Interest rates and Macroeconomic ramblings

This is a rambling post, so be cautioned that there is little rhyme or reason to the thought pattern here.

I look at the following chart of the 30-year treasury bond:

tyx

The risk-free return is very low at present. Relative to other sovereign entities (e.g. Euro-zone, Japan, Canada, etc.), however, the US 30-year bond actually still looks cheap and this can explain why it is the best performing asset class in 2014 to date.

As an exercise to the reader, please reconcile what we are seeing in front of us:

– S&P 500 is at all-time highs (approximately 1,900 as I write this)
– The economy appears to be plodding along at a low real rate of return
– Inflation is rising but not at ridiculous proportions (yet)
– US currency appears to be making a comeback
– Short-term rates are still basement low (fed funds target is 0-0.25%, but the effective daily rate has been closer to around 0.09%)
– Long-term treasury rates are relative low (see above chart)
– US government is still projecting $500 billion deficits although this is quite better than previous years; other liabilities (e.g. social security) and various other entitlements (e.g. pensions) generally remain huge liabilities and difficult to get a good rate of return
– Almost every retail Joe that is not involved in stock (lottery) picking is dumping their money in a variety of index funds that invest in the same things in the same proportions (Typical Canadian allocation: 40% TSX 60, 30% S&P 500, 30% some fixed-income ETF)

The demographic story is that the bulk of the population pyramid is entering in the stage of life where they are transitioning their capital into income-bearing instruments, which accounts for the very high cost of yield at present.

It remains very difficult to say whether we are entering in the Fairfax world of upcoming deflation despite everything (which would guarantee low interest rates for some time to come), or whether we’re entering some sort of inflationary world (because of all of the available credit, which would presumably translate into spending and consumption).

Although my style of investing does not depend on macroeconomic outcomes, it is always nice to know where you have the winds at your back. In terms of the big world-picture view, it is difficult to tell where these winds are blowing at present.

The only real convictions I have at this point is a general aversion to commodity-related products and a realization that those that are paying for yield are likely paying a premium beyond what the risk/reward ratio would suggest.

In other words, you are more likely than not to find the “hidden gems” amongst the list of zero-dividend yielders (or very low) on the equity side. Due to the “rising tide lifts all boats” phenomenon that we are encountering at present, until we see defaults of junk debt issues that go out for insanely low coupons and high durations, finding these gems is not easy. Most of them have been bidded up.

This leaves potential investment candidates in very un-ideal categories: the nearly illiquid and special situations (e.g. spinoffs, emerging from Chapter 11/CCAA, SEC/SEDAR “fine-tooth comb required because GAAP financials simply don’t explain the story” companies, closed-end ETFs, etc.). Not a lot of pickings here.

Canadian credit cards without foreign currency exchange fees

Something that always is a pet peeve is currency exchange fees.

As I type this, Interactive Brokers can give you currency spreads that are enormously small:

ib-usd

If you want to buy USD$100,000 it would cost you CAD$108,760. If you wanted to sell USD$100,000 you would receive CAD$108,755. The spread is next to nothing.

We compare this to a typical credit union that posts the following rates:

ccs-usd

Although I am reasonably sure the bank would give you a “discount” rate if you dealt with higher currency volumes, at their posted rates that USD$100,000 would cost you CAD$111,550 or about $2,790 difference from Interactive Brokers.

It is a simple procedure to get the cash out from the bank once you beam it from IB. Due to the miracles of margin accounts, you don’t even have to explicitly convert the currency – you just withdraw the amount and deal with the debit balance later (if you do not already have the US cash on hand).

When dealing with small amounts (e.g. less than $100) it is generally immaterial to pay the $3 or so compared to going through the optimal route, but when dealing with larger quantities of money, exchange fees add up considerably.

Most credit cards will do an exchange at the legitimate market rate, but tack on a 2.5% or 2.9% currency exchange fee. There is only one company that I know of in Canada that does not charge such a fee, and that is at Chase Canada. Unfortunately their cards in question are lacking in any other features that would make this useful for anything other than foreign credit card purchases. However, if you know you are going to spend a significant amount of money outside of Canada using your credit card, then these cards in themselves would constitute an implicit “reward” of the 2.5% or 2.9% currency conversion fee that you would otherwise be charged.

Cheap capital being dumped into the housing market

There’s more media sensation over the Investor’s Group offering a 3-year prime-minus 1.01% variable rate mortgage (which gives a snazzy 1.99% headline).

The rest of their rates are fairly mediocre, so this is clearly pure marketing instead of them trying to invade the mortgage market. The three-year government bond yield is 1.17% and they will pocket the (albeit) smaller spread. After three years, they’ll try to convert those mortgages into a high-cost fixed rate mortgage or some other product.

But it leads to the question of – let’s say you had access to capital for three years at 2% (assuming those short term rates don’t rise!). The number of safe investment harbours to earn a larger spread is definitely diminished.

So where do typical retail people put low-cost capital? The answer seems to be pretty clear – housing. For that matter, institutions are pouring it into almost everything other than cash – anything with a yield, including equities and bonds, have been bidded up substantially. Financial assets are quite expensive.

