Robinhood and overactive retail trading

Globe and Mail had an interesting article on the advent of Robinhood.

Robinhood is not currently available in Canada, but I’ve seen enough videos to come to an easy conclusion – it is the financial brokerage equivalent of crack cocaine.

There’s two items I’d like to discuss. One is commission-free trading, and the other is the psychological aspects of trading.

Robinhood allows commission-free trading of various products. The company’s business model makes money on payment for order flow, where the entity sells order flow to market making entities (such as Virtu – VIRT on the Nasdaq). The market makers execute on the trades and they pocket money buying on the bid, selling at the ask, and also making some informed speculation on the very short term future prices of securities depending on the order flow coming in (which is why you tend to see discontinuities on intraday trading – it is the market maker pulling away from the bid when there is a crush of supply pressure or pulling away at the ask when there is a crush of demand pressure).

For each share of stock traded, Robinhood made four to 15 times more than Schwab in the most recent quarter, according to the filings. In total, Robinhood got US$18,955 from the trading firms for every dollar in the average customer account, while Schwab made US$195, the Alphacution analysis shows.

I would suspect this magnitude difference (US$18,955 for a Robinhood dollar to $195 for a Schwab dollar) is a mis-print, but the 4-15 times magnitude of payment for order flow would intuitively sound like it is in the ballpark – reflecting the fact that customers purchase the most profitable type of items (call and put options) with large spreads. A market maker isn’t going to make much money if you buy 100 shares of Microsoft, but if you purchase 50 call options of some medium-capitalization security, it is virtually guaranteed that they will be paying at least a 25 cent (if not 50 cent or 1 dollar) spread on the trade.

In essence, there are two components to the cost of a trade. One is the commissions and fees associated with the trade – and for the most part, this is fairly transparent. The other less transparent cost of trading, which is much higher than the commission, is the slippage you pay for execution. If you want immediate execution, you must pay the spread. This is more costly than most commissions unless if you are trading the most liquid of securities.

There is a more subtle aspect to trading which applies when you have to take larger positions in companies, and that is how to acquire enough of the stock without materially impacting the stock price, but this is usually an institutional concern. This concern does sometimes happen at the retail level, especially in lower capitalization/volume stocks (e.g. my frustrations with trading Torstar, where it didn’t take much money to affect the stock price!).

So as a result of Robinhood’s price structure, they have an incentive to have their customers trade as much as possible, and ideally trade securities that will generate higher payment for order flow margins (i.e. high bid-ask spread options, especially multi-leg option positions such as Iron Condors!).

As a result, they make trading as easy as opening up an app on your iPhone and tapping a few keys and you’ve suddenly made a trade. You can trade on the bus, trade in bed, trade at the gym, etc, etc.

Clearly they’re trying to turn it into a legalized version of casino gambling, without telling the consumer that the expected value of their transactions are probably going to be higher at a casino.

So this leads me to the second item of this post, and this is psychology. There is a book called Nudge which you should read and Robinhood employs many of these tricks.

Just viewing the plethora of Youtube videos of people “minting coin” (e.g. “How I Made $30,000 in 1 Week Stock Trading on Robinhood“), and the general “millennial” attitude of these market participants, makes it definitely a herd mentality atmosphere, coupled with the “missing out” psychological sentiment – other people are making money, seemingly by tapping buttons on their phone in bed, why can’t I??? Robinhood couldn’t purchase this type of marketing. Contrast this with Interactive Brokers, where you get some very dry videos that few people in relation will click on.

The other phenomena is the advent of more sophisticated “trading rooms”, which has existed since the dawn of time (yes, pre-digital world), where people with their Robinhood accounts can band together to pumping up securities and purchasing and selling the hot tip of the day, just like a huckster at a horse racing track. There is so much rich history in herd mentality in stock trading that it would fill volumes, but for example, I’m going through a book called “Memoirs of Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds“, which was published in 1841, and its first chapter is about after Louis the 14th bankrupted France, eventually there was a mania in paper currency and the corporation that was created to exploit the Louisana Territory – people were lined up to subscribe and shares were bidded up to the roof. It didn’t end well.

Another great example is the “bucket shops” of the late 19th and early 20th century. A book written on behalf of Jesse Livermore is a good chronicle of this form of legalized gambling (in the name of speculating on the prices of securities), but it basically has the same rhythm to it.

There are all sorts of stories of financial malfeasance, and they all prey on the same human psychological ‘nudges’ that we see today. The only difference is the medium, and our digital age. Our psychological failures are the same and have not evolved with technology.

Robinhood is indeed marketing brilliance, and the net asset value in these accounts gets transferred to the shareholders of Robinhood, the market makers, and the counterparties to the trades that get executed on the platform. I generally do not have much sympathy for those that lose money in this manner. I just hope they do not ruin their lives in the process.

