Nothing really happening

Still waiting and seeing. I haven’t had many market inspirations lately. One of my positions has been significantly underperforming over the past month and this has contributed to some significant portfolio drag, which I am not entirely happy with since I was considering to jettison the thing before they got significantly hit on their last quarterly report. The underlying company’s liquidity has been less than ideal, but one would think they would have an incentive to find some sort of financing considering that its founder still has a double-digit percentage stake in the company.

My macroeconomic focus is less on geopolitical considerations (e.g. Syria) and more on what the impact of the anticipated reduction in US Federal Reserve policy accommodation will have on the economy. Clearly nothing good. Ironically I am thinking that longer term treasury bonds are looking attractive, but if those 10-year yields inch up above 3% then I think there would be a speculative position worth taking.

I also observe the REIT sector has taken a bit of a breather lately, but valuations are still nowhere close to where I would consider them attractive.

Over a quarter of my portfolio is in cash, and the majority of what I have invested in would be considered in the deep value category.

General Market Musings

There is no focus to this post, so be warned. It is mid-way through the 3rd quarter. I’ve been tempted to hit the “sell everything” button and go away for a few months and stick the rest of the cash into some mundane short-term cashable instrument earning 1.5%.

The S&P 500 is up 16.1% year-to-date, while the TSX is up a whopping 2.4%, likely due to the weightings of the commodity market, which have been hacked to death if you were not involved in the sales of hydrocarbons.

I look at the interest rate graphs of both the US and Canadian bond markets – the Canadian bond market is at 2.68% for 10-year money:

cdn-10yr

The USA 10-year bond is at about 2.83% for the same term. Either way, in both jurisdictions, interest rates have gone up a percentage point in a compressed time period, which is significant. With governments in deficit and high debt levels to be refinanced, higher interest rates means that the interest bite will be higher, and this will continue to act as a serious drag on the economy. Relatively speaking, Canada is better positioned to weather this than the USA, but Canada is more reliant on the commodity market, which does pose some concentration risk.

Gold has made a slight comeback from the dead:

gold

I still see significant headwinds for this commodity, mainly due to the appreciation of US currency and the breakage of the notion that gold is any safer than paper currency. The specific moment when I know gold will have finally bottomed is when I see a certain number of “gold for cash” retail outlets finally shut down and put up a “for lease” sign on their door front. Not yet, at present.

I am still very curious whether Fairfax’s macroeconomic call (making a fairly directional bet on deflation in the medium term future) is going to be realized or not. The market is giving Prem Watsa a bit more credit now, likely from his steadfast bet on the collapse of the US housing market. However, looking at their financials, they have virtually given up most of the upside the S&P 500 had over the past year and also are caught on the wrong side of the long term bond market. Their market value of $420/share is well above their book value (less goodwill and intangibles) of $360 and they look expensive at current prices. Still, if they went down some 15% or so, they would be a pretty good way of capitalizing on an economic collapse.

Right now I am sitting on slightly over a quarter of my portfolio in cash. I am waiting patiently. It is in the summer doldrums where relatively few major decisions are made by institutional managers because they are all out on vacation. After they get back in September I am anticipating things will be a little more interesting. However, there are a couple temptations out there which I believe people should be avoiding, most of which I have written about here before:

– The temptation to borrow short at low interest rates and to put the money into higher yielding instruments. Fantastic examples include those in the mortgage REIT categories, such as Annaly Capital Management (NYSE: NLY) or Two Harbors (NYSE: TWO) – sure, both of these give out yields in the low teens, but over the past three months did you want to see 30% of your capital evaporating? Canada’s equivalents, Equitable (TSX: ETC) and Home Capital (TSX: HCG) are somewhat similar businesses (with the notable exception that a good chunk of their packaged securities are backed with CMHC guarantees), but the key difference is that they are not insanely leveraged (just merely highly leveraged).

– The temptation to put cash into the markets just to have the money “working” and generating some sort of return. Sure, you can stick the cash into the S&P 500 and take a chance on it, but again, this is like a less extreme case than the previous bullet point, with just a bit more diversification. Rising costs of money, especially coming from the loosest monetary environment in modern history, will be causing distortions in the marketplace that will likely cause bouts of intense volatility. While there is a chance that some of this volatility might be upwards and you’ll miss out, why take the chance unless if you are targeting that cash into something genuinely trading under fair value with a good margin of error?

Being patient and waiting is boring, but it takes a bit of discipline to just simply wait. There is also the research radar which consumes time, but there hasn’t been much to pounce on other than a couple minor additions that I found in July. I’m not in a position to divulge either, but I was rather steamed that around the time one of those securities was making its all-time lows, somebody posted a rather good description of what I was thinking on Seeking Alpha (essentially the reason why it was truly undervalued and posed an excellent risk/reward ratio) and the security started to bounce back from its incredibly depressed levels and is currently up nearly 1/3rd from its low. What had been a reasonable and thoughtful accumulation (and indeed, when I see the “52-week low” price, that trade was MINE on the buy side), got completely hijacked by this article and pretty much nullified what was going to be a 15% position into a 5% position. Yuck. It pretty much cheesed me off that so much future performance got stripped by a public article when there was so much more value to be harvested from silly panic sellers. Oh well.

Blackberry and short sellers

The 145 million shares of Blackberry that were short sold are being rapidly covered over the past few trading days. The worst news they could have is that the company is interested in going private or being bought out, and this is primarily the reason why the stock is experiencing the price spike.

This is a little depressing for people that were looking to go long and have no position as this completely takes the company out of the radar now. When you’ve dumped many hours of research into something and see it go to waste like there, there is a little resentment, but now the research radar will get taken to other directions.

