Reminiscences of a Stock Operator

I’m currently reading Reminiscences of a Stock Operator. This book (the annotated version by Jon D. Markman) is so timely in relation to what is going on currently, it is unreal.

The modern day equivalents of bucket shops seem to be cryptocurrency exchanges.

And some notes on bull and bear markets and the value of sitting tight when things are in a bull market:

For all of my paranoid rantings, to exercise caution, etc., if I were to fall into a coma and wake up a couple years later, I feel reasonably confident that my portfolio would be fine.  I couldn’t say the same if I held XYZCoin or shares in Zoom or Tesla.

Gold is out, crypto (or almost anything else) is in – and FOMO

For the first time in ages, the Royal Canadian Mint ETR (TSX: MNT) is trading within a percentage point of its net asset value – prior to this it was trading at a significant premium.

This could be because the price of gold, at least as measured in US dollars, has declined from a high of about US$1,950 during the election to US$1,800 today and suddenly gold is no longer in vogue. It is difficult to prescribe what causes price decreases in gold, but given its perception of a “when everything goes to hell” metal, my guess is that the fallout of the presidential election is alleviating to those that went into gold.

Another solution espoused by monetary doomsday proponents is the purchase of cryptocurrencies.

Here is my current theory of how things will end up.

You’re going to continue hearing more and more about Bitcoin until the last dollar has been sucked up into this global Ponzi vacuum – it’s up about US$1,000/coin today. The price is going to continue to rise because of forced buying (ETFs) and rampant speculation (easy access through financial apps that can be loaded on anybody’s smartphone). You’re going to hear your friends, neighbours, etc., get into the action, and you will be aggravated to hear about fortunes made because they bought half a bitcoin and it went up ten-fold in a month, while you are just sitting on your boring shares of Fortis and Enbridge, clipping quarterly dividend coupons at a hundred times less magnitude.

The disparity in performance going to drive a lot of people insane. Literally insane. Seeing your friend pull up to your doorstep in a Lambo (“Look! I sold some bitcoin!”) while you’ve just made an extra value meal in dividends fuels a lot of psychological resentment. After finishing drag racing on the freeway in your friend’s Lambo, picking up your Big Mac and fries at the McDonalds drive-through with your dividend cheque, you both will then go home and buy some more bitcoins.

All I can suggest to keep your sanity is to go to the library (assuming your local branch hasn’t been shut down by the COVID scourge) and get some history reference books on what happened during the Dutch tulip bulb mania. This is the closest analogy I can think of to the current situation. One difference between the 17th century and today’s era is that in today’s era, things move much, much faster, including Lambos vs. horse carriages. This includes price movement and capital mobility. The Tulip Bulb mania took about 3 years to form, and the crescendo went over about four months of trading. With bitcoin, I would not be shocked that the initial collapse will be a price drop of over 50% in a 1 week period. It will be massively disruptive.

You will also hear at the same time after this price collapse a bunch of people saying this is the greatest chance to get in of all times.

Most people in finance have some knowledge of the Tulip Bulb Mania. However, many less people (including Wikipedia) have a historical knowledge of another great pyramid scheme which brought down the country of Albania in 1997. This made for a very fascinating study although there were few references to it in English. Another difference is that Albania wasn’t exactly a rich country at that time, so the absolute amount of capital sucked into this scheme was relatively limited by comparison, while Bitcoin has a nearly global audience.

History is repeating again, right before your very eyes! What a time to be living.

How do we begin to model this?

Unlike Tulip Bulbs, which trade in discrete quantities, Bitcoin is divisible in units of 100 millionths of a bitcoin, which means anybody will be able to get into the game – with Tulip Bulbs, the purchasing power of one bulb at its peak was massive, which limited the ability for people to get in (they had to put up margin collateral). With bitcoin, anybody with a cell phone and a bank account can get in.

