What to do if the Robinhood traders grip one of your stocks

Perhaps my most speculative holding is Centrus Energy (AMEX: LEU). I wrote about their predecessor back in 2013 (they went through a recapitalization and name change) and have been keeping track of them ever since.

I won’t get into the investing thesis (or valuation) but LEU is a uranium processor for nuclear fuel. They originally took nuclear missile warheads and reprocessed their uranium cores into fuel for nuclear power plants, but now they obtain their raw material through Russian and French sources.

However, given the current hype on anything nuclear-related, and especially considering that LEU is one of the few publicly traded companies that are into such businesses, over the past couple months they have received obvious retail activity:

We look at the chart and see a stock that has more than doubled, but also with a serious amount of stock volume (after the secondary offering, there is a float of about 11.3 million shares). Examining the social media, we see that there is clear retail activity.

During these periods of retail mania there are extreme ups and extreme downs. You see this in any stocks that were relatively inactive but then gain a mass following – the daytraders, speculators and short-term technical traders dive in, and then it causes intensive volatility when they jointly decide to buy and sell. These ups and downs are very difficult (if not impossible) to time, but this is where you get people on Youtube making daytrading videos as they scale in and out of such positions.

Sometimes it is right to bail out in these situations, and sometimes you just have to hold on for dear life and get used to the notion of seeing a position in your portfolio gravitate 10% a day. I guess we’re all Bitcoin holders these days, even when we’re not holding them.

Broad picture thoughts – Post-Covid investing

This is going to be a rambling post.

My investing thesis post Covid-19 is simple – invest in companies producing real stuff, with the sweet spot being primary and secondary industries. I am sure there will also be tertiary winners (e.g. technology) but there is a lot of competition in this space and I am unlikely to pick out the winners relative to current market valuations (for instance, if it turns out that Microsoft is the winner in cloud computing, on their current US$1.6 trillion market capitalization, it might not turn out to be very profitable).

In terms of real stuff, somebody has to keep pulling the raw commodities out of the ground in order to fuel the real (not digital) economy. Companies will incur costs to do so, but ultimately the commodity itself will have value. In a depreciating dollar scenario, these commodities will organically exhibit price increases, all other variables being equal. This is a well known process.

However, ultimately commodity pricing is a function of supply and demand. In many industries, there was an assumption with most producing companies that they did not want to hold inventories during Covid, and took actions to streamline. This is quite apparent in the lumber industry, and it was not generally expected that people would be using their CERB or US-equivalent to improve their homes, build fences, and so forth. The result is that lumber prices have skyrocketed.

Other commodities that have exhibited forced price cuts (e.g. oil) are now being bidded up because liquid energy consumption is clearly headed toward normalization (an examination of the Google Map traffic is enough to be said here, but I am sure the economic engineering department of Google makes much better usage of the data than we can from our consumer perspectives).

Gold is also going crazy right now. I have encountered some friends inquiring about gold, and also people with gains on precious metal funds, and inquiries about how to obtain physical gold, and so forth. It is to the point where it is feeling frothy. Just because things are frothy does not mean they will become more frothy.

The underlying basis of demand is likely a combination of a natural increase from the recovery of Covid-19, coupled with a fright of dollar devaluation. In light of the US Government (and world governments in general) blowing out deficits in record magnitude, it is reasonable to think that joint devaluation of currencies will result in increased prices for everything, starting with commodities, but in general, the price of energy is the core to it all.

The quantity of energy consumed is generally a barometer of the health of civilization – this goes back for millennia. Our lifestyle is inevitably linked to the consumption of energy. Don’t get me started on the production economics of mining bitcoins!

Fossil fuels have been shunned upon for various reasons (carbon emissions) and renewable sources have been promoted, but there is a scale limit to how much renewables can be introduced before you incur significant tradeoffs – either significantly higher costs, or reduced reliability (the higher percentage of intermittent sources you have, the more you need to buffer them with dispatch-able energy).

Despite this, renewable sources have been deemed politically correct and have received sky-high valuations and subsidies.

I will make the claim that in terms of industrial levels of power generation, in North America we are reaching a scale limit to intermittent energy production. This will certainly not be a popular opinion or claim. The short story is that renewable energy cannot scale to high percentages in all jurisdictions on an individual grid. In California, for example, during mid-day it produces a ton of energy from solar sources (on a day like today, 11.8 gigawatts!), but broadly speaking, the following are very relevant questions:

a) How much did it cost to get those solar arrays up and going, and to maintain them;
b) How do you buffer the amount of energy on days where it is no longer sunny, or off-peak times?

Question (a) tells you the trade-off economics of building one type of power generation vs. another. Incomplete accounting makes intermittent power look cheaper both from a raw cost perspective (for instance, you do not have to include the cost of a backup source of power when the wind dies down, or the sun isn’t shining), but also with subsidies and omitting environmental costs of production.

