Can Teck unload their met coal operation?

Teck (TSX: TECK.A/B) had some interesting news yesterday – they dumped their 21% interest in the Fort Hills oil sands project for $1 billion to Suncor (the majority owner and operator), and they also released their quarterly report.

The Fort Hills project was the black sheep of Teck, primarily because it goes against their “wokeist” image they are trying to project and is clearly not in their strategic mandate to be a lead producer of “low carbon metals” (aren’t all metals non-carbon?). Once the Frontier Oil Sands project was shelved, pretty much the days were numbered for the Fort Hills division.

For Q3, Teck’s share of the project was 37,736 barrels of oil a day, and the consolidated project is 180,000 barrels – not a trivial size.

The project historically has been plagued by operational issues and, in my quick evaluation, the deal is good for both Teck (who wanted to get out) and Suncor (who is likely to consolidate 100% of the project in the near future). The Frontier project might get revived in a future decade when regulatory concerns get alleviated, but I would not hold your breath.

Of note is that both companies (Teck and Suncor) will be taking non-cash accounting losses on the disposition – in Teck’s case, the amount of capital dumped onto the project is less than the amount that they were able to get back from it with this disposition. The impairment charge on the books was $952 million. The conference call transcript indicated there was a ‘small capital loss’ on the transaction.

Teck’s major project in the works is the QB2 copper mine in Chile. One reason why their stock had a tepid response to the quarterly report is because of the usual announcements of delays and construction cost escalation, coupled with a decreased expectation for production in 2023. However, this is yet another sign that one cannot click a few buttons on Amazon and expect a mine to start producing – the scale and scope of these projects is gigantic and this one has taken about 5 years to get going from the “go-ahead” decision to when things will be materially completed. If this decision was pursued today, the costs would likely be even higher (not to mention the regulatory climate would be even worse than it is today).

QB2 is the example of their “low carbon metals” strategy, where apparently they can be dug up from the ground without emitting carbon, but I digress. The “to-go” capital expenditure on QB2 is anticipated to be US$1.5-$1.9 billion from October 1, and once this is completed, Teck will be a free cash flow machine barring some sort of total collapse in the copper market (beyond the 30% drop from half a year ago).

The balance sheet is very well positioned, with $2.6 billion in cash and no major debt maturities until 2030 other than a US$108 million bond due February 2023, which they can easily pay off. As a result, Teck will be in a position to either buy back stock or issue increased dividends later in 2023.

But the focus of this post isn’t about QB2 or Teck’s future prospects, it is about their metallurgical coal operation.

Their met coal operation generated $1.24 billion in gross profits in Q3, and $5.55 billion year-to-date. It is single-handedly the reason why Teck is in such a fortunate financial position to be able to dither on QB2 and not get terribly concerned about it.

However, it flies in the face of their “low carbon metals” strategy and this reminds me of last year’s article which rumoured that Teck was looking at getting rid of, or spinning off their met coal operation.

My question is still the same – who would buy this? It is making so much money that even if you paid 2x annualized gross profits (an incredibly generous low multiple), somebody would still need to cough up $15 billion to buy the operation. This puts pretty much every coal operator out there except for the super-majors (like Glencore) out of the picture.

However, if Teck were to dispose of the coal unit, it would likely be in conjunction with a significant distribution to shareholders – a $15 billion sale would result in roughly a $22/share distribution, assuming a 25% tax rate (the actual tax paid will likely be less since Teck’s cost basis will be considerably higher from the Fording Coal acquisition). At a zero-tax rate, that would be roughly $29/share.

However, a giveaway is the non-answer during the conference call:

Orest Wowkodaw
Analyst, Scotia Capital, Inc.
Hi. Thank you. Jonathan, your number two priority seems to be rebalancing the portfolio to low carbon metals. I’m wondering if that if your strategy there is solely around growing the copper business and i.e. diluting the coal business, or do you see the potential for accelerating that transformation perhaps by either divesting some of the coal business?

