Canada carbon tax – all about politics

Canada’s political environment is really easy to model – whatever is in the best interests of Ontario and Quebec tends to become national policy, irrespective to the impact it has on jurisdictions west of Ontario.

Let’s look at the proposed national carbon tax, which will take the carbon tax from $30/tonne CO2-equivalent in 2020 to $170 in 2030:

2019 – $20/tonne
2020 – $30/tonne (+10)
2021 – $40/tonne (+10)
2022 – $50/tonne (+10)
2023 – $65/tonne (+15)
2024 – $80/tonne (+15)
….
2030 – $170/ton

To put this into context, at CAD$40/ton, a gigajoule of natural gas has a carbon tax of CAD$1.99/GJ applied to it. At CAD$170/ton, that is CAD$8.44/GJ. The AECO market price for natural gas at the moment (note, it is December when there is peak demand) is CAD$2.53/GJ. The projected carbon tax at the end of the decade will be over three times the commodity cost. Needless to say, this puts Canadian companies that rely on natural gas consumption at significant cost disadvantages over jurisdictions that do not impose such taxes (the United States, for one).

Let’s take a look at electricity generation, for example.

On the electricity generation side, we see that 99% of Quebec’s electric generation comes from non-carbon taxed sources – Hydro (94%) and Wind (5%). Ontario’s non-carbon taxed electricity (91%) is Nuclear (57%), Hydro (24%), Wind (8%) and Solar (2%).

Electricity generation is about a third of energy consumption. A really good illustration is provided by the Lawrence Livermore Labs (this was linked to from one of Peyto’s president’s reports):

You can find detailed Canadian data here, albeit not in such a convenient manner.

One issue is that it takes a lot of energy to extract energy (and resources such as iron ore, copper and pretty much anything else in the ground), and of course this puts Alberta, Saskatchewan and British Columbia at a significant disadvantage with this cost regime.

The political aim with this carbon tax continues to be levying a tax that purports to be country-wide, but the impact is concentrated on a regional basis which conveniently happens to be in areas where there is the least support for the ruling party in government.

For those of you that claim there is a corresponding payment to individuals, while this might be true at first, it is performed to get initial acceptance while the proverbial frog boils in the pot. The rebate will be whittled away and eliminated over the coming years in the name of equality. This will come in the form of income testing these “climate action incentive” payments. Eventually the threshold will be lowered to the maximal vote-buying point and any pretense of the tax being “revenue-neutral” will be eliminated, similar to what happened in British Columbia when they dispensed of the notion in 2017. I wrote about the myth of carbon tax revenue neutrality for another publication back in December 2018.

As an example, in British Columbia, it is estimated in the 2020/2021 fiscal year that the carbon tax will raise about $2 billion in revenues, or about $400 per British Columbian. About $300 million in total is estimated to be directly paid back to people (initially called the “Climate Action Dividend” but renamed “Climate Action Tax Credit” as the word “dividend” appears to be dirty with the current BC NDP government) – normally this Climate Action Tax Credit is $174.50/person that earns less than $35,748 (or family income of $41,708), but this was topped up to $218 due to COVID-19. For relation, the median family income in BC is around $90,000.

In terms of the net carbon tax revenue, the $1.7 billion the BC government collects is free for them to do whatever they want. Nationally, it will work the same way, at least for the provinces that do not levy their own carbon taxes.

The decision to raise carbon taxes across Canada does not cost the ruling Liberal party much politically, but will allow them to raise disproportionately high revenues from those areas and enable the redistribution to their vote-friendly base, namely Ontario and Quebec. Such is the nature of politics and power.

The push for yield at any cost – and a snippet on perception

It is amazing how markets cycle from panic to mania so quickly. It is a lot quicker now than it was a decade ago – one theory is that this acceleration of sentiment is fueled by social media.

I’ve been reading a bit more about perception and reality (e.g. ages ago, I linked to a TED talk that discusses the non-correlation being able to see reality and survival) and this is quite apt to describe what is going on in the financial marketplace.

