No free lunch – CASH ETFs revisited

On October 31, 2023, OSFI gave out a huge “trick or treat” to high-interest savings ETF owners (CASH, PSA, etc.) in the following technical bulletin.

There is a transitional period until January 31, 2024 whereby banks and HISA ETF operators will come to a separate rate structure that will most likely involve another haircut of gross yield – the media quoted one analyst from TD that claimed it would be about 50bps, but my suspicion it will be about half of that.

This will still make cash ETFs competitive, but not the no-brainer compared to alternatives, which include high-credit short-duration corporate bond funds.

In other words – there is no free lunch.

CASH.to right now yields a net 5.18%, while the nearest corporate bond alternative (looking at ZST.to as a reasonable proxy for this – they survived March 2020 fairly intact) is netting 5.47% for half a year duration risk. Government of Canada 6 month debt is at 5.11%. CBIL.to is an average 1.8 month duration government bond ETF that yields a net 4.92%. Another relatively innovative product is target date maturity ETFs (looking at RBC’s RQL.to), which has an average duration of 0.63 years and a 5.16% net yield and by all accounts looks inferior to ZST.

What other proxies for Canadian short-term investment-grade corporate debt are out there? Most of them have duration of 2-4 years which involves a significant interest rate component exposure. The other question is whether half a percentage point is adequate compensation for (albeit very low) credit risk.

The yield curve continues to remain heavily inverted – 1 year to 30 year is roughly a -146bps differential, while the more quoted 2-10yr spread is -80bps.

The glacial speed of quantitative tightening

Bank of Canada bond holdings

MaturityCoupon rateISINPar valueOf which on repo
2024-02-010.75CA135087M9203,566,474,000
2024-03-012.25CA135087J5466,611,368,00095,000,000
2024-04-010.25CA135087L69023,275,739,0001,775,000,000
2024-05-011.5CA135087N4231,005,000,000
2024-06-012.5CA135087B4516,304,081,00030,000,000
2024-09-011.5CA135087J96710,042,352,0001,352,000,000
2024-10-010.75CA135087M5084,062,206,000572,000,000
2025-03-011.25CA135087K52812,055,174,000643,000,000
2025-04-011.5CA135087N340600,000,000
2025-06-019CA135087VH40545,039,00031,000,000
2025-06-012.25CA135087D5074,281,933,000
2025-09-010.5CA135087K94025,819,675,000
2026-03-010.25CA135087L51820,536,229,000362,000,000
2026-06-011.5CA135087E6797,715,229,000244,000,000
2026-09-011CA135087L9308,403,101,000435,000,000
2026-12-014.25CA135087VS05440,000,000
2027-03-011.25CA135087M8472,194,445,000
2027-06-018CA135087VW172,454,089,000
2027-06-011CA135087F8258,534,306,0001,091,000,000
2028-06-012CA135087H2358,435,363,000
2029-06-015.75CA135087WL434,909,719,000
2029-06-012.25CA135087J3977,890,136,000169,000,000
2030-06-011.25CA135087K37917,477,505,000
2030-12-010.5CA135087L44317,051,478,000
2031-06-011.5CA135087M27610,856,641,000
2031-12-011.5CA135087N2663,648,167,000
2031-12-014CA135087WV25406,000,000
2032-06-012CA135087N597595,000,000
2033-06-015.75CA135087XG495,099,690,0005,000,000
2036-12-013CA135087XQ21440,000,000
2037-06-015CA135087XW987,740,024,000880,000,000
2041-06-014CA135087YQ126,953,855,000
2041-12-012CA135087YK42429,000,000
2044-12-011.5CA135087ZH04424,600,000
2045-12-013.5CA135087ZS688,925,652,000
2047-12-011.25CA135087B949392,700,000
2048-12-012.75CA135087D3586,371,150,000
2050-12-010.5CA135087G99776,000,000
2051-12-012CA135087H72218,006,997,000
2053-12-011.75CA135087M6802,965,110,000
2064-12-012.75CA135087C9392,194,182,000
279,735,409,0007,684,000,000

In 2024, $55 billion will mature, and in 2025, $43 billion, in addition to a couple billion in mortgage bonds. This is still below the $130 billion that are held in reserves at the bank, but at the rate things are going, coupled with projected deficits of the Government of Canada, means the reserves will be drained out sometime in 2025. Things will indeed get interesting once again, but it will require patience. That said, anticipation of illiquidity may cause it to occur earlier!

