Goeasy – not going so easy

I’ve been looking at the carnage left behind in Goeasy (TSX: GSY) and holy moly:

(Q4-2025 warning)

… announced today that it expects to incur an incremental charge off in Q4 2025 of approximately $178M against gross consumer loans receivable of $5.5B as at December 31, 2025, and a related write down of approximately $55M for loan interest and fees.

… $178+$55 is roughly the net interest income the company makes in a quarter. Oops!

The Company also expects a net increase in allowance for credit losses on gross consumer loans receivable in the quarter of approximately $86M compared to the amount reported as at September 30, 2025.

… this is quite a material increase given the typical top line of about $328M for Q3-2025. A +$86 allowance raise is a 26% increase in expected defaults – ouch!

The historical reporting practice resulted in certain customer payments being recorded as received while they were in fact in the process of being settled at month end, some of which were ultimately not collected, and also impacted the Company’s reported delinquencies.

… talk about counting your chickens before the eggs hatch!

Not surprisingly, the company’s stock took a huge bath today – down 56%.

Looking at the corporation in general, their reported Q3-2025 has (rounding to the nearest $100M) about $500M cash, $5.2B in loans receivable and on the liabilities side, capitalized with $4.7B in debt.

It’s pretty evident they are clearing out the books with this purge – the question remains whether this company actually ended up making any money or not on their core business. Doing a very rough projection with the above numbers suggests after fixed expenses, they did not. The company managed to get to $210/share in the middle of 2025 clearly with false profitability.

Are they a value at $50? I’ve always shied away from these types of financing companies since you never know when this sort of event will occur as it is difficult to ascertain the credit quality within the loan portfolio. On one hand, you have the Element Fleet Managements of the planet, and then on the other hand you have the Crown Capital and Accord Financials of the planet that are in much more questionable shape. I am not good at picking winners in this space.

This also might be a reflection of what’s going on in the downward-sloping part of the so-called “K-shape economy”.

Cenovus Energy preferred share redemption

Cenovus Energy called their remaining preferred share issue (TSE: CVE.PR.A/B, inherited from the Husky Energy transaction) and it will be redeemed out at the end of March.

Notably, the preferred share was incredibly low-yielding: 2.577% and a rate reset of 1.73% above the Government of Canada 5 year.

At today’s GoC 5yr at 2.68%, the preferred share would have reset at 4.45% yield at par.

Yesterday, the preferred shares closed at $24.75 (a mild discount to par). The redemption at $25 is obviously the company deciding to clear out the books entirely on one class of its securities.

A 4.45% after-tax drain, at a notional tax rate of 25% is the equivalent of issuing a perpetual debt at 5.93%, notwithstanding the 5 year changes in the reset rate – a 1.73% spread is quite narrow.

This is extraordinarily cheap capital, yet it is being redeemed. Despite blowing a bunch of cash on the MEG Energy transaction (don’t get me wrong – it was strategically the correct thing for the company to do), Cenovus has ample cash and free cash flow to spend $300 million to save $13.35 million after-tax annually.

This kind of exemplifies the yield wasteland in the preferred share market in general.

Slate Office REIT’s nearly cooked

It’s not looking good for Slate Office REIT, now rebranded as Ravelin Properties (TSX: RPR.UN):

Toronto, Ontario–(Newsfile Corp. – February 20, 2026) – Ravelin Properties REIT (TSX: RPR.UN) (“Ravelin” or the “REIT”), an internally managed global owner and operator of well-located commercial real estate, announced today that it does not expect to make principal or interest payments on the upcoming maturity date of its 9.00% convertible unsecured subordinated debentures (the “9% Debentures”).

The maturity date of the 9% Debentures is February 28, 2026. In connection with the upcoming maturity date, the 9% Debentures, which currently trade on the Toronto Stock Exchange under “RPR.DB”, will be halted at the market open and delisted at the close of trading on the business day following the maturity date, being March 2, 2026.

The REIT has been in default of its obligations to pay interest on the 9% Debentures since March 1, 2024. The repayment price due on maturity is $1,180 per $1,000 principal amount of 9% Debentures, representing aggregate principal amount of $28,750,000, and $5,175,000 for accrued and unpaid interest thereon to, but excluding, the maturity date.

The big question I have in my mind is – how will George Armoyan, who went through a huge effort to take over the REIT, be able to salvage this situation? It is incredibly unlikely anybody from the public will be able to make lemonade from the lemons (the units and debentures are well subordinated), but Armoyan’s corp, G2S2, has lent Slate/Ravelin a ton of money and maybe this was the plan all along when they will get to eat away at the entrails of this soon to be extinct REIT.

