More consolidation

This has been quite a year for mergers.

Teck (TSX: TECK.b) is on the way (although definitely not confirmed) to being acquired by Anglo American (possibly to be Anglo Teck). There is a 16% merger arbitrage spread still going on, reflecting the regulatory uncertainty – but I do think this will be passed.

I have written ad nauesum (for years) about MEG being taken over, and Cenovus (TSX: CVE) was finally the suitor. Husky Energy (which itself was taken over by Cenovus) originally took a shot at MEG more than half a decade back. There were other oil patch consolidations I will not write about here which went through consolidation mergers.

Telus International (TSX: TIXT) was majority owned by Telus and Telus was able to re-absorb it into the main entity.

I recently wrote about Laurentian Bank effectively selling itself off to a couple institutions, one of which was National Bank (NA).

On the heels of this, a couple days ago Equitable Group (TSX: EQB) announced that they were acquiring Loblaws’ (TSX: L) PC Bank business and Loblaws is taking a minority stake in Equitable.

Finally, Canfor (TSX: CFP) announced it is proposing to take over the 45% interest in Canfor Pulp (TSX: CFX) that they did not own, for a 20% premium to market, and an option to take cash or shares of Canfor – looking at the balance sheet and the state of the pulp market (which is seemingly deader than 8-track audio), their minority shareholders are quite likely to proceed with this consolidation. Canfor itself tried to take itself private in 2020 and failed by a few percentage points on the shareholder vote – is this far behind?

What is causing all of this? Natural economic forces, but also that credit is cheap and plentiful if you have it – Canadian Natural Resources, for example, just issued $1.65 billion in 3, 5 and 10 year debt at a spread of about 85bps, 100bps and 130bps to GoC equivalents, respectively – dirt cheap!

I see the preferred share market is quite low-yielding – the spreads between yields to corporate debt has narrowed significantly over the past couple years and many of the issuers have their shares trading well above par value (e.g. most of the PPL.PR.x complex, FFH, BIP, etc.) – they are being called out at their 5-year rate resets.

High prices means low yields, and in order to get higher returns, one has to venture further up the risk spectrum. It’s getting quite competitive out there.

Canadian Bank Stocks

Bank financial institutions usually make money by borrowing short and lending long (i.e. having their cost of capital at the short-term interest rate, while earning money with the long-term interest rate).  The flattening yield curve is making it more difficult for financial institutions to capture this spread and this is reflected in what we see in Canadian bank stocks.

Looking at the six majors (TD, BNS, RY, CM, BMO and semi-major NA), they are all down for the year.  Looking at the juniors (CWB and LB), they are also down, especially in LB’s case (which has some other business operation issues that I will not get into this post, but suffice to say there is a reason why it is trading at less than 75% of book and a P/E of 8).

There are also other quasi-banks (e.g. EQB, HCG, FN – yes, I know FN is not a bank, etc.) that appear to be doing reasonably well despite their obvious reliance on the stability of the Canadian mortgage market.

Some people are advocating that this is a good time to get into the sector as traditionally most of Canada’s big banks have proven to be stable in history, and the big banks are making record amounts of profits.

Assuming you had to be locked into an investment in these Canadian banks, the proper question to answer is whether these institutions will continue making money at the rate they have been making it historically that justify their valuation.  They look cheap from a historical perspective, but just relying on historical analysis is a very dangerous method of investing.  There is a lot of competition in the financial sector domain and I am not sure whether forward looking, profitability will be as strong as it has been in the past half decade.  The easy money appears to have been made.

In general, I would not be surprised at all to see the major banks tread water price-wise for the next few years or even see investors today take small unrealized capital losses over that time frame while clipping their 4-5% dividend coupons.

Finally, I will clarify this post does not take into context the insurance sector (e.g. MFC, SLF, etc.) which has their own dynamics.  I also do not hold anything mentioned in this post, although I have taken a hard look at LB and CWB recently.

Home Capital / Equitable Group Discussion #2

A few news items which are salient as this saga continues:

1. Home Capital announced a HISA balance of CAD$521 on Friday, April 28 and a GIC balance of $12.97 billion. On May 1, this is $391 million and $12.86 billion, respectively (another $220 million gone in a day). Their stock is down 21% as I write this.

2. Equitable announced their quarterly earnings and are up 35%. This was a pre-announcement as they previously stated they would announce on May 11, 2017. They announced:

* A dividend increase.

Between Wednesday and Friday, we had average daily net deposit outflows of $75 million, with the total over that period representing only 2.4% of our total deposit base and with the most significant daily outflows being on the Wednesday. Even after those outflows, our portfolio of liquid assets remained at approximately $1 billion.

Obtained a letter of commitment for a two-year, $2.0 billion secured backstop funding facility from a syndicate of Canadian banks, including The Toronto-Dominion Bank, CIBC, and National Bank (“the Banks”). The terms of the facility include a 0.75% commitment fee, a 0.50% standby charge on any unused portion of the facility, and an interest rate on the drawn portion of the facility equal to the Banks’ cost of funds plus 1.25%. This interest rate is approximately 60 basis points over our GIC costs and competitive with the spreads on our most recent deposit note issuance, and as such will allow us to continue growing profitably.

So their credit facility cost $15 million to secure $2 billion (relative to $100 million for HCG), lasts two years (relative to 1 year for HCG), and also have a standby charge of 0.5% (which is 2.0% less than HCG), and a real rate of interest of approximately 3% (compared to HCG paying 10% for their outstanding amount, and I’m assuming the Bank’s “cost of funds plus 1.25%” works out to around 3%).

I haven’t had a chance to review their financial statements in detail yet. But securing two billion on relatively cheap terms like this is going to be a huge boost to their stock in the short run.

Very interesting.

Genworth MI (TSX: MIC) is also down a dollar or 3.5% today, which is more than the usual white noise of trading. It dipped even lower today.

Home Capital / Equitable Group discussion

Home Capital (TSX: HCG) collapsed 60% on news that they are in the process (not obtained!) a secured credit facility for a 10% interest rate, and a 2.5% standby rate for the unused portion. They also announced that customer deposits have collapsed in recent days.

Needless to say, this is a huge amount of interest to be charged and the market’s reaction is fairly indicative of this being a very, very negative event for the company.

(Update, April 29, 2017 – This is a little late, but the company confirmed the secured credit facility on April 27, which including the $100 million commitment fee, means an effective rate of interest of 15% for a $2 billion borrow, or a 22.5% rate for a $1 billion borrow. The ex-chair on television said it was secured 2:1 by mortgage loans and is front-in line. Yikes!)

Equitable Group (TSX: EQB) also has collateral damage, down approximately 17%. Are they next?

No positions.

Home Capital Group, Equitable Group

Home Capital (TSX: HCG) and Equitable (TSX: EQB) have been hammered today as a result of fallout of the Ontario Securities Commission allegations that certain Home Capital Group executives have contravened the various regulations. They continue to perform damage control, today announcing their CFO (who was under the OSC investigation) will be stepping down and other various board changes.

Borrowing rates for Home Capital spiked to 26% today. Equitable, which normally has been an inexpensive borrow, had its cost to borrow rise to 2.75%.

Implied volatilities on options for HCG is also very expensive at present, around 110% for near-dated options and around 90% for a couple months out. EQB does not have options trading on their shares.

There has been an avalanche of media coverage (both in print and social media) about Home Capital and their woes. They have been pushed down to about 25% less than tangible book value.

This spill-over has not occurred to Genworth MI (TSX: MIC) at present.