Beyond Meat, beyond amazing

I just take a look at this chart from Beyond Meat (Nasdaq: BYND):

What is the first thing I think of when I see this chart?

“Follow-on offering”. BYND did their IPO in early May, and insiders are restricted from selling shares (not distributed during the IPO) for 180 days, but the company can raise capital in the meantime! I would not be shocked at all to see them raise another $750 million or so this month.

They haven’t even filed Form 10-Q yet, but when skimming their Q1 earnings press release, net revenues of $40 million for the quarter, and management estimates $210 million for the year. They raised a net of $252 million on their IPO (which was in early May, at a price of $25/share).

Needless to say, the $10 billion market capitalization is frothy. Investors in this stock better heed the following entry in the prospectus (I’ve highlighted the relevant section below, with a link for those so interested):

We may not be able to protect our proprietary technology adequately, which may impact our commercial success.

Our commercial success depends in part on our ability to protect our intellectual property and proprietary technologies. We rely on a combination of patent protection, where appropriate and available, copyrights, trade secrets and trademarks laws, as well as confidentiality and other contractual restrictions to protect our proprietary technology. However, these legal means afford only limited protection and may not adequately protect our proprietary technology or permit us to gain or keep any competitive advantage. As of March 30, 2019, we had one issued U.S. patent and 21 pending patent applications, including eight in the United States and 13 international patent applications.

We cannot offer any assurances about which, if any, patents will issue from these applications, the breadth of any such patents, or whether any issued patents will be found invalid and unenforceable or will be threatened by third parties. Any successful opposition to these patents or any other patents owned by or, if applicable in the future, licensed to us could deprive us of rights necessary for the successful commercialization of products that we may develop. Since patent applications in the United States and most other countries are confidential for a period of time after filing (in most cases 18 months after the filing of the priority application), we cannot be certain that we were the first to file on the technologies covered in several of the patent applications related to our technologies or products. Furthermore, a derivation proceeding can be provoked by a third party, or instituted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, or USPTO, to determine who was the first to invent any of the subject matter covered by the patent claims of our applications.

Patent law can be highly uncertain and involve complex legal and factual questions for which important principles remain unresolved. In the United States and in many international jurisdictions, policy regarding the breadth of claims allowed in patents can be inconsistent and/or unclear. The U.S. Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit have made, and will likely continue to make, changes in how the patent laws of the United States are interpreted. Similarly, international courts and governments have made, and will continue to make, changes in how the patent laws in their respective countries are interpreted. We cannot predict future changes in the interpretation of patent laws by U.S. and international judicial bodies or changes to patent laws that might be enacted into law by U.S. and international legislative bodies.

Moreover, in the United States, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, or the Leahy-Smith Act, enacted in September 2011, brought significant changes to the U.S. patent system, including a change from a “first to invent” system to a “first to file” system. Other changes in the Leahy-Smith Act affect the way patent applications are prosecuted, redefine prior art and may affect patent litigation. The USPTO developed new regulations and procedures to govern administration of the Leahy-Smith Act, and many of the substantive changes to patent law associated with the Leahy-Smith Act became effective on March 16, 2013. The Leahy-Smith Act and its implementation could increase the uncertainties and costs surrounding the prosecution of our patent applications and the enforcement or defense of our issued patents, which could have a material adverse effect on our business and financial condition.

Canadian natural gas stocks

Birchcliff Energy (TSX: BIR) and Peyto (TSX: PEY) are two producers that have been able to be consistently profitable (or nearly so) despite horrible economics – in the case of Birchcliff, they have been able to do some degree of vertical integration, and in Peyto’s case, they operate organizationally very lean.

Investors that bought at the relative peaks of 2016 are sitting on losses of 70% and 85%, respectively.

These are the charts of despair that I like looking at, but when looking at natural gas economics, it is simply a story of a huge supply glut. The primary driver is AECO pricing:

(Charts courtesy of GLJ Petroleum Consultants)

AECO at USD$1 vs. Henry Hub at USD$2.75 is a gigantic difference. There’s no point to mining natural gas at USD$1/MMBtu rates – only companies that can get rid of the supply at “proper” rates will have any chance in that pricing environment.

Even worse yet is that you can sell the same commodity to Japan in LNG form for about US$11/MMBtu at present. Although construction on LNG Canada is progressing, it remains to be seen whether regulatory roadblocks will put a halt to the project in some shape or form.

DHX Media

Apparently in India it is not illegal to send unsolicited bids to North American publicly traded companies to spur liquidity that enables you to get out of your own large net loss positions in said firms:

Sakthi Global Holdings, OTC MARKETS has announced that it has submitted an unsolicited Merger Proposal to DHX Media offering Shareholders of DHX Media $5.32 per share upon the completion of a Merger of Sakthi Global Holdings and DHX Media the $5.32 per share payable to DHX Media Shareholders will be comprised of $1.32 per share in cash and $4.00 Per Share in common stock of the merged entity, with Sakthi Global shareholders emerging as the majority shares holders of the combined companies. The merger offer is contingent upon 80 per cent of the shareholders of DHX Media accepting the offer and voting in favour of the Merger at Special Meeting of Shareholders to be convened for the purpose of voting on the proposal made by Sakthi Global Holdings Limited

I believe the (TSX: DHX) DHX board of investors are waiting for the unsolicited bid to come through international Canada Post, but the package has been held up in customs, and will take about 3 months to clear before they will be able to formally look at it.

