The Teck Sweepstakes!

Glencore: Proposed Teck merger and coal demerger

What the heck is a “demerger”? Rhetorical question.

I see two events going on here. The very public event is the following slide on copper:

Glencore makes a case that there is a strategic synergy to utilizing QB2 facilities to improve efficiencies on its own project (Collahuasi), which you can see on a map are relatively close together:

It is a geographical advantage that the others (specifically BHP) does not have.

But really, this merger is all about coal.

With Teck, Glencore picks up 10 million tons a year of production and this will nearly double its Canadian production.

When working in its entire base of met and thermal operations, if you believe the slide deck, it will generate CAD$14 billion pre-tax cash. Needless to say, this would be a lot of money.

At Glencore’s stock price of about $7.60/share, it prices Teck (Class B) at around CAD$59/share. Notably this is below 10x analyst forward estimates, but given that most of the Capex has already been spent on QB2, Teck’s future free cash flows will be immensely higher in the future.

Thus, the price has to go higher. In addition, after the coal spinoff was announced, the market had Teck go up to around $62/share and I think that will be a psychological anchor point as a minimum.

Because Teck has a dual class structure, there is some inside baseball going on with the Class A shares. It could be possible they will be offered a sweetened deal, especially to the exclusion of Class B shareholders, and eventually agree to it.

There are cases where you hit the sell button after a proposed takeout offer. There are times where you hold on and wait for a better offer. The latter is likely the case.

I’m guessing a deal gets done in the mid to upper 60’s.

If not, there’s a ton of cash flow to be distributed in the future, especially with the Elk Valley spinout – will be interesting to see how much the market puts a price on political correctness.

After that, however, will be a regulatory nightmare that will make Shaw and Rogers look simple.

Late Night Finance with Sacha – Episode 24

Date: Wednesday, April 5, 2023
Time: 7:00pm, Pacific Time
Duration: Projected 90 minutes.
Where: Zoom (Registration)

Frequently Asked Questions:

Q: What are you doing?
A: Quarterly review, economic thoughts (the crystal ball is clearing up somewhat), and time permitting, Q+A. Please feel free to ask them on the zoom registration if any questions.
** LATE ADDITION (March 31, 2023): SPECIAL GUEST! I will be interviewing a professional in the GTA/Canadian commercial (retail/office/industrial/multi-family) real estate investment/development industry for a guest interview! This probably means the whole episode will go over 60 minutes. (April 4, 2023: Sadly he got sick and we can no longer do this interview).

Q: How do I register?
A: Zoom link is here. I’ll need your city/province or state and country, and if you have any questions in advance just add it to the “Questions and Comments” part of the form. You’ll instantly receive the login to the Zoom channel.

Q: Are you trying to spam me, try to sell me garbage, etc. if I register?
A: If you register for this, I will not harvest your email or send you any solicitations. Also I am not using this to pump and dump any securities to you, although I will certainly offer opinions on what I see.

Q: Why do I have to register? I just want to be anonymous.
A: I’m curious who you are as well.

Q: If I register and don’t show up, will you be mad at me?
A: No.

Q: Will you (Sacha) be on video (i.e. this isn’t just an audio-only stream)?
A: Yes. You’ll get to see me, but the majority will be on “screen share” mode with MS-Word / Browser / PDFs as I explain what’s going on in my mind as I present.

Q: Will I need to be on video?
A: I’d prefer it, dress code is pajamas and upwards.

Q: Can I be a silent participant?
A: Yes.

Q: Is there an archive of the video I can watch later if I can’t make it?
A: No.

Q: Will there be a summary of the video?
A: A short summary will get added to the comments of this posting after the video.

Q: Will there be some other video presentation in the future?
A: Most likely, yes.

Yield-seekers – a 13.3% coupon on investment-grade debt!

This is a couple months late, but one of the casualties of the high-CPI environment is the issue of debentures that Constellation Software (TSX: CSU) made many years ago.

At the end of every March, they update it to CPI plus 6.5%. This year, bondholders will get a coupon of 13.3%!

CSU has the right to call the debt with 5 years’ notice in the last 15 days of March each year, and otherwise it matures on March 2040.

If they exercise this right, and if the 13.3% coupon keeps up for the next five years (doubtful), you are looking at a 3.3% yield to maturity, due to the fact that the debt is trading at 38 cents over par.

But for current yield seekers, I find some humour that the largest coupon available on the debt market right now is from a top-rated company.

The next TSX-traded debt issuer that has the largest coupon is Valeo Pharma (TSX: VPH) with a 12.0% coupon. With a market cap of $44 million, it is miles away from the financial condition that CSU is in.

Liquidity needed! Race for the exits!

The fear over financial institutions is ramping up quite rapidly with Credit Suisse (NYSE: CS) next on the media radar for insolvency.

Pretty much every sector of the financial market is having a huge amount of supply pressure added to it, with the exception of gold commodity and long duration AAA debt.

