Modelling commodity companies

I’m not much of a technical analysis guru but here is my depiction of the trendline of Cenovus Energy (TSX: CVE):

Will this go on forever and end the year at $70/share? I wish, but incredibly unlikely unless if we’re heading into Weimar Republic inflation.

Despite this price rise, the company is still relatively cheap from a price to free cash flow metric. You don’t need to have a CFA in order to do some basic financial modelling:

This is from their IR slides and they will be spending $4.8 billion on capital expenditures in 2024. At “Budget”, which is WTI US$75, and US$17 differential to WCS pricing, the company will do roughly $10 billion in operating cash flow, leaving $5.2 billion of it free. They also have a sensitivity of $150 million per US$1 of WTI.

Everything being equal (it is not, but this is a paper napkin modelling exercise), at today’s closing price of WTI at US$86.75, they’re looking at a shade just under $7 billion in free cash flow. It won’t be quite this high in reality, but that puts the company at around 8.5xFCF to EV even at the current price. If you were smart enough to buy it at $20/share back in mid-January, at the price of WTI then (US$72/barrel), your FCF to EV ratio would have been… about 9x.

In other words, the price appreciation is strictly a result of the commodity price improvement, coupled with a very small multiple decline (which the truer computer models out there which algorithmically trade all these fossil fuel companies on a formulaic basis perform).

For the fossil fuel components in my portfolio, I have pretty much given up on any other smaller companies other than the big three (CNQ, CVE and SU) simply because I have little in the way of competitive advantage to determine which one of the smaller companies have better on-the-ground operations and superior geographies to work with. They all trade off of the commodity curve one way or another. The “big three” are low cost producers and will generate some amount of cash going forward, barring a Covid-style catastrophic environment.

They are basically the equivalent of income trusts at the moment. Remember the old Canadian Oil Sands (formerly TSX: COS.un) before it was absorbed into Suncor? That’s exactly that these three companies are – they all have gigantic reserves and very well established low-cost operations, and capital allocation that is simply going to dump cash out to dividends or share buybacks.

Risks inherent with all three:
1. A common regulatory/governmental risk being located in Canada, and mostly Albertan operations.
2. Fossil fuels may be subject to displacement if we actually see some sort of renaissance on nuclear power (there are whiffs of it here and there, but going from speculation to reality is another matter entirely).
3. The usual cyclical supply/demand factors.

With point #3, I see in the presentation decks of most of these companies (especially the smaller ones) that they are very intent on increasing production. Despite the fact that TMX is going to be operational in a month, the egress situation out of Canada will once again saturate. No more refineries are being built and thus the demand-supply variable will likely push WTI-WCS differentials higher at some point in the near future. With balance sheets of all the companies stronger than they ever have been, there will likely be some “race to the bottom” effect coming in due course, similar to how the domestic natural gas market has been saturated – both AECO and Henry Hub commodity pricing are quite low and LNG export pricing is back to its historical levels (around US$9.50/mmBtu spot).

I think what will happen is that the higher capitalization companies will use their relatively stronger balance sheets to pick away at the entrails of the smaller, higher leveraged operations when the price environment goes sour. Given the overall under-leveraged bent most of these smaller companies have been taking as of late, this process going to take awhile and a lower commodity price environment to achieve. These are not “forever hold” companies, but certainly at present their valuations continue to look cheap.

Melcor REIT – another cutting distributions to zero

Melcor REIT (TSX: MR.UN) is a small REIT containing 38 properties that is controlled by parent Melcor (TSX: MRD). The book value of assets are $700 million, debt about $420 million and about $12 million in cash flow from operations each in the past couple years. At 13 million units outstanding and at $3/unit, I will leave it up to you to calculate the market capitalization and relative size of this trust to others.

On March 5, 2024 they announced their year-end results. While the actual results were tepid, the big news was the trust finally reduced its distribution to zero citing financial flexibility.

Putting a long story short, they are hitting a debt wall as outlined by one of their significant holders, FC Capital in a letter that came public on March 13.

I won’t delve too deeply into this other than that we have a couple themes in action with this and Slate Office and other marginal REITs:

1. Debt maturities are killing equity value
2. The valuation of illiquid private equity (or in this case illiquid property holdings which is almost as bad) on balance sheets is highly suspicious when it comes to the time that you actually need to liquidate said properties.

You’ve got Allied (AP.UN), Dream Office (D.UN), Artis (AX.UN), H&R, etc, etc., all trading at wildly deep discounts to book value. The financial engineering solution is to liquidate the assets at their stated value and watch the magic happen, right? If it only were that simple!

Just wait until the CPP and other pensions that are heavy on “private” or otherwise illiquidly-valued assets finally get their day in the valuation sun.

In the meantime, the REITs appear to be a reasonable canary in the coal mine, begging central banks for supplemental oxygen.

Microstrategy cornering the Bitcoin market

A moment of market history was when the Hunt Brothers attempted to corner the market on silver (Silver Thursday), which occurred from 1979 to 1980.

