Interactive Brokers / IEX / Commission-Free Brokerages

Interactive Brokers has always been the leading innovator in the brokerage realm. Normally companies that last 40 years get stale and eventually break when they can’t keep up with technological or market trends, but IBKR has been surprisingly agile and has most definitely been on the leading edge of the curve the whole time – being able to develop their business (e.g. TWS giving all of its users institutional-quality levels of market access), create a moat (e.g. TWS, margin rates, trading execution, and on and on), and also have the ability to get out of businesses that no longer work for them (e.g. the disposition of their market making).

They were the first brokerage available to retail customers that offered two-factor authentication, something that makes me sleep a lot better at night. I would not recommend using any brokerage that does not use two-factor authentication for serious amounts of money.

IBKR is slowly getting into the banking and cash management side of things, which is another huge avenue for future growth. They clearly have an organic growth policy so when this policy will eventually pay out in spades is unknown, but I think they are on the right track.

Unfortunately, IBKR’s stock is only 18% publicly available – the trading entity (IBKR) only owns a slim minority (17.8%) of shares of the operating firm. Most of the stock is owned by the founder and CEO, Thomas Peterffy, who I regard as the Steve Jobs of the online trading business. He has been outspoken on many issues concerning the brokerage world and one of them is the issue of high-frequency trading and brokerages effectively ripping off their own customers.

This is one of the reasons why Interactive Brokers decided to re-list their shares on IEX instead of Nasdaq, starting in October.

In one of the typical understatements by Peterffy, he states:

We at Interactive Brokers understand that being the first listing on a new exchange may entail certain risk, but we think that individual and institutional customers who own and trade our stock will receive better execution prices and that advantage will outweigh the risk.

Peterffy has an advantage in that he doesn’t have to care whether IBKR trades in liquid amounts, and indeed doesn’t even have to care how much IBKR stock trades for since they have no need or reason to raise capital. Indeed, one of their strategic purposes for IBKR stock to trade was as a marketing vessel for institutional clients and given the statistics IBKR releases, it seems to be working quite well. It was only about a decade ago that they made the corporate decision to actually spend money on advertising. IBKR’s rise is well worth the history lesson, but I won’t go into it too deeply here.

Instead, what I want to focus on is the upcoming hype that came with Wealthsimple Canada’s announcement that they will have a commission-free stock trading platform in Canada coming soon.

The question a customer should ask is how brokerages make money.

In short order, some answers are the following (in no particular order):

a) Trading commissions
b) Interest revenues on customer credit balances
c) Foreign exchange differentials
d) Margin interest (i.e. customers borrowing money from the brokerage to invest)
e) Stock lending (if a customer buys stock, the brokerage can lend them out for short selling, which they will earn interest for the borrow)
f) Selling (or using) customer trading data
g) Selling order flow

Item (g) is what I will focus on. Firms such as Virtu (Nasdaq: VIRT) make a lot of their “bread and butter” purchasing order flow from retail firms and giving their clients less than optimal executions. As a result, while customers can save $5 or $10 on a trading commission, they are instead paying for it with a reduction in the ability to shave more money from the bid-ask spread.

After Flash Boys, people have been more conscious of this, but your average retail investor only believes the cost of trading is the commission, which is most certainly not true.

While the actual dollar amounts are inconsequential when trading with low sized accounts and the choice of brokerage has little bearing on the overall result, trading execution becomes much more critical with higher amounts of money and choosing a brokerage that makes money by offering inferior trading executions will cost customers real amounts of money, well beyond any commissions that would be saved. The more a customer anticipates trading, especially in lower liquidity securities, the more they will likely lose in inferior execution costs.

In finance and business, there is nothing that is truly “free”, and commission-free trading is most certainly included in that category.

Past Comments – Trans-Mountain Pipeline

From my July 1, 2018 post:

Trans-Mountain Pipeline

This is a political disaster for the Liberals. It will be an even bigger political disaster when they try to tender the contracts to build the pipeline. It is a recipe for over budget, behind schedule politics, especially since the protestors know that any construction will be fueled by even more political pressure than it being built by a corporate entity. I do not believe this pipeline will be built even after the federal government bailed out Kinder Morgan Canada (TSX: KML).

Just remember, the government that can’t even build a gun registry or payroll system for themselves without spending more than a billion dollars of taxpayers’ money are trying to build an energy pipeline. Best of luck!