Many participants in the market depend on “sources” such as BNN, CNBC, Jim Cramer, Reddit, Discus forums, Youtube, and for a very rare few, yours truly to come to their investment conclusions.

They are all trying to figure out how to put cash to use, because cash in a 10-year treasury bond yields 80 basis points at present. A million dollars gives you $8,000/year in (pre-tax) cash, which is a pittance compared to alternatives. Going one step up, you can find a 5-year GIC at 175 basis points, but again, it isn’t going to get you very far.

When markets appear to be stable, people reach for yield. A “reach for yield” market is exhibited when you see garbage rise, and a lot of sectors start incurring speculative fervor. We’re clearly in one of those market environments at present, a short temporal distance away from the March 23rd CoronaCrisis crash which lead everybody to the exits (yours truly was madly investigating opportunities) where quality was being thrown out the window. How times have changed – on very quick notice.

Institutions are in the same boat. They have to make their mandated returns otherwise pensioners don’t get paid and underperformance will cause capital to shift to those that bought and held Tesla at the beginning of the year.

I look at this Globe and Mail article about institutional managers buying Canadian apartments:

While many property deals are private transactions, Mr. Kenney cited some recent sales in mid-town Toronto that were completed at capitalization rates around 2 per cent, an astonishingly low level.

I ask myself what can justify 2%. For instance, CapReit (TSX: CAR.UN) in their last quarterly report stated their mortgage portfolio is an average of 1.93% at a term of 9.3 years.

While it isn’t clear whether the definition of cap rate in this instance included mortgage interest expenses (“cap rate” is not a standardized accounting term – you can make this number go up or down depending on how much leverage you employ), 2% is indeed a very low rate of return. Indeed, for it to make financial sense, you have to anticipate some degree of capital appreciation in the underlying property for the investment to make sense.

This low spread is not limited to real estate, it also includes the stock market.

(For the comparison above with CapREIT, I’ll tip the hat to Tyler (his Twitter) who has been discussing this concurrently and independently of the writing of this post, great minds think alike I guess!).

Let’s look at the S&P 500 top components. Apple, for instance, stock price $124, and the past year of 10-K earnings show $3.30/share, and relatively stable. So a bond-like earnings yield 2.7% for Apple stock. MSFT is $6 EPS and $214/share or about 2.8%. Facebook is about 2.5%, and so on. Of course in these cases you can make an argument that earning yields will grow over time and there is some franchise value. But it is shockingly close to these Toronto-area apartments that are selling for a current 2% (although given the choice of an investment in Apple or a Toronto apartment, I’d take Apple any day of the week).

Yields are very tiny now, and investors are going to chase them. High quality, such as Apple, will be rightfully expensive. But this yield chasing will make its way down the quality chain and companies that have no right to be chased down to 4% earnings yields will be done so because there is a huge liquidity avalanche out there that is looking for a home.

Realize when stocks trade, there is no cash or stock created or destroyed in the process; it is merely a transfer between buyer and seller. The amount of cash is the same, and this cash will circulate, being handed from account to account, while in the meantime the counter-transaction to that is the transfer of assets at higher and higher prices, until such a point that the amount of baked speculation on future yields will go to a low point.

If you believe those Toronto apartments will rise in price 10% a year for many years ahead, it would be completely rational to buy them even at single-digit negative cap rates, especially if you anticipate being ample future liquidity in case if you change your mind.

Likewise, for Apple, you could bake in a whole set of variables to justify purchasing it at a 200bps earnings yield, or 150bps, etc., citing a never-ending stream of inflation-shielded future cash flows. Indeed, that $124 stock price at 200bps would warrant an Apple stock price of $165, or a 33% gain from the current price!