Canadian Convertible Debentures – Maturing 2023

I’ve been looking at the Canadian Convertible Debentures that are scheduled to mature between now and December 31, 2023. Some observations:

Medexus (TSX: MDP.DB, October 16, 2023 maturity) – This will mature on Monday for a cash payment at 125 of par (a very unique offering). To be honest, this one surprised me in that I was expecting some sort of distressed debt situation, but the company managed to scrape enough pennies together through a newly minted credit facility in early March 2023, some decent financial results posted on June 2023 and finally a secondary equity offering that concluded a week ago – striking while the equity was hot. Management navigated this whirlpool quite well, and at 24 employees, each person’s individual effort really counts for these types of companies. Before they get delisted I’ll post their chart, again noting that payout at maturity is 125 of par:

The rest are December 31, 2023 maturities:

Aecon Group (TSX: ARE.DB.C) – $184 million due. The company has a $600 million credit facility, of which $188 million was drawn out on June 30, 2023. Conversion is at $24/share and the stock is at $10.59/share, so very likely a cash maturity. Even a mediocre execution in the next six months will not result in these debentures getting in trouble and hence the 99% of par trading price at present. This engineering firm has been kind of lost since the Canadian government shot down its acquisition by a Chinese national firm many years back, but they continue to meander along despite being in a market where there is going to be plenty of demand going forward. The problem is that engineering firms need to retain talented individuals that need enough motivation to stay in such firms, which facilitates both the precise costing and execution of projects. It is one thing to get contract wins, it is another thing entirely to discover that your costing is so out of whack that in order to execute on such projects that you’re going to be losing money. A great example of this is the construction of the North Vancouver sewage plant which appears to be a case of a company being completely out of its depth.

Firm Capital (TSX: FC.DB.G) – $22.5 million due. Conversion is $15.25 with the stock price at $9.80. Firm Capital has many issues of convertible debentures outstanding at various maturities, trading roughly 4-5% above the government yield curve. The company proactively sent out a financial release on September 19, 2023 which attempted to reassure the market that despite their mortgage portfolio outstanding shrinking in size, that they are solvent. In particular, a $180 million credit facility remains untapped and combined with cash, this is comfortably facilitating a cash maturity of this particular issue. However, it is pretty clear that FC is going to have to make some tough choices – they traditionally have funded their loans through convertible debentures at really cheap coupons – the latest ones (FC.DB.K, FC.DB.L) were a combined $90 million out for 5 years with a 5% coupon with a conversion price well out of the money ($17.75 and $17.00/share!) – the last offering was done in January 2022 and this was PERFECT timing by management – there is no chance at all of them doing this again in the current rate environment.

Northwest Healthcare Properties REIT (TSX: NWH.DB.G) – $125 million due. Conversion is $13.35/unit with a current unit price of $4.57. The quick summary here is that the trust is in serious financial trouble. I remember this REIT being one of these “dividend starlings” that the usual retail crowd hyped up on financial twitter and the like, and unless if management is skillful, this one is potentially heading down to a zero. With specific regard to the ability to redeem this debenture, the trust is hitting a financial limit with its term facility (on June 30, 2023 there is $165 million available to be drawn). The minutiae in their last quarterly filing includes distressed paragraphs like this:

On August 2, 2023, the REIT executed an interim non-revolving tranche under its revolving credit facility to increase availability by $50.0 million. The tranche matures in October 2023 and can be extended until January 2024 under certain circumstances. The facility is secured by certain assets in the REIT’s Americas portfolio and it bears interest ranging from 10.6% to 13.8%.