The question of (b) is not trivial, but typically it involves a combination of natural gas, hydro, load-following base power (e.g. coal, but not in California!), storage (very expensive in industrial quantities) or imported electricity.

Essentially, somebody has to produce the supply to meet the electricity demand – this is why the more intermittent supply that is added to the power grid, the better it will be for fossil fuels – either you consume a ton of energy up-front to build up your solar arrays or storage solutions, or you consume it in natural gas. Jurisdictions with ample hydroelectric power (such as British Columbia) are also blessed with dispatch-able power, but building dams is a very expensive endeavour, both in raw costs and significantly increased political costs (permanently flooding land is not popular). In other words, for each incremental addition of intermittent energy sources that you rely on to fuel demand, you need a unit of dispatch-able power from somewhere.

The logical course of increasing intermittent resources can be seen in a place like Germany, where the cost of power has skyrocketed as they have removed coal and nuclear energy from their power grid, and attempted to replace it with solar, wind and tidal power. This is not viable without relying on others in the power grid.

One major event that will occur in the future (a matter of when, not if) will be a significant power grid failure that will have been instigated by having too much intermittent energy sources on the grid, without available backup from domestic or external grid sources. This may be caused by a freak transmission failure (cutting an intermittent-heavy grid from a dispatch-able heavy grid) or some other ‘black swan’ event. When this occurs, there will likely be a dramatic shift in power generation policy to increase the robustness of a domestic power grid.

The preceding few paragraphs lead to very political issues regarding energy production. Many will not agree.

This leaves me to my last point of nuclear energy. It has been shunned for a very long time (the documentary Chernobyl was great to watch although it did embellish in some scenes for dramatic purposes, the Fukashima reactor, etc. are all stories that are in the public consciousness), but this is going to change, for no other reason simply because to expand power generation capacity in a carbonless manner there isn’t much room to go other than nuclear.

This is not a call that Uranium commodity pricing will increase (it is a relatively abundant resource at present), but rather that an exploitable avenue is a resurgence of nuclear power in general. I do not know how that will take place, but if de-carbonization continues to be popular, it would be a logical conclusion to replace base load coal, and natural gas plants with nuclear energy. Reactor technology has significantly improved in safety, where Chernobyl-type disasters have no way of happening.

The other issue is that nuclear technology is (for obvious reasons) highly secretive and countries that have competitive advantages in nuclear energy will tend to keep them, in addition to competitive advantages associated with domestic-only production. In the USA, this means companies like BWX Technologies (NYSE: BWXT), who are more or less the sole-source provider for nuclear engines for naval vessels. I bought them post-COVID.

Finally, we have the nuclear materials themselves. While Uranium is a hyped up commodity, and domestically there is only one Canada/USA credible stable large-cap company specializing in its production (Cameco, TSX: CCO), there are also a bunch of other smaller cap companies, including Energy Fuels (TSX: EFR), Denison Mines (TSX: DML), Laramide Resources (TSX: LAM), NexGen (TSX: NXE). Even further down are a bunch of TSXV companies which I won’t bother listing.

However, the commodity itself faces considerable cost competition from central Asian companies, which makes uranium production in North America relatively uncompetitive unless if you believe that geopolitical constraints (e.g. trade embargoes) will then put North American producers on a level cost playing field. In that case, I would be much more interested.

The refinement of Uranium, however, is a much less competitive space (just ask the government of Iran how their attempts on Uranium enrichment is going for it), and a company that I took a modest position post-Covid was Centrus Energy (AMEX: LEU), which has had its stock take off to the point where I can now freely write about it. Be careful – it is very thinly traded and has a small float in absolute numbers (it is heavily insider owned). A case can be made that in an ideal scenario they will trade for much higher than their current price, which has more than tripled since their Covid lows. I’m sure now that I’ve written about it, they have peaked – the downside scenario is that the next generation of nuclear won’t move from the planning stages.

Centrus Energy (formerly USEC)

Centrus Energy (Amex: LEU) was formed out of the pre-packaged Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings of the entity formerly named USEC Inc.

LEU since recapitalization (September 30, 2014)
LEU since recapitalization (September 30, 2014)
LEU - 5 year chart (adjusted for reverse stock split)
LEU – 5 year chart (adjusted for reverse stock split)

The corporation primarily derived its revenues from reprocessing Uranium from nuclear warheads from Russia and the USA. The reprocessed nuclear fuel was then sold to nuclear power facilities. It was a reasonably profitable activity – for example, in 2006 and 2007, the company earned roughly $100 million in after-tax income.

In addition, the company is working on a centrifuge project that would allow for the cost-effective (compared to gas diffusion) enrichment of low-grade enriched uranium. These enrichment projects, as Iran is discovering (and they are attempting to produce weapons-grade uranium), are not trivial tasks to overcome. Imagine being given a million ping-pong balls, and half of them weigh 1% lighter than the others – how do you separate them?

