 2020 at its expanded 3.7 million sq. ft. (86 acre) outdoor site, at full capacity. The modest increase in the expected yield per acre for 2020 is due a number of factors which should improve the overall outdoor grow operation, including commencing cultivation several weeks earlier relative to 2019.

So we have one company that is making a claim they can produce 2/3rds Canada’s annual consumption of (legal) marijuana, and implying they can do it for a relatively low cost (10 cents per gram, all-in).

If this is true, then there are a few implications, especially considering that growing marijuana doesn’t appear to involve much in the way of patent-able or proprietary technology (it is a weed, after all!).

One is that there is going to be a massive over-supply of marijuana, and there will be a huge “race to the bottom” effect as price leaders attempt to leap-frog each other to dump their supply into the market place. This is already happening.

Two is that because the marginal cost of production is effectively nothing, that the value chain in producing is going to capture precisely zero profit beyond a cost of capital – and indeed, that will only happen when other inefficient producers get squeezed out of the market due to oversupply – is the company that is able to produce at 6 cents per gram all-in going to have a competitive advantage when all others can do it at 8 cents? Sure it will, but how much value will they be able to extract from that advantage? Not a lot.

Three is that governments are going to make a huge amount of profit on volumes (one of the winners of the value chain, and also having a huge financial incentive to encouraging as much volume as possible to be transacted in the legal market). (CRA Cannabis Excise Duty Information) At the federal layer, the government stands to make a minimum of $1/gram sold, or 10% of the product cost.

Four is that the low price of producing cannabis is going to create its own markets for ultra-low priced product, but this has to happen before it hits the excise tax layer – hence, the production of oils and other cannabis knock-off products that try to find some way to use what is otherwise worthless biological inventory.

Where is the profit going to be in the product? Obviously it is going to be in branding and marketing like most commodity products – tobacco has its Marlboro, and if/when Cannabis has their equivalent, that brand will probably end up making money. These brands take decades to build, sort of like Coca Cola and Pepsi. Until then, good luck – everybody in the marijuana production industry is going to lose.

Altagas Canada – my worst missed investment

I’m going to talk about the Canadian election results in a subsequent post. Something more mundane here.

Altagas Canada (TSX: ACI) was spun off from Altagas (TSX: ALA) in the depths of ALA’s de-leveraging attempts. Unfortunately, this was my worst “miss” that I never invested in, because of my normal policies which go against investing in initial public offerings. Altagas went public at $15 in October 2018 and I was intending on buying shares when it inevitably dropped to $12 (if I was going to buy a new public offering, why would I pay face value?), but it never got there. Sadly, my parsimonious nature got the better of me.

There is a second rule which I should have remembered: If a company goes public as a result of a forced de-leveraging or firesale, it probably is worth a consideration beyond that of a more standard IPO. Another IPO that fit this description was Genworth MI, which was spun off from Genworth Financial (NYSE: GNW) for deleveraging purposes. They do not happen very often, but when they do, you get gains like what happened with ACI.

ACI received a buyout offer from the Federal public pension board and the Albertan pension plan for CAD$33.50/share, so if I had just sucked it up and bought shares on IPO day at $14.53, I’d be sitting on a 130% gainer in the span of a year, not factoring in the $1.04 dividend. Oh well!

In terms of valuation, the pension plans are buying for a billion in cash a company that also has net $640 million in debt on the balance sheet. At an EV of $1.6 billion compared to 2018 operating cash flow of $90 million (not even factoring in capital expenditures), this isn’t the cheapest acquisition on the planet. It’s easy to see why they agreed to be bought out, and also why I wasn’t interested in them for $25/share either!

This, however, does show that pension boards are looking for cash flowing assets to park their capital into. Looking at Atlantic Power (TSX: ATP) anybody?

TSX 30: Momentum Index – Thoughts

The TSX created a new index, the TSX 30, which is formed under the basis of total return over the past three years for the top 30 companies in the TSX.

The first batch of index constituents are the following and this is an interesting list:

TSX 30: June 30, 2016 to 2019

Note the "3Yr" column is TOTAL return, dividend/distributions adjusted.
RankIssuer NameTicker3Yr
1Canopy Growth CorporationTSX:WEED1823%
2Shopify Inc.TSX:SHOP883%
3Village Farms International Inc.TSX:VFF868%
4Kirkland Lake Gold Ltd.TSX:KL605%
5Trilogy Metals Inc.TSX:TMQ503%
6Aphria Inc.TSX:APHA479%
7Air CanadaTSX:AC346%
8Neptune Wellness Solutions Inc.TSX:NEPT322%
9Ivanhoe Mines Ltd.TSX:IVN312%
10North American Construction Group Ltd.TSX:NOA304%
11Labrador Iron Ore Royalty CorporationTSX:LIF282%
12Ballard Power Systems Inc.TSX:BLDP232%
13Pollard Banknote LimitedTSX:PBL210%
14goeasy Ltd.TSX:GSY209%
15Anglo Pacific Group PLCTSX:APY185%
16North American Palladium Ltd.TSX:PDL183%
17Gran Colombia Gold Corp.TSX:GCM178%
18Resverlogix Corp.TSX:RVX174%
19Wesdome Gold Mines Ltd.TSX:WDO172%
20Cargojet Inc.TSX:CJT166%
21Theratechnologies Inc.TSX:TH161%
22Summit Industrial Income REITTSX:SMU160%
23Constellation Software Inc.TSX:CSU158%
24Tucows Inc.TSX:TC152%
25Great Canadian Gaming CorporationTSX:GC147%
26CAE Inc.TSX:CAE136%
27Park Lawn CorporationTSX:PLC131%
28TerraVest Industries Inc.TSX:TVK131%
29BRP Inc.TSX:DOO131%
30Boyd Group Income FundTSX:BYD126%

I have a few observations.

My initial gut reaction is that anybody investing in this index is nuts simply because it is a momentum index – people would be buying in and more or less facilitating the cash-out of the top players. Buying something solely on the basis of previous price appreciation is a questionable investing strategy.

Indeed, items 1, 3, 6, 7, and 8 on the table above were built on the basis of the cannabis industry (of which readers here should know I am highly skeptical of). I think most of these companies have had their hey-day and are now realizing that getting remotely close to justifying their valuation is not going to be an easy endeavour.

On second glance, the TSX 30 index is actually reasonably diversified among industries, except finance. Considering that the main TSX 60 index is dominated by finance (37% of the index at present), the lack of financials is not a terrible characteristic.

There are a few companies on this list that made me go “really?” and when looking at their stock charts they indeed were able to deliver said returns. Ivanhoe Mines? Seriously!!?? (answer: they got really lucky with the June 30, 2016 to June 30, 2019 date ranges – go take a look at their stock chart).

My other observation is: so few companies appreciated +125% in the past three years. There are a few staple companies where it is really worth buy-and-holding (Constellation Software comes to mind here, although future returns are very likely not to be nearly as good as previous ones), but is one really going to buy and hold any of the marijuana companies or Shopify from here on in? It goes as one more data point to show that being nimble in trading continues to be a key characteristic in being able to outperform – a passive investor does not see the converse index which is the “TSX negative 30”, which contains the list of non-bankrupt companies which have depreciated the most over the past three years – that in itself would be an interesting future exercise.