Investing in garbage – Dollar General

It has almost been a month since I have posted, but I have been quietly stalking targets of opportunity but still remain very defensively positioned. The economic landscape out there has deteriorated somewhat and central banks are trying to get ahead of the curve by cutting interest rates. Everybody has been pointing out that this is usually indicative of bad things happening and as a result, there has been a grab for yield, especially when you look at the Canadian preferred share market.

However, something quite interesting flashed on my radar – something that I would have never anticipated taking a position in a year ago, but have just done so.

I have (post-crash from their last quarterly report) taken a modest position in Dollar General (NYSE: DG), the largest dollar store chain in the USA. With the onset of inflation, “Dollar Store” is a misnomer now, but if you want a close comparison, just walk into a Canadian Dollarama and you will have the same feel (although I must say the American dollar stores tend to have better selection and value than the Canadian version!).

The chart is an absolute train wreck:

You have to go back to late 2017 since the stock traded this low.

I’ve done the core of my research on this just over a year ago when it started to fall from market grace from US$250 in November 2022 and I closely examined it at September 2023 but decided to take a pass. The last quarterly report had me dusting off the cobwebs from my notes and memories and re-reviewing the situation and I think it is more favourable today than it was back then.

To summarize the thesis of this investment, it is a simple regression to the mean thesis, coupled with some economic protection by virtue of the sector that the lower half of the economic cohort flock toward (in other words, economic misery should benefit this company as a consumer staple provider). As investors of Dollarama (TSX: DOL) know, the store features “Amazon protection” but also a degree of Walmart protection. Temu is probably the largest competitor in this respect. The market segment is stable and there is a consider amount of incumbency protection with amortization of fixed supply chain costs.

The stock has gotten nailed on not meeting expectations – primarily that net margins have fallen off a cliff. While gross margins have remained relatively steady, SG&A expenses have ballooned considerably and this has resulted in reduced profitability.

This suggests that there is a management problem. That said, most of the upper executive suite are only in their capacities from 2023 – notably the CEO was the CEO from June 2015 to November 2022 and only took the reigns again on October 2023. Corporations of this size and scale will take some more time to regress to proper metrics. The issues should have been acutely obvious, but being able to make adjustments financially will take time – historical contracts that get signed (e.g. crappy lease locations, supply agreements, etc.) will need to run off before being renegotiated on more favourable terms.

I also note that in the 2021, 2022 and 2023 fiscal years (note: ending January of the year), they blew nearly $8 billion in share buybacks – buying back stock at their all-time highs and at levels wayyyyyyyyyy higher than what they are trading at today.

Wage and cost inflation is also an issue, but this competitive matter will affect other industry participants and will get baked into selling prices.

Other than the large amount of lease liabilities outstanding (which is natural for a retail business), the company has about $7 billion in debt outstanding which, given their cash flows and presumed stability of their business, is not excessive:

One would have wondered how stronger the balance sheet would have been had they not engaged in value-destroying buybacks, but I digress!

I do note that the July 2028 and April 2030 tenor of debt trades at 4.9% and 5.0% yield to maturity, respectively – they should have no problem refinancing current maturities at acceptable coupons. There is also a $2 billion revolving facility that remains untapped.

I expect, after some fireworks, that the company in a few years should be able to post EPS well north of $10/share. Choose your P/E multiple to slap onto the stock price and it seems like a reasonable risk-reward.

Finally, I will make one last comparison. DG had about $40 billion in sales in the last 4 reported quarters. With a market cap of $18.5 billion, this gives it a P/S of less than a half. We look at Dollarama and they have CAD$6 billion in sales and a market cap of CAD$37 billion, for a P/S of over 6! You would think Dollarama is selling AI chips or something, but instead the only chips they are selling are Pringles and Lays! Buying some long-dated puts on DOL (and indeed, the implied volatility on them is rather cheap) is something I’ve been toying with – if they break it is going to be as hard as Dollar General and you’ll see at least a 50% correction in the stock price.

Market thoughts – volatility is finally starting to wake up!

The last two days have been quite stirring. In particular, on Friday’s trading, the volatility index spiked up to 29, which is the highest it has been since the Silicon Valley Bank debacle:

Notably, the yield curve also dived down, with the GoC 5-year going south of 3% for the first time in awhile:

There are a few lead theories that I’m thinking. In no particular order:

The “day of reckoning” of tightening interest rates is finally hitting the markets in some sort of liquidity crunch. Somebody big needed liquidity and decided to hit all the bids.

Was there somebody big that was caught short the Japanese Yen and spontaneously triggered a liquidation?