Despite AI, real is in, virtual is out

The phrase “nobody rings a bell at the top” is the cliche, but the converse of this is that nobody screams at you telling to buy at the bottom.

There has been a profound shift in the market over the past few months, and it can be abstracted with “real is in, virtual is out”.

You see this in stock charts of software companies versus anything selling tangible product. Gold and silver are surging, while Bitcoin and the purchasing power of any fiat currency is cratering.

I have been experimenting with various AI technologies and trying to get an idea of how real this will be disrupting the landscape.

The best analogy I can make at present is the operating system abstraction. In the old days (and to a lesser extent today), software was compiled to run explicitly on CISC (Intel x86), RISC chips (e.g. ARM, PowerPC, MIPS, etc.), but it became a pain in the rear to rebuild the software for differing computational systems. Operating systems (Unix-based systems, DOS/Windows, MacOS, etc.) were developed to abstract from all of this. Of course it became a pain in the ass to develop for all three (plus more) at the same time, so the next level of abstraction was initially done with Java, which ran a virtual machine on top of the respective operating systems – the appeal is in “write once, run anywhere” – it didn’t have to care about the hardware OR operating system you were running on. Browser-based technologies also provided another layer of abstraction parallel with Java – for the most part it doesn’t matter whether you are using Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Safari or whatever, you get the same application delivered to you.

The issue now is that you actually have to code and use tools to generate what you want (fancy websites, database interfaces and the like). Entire university curricula are dedicated to the craft to assembling all of these disparate skills together.

Fast forward to today, where we have AI. The acronym is not artificial intelligence, but rather artificial interface. It is essentially an abstraction on top everything I have mentioned here, and using natural language parsing as a “graphical user interface”. Of course, there is nothing graphical about it – it is entirely textual.

Do you remember this?

In terms of economics, it is a huge question where the value will be extracted from. Going back to the old days, Microsoft was clever enough to extract a royalty out of nearly every PC sold in the form of a license to Windows (and later on, Office). When you think about it, there is little consumer utility in the purchase of an operating system itself – the end-user value is in the applications run on top of that layer.

We sort of see this extraction of value with the amount of queries you can ram through OpenAI, Claude, etc. – there is a limit before you have to pay a monthly subscription fee as the amount of computational energy required to process requests is, from what I can tell, an incredibly inefficient process. Is this sufficient for them, or is the value going to be in the applications?

I have been looking long and hard at Adobe, which produces well-known products like Photoshop, Illustrator, and other digital editing software. By all accounts, they are trading at forward P/Es that are very un-techlike (11.6x estimated 2026 earnings as I write this). Despite the existence of near-equivalent open source products (GIMP for Photoshop, Inkscape for Illustrator, OpenShot for Premiere, etc.) Adobe continues to extract incredible pricing power. An entire industry of graphic designers, marketing agencies and so on rely on Adobe software to produce style guides for millions of clients out there.

The ease of using AI to replace Photoshop and Illustrator is a material threat, however. If it no longer takes a professional graphic designer to generate different styles, it leads to the question of why one needs to spend nearly a thousand dollars a year on a professional software license (for them), or a few thousand bucks to contract the person out in the first place. The application layer where one can extract pricing power must be elsewhere. I don’t have easy answers for where this goes in the digital world, but it is one potential explanation why software companies are getting murdered in the stock market at present.

Just in case if you are wondering, nothing I write here uses AI. I still find the “Turing test” for AI-driven writing to be pretty obvious but I don’t think many people have this discernment skill, and it is one reason why AI-driven media (so-called “AI Slop”) is so prevalent. Paradoxically, it is also one reason why, as this trend of increasing procedurally-generated media continues to contaminate and permeate through everything, real is making a comeback.

Bitcoin goes to zero.

The most crazy (Black Friday) day for silver

I have very little skin in the game for precious metals (aside from the indirect benefit Teck Resources, soon to be Anglo Teck, mines from the ground) but I was just looking at the futures trading today in gold, platinum and silver, and oh my god. Here is platinum (down 18%) and silver (down 26%):

Charts are Pacific Time Zone.

This type of trading reminds me of October 2008-styled selling. As in panic selling. Somebody got caught with long exposure on the futures and were clearly forced to dump – you don’t see 25% down moves in a day like this very often in any broad market! Silver actually got all the way to -35% before rebounding – timing this exact bottom would be an impossible feat. Just imagine you woke up, saw silver down 10% and thought to yourself “surely, this would be a great time to average down on my long” before receiving a summary financial execution hours later. Or at around 1:50am, you bottom-ticked the futures at US$95 long and was giving yourself a pat on the back until 7 hours later when you were underwater.

Volatility begets volatility and Monday will be very interesting. This should also be a warning shot across the bow of crypto traders, but will it be a portent to the main indexes?