Obsession with dividend investing does not prevent capital losses

There are quite a few financial websites out there dedicated towards investing in dividend-bearing securities.

Some give the impression that it is nearly guaranteed to produce returns superior to the overall market.

In addition, a lot of them convey that the production of income through dividends is somehow “safer” than investing in major index ETFs.

In general, I do not have issues with dividend-bearing equities. In a lot of instances companies do not have proper places to re-allocate capital and giving it to shareholders is the right decision – especially if their stock price is high and the cost of their debt is low.

Where I have issues with dividend investing is in companies that have suspicious cash flow profiles or give cause to believe that their earnings profiles are going to be less than what is implied by their market pricing.

I’ll give an explicit example. Cineplex (TSX: CGX) I have written about in the past. Specifically in a May 2014 article (when the stock was trading at around $41), I was puzzled why the stock was doing so well given the “dinosaur” aspect of their business.

A lot of people though will take a look at their current 5.4% dividend yield (currently trading at $32/share) and blindly buy on the basis of that number alone. What will not be asked is whether this can be sustained or whether the business is fundamentally sound to generate sufficient cash flows in the future. Maybe it will, but there is an awful amount of risk for that 5.4%, much more than I could justify for my own (cowardly) risk profile. The 5.4% doesn’t compensate for the risk of future potential losses.

Another example that I have not written about in the past is Laurentian Bank (TSX: LB). This got on my radar back in June when their CMHC securitization issues hit the headlines. After doing some deep-dive research, while I believe the financial institution in general will continue to generate cash, I determined that better prices in the future could probably be had. Their last quarterly report was a prime example of mediocrity that one would expect from a centuries-old financial institution and their stock got hit 5% on the day after the report. Dividend investors were screaming “buy, buy, buy!”, looking at the juicy 6% yield and apparent value (then trading around 17% under book value). How can you lose? Today, it is down another 5% from the day after they reported earnings. It would take a year of dividends and a flat stock price to “catch up” to even.

The real test of the veracity of dividend investors is what happens when the capital value of their investments go south, and I am not talking 5-10% – when they start seeing 20-30% capital losses across their portfolios, will these dividends be nearly as important?

Just note this is not a prediction on the future outcome of CGX or LB or the market in general. It is simply a commentary that dividend investing is not risk-free magic and it requires just as much financial rigour as other types of investing. For common share investments, I’m agnostic towards companies that either give out or do not give out dividends or distributions. It factors little in my investment decision-making. I’m much more concerned about what management does with the capital they have.

Trading Options – Two scenarios that make sense

Trading options does not require a full set of knowledge of the highly mathematical aspects of how they are valued (a grounding in statistical distributions coupled with a touch of some multivariate analysis to understand the relationship between price, time and volatility), but it helps. It’s probably the closest cross-section of application of my physics degree (statistical mechanics would be the nearest field that relates to this) to finance.

The language that they use to describe the characteristics of options (e.g. greek lettered-variables such as delta, gamma, rho, theta, etc.) is likely designed to be intimidating and convey some sense of sophistication when they sucker people into trading these products. I find it quite amusing. From a mathematical perspective, it makes complete sense – for example, theta is known as time decay, and it is simply the partial derivative of the function that measures the option value over time. For those that see the words “partial derivative” and are repulsed by it, think instead of your speed (velocity) as being the partial derivative of the function that measures your distance (your GPS at location #1, location #2, #3, etc.) over time (time at location #1, #2, #3, etc.). (People in finance reading this: I know this is completely simplified, please do not correct this loose analogy!).

Every so often, I see posts advocating “generating free income” through selling covered call options or selling put options. Selling call options or put options indiscriminately without regard to paying attention to the underlying financial instrument is giving away money. It’s really bad advice that ends up making option market maker jobs viable. The reason why it sounds so lucrative is because you’ll get your two dollar coin 80% of the time, but 20% of the time you’re giving up a $10 bill.

Instead, one must have a vision about the expected price distribution of the underlying product, over time. The closer one believes that the expected price outcome is normally distributed, the more likely that the trade you place will have a negative expected value. This is with a core assumption that the option pricing is done with a normal distribution assumption (this is not always true).

Inevitably one should always ask themselves whether they could take advantage of an expected price change by simply buying or shorting and taking a more concentrated position. The underlying is nearly always more liquid than trading options. Usually this is cheaper, safer and provides an avenue for plenty of leverage.

