Retailers going belly-up

So far of note: J. Crew (clothing), Neiman Marcus (sort of like HBC – higher end generalized department store), Aldo (shoes).

Pier 1 (homewares) didn’t even need the Coronavirus to take it down.

These are all American, but in Canada some other notables (it’s actually odd how there aren’t a lot of retail companies publicly traded on the TSX – I’m excluding the food-related companies here):

Reitmans (TSX: RET.A) – stock trading at 12 cents – this one isn’t as clear-cut, mainly because at the end of January 2020 they had $89 million in cash in the bank, and the only liabilities were their massive lease payments outstanding. Their business (mid-stream business casual women’s fashions) is a terrible sector. They did caution “the Company estimates that it will need financing to meet its current and future financial obligations”, which is never something you want to be reading, but a bit paradoxical given their still relatively strong cash position. At a market cap of just under $6 million, the market is saying this one is worth way more dead than alive.

Roots (TSX: ROOT) – looks pretty ugly. Debt on the balance sheet combined with an operation that’s not making money, means they’ll have to get more credit in order to continue. Margins are decreasing, expenses are rising, it isn’t looking very pleasant.

Indigo (TSX: IDG) – The only big debt they have is their lease payments, while their retail operation isn’t bleeding THAT much. It’s kind of surprising to think on a normal full-year cycle they do make money. But from March 1, 2018, their stock graph has been a 30-degree ski slope downhill. It’s rare to see declines this smooth. Also, at the end of December 2019, they have $66 million in unredeemed gift card balances. Amazing.

COVID-19 false positives

Apparently Nunavut’s first COVID-19 case was a false positive.

From what I remember reading, it is possible that tests have false positive rates of up to 30%, depending on what’s being tested. Conversely the false negative rates I’ve seen quoted are around 15%, again, depending on tests. I haven’t taken the time to seriously dig into what precisely the numbers are, but you can be sure that in most instances, false positives are rarely corrected to negative and subsequently not reflected in the statistics, while false negatives will eventually become positives later (at least in symptomatic cases).

One of the whole issues of this social isolation is that it’s basically impossible, short of precision testing, to contain it, so efforts are basically about buying time. If these studies of anti-body testing in the San Jose, and NYC area of people having 20-30% antibody rates for COVID-19 are true (hence being already sensitized to it and not being prone to further viral infection), once further confirmation of this broad “already infected” cohort becomes more confirmed, you will see a very suddenly policy change of just freeing up everybody.

The residual hysteria will be with us for at least a year as long as these “second wave” scare-and-fear media reports continue.

Companies using Covid-19 to cut dividends

Do not rely on the reported “current yield” statistic on nearly any stock out there. There will very likely be changes.

Companies that have regular dividend policies always find it difficult to reduce them or even scrap them entirely since there is an expectation of a return from their shareholder base. However, never letting a good crisis go to waste, you’re starting to see some action on this front.

If you think the banks are immune, HSBC Hong Kong scrapped their planned 4th quarter dividend (amusingly, there is a news article about shareholders planning a lawsuit – good luck suing yourselves!). You’re probably wondering about the Canadian banks, and they are too – calculating what their net exposures are. Securitized residential mortgages they can dump to the Bank of Canada, but on the commercial loan side of things, I’d expect their losses to rise significantly. The question is how much? For psychological reasons I do not think they will cut dividends, but Canadian banks are very opaque entities to analyze and you just never know when they will go on the brink. Entities like Deutsche Bank (DB) have always looked good on paper, but without having good granularity on their loan portfolio, who knows what the heck you’re investing in?

Food Service: On April 1st, A&W (TSX: AW.UN) suspended distributions. Their historical rate used to give out 15.9 cents per month, but clearly the take-out business is not nearly as strong when there is zero foot traffic. I wouldn’t be surprised if the Keg (TSX: KEG.UN) followed (they have yet to announce) but their units have already gotten hammered 50% from their ambient levels pre-Covid-19. MTY Group (TSX: MTY), owner/operator of a couple thousand restaurant franchises, announced they will scrap their next quarterly dividend.

Aviation, not surprisingly, is not doing well. Chrous Aviation (TSX: CHR) is suspending dividends. CAE, maker of very good flight training simulators, suspended dividends.

The list will continue. REITs, in particular, I think are prone to have distributions reduced as they need to build capital on their balance sheets to restore their debt to equity ratios to proper proportions. Since real estate is not the most liquid asset, it will take time for those fair market values to be reflected, but anybody relying on the price-to-book ratio should be cautioned that fair market value adjustments go down as well as up!