Jonathan Price
Chief Executive Officer & Director, Teck Resources Limited
Yeah. Hi, Orest, and thanks for the question. There’s a number of approaches that we’ve been taking to that. The first as you’ve seen overnight is the announced divestments of Fort Hills. Clearly oil sands carbon, an opportunity there to reduce weight in the portfolio through that divestment, something we’re very pleased to have agreed and have gotten away.

Secondly, as you highlight really the key approach for us is the growth around copper with the doubling of copper production as we bring QB2 online next year. And then with the projects I mentioned being new range being San Nicolás being the QB mill expansion all bring more copper units into the portfolio which further swing us towards green metals and away from carbon. As we’ve said before, we’ll always remain very active and thoughtful in reviewing the shape of the portfolio and the composition of our portfolio. But right now those factors I’ve mentioned are the key execution priorities and that’s what the team is focused on. And that’s what we’re gearing up to deliver.

I’m pretty sure reading between the lines that they are, at the minimum, thinking of doing this. But who in their right mind would buy such an operation in a very hostile jurisdiction?

Revisiting Teledyne

It’s always good to review some companies that have crossed your radar in the past – the library of knowledge that gets built up becomes an investing competitive advantage when the market decides to vomit.

Teledyne (NYSE: TDY) got on my radar when they acquired FLIR Systems (I was a shareholder of FLIR at the time). They are competently managed, in a market space that is relatively insulated (they have a lock on certain technologies and are strategically well positioned). However, they took on a ton of debt when they took over FLIR and here is the salient table:

We see a structure that is $550 million variable, and $3.4 billion fixed rate. Clearly the highlight debt offering was the $1.1 billion of 2.75% notes due April 2031!

TDY currently makes an annualized operating income of $900 million. Current annualized interest charges are approximately $100 million. The residual after income taxes will be poured into debt repayment over the next few years. However, the problem from an investor perspective is that this capital has an effective return limitation – for instance, the 0.65% notes due on April 2023 (half a year from now) will effectively be re-financed at higher rates via the credit facility. Ironically, the Federal Reserve increasing interest rates improves the return on capital of TDY’s debt repayment and because most of it is fixed for the next 9 years, an increasing interest rate structure should not harm the company too much.

However, the debt burden poses significant limitations on shareholder returns (traditionally this has been in the form of share buybacks), in addition to making the valuation from an EV/FCF perspective even more expensive. The share buyback history of TDY in itself is a fascinating story – the last time they did so was in 2015.

Despite the business being great, it suffers from the same problem I identified when the FLIR takeover was happening – it is just too expensive. They did crash down to $200 during Covid, where they may be worth considering. Unfortunately if it got to this point, there’s likely to be a lot of other stuff on sale at the same time. But I continue keeping it on the radar.

Signs that you should be looking for a different CFO

Does anybody read financial statements anymore, or do they just let the automated financial data scraping services compute all the ratios for you automatically?

You might think the mix-up regarding the date formatting was a one-shot thing, but no, it is also on the income statement, equity statement, cash flow statement, and notes 3, 4, 11 and 14.

If the CFO isn’t even reading these financial statements, what makes an investor think the company is being run in good hands?

This is another example of what happens when people become overly reliant on push-button systems – eventually two things get lost – one is how the push-button machine works, and the other is the reason why we have to push the button in the first place.

I have caught on occasion some pretty bad typos or formatting errors in financial statements but never have I seen such a blatant presentation error on dates as this one.

Xebec Adsorption – Bankruptcy and CCAA

Words you never want to hear if you’re an equity holder:

Xebec Adsorption Inc. (TSX: XBC) (“Xebec” or the “Corporation”), a global provider of sustainable gas solutions, announces that it will file today an application with the Superior Court of Québec (the “Court”) for an initial order (the “Initial Order”) under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”) and seek recognition of the Initial Order in the United States under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Since Xebec isn’t exactly a household name, here is a description of the business:

Xebec Adsorption Inc. (“Xebec” or the “Company”) is a global provider of clean energy solutions and specialized in the design and manufacture of cost-effective and environmentally responsible purification, separation, dehydration and filtration equipment for gases and compressed air. Xebec’s main product lines are biogas upgrading systems for the purification of biogas from agricultural digesters, landfill sites and waste water treatment plants; natural gas dryers for natural gas refuelling stations; associated gas purification systems which enable diesel displacement on drilling sites; hydrogen purification and generation systems for fuel cell and industrial applications; on-site oxygen and nitrogen generators for industrial, energy and healthcare applications; and services for compressed air and gas businesses.

