Bank of Canada Interest Rate Projections

On July 20, the Bank of Canada is very likely to increase the overnight target interest rate from 0.50% to 0.75%; this has already been baked into the marketplace. The Prime Rate is likely to correspondingly increase from 2.5% to 2.75%.

In terms of what lies ahead in the future, we look at the only financial product in Canada that one can use to predict such rate changes, the 3-month Bankers’ Acceptance Futures:

Month / Strike Bid Price Ask Price Settl. Price Net Change Vol.
+ 10 JL 0.000 0.000 99.045 0.030 0
+ 10 AU 0.000 0.000 98.960 0.030 0
+ 10 SE 98.875 98.880 98.880 -0.005 10612
+ 10 DE 98.700 98.710 98.710 -0.010 20474
+ 11 MR 98.540 98.550 98.540 0.000 17714
+ 11 JN 98.350 98.360 98.360 0.000 10038
+ 11 SE 98.140 98.150 98.140 0.080 2281
+ 11 DE 97.890 98.110 97.890 0.080 209
+ 12 MR 97.580 97.700 97.680 0.000 341
+ 12 JN 97.370 97.490 97.430 0.090 0

What we see is a 3-month future rate of 1.12% in September; and by years’ end we have a 1.29% rate.

There are four more meetings left in 2010; July 20, September 8, October 19 and December 7.  Right now, the market is speculating that there will be 0.25% increases in two of these meetings, leading to a year-end target rate of 1.00%.  It is possible that after September 8, that the Bank of Canada will leave short term rates unchanged for the duration of the year.

In 2011, the market believes that the short term rate will increase by about 0.75% above this; to 1.75%, still a very low rate by historical standards.

Presumably after its July20 statement it will change the language which will sufficiently guide the marketplace to adjust its prices.

Of note is the impact on mortgage rates; only variable-rate mortgages will be going up as a result of these short-term rate increases.  The reason is because longer-term rates are set by the marketplace, and these have gone down over the past quarter.  A 5-year government bond yields 2.49% currently; this was as high as 3.2% back in April.

BP – When to exit?

Earlier, specifically on June 16, I stated the following about BP:

For people that insist on getting into BP, the next couple weeks should be a good time. The exact timing in terms of price is an unknown variable, but I would estimate layering in 25-30 dollars a share (e.g. if it goes down to 28, you will get a 40% allocation).

Indeed, the common shares fell to a low of 26.75, which means that using the “25-30 dollars a share” algorithm would have resulted in a 62.5% position (e.g. if your typical position is 5% of your portfolio then you would have ended up with 62.5% of 5%, which would be 3.125%). The average price would have been $28.375/share, not factoring in commissions.

Now that BP has risen and the big headline (“they’ve solved the oil leak”) has come out in the news, it brings up questions of what the ideal price to liquidate will be.

I see a two-phased trading approach should work well. The first phase should involve an immediate bump up due to the “news” coming out. This has mostly occurred, as you can see by this one-day chart:

After attracting the initial wave of profit-takers, I anticipate a second wave of demand coming for BP shares which should bring the stock to the $45-50 range. This is the target I would set for my sell order. The simple justification is that I estimate this whole debacle should cost BP about $40 billion dollars, or about $13/share. Before this all began, BP was valued at around $60/share, so simple math would assume an approximate $45-50 valuation, hence the sell point at this price. Assuming the exit is achieved, you would be looking at around a 67% gain on the transaction, which I would estimate between now and the end of the year.

This is a very elementary valuation exercise; naturally to properly model the situation you have to take into assumption the strategic effects of the oil spill (i.e. reduced offshore drilling in the Gulf of Mexico) but also have to strongly factor political considerations.

I have not and will likely not trade common equity in BP, but I have sold puts on Transocean and they have moved out of the money at present from my initial transactions. They will likely expire in August.

This was probably one of the better trading opportunities I have seen in 2010.

Taking a small break

I will be taking a small break from posting for another week – posting will resume on or around mid-July.