TSX Companies that bought back shares during the last week

Here’s a quick list of companies that reported purchasing their own stock on the open market last week:

TSX Company Buybacks - March 30, 2020 to April 3, 2020

NameTicker
5N PlusVNP
Aecon GroupARE
Alamos GoldAGI
Alimentation Couche-TardATD.A/B
Atlantic PowerATP
Badger DaylightingBAD
BMTC GroupGBT
Brookfield Asset ManagementBAM.A
BSR REITHOM.UN
CAECAE
Canacol EnergyCNE
Canada Pacific RailwayCP
Canadian Western BankCWB
Capital PowerCPX
CGIGIB.A
CIBT Education GroupMBA
ClarkeCKI
CRH Medical CorpCRH
Crown Capital PartnersCRWN
Dream Hard Asset AlternativesDRA.UN
Dream Office REITD.UN
Dream UnlimitedDRM
EcoSynthetixECO
Enterprise GroupE
Evertz TechnologiesET
Exco TechnologiesXTC
Finning InternationalFTT
GamehostGH
Gear EnergyGXE
Grainte REITGRT.UN
iA FinancialIAG
Input CapitalINP
InvesqueIVQ
LogistecLBT.A/B
Manulife FinancialMFC
Maxim PowerMXG
MBN CorpMBN
Melcor DevelopmentsMRD
MetroMRU
Middlefield Can-Global REITRCO.UN
Mullen GroupMTL
NorbordOSB
North American Construction GroupNOA
NorthWest Healthcare Properties REITNWH.UN
NutrienNTR
Pivot TechnologyPTG
Points InternationalPTS
PrairieSky RoyaltyPSK
QuebecorQBR.A/B
Real MattersREAL
Royal Bank of CanadaRY
StantecSTN
TFI InternationalTFII
Toromont IndustriesTIH
Tree Island SteelTSL
Vecima NetworksVCM
Western Energy ServicesWRG

A few miscellaneous market notes

No April Fools jokes on this site.

1. I’ll post a more comprehensive report later, but Q1-2020 is shaping up to be around -13% -11% performance for me, while:

Index / Total Return
S&P 500: -20.0% / -19.6%
TSX: -21.6% / -20.9%

I was caught badly out of position going into this CoronaCrisis and I do not consider my relative performance to be any sort of victory at all. You can’t eat on relative performance is a good cliche to describe this. I hate losing money.

2. CannTrust (TSX: TRST), after getting busted by Health Canada in July 2019 for not being able to run a legal marijuana operation, finally bit the bullet and did CCAA yesterday. The fact that they haven’t been able to publish any financial statements since Q1-2019 should have been enough of a hint to anybody that something really bad was going on. The marijuana sector is regarded as one positive recipient of everybody that is forced to go on lockdown (and anecdotally when biking around Vancouver I get the impression a lot more people are smoking it!), but my views on the economics of the entire sector is the same – I wouldn’t be a buyer unless if you get the impression that branding will result in premium pricing power. Although I do not smoke marijuana at all, from those that do, apparently the legal stuff isn’t nearly as good. The majors (Canopy Growth, Tilray, etc.) will stay alive but that’s about it.

Speaking of Tilray, remember when they were trading at US$150/share back in October 2018? They’re now a shade under $7. Canopy’s down to about CAD$20/share and still has a $7 billion market cap. I’d expect this to depreciate. Still too expensive to short (borrow is still at 22% cost although this has gone down significantly), so sad.

3. What happens when a province goes bankrupt? Newfoundland is on the brink and only got bailed out by the rest of Canada…

4. Dividends will be cut. Do not depend on the historical dividends of any corporations. Another example is Corus (TSX: CJR.B) reported this morning and they will “review” their next quarterly dividend in June as they, along with the rest of the universe, has no idea what will happen to business going forward. Although quite cash flow positive, they are also heavily leveraged and this leverage is forcing them to be more conservative than what their P/E of 3 would otherwise indicate. Good luck raising debt financing in this environment unless if your investor is the Government of Canada!

If Canadian real estate valuations continue to drop and banks start taking baths on bad debt, I also wonder if they will be forced to cut dividends in an attempt to shore up their Tier 1 ratios. Remember how I described Genworth MI as picking up twenty dollar bills in front of a steamroller? With unemployment spiking up to double digits, we’re going to find out what happens when we get a whole bunch of credit defaults. The question is whether the market is pricing this in or not.