I have no idea when this speculation house of cards will end, and can only conceive of a few scenarios of how it ends (one obvious “how it ends” would be the onset of inflation beyond that of asset prices – you’d see a 30-40% stock market crash). It is a very dangerous game of participants bidding asset prices higher and higher in the search for yield and appreciation. Apple today at 270bps sold to the next guy at 265bps, then to 260bps, etc., until the demand for that cash gets directed to some other supply that is not Apple equity.

Back in the dawn of the COVID-19 crisis when everybody thought we were going to die (April 5, 2020), I openly speculated the following:

This might sound a little crazy, but I can see the S&P 500 heading to 4000 before the end of the year.

Recall at this time when I wrote it, the S&P 500 was trading at around 2,500. Predicting a 4,000 index (a 60% rise) is crazy. I don’t think anybody on this planet did that except myself. We are living in a crazy world, where many are indeed going insane with COVID lockdowns and massive disruptions of a “normal life” that people are realizing is not coming back. And while the S&P 500 index will probably fall a hundred points short of 4000 before the new year, realize that going forward this is what it takes to be successful – not seeing reality as it is, but rather being able to adapt to what are inherently crazy circumstances in the minds of market participants.

Even if you see reality for what it is in the markets, it is not sufficient for your survival – you must understand the perceptions that surround the other participants.

Late Night Finance with Sacha, Episode 9

Date: Thursday, December 10, 2020
Time: 8:00pm, Pacific Time
Duration: Projected 60 minutes. Could go longer.
Where: Zoom (Registration)

Frequently Asked Questions:

Q: What are you doing?
A: I’m going to do a rambling overview of screens for companies that appear to be sold off due to tax-loss selling, or other relative weakness. There aren’t a lot left after the “Biden surge” in the stock market, but after screening, I’ll do a deep dive in likely one or perhaps two companies. I may consider questions and comments, time depending.

Q: How do I register?
A: Zoom link is here. I’ll need your city/province or state, and if you have any questions in advance just add it to the “Questions and Comments” part of the form. You’ll instantly receive the login to the Zoom channel.

Q: Are you trying to spam me, try to sell me garbage, etc. if I register?
A: If you register for this, I will not harvest your email or send you any solicitations. Also I am not using this to pump and dump any securities to you, although I will certainly offer opinions on what I see.

Q: Why do I have to register? I just want to be anonymous.
A: I’m curious who you are as well.

Q: If I register and don’t show up, will you be mad at me?
A: No.

Q: Will you (Sacha) be on video (i.e. this isn’t just an audio-only stream)?
A: Yes. You’ll get to see me, but the majority will be on “screen share” mode with my web browser and PDFs from SEDAR as I explain what’s going on in my mind as I present.

Q: Will I need to be on video?
A: I’d prefer it, and you are more than welcome to be in your pajamas. No judgements!

Q: Can I be a silent participant?
A: Yes. I might pick on some of you though. Bonus points if you can get your cat on camera.

Q: Is there an archive of the video I can watch later if I can’t make it?
A: No. I’ve been asked why, and this is because it is not at all close to a professional level.

Q: Will there be a summary of the video?
A: A short summary will get added to the comments of this posting after the video.

Q: Will there be some other video presentation in the future?
A: Yes.

Atlantic Power / Update

The most underperforming stock in my portfolio in 2020 has been Atlantic Power (TSX: ATP, NYSE: AT – note you would have done much better had you invested in AT on the TSX!). My original write-up on Atlantic Power was in July of 2018. I’ve owned the common and preferred shares since then, but currently hold only the common shares.

Rule one of investing is don’t lose money, and rule two is to look at rule one. The reason why this company is still in my portfolio is because they haven’t lost (too much) money, and because there is opportunity for appreciation that hasn’t yet been reflected in the equity value of the company. People investing in the preferred shares (specifically AZP.PR.B and especially fixed-rate AZP.PR.A) would be sitting on a higher quantum of capital by virtue of dividends and some minor capital appreciation, but I do suspect the better days ahead will be for the equity owners. Since January 2015 (which is when the current CEO, James Moore, was hired), the stock has meandered around the CAD$3/share level and has been relatively uncorrelated to the overall markets.

