Generating synethic performance – catering to yield chasers

Finance is a very funny industry. The primary way of keeping score, change in cash, is not really used as a performance measure. Instead, the performance measure is return on investment, which is a proxy for change in cash, but not the same. Return on investment is a flawed metric because it does not take into account risk.

A clever formula to weighing historical risk and performance is the Sharpe Ratio, but I will leave that mathematical dissection (and the weakness of the Sharpe Ratio) for another post.

If I told you that I made 2% this year, an observer in an “up” market environment would say that is a horrible return on investment and bad performance. If I then said that my portfolio was 100% cash, then the performance would be fantastic. You might chide the decision to be all-cash in an up market environment (missing the wave) but at least the performance in the constraints of a 100% cash portfolio was great (given that the most you can do these days is less).

However, if you wanted to juice your performance, the drug of choice in the finance industry is leverage. And in today’s interest rate environment, the rate on leverage is cheap. Even retail investors can get into the action by loaning money from Interactive Brokers (depending on how much money you actually borrow – the first US$100,000 is at 1.65%, the next US$900,000 is at 1.15% and the next US$2,000,000 is at 0.65% and everything above that is at 0.5%).

Assume you get a 1% borrowing rate, which makes the arithmetic easy. So if you manage to earn a 2% average on cash, why not borrow cash at 1% to invest it at 2%? So I will set up a mutual fund. All I will do is invest at a risk-free rate of 2%, and apply some leverage. I invest $100 in my own fund, but borrow $900 at 1%. What happens financially?

Interest income: $20
Interest expense: $9
Net income: $11
Return on investment: ($11 net income / $100 equity investment) = 11%!

So I have magically transformed what was a 2% return into a 11% return with the magic of leverage. Using this technique, and unlimited borrowing power, I can generate any return on investment you desire. Want 101%? Easy – borrow $10,000 instead.

This concept is introduced in introductory level finance courses across the world, but most people fail to appreciate how the rate of return figure that is being advertised in a lot of cases is simply a synthetic return. The use of leverage creates this return. Parenthetically, a similar way of generating “synthetic yield” was used in the mid-2000’s when income trusts were raising equity capital and just giving back cash to unitholders as a return of capital to generate false yield when they weren’t really making any money to justify their distributions.

Where do you see synthetic performance currently occurring? Mostly in the US financial REIT markets like Annaly (NYSE: NLY) and others. They borrow money for cheap, invest them in mortgage-backed securities, and then skim the spread. They goose their performance with leverage.

While this is a valid way of making money, the danger is on the reliability of returns – even if the asset you are investing in inevitably gives out the desired return (both of interest and principal), if the asset value itself has severe variations, funds will be forced to liquidate such securities for losses because they will have lost borrowing power. If you have enough capital being driven into these financial structures and they keep leveraging the capital to generate high returns, there will be some blowups along the way simply because the asset pool they are investing in will be well above true vale. One blowup will likely cause others to blowup since they are essentially invested in correlated products.

Yield-chasers are going to get crushed. I am not sure when this will occur, but the current trend toward yield chasing is crystal clear. I’m not going to be shorting such securities presently since I think the momentum still has quite some way to go, but when this insatiable risk reaches some sort of crescendo, that would probably be a good time to sell everything and wait for a 2008-style crash in asset values. Maybe in 2013 or 2014?

Projections about the iPhone 5

Articles like this make me skeptical: IPhone 5 Sales Could Offer Big Boost to GDP.

I look at a 30-second Apple promotional video of the iPhone 5 and what I really see is the killer feature is the “virtual keyboard” around 10 seconds in the video clip:

One of my largest complaints about cell phones and other digital tablets without keyboards is that content creation on them truly is a pain in the rear. While sending text messages is fine due to the brevity of them, I would not want to be typing in something as complicated as this post, for example. In fact, when I use a friend’s iPhone 4, I find the keyboard on it to still be a pain in the ass compared to my own flip-out phone with the keypad. I guess I just like the tactile feel of the keyboard. I’m not sure how this virtual keyboard concept will work in terms of speed and accuracy, but if they get it “right” then I can see the feature being useful for people like me that need a keyboard.

However, this is not Apple’s target market – will they capture people non-iPhone users like myself, and will they be able to give a technological incentive for people to upgrade from their older iPhones? We will see.

Intel and Dell value traps

I notice Intel (Nasdaq: INTC) did a proactive release indicating that their third-quarter expectation is below their public target:

The company now expects third-quarter revenue to be $13.2 billion, plus or minus $300 million, compared to the previous expectation of $13.8 billion to $14.8 billion.

Intel is trading around a P/Es of 10, but it is a classical value trap. The company is a victim of a slower sales cycle – people no longer need to replace their PCs and notebooks every two years like they did a decade ago. Likewise, Intel is facing the declining technology refreshment cycle in addition to having traditional PCs/Laptops marginalized by tablet computers. Intel should be able to diversify enough that it can escape out of its trap over time, but I am not so sure about Dell – they are further entrenched in the traditional PC/Laptop market than Intel is. Dell has simply turned into another retailer, competing in a commoditized retail market. This is a recipe for margin shrinkage.

The market is also signalling this by virtue of Dell having a forward P/E of 6 based off of consensus analyst estimates. Anybody want to make a bet that those EPS estimates are going to go down next year? Right now they are saying $1.80/share.

I don’t have interest in either companies other than just following them for curiousity’s sake.

Valuation not a sufficient criterion to short

Lululemon (Nasdaq: LULU) announced quarterly results a couple business days ago and you can see the market reaction as follows:

They made 39 cents per share in the quarter (which was positively affected by a tax adjustment regarding their transfer pricing) but that isn’t exactly the story. Even when you annualize their earnings or take the next year’s analyst estimates of $2.07/share, you still have a stock that is very pricy for a retail clothing company.

However, it brings me to one of my fundamental rules of trading, mainly: valuation is a necessary, but not sufficient criterion for shorting the stock. As tempting as it seems, you will need to know the psychological catalyst that will bring the company’s stock down or in disrepute before shorting. If valuation is the only reason, your short sale will likely lose money.

Short selling is a very difficult business because your position size concentrates as it moves against you, and decreases as it moves into your favour. Managing your position size and dictating your risk in explicit terms before-hand are two ways to mitigate this negative mathematical aspect of short selling.

I do not have any positions in LULU and do not intend to establish any either. This observation is purely for spectator sport purposes.

Sometimes, doing nothing is best

Letting your winners run is an art. When you do this, capital compounds on capital – if you bought something and it goes up 10%, suddenly you have 110% of your original investment in play, and a 10% gain on top of that will not result in a 120% investment, but rather at 121% of the original investment. In a more extreme case, when something you own doubles, it only requires a 50% gain from that point to amount to another double on the original investment.

This must be balanced off with knowing when to take gains. That time is not now. Everything in my portfolio at present I have a reasonable price target of above the current market value. If anything, I should be adding to the positions.

So the best action I can take is to twiddle my thumbs. People feel fearful of the equity market at present, which is good.