Category: Equity

Payment for liquidity – anatomy of a margin call

When you go to a bank and ask for their rates on 1-year GICs, you usually get two responses – the rate for the cashable GIC and the rate for a locked-in GIC. You will receive a larger rate if you are willing to commit your money for a longer time period, at the penalty of having no interest if you want early access to your cash. The rate differences can be considered a payment for liquidity.

In the stock markets today, people are paying heavily for liquidity.

As an example, one of my top holdings, Rogers Sugar (TSX: RSI), tanked in trading because somebody needed liquidity, fast:

At 9:56 (eastern), the bid/ask was already being pushed down. It was at bid/ask 4.90/4.92 and then somebody wanted to get rid of about 100,000 shares quickly. In the span of five seconds, they took down the asking price 44 cents to $4.50 and then in the course of ten seconds there were 58,190 shares traded between 4.46 and 4.90. The bulk of the trade was done at the price of $4.50 where 35,400 shares changed hands.

This is the type of trading activity that occurs when somebody is undergoing a margin liquidation. They are paying a 40 cent per share premium for the privilege of wanting cash right now.

Generally speaking if you were on the opposite ends of these types of liqudiations you will receive a very, very good price. However, the window of opportunity you actually have to react to such liquidations is very, very tiny – you had about 1 second to hit somebody’s ask at 4.50 before somebody else picked it up. This is why computer trading is so prevalent in the marketplace – they are out there looking for such prospects.

When the market needs liquidity it does not matter what the fair value of the underlying security is – it will go at whatever price others want to pay for it. This can be much lower than the existing market value or what would be a rational valuation for the underlying company.

Markets getting slammed – how to trade in a downturn

The equity markets have been getting slammed (down about 3% currently) and bond yields have correspondingly dived as people search for safety. Most notably, this is the the second spike in volatility in the year – the first one was in March (which was caused by the Japanese earthquake).

When the bottom is in will be when the least number of people think so, but the tone of the markets at present are quite panicky – even the commodity markets are dropping in price. My guess is that this will occur when volatility reaches around 30-35.

Suffice to say when prices drop, equities become more attractive. The trade that makes money is moving from low risk to high risk when others are running away from high risk. Risk is being discarded quite actively.

Zarlink hostile takeover

Zarlink Semiconductor (TSX: ZL) is facing a hostile takeover bid. I have no idea whether investors should sell the equity or wait for something sweeter, but the relevance of this for me was that when I was looking at companies to invest in during the peak of the economic crisis, Zarlink debentures came on my radar screen. The debentures were trading at about 40 cents on the dollar back then, while the underlying company was not terribly profitable and seemed to be going along the wrong trajectory.

I was also concerned back then that you had a company which had a market capitalization that was a low fraction of the debt outstanding which would have made capitalizing the debt more difficult if the company went down that route (like Arctic Glacier, which will be condemning its unitholders to dilution purgatory at the end of July).

In retrospect, the decision to not invest was bad compared to some entities I did put my money in, but back in the middle of the economic crisis, capital was scarce and I made other investment decisions. Zarlink was a close candidate but barely did not make the cut.

Now when you look at various investments, the potential returns for risk is depressingly low. Back then you didn’t need to take much risk to get a very handsome potential reward. Today those risks are much, much higher.

Petrobakken short squeeze

For other articles I have written about Petrobakken, you can click here.

A lot of people are asking “Why did Petrobakken go up 14% in a day?”.

The quick answer is because this is a classic short squeeze, fuelled by a cascade of stop orders taking the stock up higher.

We have the following 6-month graph:

Nearly everybody that has invested money in the company is sitting on a losing position. Conversely, those that were short Petrobakken are sitting on money. In order for short sellers to maintain their fraction of PBN, they must be able to add to their short positions. Short interest in PBN has been about 3 million shares since October and about 4.8 million shares in June. Short interest in Petrobank (which owns 59% of PBN) has also been proportionately higher, so one can’t automatically assume that the short position in PBN is hedging off ownership in PBG.

Eventually there has to be a spike as marginal short players have to cover their tracks – it is nearly impossible to tell when this happen, but when they do, the liquidation is swift and sharp:

PBN continues to trade above my fair value estimate and I will continue spectating as I have no position in this or PBG. My guess, from a trader’s perspective is that there is a good probability that we will see one other sharp spike up and then the shares will continue their steady descent down to fair value. The valuation mismatch between today and what it was a year ago, however, is much less than when the shares were trading at $25. The company also still has the material financial issue of figuring out how to spend more money and issuing dividends beyond the cash flow coming in.

Shaw and Netflix – Bandwidth vs. Content

This is probably old news to a lot of people, but I’m awfully curious how the competition dynamics between Netflix vs. the bandwidth providers (e.g. Shaw/Rogers/TELUS) will play out. Shaw announced a streaming movie service recently.

I look at a company like Netflix (Nasdaq: NFLX) and ask myself how many more legs the company has before it starts to hit a competitive wall like TiVo (Nasdaq: TIVO) did.

I’m not going to call winners here, although I am quite aware that it is necessary for bandwidth providers to exist in order for companies like Netflix to exist; the question is where is the most profit to be obtained in the value chain? Is it about the bandwidth, or the content?

The biggest pure play on bandwidth has to be Level 3 (Nasdaq: LVLT), which has successfully been losing money since its history and is a darling of Southeastern Asset Management and the Canadian Berkshire-equivalent, Fairfax (TSX: FFH).

Time will tell, but I’m sticking to the sidelines.