Formulating some thoughts about 2022

Light yellow line is the 10-year Government of Canada bond yield, orange line is the 2-year bond yield:

Over the past week, Omicron fears have triggered a huge demand for long-dated government debt, while central bank talks of tapering have pushed the front end of the yield up.

Indeed, when looking at the BAX futures, we have the following curve (for those that are unfamiliar, these are 3-month bankers’ acceptance futures, of which you derive the rate by going 100 minus the anticipated yield percentage, so a 98 would be equal to 2.00%):

BAX – Three-Month Canadian Bankers’ Acceptance Futures

Last update: December 5, 2021

Month Bid price Ask price Settl. price Net change Open int. Vol.
Open interest: 1,173,941
Volume: 145,981
December 2021 99.455 99.460 99.460 -0.005 136,604 34,223
January 2022 0 0 99.380 0 0 0
February 2022 0 0 99.220 0 0 0
March 2022 99.080 99.095 99.105 -0.015 242,041 25,545
June 2022 98.660 98.665 98.690 -0.030 185,438 16,971
September 2022 98.335 98.340 98.360 -0.025 167,920 15,778
December 2022 98.125 98.140 98.150 -0.015 144,759 17,816
March 2023 97.985 97.995 98.010 -0.020 107,855 13,145
June 2023 97.865 0 97.890 -0.020 62,554 10,228
September 2023 97.795 97.840 97.820 -0.025 69,061 6,586
December 2023 97.510 97.820 97.805 -0.020 38,357 4,960
March 2024 0 0 97.780 -0.005 12,729 386
June 2024 0 0 97.775 -0.010 4,613 181
September 2024 0 0 97.790 -0.005 2,010 162

The spot price is at 0.54%, while the December 2022 future is at 1.85%, which implies that in the next 12 months we will have a rate increase of about 125bps the way things are going.

The 2-year government bond is yielding 0.95% as of last Friday.  Using expectations theory, this is roughly in-line, but functionally speaking, the inversion of the yield curve is going to signal some ominous signs going forward.

Central banks are engaging in the tightening direction because of fairly obvious circumstances – there are leading indicator signs of inflation everywhere (labour market tightness AND the inability to find quality labour both count; the first is easily quantified, while the second one is not, and is a very relevant factor for many businesses), input costs rising or even being completely unavailable, energy costs spiking, etc.  With governments flooding the economy with deficit-financed stimulus, it is creating an environment where no realistic amount of money thrown at a problem can stimulate productive output.

My guess at present is that tapering and rate increases will go until the economy blows up once again – the evaporation of demand will be mammoth – when these supply chain issues are resolved, the drop-off in demand will commence very quickly.  It will likely happen far sooner than what happened in the 4th quarter of 2018 (the US Federal Reserve started shrinking its balance sheet of treasuries at the end of 2017 and the vomit started occurring around October 2018).  Indeed, you even saw hints of this economic dislocation occur in late 2019 – there was likely going to be an economic recession in 2020 even if Covid-19 did not occur.  Covid instead just masked the underlying conditions, and stimulative monetary policy coupled with shutdowns of global logistics and labour disruptions was the subsequent excuse when fundamentally things were already in awful shape to begin with.

This means that portfolio concentration (other than not being leveraged up the hilt) should be focused on non-discretionary elements of demand.

These are not serious suggestions, but Beer (TAP), Smokes (MO) and Popcorn (AMC…  just kidding!) will probably be the last industries standing among the carnage.  Even McDonalds (MCD) will not be spared as less and less will be able to afford the $10 “extra value” meals as central banks continue to drain the excess, but Dollarama (TSE: DOL) will thrive.

The conventional playbook would suggest that commodities would fare poorly with a precipitous decline in demand, but this is one of those strange interactions between the financial economy and real economy where hard assets will initially lose value in the face of interest rate increases (this has already happened), but the moment the central banks have stretched the rubber band too hard and it snaps, commodities likewise will be receiving a huge tailwind.