On a more serious note, before this I was looking at the DHX debentures (TSX: DHX.DB) in early May and passed on it, although I’ll add that this is getting to the point of being an interesting speculative instrument if it goes any lower – the valuation of intellectual property works such as Peanuts (the Charlie Brown franchise which they dumped a 39% stake in to Sony Japan) for $234 million in July 2018 was a pretty good sale. For those that were ever interested in speculating on the value of artwork and the public’s institutional memory, this is a reasonably close proxy. Somehow I don’t think the names of Teletubbies (which causes mental erosion in children) or Strawberry Shortcake will fetch nearly as much, but I think Inspector Gadget in the right hands could make a comeback!

Enbridge Line 3 – Another setback

I do not have shares in Enbridge, but investors today (and probably tomorrow as the news came out mid-day and institutions will look at it overnight to digest the impact on valuation) will be feeling slightly less rich after today’s news that the Minnesota court of appeals deemed the environmental assessment concerning Line 3 to be inadequate.

The net result is that Line 3 will have their construction halted until Enbridge can file an appeal or an amended environmental assessment. This will also result in another round of legal battles with the 3Cs of regulation – committees, commissions and courts and my initial estimate would be at least half a year of delays. I could be wrong.

The reason for the delay is not terribly relevant from a financial standpoint, but the impact of it will be for both Enbridge (who will not be realizing increased cashflows from the increased volume that would be flowing through the pipes the second they are activated – not to mention the capital that has already been sunk into the project), but more importantly, land-locked Albertan/Saskatchewan oil producers that were seeing a light ahead of the tunnel after the presumptive second half of 2020 activation of Line 3.

At CAD$50/share, Enbridge was priced for perfection. Although Enbridge is mostly a cash flow story, an investor is paying a lot in advance in order to realize those cash flows – in addition to the requisite risks to pay back the debt, interest and preferred share dividends. Just wait until Line 3 or Line 5 experiences a spill, or some other adverse event which is currently not baked into the stock (or perhaps another adverse legal ruling that will stall it another couple years). Although the company in 2019 is expected to generate around $4.50/share in cash ($8.9 billion), the inherent growth that is available to Enbridge is a limiting factor – and as such, the accounting income P/E in the 20s (which takes into account depreciation) is unjustified. Coupled with large future capital expenditures, if there is any sort of credit situation that may occur in the future, equity owners will be taking a lot more price risk than the current potential for reward – which wasn’t going to be a stock price that much higher than CAD$50/share.

I would especially take issue with the common share dividend, which is currently $6 billion a year – while they can certainly afford to pay this at present (and management continues to escalate the dividend each year), it is not a financial perpetual motion machine – given the capital expenditure profile, this is currently being partially financed with debt.

There aren’t many free lunches in the stock market, including the pipelines. Companies like Inter Pipeline (TSX: IPL), which has less legal risk than Enbridge, are still at valuations that aren’t incorporating much risk to their future expected cashflows (albeit, in IPL’s case, it is a lot better today than it was a couple years ago where it was trading about 30% higher). It wouldn’t surprise me to see Enbridge follow a similar trajectory, but still maintain its equity dividend.

Students of history will want to pay attention to Kinder Morgan (NYSE: KMI), a supposedly safe and stable pipeline company in 2015:

I’ll leave it at that – pipeline companies are supposed to be stable for their cash generation capabilities, but financially it can be a completely different story.

More cash parking options

I’ve written a lot about some cash parking options – whether they are short-term bond ETFs, or short-duration target-maturity ETFs. Interactive Brokers currently gives out 111bps on Canadian cash, but there are higher yielding options with less risk.

I’ve discovered another vessel for cash parking: a high interest savings ETF (TSX: PSA), which simply invests in cash accounts held at credible financial institutions (National Bank, Scotia, Manulife, and some BC credit unions). They give out a net yield of about 2% (215bps minus 15bps expenses) with zero duration risk, and this is paid out monthly. There is a market maker which keeps transaction spreads to a penny at ample levels of liquidity.

Even VSB.TO (Vanguard’s short term bond ETF) has a YTM of 190bps and an MER of 10bps, plus you take the 2.6 year duration risk if interest rates change.

I’m surprised I haven’t encountered the zero-duration option (aside from cold hard cash) before.

I’ve recently sold out what used to be my largest position and I’ve once again found deployment of cash to be a pleasant, yet annoying problem. Future returns are likely to be muted by the levels of cash in the portfolio.