Strange times

This is a post without much direction.

Canadian Macro

Perhaps the largest surprise to occur in the past two weeks was the Bank of Canada deciding to resume interest rate increases. I generally believe that this is an attempt to shake up complacency in the marketplace and that we are approaching the point of diminishing returns. By increasing future implied interest rate expectations, however, is in itself a form of interest rate increase. So we continue to have the triple barreled approach – actual rising interest rates, threatened future interest rates, and quantitative easing. Interest rates started rising on March 2, 2022 and we are about 15 months into the program. As capital hurdle rates have increased and projects that otherwise would have been initiated stall out, we’re probably going to start seeing this slowdown occur pretty soon.

The yield curve remains heavily inverted – right now you can get a 1yr GoC yield of 5.07%, while 10yr is 3.40%, a 167bps difference.

GST/HST inputs, from fiscal 2021-2022 to 2022-2023 (table 2), only rose 2.7% year-to-year, which is a negative real growth in GST-able consumption. This does not bode well overall.

I look at the inflation inputs and it seems intuitive that cost increases will continue to rise above the 2% benchmark – especially on shelter. The interest rate environment (in addition to other roadblocks) is seriously constraining supply, yet demand continues to remain sky-high (one of the effects of letting in a whole bunch of people into the country, including students, which massively raises rental rates in cities).

Inefficient spending

One of the problems of using GDP is that it doesn’t account for unproductive expenditures vs. productive expenditures. If you paid somebody a million dollars to move a pile of dirt from one location to another, and then back again, you would have a million dollars added to the GDP, but the wealth of the country has gone nowhere. That money could have been used for something more productive. If you get enough of this inefficient spending, it starts to show itself in other components of the economy – namely demand for goods/services that clearly are not being supplied because you’ve tasked too many people with moving piles of dirt from one location to another and back again. Those people could have been employed in another activity, say road building, which is a more skillful (and productive) use of moving dirt from one location to another.

It is pretty much the reason why much government spending is inefficient – it gets directed to segments of the economy which are for political purposes rather than productive purposes. Do this enough, and you eventually get inflationary effects in the things that people really need.

A lot of what we have seen over the past 15 years or so can likely be attributed to the cumulative effects of this. While governments are the chief culprit, the private sector as well has significant bouts of inefficient capital allocation (e.g. look at the value destruction in the cannabis sector, or most cryptocurrency ventures, etc.). The “slack” of the misdirection of resources has been exhausted after Covid, and the cumulative impact is truly obvious – a lot of people are going to suffer as a result, and collectively our standard of living will be declining.

Nifty 50 re-lived

The nifty 50 were the top 50 stocks in the US stock market in the 1970’s. Today, the top 10 stocks of the S&P 500 consist of about 30% of the index and many comments have been made about the effect of these stocks on the overall index. In particular, the rebound in technology stocks since November 2022 has caught many fund managers by surprise, and it is to the point where essentially if you did not own them (Facebook/Meta, Nvidia, etc.), most closet index fund managers would have badly underperformed. Perhaps it is sour grapes from somebody like myself (where I am barely treading water for the year), but this just does not look healthy.

Safe returns

Cash (various ETFs) return about 5.08% at the moment. For yield-based investors this is a very high hurdle. For example, looking at A&W Income Fund (TSX: AW.UN) with its stated yield of 5.3% – while you do get a degree of inflation protection, how much can burger prices rise before you start seeing volume slowdowns (and it is volume, not profitability that counts for these types of royalty companies)? Cash is out-competing much of the market right now. With every rise in the short-term interest rate, the differential widens.

Everybody looks at the charts of long-term treasury bonds in the early 1980’s and said to themselves “if only I had gone all-in on those 30-year government bonds yielding 15%, I would have made out like gangbusters”. This is almost the equivalent of saying your ideal timing into the stock market is February 2009, or March 23, 2020. The problem with such statements, other than they are entirely “hindsight is 20/20”, is that in order to get those 15% yields, such a bond needs to trade at 10%, 12%, 14%, etc., before reaching that 15% point. Valuations that would seem attractive and bought before that 15% yield point will have unrealized losses, sometimes significant, at the crescendo event. This is usually the point where most leveraged players are forced to be cashed out at the violent price action.

Parking cash is boring, and likely will result in the loss of purchasing power over periods of time (the CPI is a terrible barometer for ‘real’ consumer inflation), but better to lose 5% of purchasing power instead of 40% in a market crash!

Implied volatility

The so-called ‘fear gauge’ (the 1-month lookahead volatility of the S&P 500) is getting down to 2019 lows:

I don’t know what to make of this. Markets price surprises and probably the biggest surprise is a rip to the upside, despite all of the doom-and-gloom that the macro situation would otherwise suggest – perhaps interest rates are going to rise even further than most expect?