There are about 18.6 million bitcoin outstanding at present, with a good chunk of this (at the onset of creation) apparently not used, and with people losing coins here and there. At US$19,000/coin, the market capitalization of the entire bitcoin set is US$350 billion. I think you can now make a good argument this could go a lot larger before the bottom falls out on this one. I initially thought the market cap of bitcoin would be roughly restricted to the largest cap companies trading on the public exchanges (currently, this would be Apple at around $2 trillion) but for a true mania, shouldn’t it go higher? There’s clearly room to head up to $100k/coin. The question is – how much cash will this suck up before demand stops?

Kind of makes my earlier predictions half a decade ago of a $10k ceiling to be pretty ridiculous, but then again, I never knew Bitcoin would be the vessel of the next tulip mania. Times really haven’t changed.

Melcor / Melcor REIT / Firm Capital

Looks like another dust-up happening in the Canadian REIT market. First we have the ongoing saga at Artis (TSX: AX.UN), but now Firm Capital (TSX: FC) is launching a salvo against Melcor REIT (TSX: MR.UN).

Considering that 55% of Melcor REIT is owned by Melcor (TSX: MRD), clearly Firm Capital won’t be trying to overthrow the board of trustees. However, they can threaten to make things very expensive:

If an oppression action was brought against MDL, MDL would be required to either purchase minority unitholders equity at fair market value or have the business sold accordingly.

The summary of Firm Capital’s argument is that the REIT has an NAV of about $9, while the market value is at $4. Melcor has it at NAV on their books, and is economically extracting far more than it should be, so therefore, the solution is to buy out the 45% it doesn’t own for a small fraction under NAV. Simple!

Firm Capital, in its letter, points out precisely the reason why I don’t invest in the equity of these majority-owned REITs that are spun off from the parent corporation – related party fees tend to put the minority in an unfavorable position. Another obvious corporation/REIT combo is Morguard (TSX: MRC), Morguard REIT (TSX: MRT.UN) and North American Residential (TSX: MRG.UN), where the terms of engagement are set by the parent corporation.

Within the capital structure of Melcor REIT, the convertible debentures are another story. As long as you get paid out in the end, it doesn’t matter if management has their hands excessively in the cookie jar, unless you paid excessively for the call option value of the equity conversion component. Fortunately, in Melcor REIT’s case, when I purchased my debt, they were so far out of the money that it wasn’t something I was banking on. The ultimate irony is that I was getting paid a higher coupon than the REIT units, yet having the security of a debt investment – isn’t safe yield what you’re supposed to be investing in a REIT for?

This soap opera was made even better with Melcor’s response, which included:

Melcor REIT confirms that the first it has been made aware of the November 4th , 2020 letter from Firm Capital was today.

And a few hours later, they went to clarify:

Further to our press release from earlier today, we have investigated the matter and discovered that the original letter, dated November 4, 2020 and sent to us via email by FC Private Equity Realty Management Corp. (Firm Capital), was caught in our spam filter and did not reach any of its intended recipients.

Caught in the spam filter! One wonders if they received any other solicitations that ended up in the spam bucket as well. A tough claim to believe.

I am loaded with plenty of microwave popcorn to watch this debacle unfold.

Alternative Performance Metrics

There are two standardized mathematical methods of measuring raw performance (non-risk adjusted) and that is time-weighted and dollar-weighted returns. I won’t get into the definitions (go to investopedia for a good primer), but either method is legitimate. Typically funds that have lots of inflows and outflows use dollar-weighted returns, while time-weighted returns allows for an “apples to apples” performance comparison between funds.

Something we almost never question is the unit of measure that we use to evaluate such performance. This is most typically in the currency of the portfolio construction. For Canadians, this is usually in Canadian dollars, although it can be acceptable to use US Dollars as well.

However, is this yardstick, the currency, a correct one? It is very easy to overlook as this core assumption is baked into everybody’s consciousness that the currency is stable. Times are changing, however, where we now have to question the currency we use.

I looked at a couple alternative measures of past performance.

