Encana deal a signal of future natural gas prices

Encana’s deal with PetroChina, where it sold a 50% interest for $5.4 billion dollars in their Cutbank Ridge property is likely a signal that management believes natural gas prices will remain depressed relative to the run-up experienced in the middle of 2008. The management of PetroChina likely disagrees or is trying to rapidly deploy capital even if they have to pay an expensive price in doing so.

Although the exact terms of the deal are not known, an injection of $5.4 billion in cash leaves Encana in a fairly unleveraged financial position – their total debt at the end of December 2010, net of cash is about US$6.5 billion. Encana will also be spending most of its operating cash flows on capital projects in 2011.

OPTI Canada – Not looking too good

OPTI Canada owns an equity stake in an oil sands operation. Equity investors in OPTI Canada (TSX: OPC) have not been feeling too good lately – the latest catalyst to their downfall has been them sacking their prior consultants that they employed failed to find “strategic alternatives” (a.k.a. creative financing or an outright sale).

The following is a chart of their recent trading:

Equity investors have lost about 60% of what remains of their investment.

Looking quickly at the financial statements is a company that has a massive amount of debt and little chance of being able to pay it off. They have a total debt of about $2.6 billion. One major maturity will start on December 15, 2012 – approximately $525 million. As there is no chance of internal cash flows being able to pay off this amount in the next 22 months, they will either have to renegotiate some package with their creditors or take their chances in bankruptcy court. Either way, the equity investors in OPTI still look like they are holding an overvalued stock.

Bond traders are not faring much better – OPTI has two issues of senior secured notes, due 2014 and par value of $1.75 billion – they are now trading at 49 cents on the dollar, down from 80 cents back in November 2010. These bonds are effectively junior to $850 million of other debt that is due to mature at an earlier date.

The Priszm Income Trust soap opera continues

I have been writing a lot about Priszm Income Fund – a horribly broken trust going through massive financial restructuring.

Today, they announced:

TORONTO, Jan. 19 /CNW/ – Priszm Income Fund (TSX: QSR.UN) (“Priszm” or the “Company”) reported today that the Company has executed a forbearance agreement to extend the maturity date of its senior debt facility, including the payment of all interest accrued but unpaid to January 31, 2011. In addition the senior debt lender will temporarily suspend action to exercise its remedies for the Company’s defaults in respect of the existing terms of its senior debt facility. As part of the agreement, the Company is not permitted to make payments in respect of obligations that are subordinated to the senior debt facility, other than those relating to the direct operation of the business in ordinary course.

The senior debt lender and the Company also executed a separate short-term financing agreement that provides the Company a supplemental facility of up to $4 million to ensure the business has sufficient liquidity to continue operations while a longer-term plan is developed. The facility bears interest of 10% per annum with a maximum one draw per week and matures January 31, 2011.

Translating this into English, the company received a $4M bridge loan in exchange for the creditors not pushing the company into bankruptcy. As part of this loan, the company cannot make payments to subordinated obligations, which would also include the subordinated convertible debentures, amongst other things.

After my January 8, 2011 post regarding the convertible debentures (TSX: QSR.DB), I entered into the market on January 10 and bought $20k face of the debentures at 19 cents on the dollar. My expectations were that the debentures would settle at a value of around 30-35 cents on the dollar. I was aiming for a bit more size on the position, but QSR.DB is illiquid and I did not catch many liquidators on the bid. Today, I sold $19k face for an average of 21.95 cents on the dollar, approximately a 9% gain over my January 10th purchase. After commissions, this will pay for a few sushi dinners. I still hold $1k face value (approximately $230 market value) for entertainment and educational purposes – I want to see how this drama resolves itself. There is also a very slight (and I emphasize very slight, as in less than 5%) chance that the debentures will be redeemed at par by June 2012.