Commodities, specifically oil and gas, are getting absolutely slaughtered over the past week, presumptively due to a forecasting of demand going off a cliff with the rest of the world economy.

Cash is an essential element in the portfolio – it just sits there and is generally disrespected until moments like these where it provides a layer of comfort.

Some surprises in this is that the CAD/USD is not lower than I would have thought given what is happening to fossil fuel pricing and the increase in VIX.

When central banks raise interest rates like they have, it was bound to cause some sort of financial earthquakes, but predicting where they hit is usually done only with the benefit of retrospect. The first casualty is improperly leveraged financial institutions. The spillover effects of this remain to be seen. Cash, however, is a good short-term defense.

The financial earthquake – some thoughts

Few appreciate liquidity until you don’t have it, and then everybody wants to rush out the exits – this is when you get price crashes.

With major US regional banks trading down significantly (examples: FRC, WAL, ZION, PACW) and with SI, SIVB and SBNY going into FDIC receivership, there will be some other consequences. I’ll write a few of them here:

1. The Fed is offering a “treasuries for par for one year” program. So if you were stupid enough to buy long duration last year, you’ve got a one year term grace period to figure things out – although inevitably your shareholders will have to choke on the loss (unless if the Fed really bails out everybody by dropping interest rates!). This can only be described as a time-limited QE action! However…

2. The yield curve has gone bonkers, with longer-term yields trading significantly down and the Fed Funds rates basically indicating one more quarter-point rate hike and that’s it:

3. Bitcoin and Gold have simultaneously received a huge bid, with BTC up +$4,000 to US$24,000 and an ounce of gold up $50 to $1915. There is obviously a huge pressure in the market for safety at the moment.

What is the big picture here?

1. A bank’s traditional model of riding the yield curve does not work very well in an inverted yield curve environment. The yield curve has been inverted for many months, and customers with zero-interest deposits are not going to be a stable source of capital if you’re running a bank;

2. The question of inflation – the central banks have a mandate to stamp inflation. This is also a function of what the BoC referred to as entrenched expectations of inflation. Ultimately the labour input function of inflation will get stamped down if we start seeing mass unemployment claims come to the fore. I’m suspecting that my prognostications of this happening in January-February 2023 (which I made later in 2022) are simply delayed – I’m going to guess we will see more of it coming, especially in the second half of the year;

3. “This can’t happen in Canada!” – the Bank of Canada in 2008 took considerable measures to backstop the major Canadian schedule 1 banks. The USA has JP Morgan, Bank of America and Citigroup, while Canada has Royal Bank and Toronto-Dominion as key global banks. While the stability of the banking system will be defended at all costs by central banks, whether equity/debt holders or not will take a bath is another question.

Let’s review the business model of a bank. Inherently it is a very simple business. You take deposits from customers and (usually) pay them for the right to hold their money for a time. Say your rate of pay is 2%. Parallel to this, you also lend money out to credit-worthy customers at a higher rate of interest. Say that you lend money out at 5%. In this example, for every dollar your are able to recycle, you get a 3% interest spread. Then you have to subtract all sorts of expenses relating to hiring staff, maintaining IT infrastructure, leasing branches across the country, etc., and after paying taxes on the residual, your shareholders make a profit.

Making a 3% interest spread is not efficient. To increase this amount, you do the procedure twice over – take in one dollar of customer deposits at 2%, and loan out two dollars to customers at 5%. You can do this because you have a deal with the central bank that if you keep a certain amount on deposit, you have a license to create money and leverage it off your net equity figure. If you can pull the 1:2 deal as described on this paragraph, then your effective margin is 6% on a dollar of deposits due to the power of financial leverage.

The magnitude of money you can earn is even greater if you raise a hundred million dollars in equity financing and use that to lend a billion to customers, which is typical for most banks.

Where does this blow up?

One is what happened to SI/SIVB/SBNY – the bank took their liquid customer deposits and dumped them into long-dated government securities which could only be sold for less than what they paid for it, coupled with the depositors wanting their money back, now.

The second mode of failure is if the customers you’ve loaned money to don’t pay back their loans. We haven’t seen this to any material degree (yet). However, if we start seeing defaults on construction loans in Canada, this might become material.

The third mode of failure is more subtle – for a prolonged period of time, you can’t obtain deposits from customers at a cheaper rate of interest than you can loan the money out for. This could happen if would-be depositors start to demand higher rates of interest, coupled with your customer screening division not being able to find credit-worthy customers to lend money to.

4. Financial companies in themselves do not generate wealth in an economy (i.e. manufacturing, farming, natural resource extraction, Netflix, etc.) but they facilitate it. Inevitably if the business that financial companies are financing are unprofitable, financing companies cannot be profitable by definition (businesses won’t be able to pay back loans). Companies that produce economic value, as measured by profitability, will survive this mess, while those participants that are forced to rely on low-cost capital will wither.

5. Hold onto your wallets, this will get pretty wild. I was originally thinking “sell in May and go away”, but perhaps I was a couple months too late with this prognostication.

More later.