In my original post, I posted the basic metrics from 2012 to 2017 and they were in a reasonably positive trajectory. I will update this for 2020:

Debt / Revenues / EBITDA / Shares Outstanding (millions, and USD)
Year-end 2012: 2071 / 440 / 226 / 119.4
Year-end 2017: 821 / 431 / 288 / 115.2
Year-end 2019: 649 / 282 / 196 / 108.7
TTM 2020-Q3: 585 / 267 / 180 / 89.2

The highlights here are that revenues are dropping (because of the expiry of the power purchase agreements) and this will continue. Management continues to spend much capital paying down debt and repurchasing a huge amount common stock for roughly US$2/share, and to a lesser degree, preferred shares. There was a fire at the Cadillac biomass power plant that caused a few million in damages (the remainder was picked up by insurance) which didn’t help, coupled with the usual COVID-19 theatrics (which didn’t affect the company too much operationally). Power supply drama in California also is giving a lifeline to the company’s sole plant in the state, which is a natural gas plant.

Biomass is not a preferred form of energy which lead to the company pulling the trigger on the acquisition of some biomass plants. Year-to-date, this consists of about 8% of the company’s EBITDA; due to the Cadillac fire, the Williams Lake re-start (which a power purchase agreement was finally reached with BC Hydro) and some maintenance issues at the newly acquired biomass plants, the rest of the segment’s performance has been mediocre, although this will likely pick up in future years.

The CEO continues to say all the right things, and unlike a lot of others that talk about capital allocation and give the Buffett talk, I believe he walks it as well. One interesting highlight from his previous quarterly report is the following slide:

With the following remarks:

We continue to see signs of slight improvement in markets as reliability issues from an overreliance on intermittent power sources emerge. On a broader level, we may be near a bottom in the long down cycle in commodities. The chart on page 5 shows the relative performance of a commodities index against the S&P 500. The ratio is at its lowest level in 50 years.

Considering that to recent memory he hasn’t reflected upon the valuation of the broad commodity environment (he has commented on relative valuation of various power generation methods), this was worth noting they’d take 10 seconds to dwell upon it. ATP does hedge natural gas exposure with commodity futures so it isn’t entirely unrelated.

Atlantic Power is a relatively boring company from a cash flow perspective – a lot of it is locked in, so most analysts leave it alone since they believe the market has predicted the future of the company with the stock price – indeed, there are only three covering the company. The downside appears to be relatively low, and there does appear to be a few pathways for upside. So I continue to hold.

Riocan Distribution Cut

The big news yesterday that made ripples was Riocan REIT (TSX: REI.UN) slashing its monthly distribution from 12 cents to 98 cents.

I’m surprised they didn’t cut it further. Their cash flow statement shows that most of their operating cash flow goes out the door in distributions, not leaving a lot left over for construction capital:

A few comments:

1. Riocan is mostly a GTA REIT; about 50% of their revenues come from Toronto, another 1/8th from Ottawa, and almost 1/5th from Alberta. Understanding the GTA environment is key to a proper projection of Riocan’s fortunes, which brings me to point #2:

2. Retail conversions to residential is a component of Riocan’s new business model. This will require capital, a lot more of it. The last moment you want capital markets to constrain your inventory building is in the middle of a construction project. Although Riocan is not in any danger of not being able to raise capital (indeed, they made an impressive unsecured capital raise in March of this year at 2.36%), one never knows in the future.

3. My aversion to the REIT sector has not changed since the COVID-19 crisis occurred.

4. Most importantly – the reaction to this highly suggests that many people in retail-land have units in Riocan. It has been the most commented post on Reddit’s /r/CanadianInvestor in ages, and also it got comments on the Globe and Mail, etc, etc. This is a widely-looked at and widely-owned investment and it highly suggests that there are going to be smarter people than myself out there that will be getting the pricing correct. There are more obscure REITs out there which are more likely to have mispricings if you choose to venture into the sector.