My theory about the valuation of the company changed significantly after some subsequent research and deeper analysis – when the company announced it was exploring a “sale of all assets”, any cash flow generation would have been likely gutted out of the company, leaving purely administrative expenses associated with running a publicly traded company. The company does not have a massive amount of future tax assets which ordinarily gives such unprofitable operations some market value. Assuming the $200k/franchise level that was achieved in the previous sale applied across the 200 remaining franchises would have rendered the company with approximately $40 million further cash, which would have not been enough to pay liabilities, let alone the debentures.

When you bake in costs of restructuring and/or bankruptcy, there is not much value in the debentures – they will likely be given some sort of settlement offer at a deep discount to face value to get them out of the way. This is when I will get rid of the other $1k face value I own.

The Priszm story continues

I wrote last week about Priszm Income Fund (TSX: QSR.UN) earlier, especially about their near-bankruptcy situation they are currently facing.

Today, they announced that the transaction to liquidate over half their franchises was proceeding, but subject to approvals by two consenting partners, the franchiser (YUM Brands) and the senior creditors. Notably in the release there were two statements:

Although there is no guarantee that the required approvals will be obtained or that the remaining conditions will be satisfied, the transaction is scheduled to close on February 28, 2011 unless the parties agree otherwise.

Presumably February 28th was the mutual date that the various parties agreed to in order to see if they could pursue something a little more substantial, alluded to in the next paragraph of the press release:

The Company also reported that it remains in discussions with its senior debt lender and franchisor on various options to restructure the business which may include the sale of all assets. The Company’s interim agreement with its franchisor, YUM! Restaurants International, with respect to the franchise agreements for 70 restaurants expired on January 15, 2011 as did its interim agreement to defer unpaid continuing fees. The Company continues to work with the two key stakeholders to come to both short and long-term resolutions that are mutually satisfactory.

As of September 5, 2010, the company has a senior credit facility of $65 million to pay off; the aforementioned agreement to sell over half the franchises would result in gross proceeds of $46 million. The company also has about $41 million in other current liabilities and accruals. The subordinated debentures amount to $30 million face value.

It remains to be seen whether the company can generate enough cash through asset sales to pay off the creditors and liabilities; at the current trading price of 21 cents per debenture, the residual value predicted by the marketplace amounts to $6.3 million.

There were 432 franchises as of the September quarterly release, leaving 200 franchises after the execution of the sale agreement.

Davis + Henderson – Valuation

Markets indeed move quicker than most anticipate, and I can say the same for the common shares of Davis + Henderson (TSX: DH) as I have unloaded them today for a mild profit. Readers may recall my entry into the former income trust units, and partial sale in October of last year.

I have no concerns with the underlying business – although I have concerns with the speed of their acquisitions – it assumes that management can execute on proper integration. The balance sheet of DH is less than stellar, with about negative $224 million in tangible equity, but their debt levels (about $200 million in low cost debt) is manageable in relation to their cash flows (due for about $100 million after CapEx in the 2010 year). They will be giving off about $100 million in distributions to income trust holders in 2010, however. In 2011 the situation will change somewhat as they reduce distributions by 35% and will also incur an income tax (which will cut their cash flows by about 27-28%).

Most people will look at the headline yield number (roughly 5.8%), but the company should be evaluated on cash flow generation rather than the dividends they give out. On a free cash flow basis, they should be generating about $75 million after the trust conversion or about $1.39/share. Given their share price, this works out to a P/E of roughly 15, or a 6.7% combined yield. It is a healthy valuation considering the various businesses they are involved with.

The capital will likely be better invested in other options throughout the year but presently the pickings are slim on the Canadian side. I suspect 2011 will involve a lot of waiting.

It wouldn’t surprise me to see DH go up to $23/share if they show they have executed well on their acquisitions, but I’m happy to get out now – my initial valuations were also somewhat fuzzy since I don’t have a full comprehension of their industry. Most of the gains from the price they traded at after they did their corporate conversion plan have been realized with the existing stock price. No point in getting greedy right now.