Keep shorting volatility

Perhaps the biggest no-brainer trade of this COVID-19 economic crisis (which is going to come to an end pretty soon) is shorting volatility on spikes. Today was the first real spike up since April 7th (which wasn’t much of one). I’ve attached the spike – and note just before Easter it was at around 33-34%:

Long-time readers of the site knows that I’m generally into fundamental analysis but once in awhile, there are trades out there that are so seemingly skewed to risk/reward that I just have to take them. The even better news is that unlike scammy marijuana companies, in the futures market your only price of admission is the initial margin and you don’t have to worry about borrowing, or carrying costs or anything like that, only a US$2.38 commission to get short a contract of US$1,000 times the index of notional value (i.e. every point the VIX goes up or down, your equity goes up or down US$1k per contract).

Of course, there are always risks. Who knows, Supreme Leader Kim might decide to launch the nuclear missiles, or there might be a 9.0 Richter scale earthquake in San Fran or some other catastrophic event, so this is why you never, ever go all-in on a trade (VIX would skyrocket). However, on the skewed balance of probabilities, by the time May comes rolling around, I’m pretty sure VIX is lower. Every quant fund out there on this planet that didn’t get wiped out on March 23rd is now applying the same rubric in our ultra-loose monetary policy situation and is making coin with volatility suppression – the S&P 500 doesn’t even have to rise to make this trade work. In fact, if it meanders, the trade works even better.

One of the biggest winners of all of this volatility has been the HFT firms, including Virtu (VIRT), but I would not invest in their stock. It is interesting to note, however, that they averaged about US$9.5 million in net trading income a day in Q1-2020! Holy moly!

Dysfunctional trading algorithms part 2

Trump mentions Thermo-Fisher (TMO) in his speech today.

Reaction in the stock market:

Within seconds there was a news entry, and the algorithms went wild.

It’s amazing to think that short-term traders are competing against machine-language transcriptions and language parsers to make trading decisions. If this is any indication that being a human being is a competitive disadvantage in short-term trading, I don’t know what is.

You can also look at Virtu’s (VIRT – Nasdaq) trading history, skimming micropennies in high frequency trading, and realize that you stand zero chance in the short term.

Interactive Brokers / IEX / Commission-Free Brokerages

Interactive Brokers has always been the leading innovator in the brokerage realm. Normally companies that last 40 years get stale and eventually break when they can’t keep up with technological or market trends, but IBKR has been surprisingly agile and has most definitely been on the leading edge of the curve the whole time – being able to develop their business (e.g. TWS giving all of its users institutional-quality levels of market access), create a moat (e.g. TWS, margin rates, trading execution, and on and on), and also have the ability to get out of businesses that no longer work for them (e.g. the disposition of their market making).

They were the first brokerage available to retail customers that offered two-factor authentication, something that makes me sleep a lot better at night. I would not recommend using any brokerage that does not use two-factor authentication for serious amounts of money.

IBKR is slowly getting into the banking and cash management side of things, which is another huge avenue for future growth. They clearly have an organic growth policy so when this policy will eventually pay out in spades is unknown, but I think they are on the right track.

Unfortunately, IBKR’s stock is only 18% publicly available – the trading entity (IBKR) only owns a slim minority (17.8%) of shares of the operating firm. Most of the stock is owned by the founder and CEO, Thomas Peterffy, who I regard as the Steve Jobs of the online trading business. He has been outspoken on many issues concerning the brokerage world and one of them is the issue of high-frequency trading and brokerages effectively ripping off their own customers.

This is one of the reasons why Interactive Brokers decided to re-list their shares on IEX instead of Nasdaq, starting in October.

In one of the typical understatements by Peterffy, he states:

We at Interactive Brokers understand that being the first listing on a new exchange may entail certain risk, but we think that individual and institutional customers who own and trade our stock will receive better execution prices and that advantage will outweigh the risk.

Peterffy has an advantage in that he doesn’t have to care whether IBKR trades in liquid amounts, and indeed doesn’t even have to care how much IBKR stock trades for since they have no need or reason to raise capital. Indeed, one of their strategic purposes for IBKR stock to trade was as a marketing vessel for institutional clients and given the statistics IBKR releases, it seems to be working quite well. It was only about a decade ago that they made the corporate decision to actually spend money on advertising. IBKR’s rise is well worth the history lesson, but I won’t go into it too deeply here.

Instead, what I want to focus on is the upcoming hype that came with Wealthsimple Canada’s announcement that they will have a commission-free stock trading platform in Canada coming soon.

The question a customer should ask is how brokerages make money.

In short order, some answers are the following (in no particular order):

a) Trading commissions
b) Interest revenues on customer credit balances
c) Foreign exchange differentials
d) Margin interest (i.e. customers borrowing money from the brokerage to invest)
e) Stock lending (if a customer buys stock, the brokerage can lend them out for short selling, which they will earn interest for the borrow)
f) Selling (or using) customer trading data
g) Selling order flow

Item (g) is what I will focus on. Firms such as Virtu (Nasdaq: VIRT) make a lot of their “bread and butter” purchasing order flow from retail firms and giving their clients less than optimal executions. As a result, while customers can save $5 or $10 on a trading commission, they are instead paying for it with a reduction in the ability to shave more money from the bid-ask spread.

