Lulu – Gaga

Although I like looking at fashion companies for their financial statements, when it comes to the wares they are selling, I am absolutely clueless. I have to ask others that know much more about the fashion aspect of clothing companies for their anecdotal opinions.

Never have I been so wrong about Lululemon:

Obviously this train ride has to end somewhere, but I just look at this chart with my jaw open. Reference my December 2010 post when I was questioning the high $2.8 billion valuation. Today: $6.3 billion.

He has power to move markets

John Hempton of Bronte Capital writes very entertaining articles. Most of his extensive postings are about companies that have “issues”, such as his strong suspicions of financial wrongdoing at the Chinese company Universal Travel Group (NYSE: UTA).

His latest spread is regarding Northern Oil and Gas (NYSE: NOG), which I found thoroughly fascinating, for a few reasons.

The first reason is that my earlier article on Petrobakken (TSX: PBN) and its steep decay rate of oil flowing from newly drilled Bakken-shale wells assisted his thinking with respect to NOG’s depletion rates. He is very gracious to link to my article.

The second reason is that apparently the rest of the market has “picked up” on Northern Oil and Gas’ low rate of expending of depletion and has decided to price this in (note the article hit the wires on Tuesday, although it seemingly was digested on Wednesday):

Interestingly enough, before this all hit the wires, NOG had about 20,000 shares available for borrowing at Interactive Brokers. Today there are none.

Thirdly, he writes good analysis. There is good reason to be skeptical of NOG’s management and their intentions. Even disregarding that, it does appear the valuation of the company is well above fair value. That said, the company’s balance sheet does show a net cash position (assuming those balances are truly there!), so the shares are most certainly worth something, unlike most of the other likely frauds that Hempton has been writing about.

Disclosure: No positions in any stocks mentioned in this article, nor do I intend on opening any. I’m watching this purely for entertainment value, although others likely have money on the line.

The trend is clearly broken

The uptrend in the major indicies over the past six or seven months has clearly been broken. Here is a chart of the S&P 500 with my retrospective scribble on the chart, indicating the prevailing trend:

Note that volatility has increased considerably:

VIX is not predictive; however, it does say that market participants have been spooked to pricing in more volatility in the future. The question is whether they are spooked enough – my gut instinct says we may get a sucker rally here or there, but it is more likely than not that the prevailing trend will either be choppy or down – not exactly the type of environment for a buy and hold investor.

Playing conservatively is likely the better option at this point, just as it has been for the past few months.

Quick review of some large cap technology stocks

I am continuing to look at the US large cap sector, just for personal review rather than serious consideration. I am continued to be surprised by relatively good valuations, around the 10% yield levels. Most of these are in the first-generation “old-school” technology sector. Very well-known companies include the following, with some very anecdotal remarks on my behalf:

Microsoft (MSFT) – Trading at 9.3x FY2012 projected earnings, with $30B net cash on balance sheet, Windows/Office empire continued to be chipped away at with competition;
Intel (INTC) – Trading at 9.5x FY2012 projected earnings, $20B net cash on balance sheet, likely to be around for a long time, competition in mobile processors, but nothing in really ‘large scale’ CPUs except AMD;
Dell (DELL) – Trading at 8.6x FY2012 projected earnings, $8B net cash, well-known customer support/service issues, but otherwise entrenched in computer/IT market;
Hewlett-Packard (HPQ) – Trading at 7.3x FY2012 projected earnings, $10B net debt, along with Dell, entrenched in computer/IT market;
Lexmark (LMK) – Trading at 7.7x FY2012 projected earnings, $600M net cash, major supplier in printer/imaging market;
Xerox (XRX) – Trading at 8.3x FY2012 projected earnings, $8B net debt, in a similar domain as Lexmark;
Seagate (STX) – Trading at 7.2x FY2012 projected earnings, $0 net cash/debt, hard drive/storage manufacturer;
Western Digital (WDC) – Trading at 9.3x FY2012 projected earnings, $3B net cash, in a similar domain as Seagate;
Micron Technology (MU) – Trading at 8.4x FY2012 projected earnings, $600M net cash, memory manufacturer;

One would think that diversifying a position into these nine companies and calling it the “Old-school technology fund” would probably be considered a relatively safe alternative over the next 10 years, compared to the 3.4% you would achieve with a 10-year US treasury bond.