Another source of cheap credit is Interactive Brokers, assuming you can post the appropriate equity security to back the margin loan. Canadian dollars right now are 2.5% for up to $100,000, 2.0% for up to a million, and 1.5% after that.

The one thing about accumulating debt is that you’ve got to pay it back. Leveraging when the stock market is at all-time highs and yield spreads between AAA debt and junk bonds are at a minimum is not the world’s best formula to get rich.

As you might tell by the tone of this post, the pickings are slim out there. Almost anything worth speculating on (i.e. with cheap prices) has considerable baggage.

Amazing stock performance from a dinosaur – Cineplex

(I had initially written this entire draft on May 3, 2014 and forgot to hit the “Publish” button when done since I had to rush off to do something else… subsequent to this post, they announced a fairly tepid quarterly result and the stock went down to about $39/share. I have not revised the content of this post, but really, I did write this five days ago!).

Was doing some simple research today. Found this company with the following five-year chart:

cgx

Anything since 2009 has performed well, but this one has gone up nearly in a straight line by about 2.6 times – 22% compounded annually for those interested in that figure.

What’s the company? Cineplex (TSX: CGX).

Intuitively if you had presented me the equity case for this company 5 years ago I would have laughed at you – who the heck goes to movie theaters in these days with Blueray and DVD’s, home theaters, video games, and just almost anything else than sitting in a dark air conditioned room for two hours with a bunch of teenagers armed with noisy cell phones?

The answer is – more than I was expecting. The corporation in 2013 made $660 million in box office revenues and about $110 million in revenues contaminating the minds of its customers with pre-movie commercial advertising. This is in addition to other revenues selling overpriced junk food and the usual sort of things you’d expect from a theater company. At the end of the day, they booked $83 million in income, or about $1.32/share.

Balance sheet-wise, they have a little bit of debt, but it is not ridiculously high (about equal to their 2013 cash flows through operations). The corporation is still in an acquisition mode, consolidating what was previous a fragmented market of small players. As one might expect with a consolidator company, tangible book value is deeply in the negative (about $160 million negative). They pay a monthly dividend of 12 cents per share, or $1.44 annually (roughly $88 million in 2013).

So the stock, at about $41/share or a market cap of $2.6 billion (63 million shares outstanding), isn’t exactly cheap. It would have to go down considerably before I would even be remotely interested in it. But I was just amazed that this business is still afloat in the 21st century and apparently thriving. These sorts of businesses shouldn’t be surviving the internet age.

I always keep in mind to never mix my own consumer preferences with those of others. This is one classic case.

Or perhaps there is a short sale thesis here? I won’t do it, but perhaps somebody else there might look at it.

Genworth MI trading at all-time highs

mic

Since their quarterly report at the end of April 29, Genworth MI is trading at all-time highs. I haven’t had a chance yet to listen to the conference call, but I would expect management signaled that the foreseeable future is relatively stable and that their loss ratio estimates are on the conservative side.

The question is – how much better can things get? No defaults at all in the Canadian mortgage market?

Assuming all things are equal to today, one would expect Genworth to earn about $3.80/share this year and next year this would be slightly higher due to mortgage insurance premium increases. The mortgage premium increase will attribute for a $35 million increase in written premiums in 2014 and $70 million in 2015. This will effectively equalize their current differential between written and earned premiums; earned premiums have been higher than written premiums for the last five years.

Doing some math would lead an equity investor to expect approximately a 10% total return, minus market valuations (P/E, P/B expansion) and other external events (competition, real estate volumes, etc.).

Considering your typical bond investor is going to be lucky to make a decent 5% yield with a A- to BBB risk profile (your typical US$ BBB-rated 5-year bond yield is currently at 5.8%), and Genworth MI’s rating is A-, there is a healthy equity premium associated with the company that would still justify holding the shares. Genworth MI itself just issued 10-year debentures at about 4.25% for 10 years recently. However, the company has long since passed the point where it is bargain territory.

Genworth MI itself is a glorified bond fund, with about $5 billion in assets invested with an average yield of 3.6% and duration of 3.7 years. This, along with the liabilities associated with the mortgage insurance business, is valued at $3.7 billion presently. Given the “if all things are equal” projection, it does make financial sense for the company to still invest in its own equity since there is a good yield spread of about 5% still to be harvested. If you give a “natural” equity premium of 3% then there is 2% left to run – i.e. around $44/share.

I hope momentum and yield investors (speaking of which, is about 3.6% at current prices) actually does that. If and when they do, I will take that opportunity to unload shares.

What is keeping back the market from bidding up the share price are all the obvious factors concerning the general perceptions of over-valuation in the Canadian real estate market and macroeconomic factors, including the Fairfax doomsday scenario. If the commodity sector starts to sneeze and prices decline, then it will have an impact on employment, which will subsequently have an impact on the overall health of the mortgage credit market.

Right now Genworth MI is priced for some fairly rosy days ahead of itself and this bodes well for the general Canadian economy. Are investors right? How long will this last? I don’t know.

Genworth MI, on account of its appreciation over the past 20 months, is still a significant component in my portfolio.