2022 is surely to be a worse year for most broad market investors and the public in general.  Returns are going to be very constrained and P/E expansion will be non-existent (other than by reduced earnings expectations!).  Watch out, and hold onto your wallets.  There will be few that will be spared.

High flying growth companies will badly damage new shareholders

The problem with having a huge amount of anticipated growth baked into your stock price is that the expectations become incredibly difficult to achieve.

High expectations result in high stock prices.

I’ll post the charts of two of these companies which are household names – Zoom (Nasdaq: ZM) and Docusign (Nasdaq: DOCU):

We will look at Zoom first.

At its peak of $450/share, Zoom was valued at around $134 billion. Keeping the math incredibly simple, in order to flat-line at a terminal P/E of 15 (this appears to be the median P/E ratio of the S&P 500 at the moment), Zoom needs to make $9 billion a year in net income, or about $30/share.

After Covid-mania, Zoom’s income trajectory did very well:

However, the last quarter made it pretty evident that their growth trajectory has flat-lined. Annualized, they are at $3.55/share, quite a distance away from the $30/share required!

Even at a market price of $180/share today, they are sitting at an anticipated expectation of $12/share at sometime in the future.

Despite the fact that Zoom offers a quality software product (any subscribers to “Late Night Finance” will have Zoom to thank for this), there are natural competitive limitations (such as the fact that Microsoft, Google and the others are going to slowly suck away any notion of margins out of their software product) which will prevent them from getting there.

The point here – even though the stock has gone down 60% from peak-to-trough, there’s still plenty to go, at least on my books. They are still expensive and bake in a lot of anticipated growth which they will be lucky to achieve – let alone eclipse.

The second example was Docusign. Their great feature was to enable digital signing of documents for real estate agents, lawyers, etc., and fared very well during Covid-19. It’s an excellent product and intuitive.

They peaked out at $315/share recently, or a US$62 billion valuation. Using the P/E 15 metric, the anticipated terminal earnings is about $21/share.

The issue here is two-fold.

One is that there is a natural ceiling to how much you can charge for this service. Competing software solutions (e.g. “Just sign this Adobe secure PDF and email it back”) and old fashioned solutions (come to my office to scribble some ink on a piece of paper) are natural barriers to significant price increases.

Two is that the existing company doesn’t make that much money:

Now that they are reporting some earnings, investors at this moment suddenly realized “Hey! It’s a long way to get to $21!” and are bailing out.

Now they are trading down to US$27 billion, but this is still very high.

There are all sorts of $10 billion+ market capitalization companies which have featured in this manner (e.g. Peleton, Zillow, Panantir, etc.) which the new investors (virtually anybody buying stock in 2021) are getting taken out and shot.

This is not to say the underlying companies are not any good – indeed, for example, Zoom offers a great product. There are many other instances of this, and I just look at other corporations that I give money to. Costco, for example – they trade at 2023 anticipated earnings of 40 times. Massively expensive, I would never buy their stock, but they have proven to be the most reliable retailer especially during these crazy Covid-19 times.

As the US Fed and the Bank of Canada try to pull back on what is obviously having huge negative economic consequences (QE has finally reached some sort of ceiling before really bad stuff happens), growth anticipation is going to get further scaled back.

As long as the monetary policy winds are turning into headwinds (instead of the huge tailwinds we have been receiving since March 2020), going forward, positive returns are going to be generated by the companies that can actually generate them, as opposed to those that give promises of them. The party times of speculative excess, while they will continue to exist in pockets here and there, are slowly coming to a close.

The super premium companies (e.g. Apple and Microsoft) will continue to give bond-like returns, simply because they are franchise companies that are entrenched and continue to remain dominant and no reason exists why they will not continue to be that way in the immediate future. Apple equity trades at a FY 2023 (09/2023) estimate of 3.8% earnings yield, and Microsoft is slightly richer at 3.2%. Just like how the capital value of long-term bonds trade wildly with changes of yield, if Apple and Microsoft investors suddenly decide that 4.8% and 4.2% are more appropriate risk premiums (an entirely plausible scenario for a whole variety of foreseeable reasons), your investment will be taking a 20% and 25% hit, respectively (rounding to the nearest 5% here).