My gut instinct would suggest that these companies would still be around in 10 years, especially Intel, which has the biggest competitive advantage out of the nine listed above.

I am also assuming that smarter eyeballs than my own have looked at these companies, which is why I suspect there isn’t much extraordinary value here other than receiving a nominal 10% return on equity, which is pretty good for zero research.

Petrobakken – Value trap

(Update, June 23, 2011: Readers may be interested in further coverage of Petrobakken by clicking here.)

Petrobakken (TSX: PBN) has been on the top of my radar screens for oil and gas companies for quite some time. The reason is fairly simple – it appears to be a high-yielding security that has a large amount of reserves and land rights. During my extensive investigations of this company during the autumn of 2010 (when the common equity was at around $23/share) I rejected PBN as an investment candidate.

The past three years of trading have had investors seen their better days in earlier times:

The drop in late 2008/early 2009 can be attributed to the economic crisis and the decrease in oil prices, but the price drop lately can be solely attributed to financial management. In 2009 and 2010 the company engaged in a series of significant purchases with companies with large holdings in the Bakken oil fields (southeastern Saskatchewan). It also has significant holdings in the Cardium (roughly northwest of Calgary and south of Edmonton). These acquisitions were very costly and ended up hurting shareholders.

The company is paying off about $180M/year in dividends to its shareholders when it is spending far above its operational cash flow to drill for more wells in order to keep its production levels steady.

The large dividend yield probably serves as a psychological crutch for investors, in addition to providing its parent company, Petrobank (TSX: PBG), with a cash stream. Petrobank owns roughly 60% of Petrobakken. This appears to be a classic example of knowing the risks of investing in companies that are majority-held or controlled – a retail investor’s interest may not be in alignment with the parent company, and when this is the case, you may receive an adverse outcome.

The big operational issue in the Cardium and Bakken fields is that your production falls off steeply after the initial drilling (as opposed to your typical Steam-assisted gravity drainage project that a company like Cenovus does):

Although the capital expenditure can be justified, the economics are not as pleasant as what most people may anticipate by looking at the “trend” of oil production based on first year results. Most of the growth in revenues has to be looked at with the knowledge that the first year of wells will be extraordinarily high, while the second and subsequent years will have slower, but steadier production.

In 2010, PBN took in about $562M in operational cash flow, but they also spent $36M repurchasing their common shares (questionable given their balance sheet), $812M in capital expenditures, $483M in corporate acquisitions (mainly for land rights discussed previously). When you net everything together, the company had to borrow $750M in cheap financing (6-year notes, 3.125% coupon) and also maintain a line of credit with a bank ($825M outstanding of $1.2B available) in order to finance all of this spending and payouts.

Although the company is producing a lot of operational cash flow (in particular, they like quoting the statistic funds flow from operations, which was $3.51/share in 2010), in order to maintain this cash flow they need to continue spending significant sums of money on capital expenditures.

The valuation then becomes a matter of determining the decay rate of the various wells drilled on the Bakken/Cardium fields and the prevailing price of oil – and there are smarter people than myself that can model the decay rate better.

Most retail investors, however, would just look at the dividend yield at the current $19.60/share and say “Wow, look, 4.9%!” and buy in, not realizing that the company has probably hit the point where it can’t borrow money as cheaply as it has in the past. If you look at the GAAP net income, 26 cents per share does not look that impressive compared to the share price. One does have to model for a significant amount of depreciation (which is a non-cash expense that represents money already paid for drilling) in order to receive a more relevant free cash-flow figure.

This is not to say that Petrobakken is not a legitimate oil company – just that to my knowledge, its equity valuation does not represent an under-valuation at present, even factoring in the existing price of oil.