Blackberry and margin of safety

I have been analyzing Blackberry (TSX: BB) on-and-off since their last quarterly report disaster and gained a rather wide comprehension of the challenges facing the mobile sector. It is almost reminiscent of what happened in the personal computer space in the 1990’s, with the notable exception that in terms of marketing, mobile vendors (Canada: Telus, Bell, Rogers, USA: AT&T, T-Mobile, Sprint, Verizon, etc.) become a material consideration in terms of consumer acceptance of handheld devices. While in the PC-space, people would just purchase their computers outright (with the obligatory Microsoft Windows license), typically people purchase their handheld devices on an opaque financing plan where you pay the implicit fee of the phone that is baked into the monthly payment for mobile phone service.

Blackberry stock has been hammered over the past few years – any investor in the stock from 2011 and earlier is guaranteed to be in a loss situation:

bbry

Still, as many market participants are aware, from a financial perspective, at current valuations Blackberry is not that in rough shape – despite having a market cap of $5 billion at Friday’s close, they have about $2.8 billion cash in the bank, and still have a very significant revenue base, and most importantly, their technology platform is still top-notch and relevant. It appears the challenge at this point is from a marketing perspective.

None of these financial metrics are a secret and thus should not be a material consideration in terms of a purchase decision unless if one believes the market is somehow misreading the financial statements (which I do not believe is the case). Rather, the relevant variable to consider is whether Blackberry will retain some sort of presence in the market that will enable it to be profitable, whether it is through technical or marketing clout.

I generally do not believe that it is a requirement to be the mass-market leader in order to be profitable – rather, if they can continue carving out their typical niche in the corporate-type sector that they should continue to survive with acceptable profitability. Right now, Samsung through their Google Android offerings are mopping up the consumer market, but the industry is very flighty – Apple iPhone was all the rage a couple years ago, and tomorrow, who knows?

According to some survey data (and this was a quickly pulled off link from the internet and is not designed to be authoritative by any means and is strictly USA geography), Android controls about 50% of the market, and iPhone controls about 40%, and Blackberry is currently at around 5%. This could go up or down, but intuitively it is not a stretch to think that in the future more than 1/20 phones sold could be a Blackberry.

While the rumour last Friday about them potentially going private gave their stock a boost, I highly suspect that such rumours are simply about some hedge fund creating the news piece to allow it to bail out of an outsized position. I also doubt the regulatory environment would enable this transaction to occur.

Prem Watsa, through Fairfax, has a 9.9% stake in the company and also is sitting on the board of directors. He has a savvy, contrarian mind, and although the investment is probably somewhat out of his niche, I’m going to guess that he did have some staffers that are more in tune with the industry to give him some good advice on this one. His purchase price was considerably higher than existing valuations.

I’ve written about Blackberry (RIMM) before (link) and made a comment on analyst expectations – how important it is for potential investors to be purchasing when the expectations are low rather than high. In my June 2012 post, I noted the following estimates:

rimm

Today, we have the following estimates (noting the significant notch down after the last quarter update!):

rimm-expectations

Now, these are estimates that are getting close to worth investing in – mainly the February 2015 estimate of the company losing 80 cents a share (or about $410 million!). This is not a lofty goal for the company to achieve if they can maintain some sort of market presence. The number does assume a significant amount of erosion of the current customer base.

I am factoring in a high probability for the rest of 2013 that the company will continue to languish in the upper single digits as institutional investors attempt to offload shares for tax loss purposes and also the investors that invested into BBRY for the turnaround story likely will have their backs broken and will bail out – what fund manager wants to confess to holding this dog in their 2013 statements? However, the investment story at present is more compelling from a risk/reward ratio today than it has been over the past two years and I will be keeping a very sharp eye out for a potential entry. Obviously I’d like to see more negative sentiment baked into the stock price, and I certainly wouldn’t want to be paying any potential “takeover and go private” premium and will wait for this to blow over before considering my options.

Also not helping is my outlook on the macroscopic side of the market, which I believe is getting frothy on the equity side.

Tim Hortons financial engineering

I noted with some amusement that some shareholders of Tim Hortons have been clamoring for the company to financially leverage itself (via the Globe and Mail). I am not an investor in Tim Hortons and will likely never be, but I took a brief look at the financial metrics driving the company.

One can assume the company in Canada is relatively mature. There seemingly is a per capita rate of Tim Hortons of one per ten people. This has been the case in almost any region in the country I have been in.

So the push southward is a logical strategic focus for the company, except for the fact that they can’t gain any traction in the USA. I find this to be a curious phenomena since this is one of the few cultural differentiators between Canada and the USA that I can think of – intuitively there shouldn’t be any reason Tim Horton’s can’t be as successful in the USA, but there is seemingly something wrong with their product mix.

As such, when looking at the financial state of the situation, the company is trading at approximately 20 times earnings and they have succumbed to the vocal shareholders calling for a share buyback. Right now, Tim Horton’s debt level is $530 million, which is a relatively safe level given their cash flow generation (for the first half of the year, operational cash flow is at $258 million and free cash flow at $171 million). Also note that the company does give out a 26 cent quarterly dividend, which took out another $79 million in cash for the first half of the year. The proposal to lever the company another $900 million to do a buyback will not accomplish much other than destroying shareholder value and making the company as a whole more financially brittle.

I do not think $1.4 billion in debt is an unsafe amount of money for the company (although it is at the upper end of the threshold I would accept if I was on the board of directors), but it does seem unnecessary to exercise this buyback at existing valuations.

Although it can be assured that Tim Hortons will exist in some form in the indefinite future, will it always be as profitable as it is currently? I would steer clear of the shares.