It is vitally important for fresh perspectives to get away from the computer and once in awhile break the typical daily routines in life – ideally you will take note of random events that occur and this may strike the imagination in such a way that will make you become a better observer of your surroundings.

Nokia valuation

I have read some posts by people out there that believe that Nokia is a value play and is worth purchasing. It is trading at a price that is lower than it has been in a decade ($8.36/share presently; as late as 2007 it was $40/share). I’ve briefly looked at Nokia and, financially speaking, while they have a decent balance sheet and some positive net income, their profitability is sliding down and this represents why the market has discounted the stock.

The first item I would like to address is the dividend – it is very likely it will be slashed. An investor putting money into Nokia for the dividend is going to be very disappointed, likely within a year. Nokia will need to go into a cost cutting and capital conversation mode soon and the easiest thing to go before making the very difficult decisions is the dividend.

However, the proper valuation analysis for Nokia is not a financial one; rather, it is determining who is going to be the winner in the mobile handset space. A decade ago, Nokia was clearly the champion in this industry – for the most part they edged out Motorola and Ericksson (now Sony Ericksson).

Between then and now, we have seen a huge quantum leap in mobile technology. Voice functions are trivial – it is all about mobile data, web and video. Apple has invaded the space with their hardware/software offering (iPhone), and Google has invaded the space with their software (Android). These two factors alone have likely put Nokia behind with inferior product offerings.

While I am not the techie I used to be when I was younger (I no longer follow the computer hardware scene and my cell phone is a 2004 Nokia model that I use exclusively for voice and will feel bad if I lose it), I still peripherally follow the industry. It has matured so quickly compared to when I was a teenager that it has gotten relatively boring. That said, there are plenty of people out there that follow it feverishly, and the following comment by somebody following Nokia’s operating system (Symbian) pretty much sums up the picture:

To Nokia, you guys are losing. Hard. Wake the hell up. Doing the same thing repeatedly while expecting different results is the definition of insanity. I’ve been a huge Nokia fan since my 2nd cellphone, and I just can’t do it any longer. You guys aren’t competing like you once were, and everyone but you seems to see that. You used to build the world’s best smartphones, the world’s best cameras, the world’s best GPS units – you’ve lost pretty much all of that, and with nothing to show for it. You unveiled your Ovi vision over 2 years ago – I was there. Today, it’s still a complete mess. I have to log in every single time I visit the site – regardless of how many times I check the ‘remember me’ box. I spent 6 months (and about 3 hours at Nokia World 2009) trying to find someone to help me with Ovi Contacts on the web – no one knew who to point me to. You spent millions of dollars purchasing your Ovi pieces – Ovi Files, Ovi Share, and a host of other little companies – are you proud of what you ‘built’ with them? Most of your own employees (that I’ve talked to) don’t even use them, so why should I?

This really reminds me somewhat of what happened to IBM’s OS/2 when they were competing against Microsoft in the desktop operating system marketplace. Another example is what happened to Cyrix when they were competing against AMD and Intel for the processor market. Both had inadequate offerings and were only running on steam before they finally folded – Cyrix was bought off by IBM, and OS/2 was canned. I am sure there is a better analogy that would apply to this particular situation, but the point is the same – Nokia’s mobile platform, in absence of something completely hidden and not marketed yet, is toast.

Without control over the platform, there is no opportunity for them to gain a market premium, and they will become a commodity producer of mobile hardware – a very low profit industry. Nokia’s best option is likely to sell out as quickly as possible to the highest bidder since with every passing week they will be commanding less of a premium on the market.

If Nokia’s board of directors are rational, they should be looking for an exit, but finding somebody willing to fork out $31 billion to buy out the company (this assumes no takeover premium) would be difficult. As such, I wouldn’t touch Nokia equity – investors are likely to face continued losses. You might even be able to make a good case for a short sale, but my knowledge in this area of the business world is not comprehensive enough to make such a decision.