The commodity complex has also gotten hammered. For example, CNQ and CVE reported quite decent quarterly results, but their stocks have been taken down 10% since then (and WTI has dropped from US$77 to US$73 in short order).

Finally something that might be concerning is the liquidity of cash ETFs – in particular, I note that HSUV.u (the US dollar corporate class fund) in intraday trading actually was trading 0.3% below NAV in very illiquid trading (note: NAV is 111.01):

Somebody holding this fund was demanding US dollars in the middle of the trading day and simply was not getting it. This is the hallmark of liquidity issues during a market volatility event.

My gut says there is more to come, so don’t buy too early. However, I’m well positioned for something catastrophic occurring.

Late Night Finance – Episode 28

Date: Monday July 15, 2024
Time: 7:30pm, Pacific Time
Duration: Projected 60 minutes.
Where: Zoom (Registration)

Frequently Asked Questions:

Q: What are you doing?
A: Quarterly review, crystal ball gazing, post-quarter dispositions, and finally time permitting, Q+A. Please feel free to ask them on the zoom registration if any questions. Honestly, other than jumping through some June 25 tax hoops, it has been a relatively inactive quarter so don’t expect any fireworks if you do attend.

Q: How do I register?
A: Zoom link is here. I’ll need your city/province or state and country, and if you have any questions in advance just add it to the “Questions and Comments” part of the form. You’ll instantly receive the login to the Zoom channel.

Q: Are you trying to spam me, try to sell me garbage, etc. if I register?
A: If you register for this, I will not harvest your email or send you any solicitations. Also I am not using this to pump and dump any securities to you, although I will certainly offer opinions on what I see.

Q: Why do I have to register? I just want to be anonymous.
A: I’m curious who you are as well.

Q: If I register and don’t show up, will you be mad at me?
A: No.

Q: Will you (Sacha) be on video (i.e. this isn’t just an audio-only stream)?
A: Yes. You’ll get to see me, but the majority will be on “screen share” mode with MS-Word / Browser / PDFs as I explain what’s going on in my mind as I present.

Q: Will I need to be on video?
A: I’d prefer it, dress code is pajamas and upwards.

Q: Can I be a silent participant?
A: Yes.

Q: Is there an archive of the video I can watch later if I can’t make it?
A: No.

Q: Will there be a summary of the video?
A: A short summary will get added to the comments of this posting after the video – assisted by Zoom AI because I can’t think for myself anymore and need to let the computer do it!

Q: Will there be some other video presentation in the future?
A: Most likely, yes.

The slate is being cleaned

Slate Office REIT (TSX: SOT.un) today announced an update on its “portfolio realignment plan”, also known as “We’re trying to dump this stuff as fast as we can but can’t find anybody willing to pay a price that will pay down the mortgages” plan:

Slate Office REIT (TSX: SOT.UN) (the “REIT”), an owner and operator of high-quality workplace real estate, announced today that it continues to make progress on its previously announced portfolio realignment plan, and in connection with the foregoing, continues to engage with its senior lenders to determine a mutually acceptable path forward in respect of its obligations to such senior lenders, including in respect of its revolving credit facility. The REIT also announced today that, notwithstanding those ongoing discussions, its senior lenders have provided notices of default, which currently restrict the REIT from making further payments of accrued interest in respect of its outstanding debentures (collectively, the “Debentures”), for so long as such defaults have not been cured or waived. The REIT has determined that based on the information currently available to it, there can be no assurance if or when a cure or waiver in respect of such defaults will be achieved, and as such, the REIT does not expect to make the cash interest payments due on June 30, 2024 in respect of its 7.50% convertible unsecured subordinated debentures and 5.50% convertible unsecured subordinated debentures, nor does it expect to make the cash interest payment due on August 31, 2024 in respect of its outstanding 9% convertible unsecured subordinated debentures. Pursuant to the trust indentures governing such Debentures, failure to pay interest on the Debentures for 15 days following such interest being due will give rise to an Event of Default under the terms of the Debentures.

Needless to say, it isn’t looking good for them. This could be inferred from previous public filings, in addition to them having to beg to shareholders to go above their prescribed asset to debt ratio.

My attempts at being a corporate raider (November 2022) was incredibly brief before I came to the conclusion that there’s no way to win.

My question is not necessarily for Slate (we will see how George Armoyan can try to salvage this situation) but rather whether there will be any ripple effects in the office REIT sector if Slate does decide to go into CCAA. In the sector include AP.un, D.un, SOT.un, TNT.un, and diversified REITs which contain significant office components including BPY/BPO (preferred shares), HR.un, AX.un, and to a lesser extent MRC/MRT.un.