One alternative measure is the portfolio value in relation to the price of gold – i.e. performance in how many ounces of gold you could purchase at quarter-end. Using this metric, despite the fact that I have fared reasonably well in the COVID crisis, I have not done that much better today in relation to gold since the September 2018 quarter. In fact, going back as far as I could with some moderately reliable records, my performance, as strictly measured in gold, for the past 15 years has been about 7% compounded annually (compared to roughly 19% if you use a standard time-weighted return). This is a huge difference in performance – it shows that I am barely treading water.

If I use crude oil as a benchmark, I’m making out like gangbusters.

Another common measure is benchmarking to an index – relating your portfolio performance above or below the overall TSX Composite or S&P 500 is popular. Indeed, when I do my regular performance reports, I include those indices as a benchmark, simply because if I could do just as well (or better) sticking my money in an index fund, there’s no point in me bothering to do any investment research at all (indeed, I’d be adding negative value with every minute spent on investment research!).

I’m always cognizant that my past performance could purely be a function of luck. While depressing to think about, it is a possibility.

Another measure is benchmarking your portfolio to real dollars (instead of nominal dollars). This doesn’t change too much since reported CPI figures are under-reported (typically around 1.5% per year), so I do not consider this a useful measure. However, for marketing purposes, fund managers can claim victory in that most of them will show “your purchasing power will increase” – a 1.5% friction to nominal performance is not too difficult to overcome when central banks are applying a category 4 hurricane tailwind to your portfolio, especially if you invested in Tesla and Nio.

Is using real dollars to benchmark absolute performance correct?

I’d view M2 as a better barometer, as it reflects the fraction of currency that you control of the entire float of currency (that gets created through loans and central bank actions). This represents cash and cash-like instruments at banks. Over the past five years, it (USA) looked like this:

Very roughly, M2 has increased about 6% a year from 2016 to 2020. Going back earlier, we have the following:

We see during the economic crisis that the overall trend did not really change (there was a mild inflection) but during the COVID crisis, it really ramped up. Assuming the year ended today, M2 in the USA has increased by a factor of 24%. Needless to say, this is unprecedented in the past 40 years of financial history.

When applying M2 from 2005 to present, the growth has been about 7% compounded annually. Hence, my “real” performance as measured by USA M2 is about 12%.

Canada (Bank of Canada Statistics) has a similar M2 curve, please forgive my thirty second excel job on this dataset:

While their M2 is only refreshed up to September 1, 2020 (the USA data is updated weekly and is current), Canada’s M2 growth over the past 15 years is roughly 5% compounded. From January 1 to September 1, M2 growth in this year alone has been about 15%.

I generally believe that measuring absolute performance in relation to monetary aggregate growth is a more realistic measure than using CPI. There are still deficiencies using this as a yardstick, but the overall point of this exercise is to use different ways of measuring absolute performance.

Interestingly, if you relate USA M2 to the S&P 500 index, the price index return of the S&P 500 is roughly equal to the growth of the M2 over the past 15 years. The 15 year price return of the TSX Composite has lagged the growth in Canada’s M2 – using this metric, an index investor has barely kept afloat when you factor in dividends.

I deeply suspect we are all doing a lot worse in absolute terms than our nominal and real returns indicate – something to keep in mind when measuring our financial objectives.

Nasdaq buying Verafin

News article (Nasdaq to buy Verafin for US$2.75-billion in biggest Canadian software takeover since 2007)

The line that caught my attention was:

The purchase price, at 19.5 times expected 2021 revenue, reflects Verafin’s rapid expansion, with a compound annual revenue growth of approximately 30 per cent over the past three years. Nasdaq expects Verafin to deliver more than US$140-million in revenue in 2021.

No wonder they sold out at the price they did!

Software is all the rage currently and some are trading ridiculously expensive, even more so than 19.5 times sales, let alone earnings (want to TSX: SHOP?). Good on the ownership for Verafin for cashing out.

The article laments how Canadian technology companies get taken away, but this is a result of Canada’s regulatory and paternalistic climate – structurally designed to strongly favour incumbency entrenchment and throw talent that can innovate to the USA.