That’s not a margin of error that I would want to take, but consider for a moment that there are hundreds of billions of dollars of passive capital that are tracking these very expensive equities. You are likely to receive better returns elsewhere.

Take a careful look at your portfolios – if you see anything trading at a very high anticipated price to cash flow expectation, you may wish to consider your overall risk and position accordingly. Companies warranting premium valuations not only need to justify it, but they need to be delivering on the growth trajectory baked into their valuations – just to retain the existing equity value.

SARS-CoV-2 / New mutation / Thoughts

Please read my December 21, 2020 post, Mutant SARS-CoV-2 Viruses, Perceived Risk, Actual Risk, which has aged reasonably well since its publication. The only factor I continue to under-estimate at all instances is the notion of “back to normal”, which from the onset of the Diamond Princess I have been consistently wrong with.

I have very consciously been trying to avoid any political discussions of COVID-19 on this site, except when things interfere with the financial markets.

For the most part, the “known unknowns” have been well priced into equities.

However, we might have a game-changer that will require some re-thinking.

Insert today’s scare headline, the B.1.1.529 variant:

The issue here is regarding the psychology of the effectiveness of COVID-19 vaccinations.

Most people believe they work. Indeed, because of this popular support, governments have been able to coerce those that do not into taking them.

The issue is that just like influenza and HIV, you might be able to take something to address the clinical symptoms (which the existing vaccinations have done) versus dealing with the transmission of SARS-CoV-2.

Without preventing the transmission of SARS-CoV-2, vaccinations to mask clinical symptoms of COVID-19 are a delaying tactic at best.

The best analogy I can make here is the advent of computer viruses and anti-virus software. Initially there were programs (McAfee and Norton Anti-virus) that you ran in MS-DOS to search executables for specific code snippets (containing viruses). They worked initially (sometimes producing false positives), and you had to get updates to tell the program the new code snippets of new viruses that were coded and spread around. However, technology advanced (such as auto-modifying code) and conventional anti-virus software is practically useless as a form of computer security (it is beyond the scope of this post to discuss this fascinating matter). Anti-virus software continues to be sold today and all it serves is to slow down the computer system and provide a false sense of protection.

Likewise in the biological world, mutations are rapidly rendering COVID-19 “anti-virus software” (vaccinations) obsolete. You might be able to protect against the “old school” strains, but for the new software versions (variants), you have much less protection.

This is the result of having a population monolithically vaccinated with the same anti-virus software. It doesn’t take much of a code modification to work around it.

What isn’t discussed about the B.1.1.529 variant is whether the severity profile is more or less severe than Delta. This remains to be seen.

Unlike computer viruses, which are engineered to have a specific impact, biological viruses are positively selected for transmissibility, and not for clinical severity. Indeed, too severe clinical symptoms would work against transmissibility, just as it did for SARS-CoV-1.

The changing psychology will be increasing public awareness that the existing COVID-19 vaccinations do a minimal job of protecting against transmission. They were fighting yesterday’s battle. It will be sold to the public as a necessary “first step” to fighting COVID-19, with much more to go, even though it is pretty evident the “vaccinate everybody” strategy that was taken has proven to be incorrect. The correct strategy was to vaccinate those that are at high risk, but now that mostly everybody is vaccinated, there is going to be a new strain that will dominate and this might be B.1.1.529. The question at this point is whether this new variant exhibits increased severity of clinical symptoms.

In the past my ability to predict public reaction to SARS-CoV-2 has been terrible. If B.1.1.529 picks up, from historical reaction over the previous 18 months, the cultural of zero risk will force more sanctions, “to prevent the spread”.

Governments always want to be seen doing something, even if their actions have no effect on the outcome (e.g. outdoor mask mandates).

They will also never admit that their past strategies have been terrible to preserve whatever credibility they have remaining to implement new measures.

My guess at present is that the Covid-sensitive sectors which got hit from March to June of 2020 will probably face another dial-back. Until I see how B.1.1.529 evolves, I’ll reserve judgement on timing.