I don’t even get into the actual trading costs of options, which are almost always higher for most underlying issuers. This includes both the commission, but the more expensive spread between the bid and ask price. In liquid options (e.g. if you were trading SPY or anything reasonably liquid) this is less of an issue and you are likely to be able to buy at the bid or sell at the ask.

There are a few situations where I would rather buy options than the underlying.

One is that if you are interested in betting on a price decline but have uncertainty about borrowing stock. Unfortunately there is usually a correlation between stocks that are hard to borrow and their implied volatility, resulting in more expensive options.

Also, the deeper out-of-the-money you go, the higher the implied volatility (and thus the higher the price you pay relative to closer-to-the-money strike prices). This is because market makers have evolved well past the Black-Scholes valuation era which assume normal distributions of returns (in reality, there are fat tailed price returns that traditionally have rewarded those betting on “1 in a thousand year” events that actually occur once in ten). Putting this into English, you pay higher for the lottery ticket component of an option predicting an extreme price event even though the absolute price of this is lower.

The other and less intuitive manner that options are useful is if you are expecting a non-normalized distribution of returns. If you find yourself saying “this stock cannot possibly trade lower than X” then there is a good chance that the underlying options will give you the opportunity to sell puts at a strike price near that level (assuming that the stock price is close to X). Using a fictional example, if a stock has a market cap of $500 million and has $450 million of cash on its balance sheet and no debt, and if their operations were cash breakeven in a stable industry and management was not completely incompetent or corrupt, put options at $450 million would be more probable to expire than call options at $550 million.

Some market makers account for this. You see this a lot when biotechnology companies face event risks leading to announcements of pivotal clinical trials. But in certain companies, you don’t see market makers adjust – their computer algorithms don’t account for a probable misshape in the expected distribution of returns. This is one of the rare situations where you can make money trading options at retail levels of dollar volumes. Like everything in finance, it takes time and effort to identify these situations. They will never flash at you on BNN or CNBC. Instead, you’ll just see more advertisements for trading systems that instruct their hapless victims to sell covered calls and naked puts for free income.

There are other situations where using options makes sense, but that’ll be for another post.

Just as a general note, I do not like to trade options. But they are powerful tools that can be used in limited situations to great effect.

Interest rates, monetary compression

History appears to be repeating. Refresh your memory of the past 20 years of short-term interest rate changes here. Just note the late 70’s and early 80’s was a very special time in financial history and should be disregarded for historical “regression to the mean” purposes, similar to how when looking at equity charts one should mentally blank out the 2008-2009 time period as economic-crisis induced.

The last time interest rates were held at a “very low” level was back after the dot-com bubble crashed. The US Federal Reserve dropped interest rates from 6.5% to 1%, which took three years to execute (it took about a year to go from 6.5% to 2%).

Over a period of 2 years, the Federal Reserve from 2004 to 2006 raised interest rates from 1% to 5.25%. Then during the pits of the economic crisis, it took the Fed about a year to drop rates to nearly nothing, where rates remained for seven years until the end of 2015.

Now interest rates are creeping up again, although at about half the pace of the prior interest rate increase from 2004-2006. What’s interesting is that while textbook theory suggests that interest rate increases are not good for equity pricing, the opposite appears to be the case.

However, there is always a lag effect between monetary actions and the actual economic consequences of such actions. I would claim that we’ll really start to see the consequences of monetary tightening around now. Financial deals that seemed better at 0.25% financing do not seem good so good at 1.9%, and at 2.5% will seem even worse.

The real issue is the long-term treasury bond rate, which is currently 3.02%. In theory, if everything in the USA was fine and dandy, that rate should be higher.

Also, the initial signs of US monetary policy tightening is not seen in the USA itself, but rather the foreign markets. This in itself is worthy of a separate discussion, but what we are seeing today in Turkey and other external countries that are facing economic difficulties is not solely due to trade war and tariff talks, but rather that the US dollar is becoming more expensive.

All I can say (and this has become so much of a cliche) is that caution is warranted. Investment capital is best applied at reasonable valuations to entities that clearly have cash flow generation capabilities and ones that do not have complete reliance on credit markets (or conversely ones that will be able to acceptably tap the credit markets to roll-over their debt). This is doubly true if the company in question generates its profit from foreign currency, but borrows in US denominations.

The conventional wisdom says to not time the market, but I deeply suspect that over the next 12 months that we’ll see lower prices ahead.