Since the beginning of 2021, the stock chart does not look pretty:

At its final demise, the company had 155 million shares outstanding, which means at 51 cents per share, it still had a market cap of about 79 million.

Financially, the company was bleeding cash this year and they had blew a covenant on their credit facility (their total liabilities to tangible net worth ratio was exceeded) and thus people reading financial statements would have had some sort of hint this would happen. Goodwill and intangibles amounted to $237 million on their balance sheet, while total equity was $260 million and needless to say the $42 million in net losses for the half year tipped the balance.

It is not a complete loss, however – they have $50 million of cash and restricted cash on the balance sheet, offset by $85 million in debt. While their business is awful (gross margins were less than 10% of revenues in the first half, while SG&A was about 40%!), balance sheet-wise it is not a huge train wreck. Perhaps after restructuring they might make a better go of it, but I doubt equity holders will get any recovery from this one.

While the increasing interest rate environment will likely contribute to further CCAA and bankruptcy filings in the future, in the case of XBC, this one looks to be entirely by self-inflicted wounds. The business isn’t profitable.

I did not own any shares at any time.

Aimia – not at this time

It’s been quite some time (four years) since I’ve written about Aimia (TSX: AIM).

The corporation is much ‘cleaner’ than it was when they were operating Aeroplan and especially now that they’ve sold their last loyalty program (PLM) they are sitting on a bunch of cash and assets. The PLM sale netted about $537 million, and by virtue of significant operating and capital losses in the past, the tax hit on this transaction will be relatively low. They still have a tax shield going forward and one of their stated intentions is to use their newly found half-billion dollars for investments to chip away at their tax shield.

From the June 30, 2022 balance sheet, they have a bunch of investments in income-losing entities. It does not inspire much confidence about future speculations.

Writing off the entirety of their investment portfolio, this leaves them with about $550 million to play with on 92 million shares outstanding, or about $6/share. There is no material liabilities or debt on the sheets. However, they do have $236 million in perpetual preferred shares outstanding which sucks out nearly $13 million/year out of the company, plus an even nastier Part VI.1 tax for another $5.1 million (hint to Aimia management – you perhaps might wish to NCIB the preferred shares). The rate resets are due in March 2024 and 2025, which would be at rates significantly higher than what they are paying now.

We know through public filings that they bought back 7.13 million common shares for $31.45 million in July and August. In a few days we will know about their September buybacks. The ending balance for August would be 85 million shares outstanding and approximately $510 million cash on the balance sheet, minus whatever else they threw money at in the interim.

Practically speaking, Aimia is trading at a price that is close to its cash balance, and assuming the remainder of its investment portfolio is worthless.

You would think that they should be able to convert half a billion dollars into something that earns a positive return. The Divestor Oil and Gas Index would be one avenue.

I tend to shy away from these “sum of the parts” entities because the incentives are generally misaligned for minority shareholders to make a proper return. Aberdeen International (TSX: AAB) was a poster child for this.

Aimia is controlled by Mittleman Investment Management, although they do not own a dominating stake in the company (approximately 10 million shares held between the company and the two brothers). Since Aimia does not have a common stock dividend, returns would be through capital appreciation. This typically would be driven by a share buyback, but as clearly evidenced by July and August’s trading action, the market has been more than happy to part ways with its shares at an average of $4.41.

The preferred shares are also not trading at a level that I would consider sufficient compensation (roughly 7% current yields and illiquid) given the overall situation.

Given the stress we are seeing in the market, even if there was a dump of liquidity on Aimia, I would find it probable that there would be some other part of the market that has a viable operating entity to be trading at equally or better levels at such a time. The fixed income component of it, however, I will continue keeping on eye on.