… 10.6% to 13.8%! Ouch!

Subsequent to June 30, 2023, the REIT extended the maturity date of its revolving unsecured credit facility with an outstanding balance of $125.0 million credit facility by one year to November 2024, The facility bears interest ranging from 8.73% to 10.01% (previously 8.23% to 9.51%).

Banks are ratcheting the screws on the trust…

They released a September 22, 2023 financial update trying to assure the market that with some “non-core” asset sales coupled with some other measures they are “fortifying” the balance sheet, but there is indeed a danger that this convertible debenture will be partly redeemed in units by the company. While writing this post, I notice the “fantastic” SEDAR Plus is down for maintenance so I could not confirm directly that the indenture allows for this, but a previous MD&A does allude to this being an option for the company. The two other outstanding convertible debenture issues (maturing roughly in 4 years) are trading at a YTM of 12.5% so refinancing is not going to be in the cards for this REIT. My guess is that they squeeze out a cash maturity but good luck in the future!

Canadian Fixed income review – end of August 2023

I’ve been reviewing the fixed income situation in Canada. Some observations:

1. The yield curve is still heavily inverted, and the inversion has gotten even wider over the past week. The half-year bond is at around 525bps and the 10 year is at 359bps as I write this. There is a general anticipation of the rise of the short-term interest rates stopping, but this anticipation has been present now for almost half a year. Time will tell.

2. There hasn’t been a new TSX debenture issue since Fiera Capital a couple months ago, and issuance this year has been very light. Previously you would typically see companies issue new debt and call existing debt with half a year to a year left of maturity, but now they are letting debt run to near-maturity – probably because the coupons they are paying today are less than what they can roll over for, coupled with everybody and their grandmothers waiting for rates to decrease!

3. Preferred share markets are very thin, but if you do not anticipate the 5yr government bond yield changing materially for a year, there are many high-credit names that are trading at 10% rate resets. There are too numerous to mention, but for example, pretty much all of TransCanada’s (TSX: TRP) are trading above 10% at the current 5-yr rate reset value. It becomes an interesting situation for an income investor whether they want to roll the dice with equity, get a 7.6% yield currently or to play the relatively safer preferred shares and clip about 300bps more out of it. There’s even one really trashy financial issuer that has a reset yield currently north of 15% which I’ve looked at, but I value my sanity over yield at the moment.

4. Risk-free cash continues to remain extremely competitive against much out there. The only way to rationalize more speculative equity investments out there is with implied growth or implied expectations of interest rates dropping. We are not going to get this interest rate drop as long as market participants are obviously stalling for it.

Strange times

This is a post without much direction.

Canadian Macro

Perhaps the largest surprise to occur in the past two weeks was the Bank of Canada deciding to resume interest rate increases. I generally believe that this is an attempt to shake up complacency in the marketplace and that we are approaching the point of diminishing returns. By increasing future implied interest rate expectations, however, is in itself a form of interest rate increase. So we continue to have the triple barreled approach – actual rising interest rates, threatened future interest rates, and quantitative easing. Interest rates started rising on March 2, 2022 and we are about 15 months into the program. As capital hurdle rates have increased and projects that otherwise would have been initiated stall out, we’re probably going to start seeing this slowdown occur pretty soon.

The yield curve remains heavily inverted – right now you can get a 1yr GoC yield of 5.07%, while 10yr is 3.40%, a 167bps difference.

GST/HST inputs, from fiscal 2021-2022 to 2022-2023 (table 2), only rose 2.7% year-to-year, which is a negative real growth in GST-able consumption. This does not bode well overall.

I look at the inflation inputs and it seems intuitive that cost increases will continue to rise above the 2% benchmark – especially on shelter. The interest rate environment (in addition to other roadblocks) is seriously constraining supply, yet demand continues to remain sky-high (one of the effects of letting in a whole bunch of people into the country, including students, which massively raises rental rates in cities).