Things changed with the business. The contract with Russia expired (and diplomatic relations between the countries had soured anyhow). Nuclear energy after the Fukushima reactors blew up took a massive hit. The market for Uranium had essentially peaked in the early 2000’s and pretty much now most producers are on life support if your name is not Cameco or subsidiaries of Uranium One. We fast forward in 2014 and the company cannot pay back its $530 million in convertible notes and is forced to recapitalize.

The recapitalization left the company with $240 million in notes to existing note holders and preferred share holders and 95% of the equity. This also left USEC equity holders with 5% of the company. These shares continued to trade down some 50% post-recapitalization until the remaining entity has a market cap of about $50 million and $240 million in notes.

In terms of the balance sheet, things are very ugly. At the end of 2014, while they do have $220 million in cash, they have significant pension liabilities and also considerable negative tangible equity. On the income side, they have negative gross margins and without a real market for nuclear fuel, which is stocked up for the remainder of this decade.

So what could possibly be an investment case for this company?

It deals with the centrifuge project. One would suspect that this is an item of USA national security and that there would be geopolitical considerations to keeping it alive for future purposes. Accounting-wise, this project does not really appear on the balance sheet except as intangibles. One could argue that the “true” value of the project is worth much more than what appears on the balance sheet.

A very condensed consideration of nuclear energy at this point in time:

One also has to weigh in the factor that world uranium supplies have not been mined as intensively given the relatively low prices seen in the last decade. Nuclear power plant construction has also slowed down due to the 2011 Japan earthquake, but China is building more than 20 reactors, and this is higher than Germany’s 9 (which will be shut down). It is likely China will continue building more nuclear reactors to replace their coal power plants (pollution being one reason).

Japan is a wildcard – they currently have 43 reactors operating and the current government’s intention is to continue producing nuclear power. India is also expanding their nuclear generation portfolio (noting that their nuclear production is going to increase 70% in the next two years – reference Cameco).

Oil and gas does not explicitly compete with nuclear power because of how the power is generated – nuclear power provides base loads, while gas powered plants can be turned on and off relatively quickly and are peak load providers. Nuclear plants are direct competitors to coal powered plants.

Management

Centrus’ first real act was to hire the former deputy secretary of the US Department of Energy in the US federal government. His rolodex must be quite large and considering that the Republican-held congress has made some inquiries is probably a better sign than not that the new CEO carries a bit of clout as Centrus is fairly dependent on US government funding at present.

The investment thesis

The short part of the story is that the stock is trading extremely low simply because there is a culmination of nearly every single bad circumstance for the production and sale nuclear fuel. If these variables were to change, it would appear that a $50 million market cap for this sort of company would be extremely low. While it is not likely that they will ever get back to the days where they will earn $100 million in net income, there is a considerable chance they could generate positive income of some quantity.

Other than pension liabilities, the other primary liability the company has are its US$240 million in notes, which are structured for maturity on 2019 but can be extended to 2024 if the centrifuge project goes ahead. In 2015, the notes accrue 5% cash interest and 3% payment-in-kind (in the form of more notes), while in 2016 and beyond, the notes accrue 2.5% interest and 5.5% payment-in-kind (in the form of more notes). They will not be a huge financial burden until maturity.

Past history would suggest that the company would recapitalize these notes if solvency became an issue again.

The last reported trades on TRACE of any real size (i.e. par value of $100,000 or greater) was at 45 cents on the dollar, which is hardly a ringing endorsement by the bond market. Assuming a 2019 payout, that would be roughly a 25% yield to maturity.

TRACE prices of LEU 8% notes (maturing September 30, 2019 or 2014)
TRACE prices of LEU 8% notes (maturing September 30, 2019 or 2014)

The risk-reward here on both the equity and debt are high risk and extremely high reward if things work out for the nuclear fuel industry. There are a ton of what-ifs to consider, but one would think the worst-case outcome for Centrus at this point is bleeding cash until another recapitalization in 2019 (I’d guess you’d see a maximum of 50% downside but it should be reasonably obvious that they are going nowhere). In terms of upside, if all the stars lined up correctly, you could see a 10-bagger over a few years. I have no idea what the probability of this would be, but I’d ballpark it at 10-30%.

This is also a rare company that would likely be bidded significantly higher in the event of a nuclear detonation occurring somewhere in the world, although they would likely be sold if there was a civilian nuclear power plant incident (in line with Chernobyl or Fukushima).

The financial statements otherwise are nearly useless in terms of properly trying to value the company.

Final note

There is a lot of analysis work that I have performed here that is not in this post, but the previous 1,000 words roughly summarizes the investment. A whole bunch of commodity risk, political risk, technology risk and financial risk.