Either way, I’m not going to be a market hero. I remain very defensively postured and I do not feel like I have much of an edge at the moment. When you had everybody losing their heads over Covid three years ago there was a ripe moment where the reality vs. psychology mismatch created huge opportunities. Today, the normalization of this reality vs. psychology has created much more efficient market pricing. I can’t compete in this environment which feels like trading random noise. Maybe the AIs have whittled away the differential between reality and psychology – but they are only as good as the data that gets fed into them, and markets tend to exhibit random patterns of chaos now and then which will throw off the computers. So I wait.

If you ever wonder why I can’t work in an institutional environment, it is due to having some radical thoughts like the last paragraph.

US Regional Banks

Like a moth flying around a campfire, it is easy to fly in and get incinerated. But I can’t resist looking at more of these regional banks. When you have a lot of third parties claiming to be purchasing puts on the next one bound to be FDIC’ed (the earthquake, in my view, appears to be finished), one would suspect that there is going to be a boomerang effect on these entities as shorts get cleaned out.

The one I’ve been looking at is Customers Bankcorp (NYSE: CUBI), notably because it doesn’t pay a common share dividend and is trading well below book value.

By most accounts it is not an atypical regional bank. It does the usual stuff. The borrow, however, has jacked up from 50bps to 800bps over a month.

In many instances, looking at a chart before the 2020 Covid crisis hit should be a reasonable barometer of economic health of these firms. Indeed, CUBI at this era was around $20-25/share, which is its present trading price.

However, 2019 featured something that we do not have today. A positively sloped yield curve.

Playing around with the dynamic yield curve chart, the short term to long term curve has nearly always featured a positive slope for most of the 2010’s decade.

Today that is heavily negative.

So while there is an argument to be made that entities such as CUBI can run off their books and an investor can claim capital appreciation, theoretically speaking the economic environment for a bank (traditionally having a finance model of “lend long and borrow short”) continues to remain incredibly adverse to profitability, especially as more and more customers want to escape zero/low-yield purgatory for idle cash and can do so with a click of a few mouse buttons.

This moth is happy to stay away from the campfire.

Bank of Canada QT Progression

Another $23 billion of Canadian government bonds matured off the Bank of Canada balance sheet on May 1:

What’s interesting is that the Government of Canada ordinarily will receive a lot of tax remissions by April 30. In the past couple years, between the last April data point and the first May data point, the number spiked up about $10 billion, but this time the amount was up less than a billion dollars. Spend, spend, spend!

The $182 billion in bank reserves remaining continue to earn member institutions a very adequate 4.5% deposit rate – I’m sure the public really loves the annualized $8.2 billion dollars (that’s about $210 per Canadian!) being graciously donated to the big banks, risk-free. Why bother lending money to customers when you can get it so good from the BoC?

The next few slabs of QT are $6 billion on June 1, $9 billion on August 1, and $24 billion on September 1.

How not to sell an ETF

If you ever wanted to liquidate $2 million dollars of the CASH.to ETF in the last four seconds of trading, look what happens!

I could not imagine went on in the mind of somebody punching this order into the computer. Reading the tape, those sitting at around $49.75 on the limit would have received a reasonable fill and this is the financial equivalent of picking up the freest half a basis point on the planet.

Processing the entrails of First Republic Bank

In highly anticipated news, First Republic (NYSE: FRC) went bye-bye over the weekend.

As long as the yield curve remains inverted and quantitative easing continues, financial institutions are going to receive continued pressure and the “too big to fail” institutions will be the ones to vacuum up the money.

Think of it this way – behind each bank asset (a customer loan) is a bank liability (a customer deposit). If the asset to liability situation goes out of regulatory proportions (e.g. you took your customer loans and invested in them in high-duration government debt and suddenly your customer wants their deposits back and you can’t pay it), you get FDIC’ed. However, when the FDIC process occurs, it is not as if all of that capital goes away – it has to go somewhere. It doesn’t end up as paper banknotes inside the safe or underneath the couch, but rather it goes to another financial institution. The assets and liabilities go somewhere else within the financial net – they do not vanish!

In this case, it appears destined that the assets in this digital financial world (where assets get transferred with mouse clicks) will bubble up to the systemically important banks.

I’ve been trying to pick away at the entrails of the lesser banks within the USA, but I don’t have a clue how to project who will survive and who will not. So I’ve given up.

I will leave this post with one amusing note. Financial releases go through plenty of review cycles within management, but if they can’t spell the word “average” correctly, it is trouble: