I’m not a big believer in technical analysis, but the trendlines here are obvious:
Presented without further comment.
Canadian Finance and Economics
A briefing note. I do not think any of this thinking below is original by any means, but it needs to be said.
On May 26, Suncor (TSX: SU) guided at WTIC US$60 in 2021 and US$55 in 2022 (which is presently US$68 and US$62 for the year-end contracts, respectively) a free cash flow of $7 billion. This is after a $3 billion capital expenditure in 2021.
The guidance was notable in that the 9 megabyte slide deck they provided went through great pains to downplay the amount of cash they actually were going to generate (in typical Canadian fashion, it is like they are embarrassed to admit they are making this much money), but let’s play along.
Suncor’s enterprise value is about CAD$60 billion, about $45 billion market value and $15 billion debt.
Let’s do some basic math. This is grade school finance.
It means if the company can produce cash at the present rate (which, in general, they can given the nature of what they are mining at the present capital expenditure rate), if directed to debt and equity, they will be able to pay off all their debt and repurchase their entire share stack (at current prices – it will rise over time) in 8.5 years.
This doesn’t include changes in the selling price of oil, which the above figure is currently below market.
This is a little more complicated to calculate the sensitivity to commodity pricing. Companies give out sensitivities and for every dollar on Brent (not quite WTIC, but deeply correlated), Suncor changes its funds flow through operations by about CAD$300 million. Very roughly, subtract royalties and taxes (no more tax shield, they made too much money already) and it is about CAD$200 million leftover.
I note that at current pricing, an $8 positive oil price difference over the model (note: do not confuse with the Canada/USA differential) changes the 8.5 years alluded to above into about 7 years.
You just need to make the assumption that oil pricing will stay steady.
If this is the case (or heaven forbid, oil rises even further), Suncor is ridiculously undervalued.
This doesn’t even factor in the WCS/WTIC differential, which is likely to close once Line 3 is completed (end of the year) and TMX is finished (2022?). This will be the freest money for all stakeholders involved. An extra US$5 off the differential (it is now about US$15) on Suncor’s capacity is about US$1.5 billion a year – suddenly 7 years now becomes 6 years.
Not surprisingly, the company is buying back stock like mad, probably because there isn’t anything else they can really do with the excess cash flow.
In the past couple months, they’ve bought back US$375 million in stock, 17.2 million shares (about 1.1% of the outstanding). They should aim to buy back the maximum they can at current pricing.
As this continues, the stock price will rise and make future buybacks less attractive. After the appreciation, they should jack up the dividend.
Normally businesses would also invest in capital expenditures, but in Canada, we are closed for business for any significant natural resource projects. We mine what we have left, which makes the decisions easy – harvest cash.
What is the thesis against this?
The obvious elephant in the room is the sustainability of oil pricing.
I have no doubt in 100 years from today that fossil fuel consumption, one way or another, will be seriously curtailed. It will likely be too expensive to use in most applications that we see today.
But in 8.5 years? Get real. Oil sands reserves are measured in decades.
The other obvious component of “Why are they letting me have it so cheap?” is political correctness in the form of ESG. Much demand is sapped because of this. Many institutions cannot touch oil and gas, including Berkshire Hathaway.
Eventually through buybacks and dividend payments, the market will adjust this.
The margin of safety here is extremely high and nothing comes close in the Canadian marketplace, at least to anything with over a billion dollar market cap.
The same reasoning above also applies to Canadian Natural Resources (TSX: CNQ) and Cenovus (TSX: CVE). They are also in the same boat in terms of their FCF/EV valuation, and also with similarities in their operations. Once they reduce leverage, they will be buying back stock like crazy if it is still at the current price. I don’t know how long this will last.
Sometimes things are so obvious in the markets you really wonder what the trick is, but with this, it is the closest thing I can think of picking up polymer cash notes on the street. Efficient market theory would tell me that those cash notes wouldn’t be there. Perhaps traditional finance theorists might be right, we will see. At least I can take some solace when I am at the gas station and seeing record-high prices.
I’ve got it give it to the people that bought the Toronto Star back in May of 2020, they got a very low valuation which assumed the residual business was relatively worthless (the company had a lot of cash on the balance sheet and the pension debts weren’t too onerous). They really cashed in the middle of the COVID-19 crisis.
However, never in my mind did I anticipate that they’d be able to bring public their Verticalscope subsidiary (TSX: FORA) for triple the value that they bought Torstar for.
My, oh my, are the founding shareholders of Torstar probably feeling like they got ripped off.
Skimming the Verticalscope June 14, 2021 prospectus, we see a corporation that is flat on revenues (approx. $57-58 million/year in 2020 and 2019) and capitalized with about $100 million in debt on the balance sheet. The net debt will be gone with proceeds from the public offering. The entity does generate cash (about $14 million in operating cash flow in 2020) but overall it isn’t exactly what one would consider to be a huge money-winner, especially given what has been invested in it.
The business itself is a collection of online properties. It is a faint resemblance of what the Yellow Pages (TSX: Y) was probably trying to originally execute on their “digital strategy” before management (rightly) corrected that course from 2017 onwards. And just like Yellow’s original digital strategy, it’s likely they’ll use their enhanced liquidity position and/or their stock to acquire more online properties.
Indeed, one of the businesses that Verticalscope owns, Red Flag Deals, was sold to them by none other than the Yellow Pages.
Verticalscope extensively uses the phrase “adjusted EBITDA” to justify valuation and it indeed appears that investors are happy to overlook all the adjustments. At least with the IPO, there won’t be much in the way of interest expenses anymore.
It won’t be myself buying shares of this offering. I really wonder what the thought process of the institutional managers that do, or people that bidded it up another 10% on the after-market trading today!
Ag Growth (TSX: AFN) sold off heavily today as a result of overall market weakness coupled with the markets not liking the fact that their costs are going to be increasing in the upcoming quarters due to the surge in steel pricing, coupled with a likely re-valuation of their technology platform. It’s not great having your top holding taking a haircut like this, but that’s how markets work – things go up and down, and this is also buffered by other things in my portfolio which take advantage of inflation.
However, what really got my attention was a tender offer from a “Sustainable Agriculture & Wellness Dividend Fund“, which will soon by listed as AGR.UN on the TSX.
They want me to flip my AFN shares in exchange for yet-to-be listed units in their fund, based off of the average trading price on June 1-3, at a par value of $10/unit.
I can only assume it was also offered to other securities they plan on holding in their fund (they list the prospective holdings on a one-pager, including companies such as Beyond Meat, Farmers Edge, Goodfood Market, Rogers Sugar, etc.).
I have stronger wording which I will not type in, but will state that this offer is highly unattractive for a few reasons. I’ll list a couple.
One is that right away, such an offering will involve a 4.5% payment to the agents, so effectively your $10 ‘value’ will be reduced to $9.55 immediately, plus another $500k in expenses associated with the offering (it costs legal fees to process partial tender requests such as these).
Assuming you were silly enough to go with it, the MER of the fund in question is 125bps.
I just shut off the prospectus from my computer screen before I wasted more mental space on it. But it was worthy of a post – who actually falls for these types of offers?
The universe of Canadian convertible debentures is ever-shrinking – there are 92 issues remaining, and three of them (Atlantic Power, Great Canadian, Yellow Pages) will be going in a month, and there are a few more that are obviously slated for rollover/maturity in the coming months after.
I’ve recently unloaded my last convertible debenture today. It is a statement on this particular market that there isn’t much point in putting capital into this when returns are so weak in relation to the apparent riches available in the equity market (of course, this could be a sign that equities are topping out!).
Junk bond yields are also at lows (ETFs include JNK, HYG). An interesting hedge here is longing puts on these in anticipation of some credit action.
My only material debt instruments I currently own are the Gran Colombia Gold notes (TSX: GCM.NT.U) which continue to happily slide into maturity (and if the underlying corporation has any financial sense whatsoever, will be called out before July 31st).