Tag: CVE

I’m not much of a technical analysis guru but here is my depiction of the trendline of Cenovus Energy (TSX: CVE):

Will this go on forever and end the year at $70/share? I wish, but incredibly unlikely unless if we’re heading into Weimar Republic inflation.

Despite this price rise, the company is still relatively cheap from a price to free cash flow metric. You don’t need to have a CFA in order to do some basic financial modelling:

This is from their IR slides and they will be spending $4.8 billion on capital expenditures in 2024. At “Budget”, which is WTI US$75, and US$17 differential to WCS pricing, the company will do roughly $10 billion in operating cash flow, leaving $5.2 billion of it free. They also have a sensitivity of $150 million per US$1 of WTI.

Everything being equal (it is not, but this is a paper napkin modelling exercise), at today’s closing price of WTI at US$86.75, they’re looking at a shade just under $7 billion in free cash flow. It won’t be quite this high in reality, but that puts the company at around 8.5xFCF to EV even at the current price. If you were smart enough to buy it at $20/share back in mid-January, at the price of WTI then (US$72/barrel), your FCF to EV ratio would have been… about 9x.

In other words, the price appreciation is strictly a result of the commodity price improvement, coupled with a very small multiple decline (which the truer computer models out there which algorithmically trade all these fossil fuel companies on a formulaic basis perform).

For the fossil fuel components in my portfolio, I have pretty much given up on any other smaller companies other than the big three (CNQ, CVE and SU) simply because I have little in the way of competitive advantage to determine which one of the smaller companies have better on-the-ground operations and superior geographies to work with. They all trade off of the commodity curve one way or another. The “big three” are low cost producers and will generate some amount of cash going forward, barring a Covid-style catastrophic environment.

They are basically the equivalent of income trusts at the moment. Remember the old Canadian Oil Sands (formerly TSX: COS.un) before it was absorbed into Suncor? That’s exactly that these three companies are – they all have gigantic reserves and very well established low-cost operations, and capital allocation that is simply going to dump cash out to dividends or share buybacks.

Risks inherent with all three:
1. A common regulatory/governmental risk being located in Canada, and mostly Albertan operations.
2. Fossil fuels may be subject to displacement if we actually see some sort of renaissance on nuclear power (there are whiffs of it here and there, but going from speculation to reality is another matter entirely).
3. The usual cyclical supply/demand factors.

With point #3, I see in the presentation decks of most of these companies (especially the smaller ones) that they are very intent on increasing production. Despite the fact that TMX is going to be operational in a month, the egress situation out of Canada will once again saturate. No more refineries are being built and thus the demand-supply variable will likely push WTI-WCS differentials higher at some point in the near future. With balance sheets of all the companies stronger than they ever have been, there will likely be some “race to the bottom” effect coming in due course, similar to how the domestic natural gas market has been saturated – both AECO and Henry Hub commodity pricing are quite low and LNG export pricing is back to its historical levels (around US$9.50/mmBtu spot).

I think what will happen is that the higher capitalization companies will use their relatively stronger balance sheets to pick away at the entrails of the smaller, higher leveraged operations when the price environment goes sour. Given the overall under-leveraged bent most of these smaller companies have been taking as of late, this process going to take awhile and a lower commodity price environment to achieve. These are not “forever hold” companies, but certainly at present their valuations continue to look cheap.

Oil refineries are incredibly complex pieces of machinery.

I’ve read the technical report at the now-Cenovus, formerly Husky Superior refinery that occurred in 2018 (this was before Cenovus took over Husky).

If you ever want to get a sense of appreciation at the technological marvel of oil refining, you should read this report.

This refinery is currently being rebuilt and should become operational again sometime this year.

Cenovus has had bad luck with their refineries. About a month after they signed a deal to acquire the remaining 50% of their Toledo refinery (the other 50% is owned by BP and the refinery is operated by BP), the refinery blew up on September 20, 2022 which resulted in the death of two workers. Thankfully for Cenovus, it was before the deal actually closed, and one would presume that the acquisition contact would require the refinery to be in a non-blown up state before the deal closes.

The preliminary report, released on October 31, 2022, indicates that a release of flammable materials from a specific drum was the origin of the fire.

These investigations take a lot of time and I do not think the repair job will be a speedy process either. It is too bad for Cenovus, as refinery spreads are sky-high at the moment and considering the lack of capacity expansion on downstream operations, will likely be this way for some time.

Cenovus (TSX: CVE) reported quarterly results.

The salient detail is that in addition to spending $2.6 billion in share buybacks and dividends, they are able to get net debt down from $9.6 to $5.3 billion for the 9 months. Specifically they have $8.8 billion in debt and $3.5 billion in cash.

They have a framework that gives off half the excess cash flow to buybacks and variable dividends. For Q3 this was allocated 75% to buybacks and 25% to the variable dividend.

In the conference call they alluded to this mix depending on the projected returns on the equity, which suggests a price sensitivity to their stock price.

This is exactly how they should be thinking. There should be a point where they stop buying back shares and instead just give it out in cash. At CAD$28/share, that point is getting pretty close.

They have a stated objective of dumping half their excess cash flow into their framework, and once net debt heads below $4 billion, then it becomes all of their excess cash flow. This should happen by the end of Q4.

While I believe a 100% allocation is not the wisest (they should top it out at 90% and focus on eliminating the debt entirely), given the maturity structure of their outstanding bonds, there is zero term risk in the next decade and a half (with their existing cash balances they can tender out the rest of their debt until 2037).

Once they start distributing 100% of their excess cash flow to dividends and buybacks, Cenovus will effectively function as an income trust of yester-year where you had Penn West and Pengrowth consistently giving out cash distributions. The buyback algorithm should auto-stabalize the stock price. At US$90 oil and refining margins sky-high and with little signs of abatement, Cenovus is on track to generating $8 billion in free cash flow for the year. Very roughly, that is about 14%/year and this is much higher than I can recall the historical income trusts yielding.

Unless if the stock price gets ridiculously high, or if management starts to display capital management that is off-colour (i.e. going on acquisition sprees that do not make sense), this is going to be a core holding for a very long time. It is too expensive to buy and too cheap to sell, so I look forward to collecting the cash distributions where I will try to find a better home for.