After Flash Boys, people have been more conscious of this, but your average retail investor only believes the cost of trading is the commission, which is most certainly not true.

While the actual dollar amounts are inconsequential when trading with low sized accounts and the choice of brokerage has little bearing on the overall result, trading execution becomes much more critical with higher amounts of money and choosing a brokerage that makes money by offering inferior trading executions will cost customers real amounts of money, well beyond any commissions that would be saved. The more a customer anticipates trading, especially in lower liquidity securities, the more they will likely lose in inferior execution costs.

In finance and business, there is nothing that is truly “free”, and commission-free trading is most certainly included in that category.

Overall market thoughts – volatility – fossil fuels

This is another rambling post with no coherency. The quarterly reports from companies are flowing in and I am reading them – but there are few companies that are below my price range where I start to care about them in detail. As such, my research pipeline at this point is in the exploratory mode rather than doing detailed due diligence.

It is in the middle of summer and I am not expecting much in the way of volatility – it is truly a summer where major portfolio decision-makers have decided to take away from the trigger switches.

Accordingly I have been sitting and watching with respect to my own portfolio while I do my casual research. Probably my biggest error of omission was watching the solar market rise over the past six months – I’d written them off, along with almost everybody else, as languishing when the price of fossil fuel energy dropped. A lost opportunity there – there was one company in particular which I earmarked, financial metrics looked great, but didn’t even pull the trigger, primarily due to insider selling. If I executed correctly on it, I would have been looking at a double now. Oh well.

An equity chart that caught my attention was the high expectations of investors of Canaccord pulling a great quarter, which came nowhere to fruition:

This is very obviously the chart of expectations crushed after a quarterly report – a regression to the recent mean would suggest a $4.50-ish stock price. I also notice their domestic competitor, GMP, being crushed after their quarterly report.

I also notice most liquid fossil fuel companies are getting hit badly and are close to multi-year lows. In the USA, most of the companies receiving boosts are the ones that have had been relieved of their debt burdens through the Chapter 11 process (LNGG is a great example of this). I still don’t think equity holders of fossil fuel extraction companies are going to be too happy over the next 12 months.

I also took notice with Interactive Brokers, and Virtu’s commentaries with respect to Q2-2017 as being one of the lowest volatility environments possible – they are two types of businesses that generate revenues as a function of trading volumes. Volatility correlates negatively with an increase with the broad markets – I am looking for defensive-type companies that will do okay in an environment like present, but will really do well when volatility increases.

Interactive Brokers is a classic example of a great company (they are the best at what they do by a hundred miles over everybody else), but one who’s stock I am not interested in buying at current prices.

Mostly everything in the Canadian REIT sector seems to be over-valued. An interesting trend is that the downfall of retail is somewhat being projected by RioCAN’s chart – trading below book value, it might seem to be an interesting value, but are they able to keep up occupancy and lease rates to businesses that have to compete against Amazon? The residential darling of the market is Canadian Apartment Properties (CAR.UN) but they are most definitely not trading at a price that would suggest a future performance beyond a high single digit percentage point and this is under the assumption that their real estate portfolio asset value remains steady. Trading in the entire REIT sector seems to be entirely yield-focussed which is never a good basis to invest, but it is a good basis to evaluate other investors’ expectations on these entities.

Gold has also been up and down like a yo-yo and might be an interesting bet against dysfunctional monetary policy. Unfortunately my ability to analyze most gold mining firms is generally not that fine tuned.

The liquidity of my overall portfolio is very high (nearly a quarter of the portfolio is collecting dust at a short duration 1.5%), but right now I don’t see much investment opportunity that would suggest avenues for outperformance. I could shove the money into some sub-par debenture (e.g. TPH.DB.F which buys you a 7% coupon until March 31, 2018 maturity) but do I really want to lock my capital into something that is questionable? It is the literal metaphor of picking up pennies in front of a steamroller. My policy is that if I have to force my money to work, chances are the investment decision’s risk/reward is worse than if I just held it in cash and waited for some sort of crisis to hit. I generally define “crisis” as something that will take the VIX above 30%, but it has been awhile since we last saw it:

It is pretty ironic how the election of Donald Trump was foreseen by most pundits to be the end of the world and higher volatility times, but so far the opposite has turned out to fruition. Will it continue? Who knows.

I see a lot of people making the mistake of impatience, and also the mistake of assuming that the index ETFs that they are investing into (Canadian Couch Potato, etc.) will leave them safe through masked diversification – works great as long as there are net capital inflows, but what happens if there is a correlated bust among these products? Will retail continue their conviction when they see a 10% drop in prices, or will they grit their teeth and add to their positions?

I continue to wait. It might be a very boring rest of the year with very limited writing. If you think you’re in a similar predicament, I’d love to hear your comments below.