Turkey – Turkish Lira – How to live in a country with a collapsing currency

Lots of headlines are being made about Turkey and its currency, the Turkish Lira:

(The chart with the Turkish Lira to US dollar is very similar).

(Wikipedia Article on the matter)

Turkey’s GDP is about half of Canada’s (i.e. not an insignificant economy).

A lot of the cause of the currency depreciation appears to be the leveraged borrowings in foreign currency by domestic companies coupled with the domestic government wanting to keep interest rates lower than the prevailing market rate.

As a result, the purchasing power of the domestic currency has declined significantly. Even the basic math of accounting changes when dealing with a rapidly inflating currency. Just imagine marking up all of that foreign debt on each quarterly financial statement – normally the foreign currency translation adjustment component of equity on the balance sheet is some small fraction of the overall picture, but in this case, comprehensive earnings becomes a very important figure to watch – your business might be making 500 units of profit, but if foreign currency liabilities increase by 5,000 units of domestic currency, you’re toast!

Since Turkish inflationary headlines have reached the mainstream, chances are there is some actionable ideas, but I am not enough of a macroeconomic professional to truly figure out where things are headed.

On the domestic side of things, Turkish stocks have been a better store of value than pure Lira:

The preceding chart is the iShares MSCI Turkey ETF, the only broad-based Turkey ETF I could find. It is denominated in US Dollars.

Despite the Lira depreciating 75% over the past five years to the US Dollar, the ETF has “only” lost about 25% of its value denominated in US Currency.

Obviously, when the companies that constitute the index have heavy amounts of foreign currency debt, the equity will be taking a considerable hit as companies try to service these debts with domestic cash flows. However, with the currency depreciating at the rate it does, it amounts to an effective interest rate on foreign debt that is very high. One possible conclusion is that there will be a foreign debt default with a subsequent recapitalization and/or nationalization of various strategic entities as I very much doubt the Turkish government wants its major companies to be foreign controlled.

The stock market is thus not a very good retreat if you are forced to live with a currency in a very inflationary environment. This has also shown to be true in other jurisdictions – initially the stock market makes huge gains (everybody is looking for a shelter for depreciating currency), but later the economic damages caused by high inflation rates eventually kills returns on the whole spectrum of the capital structure.

Indeed, there is a huge incentive to leverage at low interest rates (these debts would be repaid in much less real value) and purchase different assets, ideally liquid ones.

Holding USD itself (or Euro) would be a liquid store of value. A physical gold investor over the past 5 years not only would have made a 50% return in nominal US dollars, but the gains would be much, much higher in Turkish Lira. Having a mechanism of storing crude oil would also be a liquid store of value. There are plenty of options, some feasible, some not.

Here in Canada, if companies issue debt in non-Canadian dollar currency, it is most likely to be in US Dollars. Since most of our trade is linked to the USA (we are functionally joined at the hip with them) it is unlikely that we will face the same mechanism of currency decline as Turkey. If our export market starts to evaporate (e.g. we shut down our fossil fuel and automobile industries in the name of climate change) we will be in serious trouble.

The 2021 tax loss selling screen… or the “bottom 50” of the TSX

Posted below are 50 companies with a market cap over $50 million (i.e. weeding out those that actually went completely bust during the year) that have the worst year-to-date stock performances from 2021. I also include a short one-liner description of these companies and/or quick thoughts. This is as of closing prices on November 12, 2021.

Themes / Notes:
The “top 50” lost 72% to 36% of their market value during the year;
Gold mining or shiny metal companies (whether they actually are operating or theoretical) populate 20 of 50 of these;
Bio/pharma (or medical instrumentation) companies were 8 of 50;
Cannabis and related are 7 of 50;
Hydrogen or “clean energy” are 4 of 50.

When looking at these 50, there were none of them that passed my own personal screens for being worthy of a watchlist placement. Your mileage might vary. There is no “best of the worst” here, I really don’t like this year’s crop of tax loss candidates, at least the top 50.