Inefficient spending

One of the problems of using GDP is that it doesn’t account for unproductive expenditures vs. productive expenditures. If you paid somebody a million dollars to move a pile of dirt from one location to another, and then back again, you would have a million dollars added to the GDP, but the wealth of the country has gone nowhere. That money could have been used for something more productive. If you get enough of this inefficient spending, it starts to show itself in other components of the economy – namely demand for goods/services that clearly are not being supplied because you’ve tasked too many people with moving piles of dirt from one location to another and back again. Those people could have been employed in another activity, say road building, which is a more skillful (and productive) use of moving dirt from one location to another.

It is pretty much the reason why much government spending is inefficient – it gets directed to segments of the economy which are for political purposes rather than productive purposes. Do this enough, and you eventually get inflationary effects in the things that people really need.

A lot of what we have seen over the past 15 years or so can likely be attributed to the cumulative effects of this. While governments are the chief culprit, the private sector as well has significant bouts of inefficient capital allocation (e.g. look at the value destruction in the cannabis sector, or most cryptocurrency ventures, etc.). The “slack” of the misdirection of resources has been exhausted after Covid, and the cumulative impact is truly obvious – a lot of people are going to suffer as a result, and collectively our standard of living will be declining.

Nifty 50 re-lived

The nifty 50 were the top 50 stocks in the US stock market in the 1970’s. Today, the top 10 stocks of the S&P 500 consist of about 30% of the index and many comments have been made about the effect of these stocks on the overall index. In particular, the rebound in technology stocks since November 2022 has caught many fund managers by surprise, and it is to the point where essentially if you did not own them (Facebook/Meta, Nvidia, etc.), most closet index fund managers would have badly underperformed. Perhaps it is sour grapes from somebody like myself (where I am barely treading water for the year), but this just does not look healthy.

Safe returns

Cash (various ETFs) return about 5.08% at the moment. For yield-based investors this is a very high hurdle. For example, looking at A&W Income Fund (TSX: AW.UN) with its stated yield of 5.3% – while you do get a degree of inflation protection, how much can burger prices rise before you start seeing volume slowdowns (and it is volume, not profitability that counts for these types of royalty companies)? Cash is out-competing much of the market right now. With every rise in the short-term interest rate, the differential widens.

Everybody looks at the charts of long-term treasury bonds in the early 1980’s and said to themselves “if only I had gone all-in on those 30-year government bonds yielding 15%, I would have made out like gangbusters”. This is almost the equivalent of saying your ideal timing into the stock market is February 2009, or March 23, 2020. The problem with such statements, other than they are entirely “hindsight is 20/20”, is that in order to get those 15% yields, such a bond needs to trade at 10%, 12%, 14%, etc., before reaching that 15% point. Valuations that would seem attractive and bought before that 15% yield point will have unrealized losses, sometimes significant, at the crescendo event. This is usually the point where most leveraged players are forced to be cashed out at the violent price action.

Parking cash is boring, and likely will result in the loss of purchasing power over periods of time (the CPI is a terrible barometer for ‘real’ consumer inflation), but better to lose 5% of purchasing power instead of 40% in a market crash!

Implied volatility

The so-called ‘fear gauge’ (the 1-month lookahead volatility of the S&P 500) is getting down to 2019 lows:

I don’t know what to make of this. Markets price surprises and probably the biggest surprise is a rip to the upside, despite all of the doom-and-gloom that the macro situation would otherwise suggest – perhaps interest rates are going to rise even further than most expect?

Either way, I’m not going to be a market hero. I remain very defensively postured and I do not feel like I have much of an edge at the moment. When you had everybody losing their heads over Covid three years ago there was a ripe moment where the reality vs. psychology mismatch created huge opportunities. Today, the normalization of this reality vs. psychology has created much more efficient market pricing. I can’t compete in this environment which feels like trading random noise. Maybe the AIs have whittled away the differential between reality and psychology – but they are only as good as the data that gets fed into them, and markets tend to exhibit random patterns of chaos now and then which will throw off the computers. So I wait.

If you ever wonder why I can’t work in an institutional environment, it is due to having some radical thoughts like the last paragraph.