If the article is accurate, the Hunt Brothers at one point controlled a third of the world’s privately available silver supplies, primarily using futures contracts.

The collapse of the scheme occurred when the highly leveraged Hunt Brothers could not post sufficient equity to keep their margin loan going.

Fast forward 44 years and we have the situation with Microstrategy and Bitcoin, which appears to be an analogous situation.

On March 11, 2024 via Form 8-K, Microstrategy announced they had purchased 12,000 Bitcoin, during the period between February 26, 2024 and March 10, 2024, for $822 million, mostly with the proceeds of an $800 million convertible debt offering (0.625% coupon, maturing March 15, 2030, convertible into equity at $1498/share). After this filing, Microstrategy owned 205,000 Bitcoins purchased at a cost of $6.91 billion.

I will note this date range of the purchased Bitcoin appears to line up exactly with the rise from $53,000 per Bitcoin to around the $67,000 we see today:

This wasn’t enough.

On March 15, 2024, Microstrategy closed another convertible bond offering, $525 million (0.875% coupon, maturing March 15, 2031, convertible into equity at $2327/share). Unlike the previous offering, this offering claimed to be used for general corporate purposes and the purchase of additional Bitcoins.

With the stock price (after a 15% drop as of the writing of this article) at about $1,500 a share, they are obviously continuing to leverage themselves to the hilt in order to keep the price of Bitcoin high. The liquidity of Bitcoin itself is somewhat questionable – throwing $820 million into Bitcoin over 10 trading days is enough to spike it around 30-40% in value. Microstrategy is clearly trying to keep as much gasoline onto the Bitcoin fire as it can, as its market valuation is tied to the hip with it. The primary owner and chairman, Michael Saylor, is dumping stock like crazy while the going is good.

My only question is when will this house of cards collapse?

The answer is strange – it depends on whether the stock collapses. It may not happen soon. The looming debt maturity was going to be in 2025 with a $650 million convertible note, but it is likely that it will be converted at approximately $398/share. The next looming debt maturity are the 2027 notes, which has a conversion price of $1432/share, which is much closer to the current stock price.

As long as the company can keep the stock price up and be able to avoid raising cash (presumably by selling Bitcoin!) in order to pay for the maturity, this can go indefinitely.

The cycle would be: issue equity or convertible debt financing -> purchase bitcoins -> raise the price of bitcoins -> higher MSTR stock valuation -> issue equity or convertible debt financing

The question will eventually be settled by somebody with deeper pockets than Microstrategy that decides to short enough Bitcoin and also Microstrategy stock to get an even larger payoff in the subsequent collapse. They would need to force Microstrategy to sell its Bitcoin.

Fairfax gets a short selling hit piece

Muddy Waters put out an interesting hit piece on Fairfax, accusing the corporation of using accounting tricks to overstate its true book value by about USD$4.5 billion. FFH’s stated equity in September 2023 was USD$21.6 billion. This accused mark-down isn’t gigantic, but considering that Fairfax is trading at a healthy valuation over book (about 1.5x 1.2x) a valuation with a constant P/B multiple metric would result in an approximate 20% haircut all other things being equal. The stock is down about 10% today as I write this.

Skimming through the presentation, the bulk of the accusation is centered around the accounting of purchases of various subsidiaries and not taking or being able to cleverly avoid write-downs.

Fairfax is a massively complex entity and the stated financial position of various entities, whether in Fairfax or in other entities that try to do private market equity (or even real estate valuation for commercial REITs!) is ultimately up to a management judgement using some semi-standardized variables. The reality of these valuations are achieved when the entity involved tries to liquidate the venture in question.

The other accusation revolved around the application of IFRS 17 and the subsequent accounting adjustment in contrast to other insurance firms. Among other items, IFRS 17 applies a discounted value to the expected liability component of an insurance contract payout. Muddy Waters accuses Fairfax of being an outlier in relation to some other insurance firms. I have no good way of evaluating this other than that if a company anticipates its insurance payouts longer in the future, the stated liability reduction will be greater.

Finally, from the IPO to present, I did note that Farmer’s Edge was a disaster, including that of Fairfax, and its privatization offer is probably some attempt to internalize Fairfax’s upcoming loan loss on that venture. The amount, relative to the whole Fairfax consolidated entity, is small beans but blowing a high 8-digit figure of money is not chump change for most mortals like you and I!

I’ve looked at Fairfax here and there over the past couple decades and while there was a reasonable valuation case to be made when it was in the 400-500s, I found the stock to trade rich lately, even without the news of this particular short selling report. Ultimately the firm’s ability to dredge out cash flows from its insurance operations (which the metrics are quite excellent if they are to be believed!) is what is going to matter, not necessarily the stated book value of the various subsidiaries and minority investments on its balance sheet – if your assets are generating (this is a made-up number) $2 billion dollars cash a year, it doesn’t matter whether you keep them on your balance sheet at $20 billion or $30 billion – you’re getting $2 billion of cash – just that your return on assets metric will get skewed as a result.

Of course, if you compensate your management on the increase in book value per share instead of free cash flow, you will likely get a result where your management will pull out every derivative contract trick on the planet to artificially goose up the book value number. I suspect this may be the case if the report has any validity.

Either way, I have no position in Fairfax, and not too much interest either aside from watching this as a financial spectator.

Investing in AI – Corvel

I unintentionally made an investment in an AI company. You can read my original thesis on May 27, 2020. Like most companies around that time, it was trading heavily down during the Covid crisis. Indeed, my intentions were everything other than investing in AI at the time.

Fast forward nearly four years, the stock has rocketed upwards to valuations that are difficult to rationalize.

The company is operated by a reclusive management and they have very terse press releases. They quit doing their no-question conference calls (which gave slightly more colour to their business operations) after their January 2023 quarter. No analysts follow the company, there are no EPS estimates, and almost nobody knows that this company has a huge competitive advantage in its niche.

Amusingly, I have noted they have been using the two-letter “AI” phrase in the last few press releases.

On May 27, 2021, they first used the words “artificial intelligence” in their press release:

CorVel Corp. applies technology including artificial intelligence, machine learning and natural language processing to enhance the managing of episodes of care and the related health care costs. We partner with employers, third-party administrators, insurance companies and government agencies in managing workers’ compensation and health, auto and liability services. Our diverse suite of solutions combines our integrated technologies with a human touch. CorVel’s customized services, delivered locally, are backed by a national team to support clients as well as their customers and patients.

January 31, 2023:

The Company has also continued work in the area of digital transformation. Most recent efforts have focused on enhancing CorVel’s document repository system with AI-centric technologies. The advancements being implemented automate the extraction and codification of critical data, which can then be leveraged dynamically within systems. The development roadmap for the quarter and beyond includes increased automation and augmentation, which will further optimize bottom-line results and outcomes.

May 25, 2023:

In other areas, CorVel is moving forward quickly and intentionally, using generative AI in a closed-source data environment. The technology will be incorporated into CogencyIQ® service offerings and has extensive benefits. Most importantly, generative AI will elevate the work of claims professionals and allow more time to be spent interacting directly with injured workers. The reallocated time will ultimately improve the experience of injured workers and enhance partner outcomes.

August 1, 2023:

CorVel’s 1st generative AI initiative will be released in the September quarter. The release will reduce mundane, repetitive tasks and provide decision support at critical inflection points. This automation will add to the existing machine-learning tools with increasing capabilities within the system. The Company also views generative AI as an effective tool to mitigate labor challenges and provide guidelines for future generations of professionals. In the quarter, investments in the foundational systems and workflow processes continued to strengthen the results achieved with CorVel’s products and services.

October 31, 2023:

In the payables market, developments were made in both the revenue cycle management arm, Symbeo, and the treasury services department. At Symbeo, hyperautomation, a combination of AI, machine learning, and robotic process automation technologies, presents an expanded opportunity in the market. By using Symbeo’s payable solutions, partners receive the benefits of touchless digital invoices, AI enabled optical character recognition, a machine learning Document Classification model, configurable AP rules, and standard ERP integrations via Robotic Process Automation which provides faster invoice cycle times, lower total cost of ownership, and an enhanced user experience.

Finally, today, on January 30, 2024:

The implementation of generative AI initiatives has been proven to boost the efficiency and effectiveness of both the P&C and Commercial Claims teams. These updates have gradually reduced time spent on routine tasks, thus creating more time for essential activities that require critical thinking, directly impacting the user experience and results achieved.

…

With today’s earnings release (the 3rd fiscal quarter for the company), we have a past 12-months EPS of $4.32/share. The company historically has been able to slowly increase its per-share earnings both through a combination of higher net income and also through the deployment of a significant share buyback program which has been running for a couple decades – the capital allocation strategy appears to be holding about $100 million cash in the bank and dumping the rest of the free cash flow into buying back shares. While the company has been able to reduce its shares outstanding by 139,000 shares from December 2022 to 2023, much of the $55 million spent was to offset prior option issuances. Needless to say, with the stock price as high as it is, those equity options are all entirely in-the-money.

Focusing on the $4.32/share, this gives a backward-looking P/E of 55, which makes Corvel the richest (highest valuation) stock I currently own. The valuation has me concerned, but I can easily see a scenario where for some reason the hype decides to bid it up even further. It is very difficult to predict these things. Who is to say that the capitalized value of their software technology is not worth well greater than the $4 billion market cap? Maybe some insurance giant wanting to internalize their own software operations (and de-licensing competitors) would be a strategic bidder for $8 billion in stock? My guess is about as good as anybody else’s.

While this is still a top-5 in my portfolio, I did pare a little at the 200 level to justify my sanity a little bit. But instead of chasing Nvidia, I will take solace in this – at least the company itself is set to generate cash for a very, very long time.