Dynamics of a catastrophic event – LNG terminal explosion

Today, natural gas futures were headed to their 15-year highs when the following happened:

What happened?

Apparently there was an explosion at the Freeport LNG temrinal.

Freeport LNG handles about 2 BCf/d of volume, which is about 1/6ths of the USA’s current export capacity. Let’s assume this is out of commission for a while, which is what the market is pricing until it figures out what is happening (we do not know the severity of this explosion).

The 1-year out natural gas futures curve was relatively unaffected (it dipped about 20 cents and is roughly unchanged for the day).

We work through the logical consequences of a temporary shutdown of 1/6ths of the US LNG capacity. Obviously spot drops due to 2 BCf/d less demand on domestic North American natural gas (the LNG terminals otherwise are pumping it out as quickly as they can export it). Pure gas players (TOU, ARX, PEY, SDE, BIR) get a profit hit depending on their Henry Hub exposure, but this will diffuse out to AECO/Dawn.

One unexpected winner will be crude futures. Reason? With less LNG export capacity, Europe will now face increased LNG prices and they will face substitution decisions (i.e. they will burn crude instead of oil). Crude is up for the day across the curve.

SAGD producers that are net heavy on steam (SU, CVE, MEG) will do better with a lower natural gas price.

Coal is more vulnerable, due to natural gas to coal substitution.

The reverberations are fascinating to watch in the markets, and they are incredibly quick to occur. They are impossible to trade unless if you have eyes and ears everywhere.

This is also an indication of the liquidity capacity of the market if you remove demand – 2 BCf/d is good enough for a 10% drop in the market. Heaven forbid if 2 BCf/d of supply capacity was added, or if demand dropped by 2 BCf/d in the future (say, perhaps due to an economic depression). Events like these give you good information for future expectations.

Why the focus on macroeconomics?

It might be a sign of the times that over the past half year or so I have been less focused as of late on my investment research looking at individual companies, and more about playing the role of “closet macroeconomist”, hence the focus of my posts being mostly about macroeconomics lately.

I am not intentionally trying to hide secrets (although there are a couple picks here and there in the non-oil and gas space that are still sitting on my research queue after passing my initial smell test) but in an environment where my baseline investment criteria is that it can earn 25% free cash flow to enterprise value, what’s the point in looking for other stocks?

The answer of course is there will be a time that fossil fuels will become politically correct once again (perhaps when all the lights and crypto farms shut off) and one will then have to dip into the watchlist bucket for other suitable investment candidates. That said, fossil fuels are still going very strong and hence why bother when the thesis I wrote back in 2020 (roughly summarized as being long anything ‘real’ and avoiding anything ‘financial’) is still very much intact?

The reason for the macro focus is simply because it is increasingly a dominant variable in today’s investing climate. To give an analogy, let’s say your choice was investing in established large cap gold miner X and gold miner Y. Ultimately you can talk about mine reserves, operating practices, all-in sustainable costs, capital structure, and on and on, but the dominant variable is much more simpler – the price of gold.

Likewise, the macro situation is creating a dominant variable environment where if you cannot get on board with the correct solution, it doesn’t matter what else you invest in – for instance, back in November 2021, it did not matter one bit which portfolio component of ARKK you invested in – you would have lost money no matter what. Perhaps the magnitude of loss would have been different had you chosen wisely, but it would have been a loss nonetheless.

The macro focus that requires meticulous attention is monetary policy and energy economics. Both right now are more dominant than ever as we are experiencing ‘the turn’ that has caught people flat-footed (including Covid, and the sudden realization of geopolitical instability in eastern Europe), coupled with an incredible amount of monetary mismanagement and dismissal of energy physics that has all translated into really terrible policy. Playbooks that worked in the past will not be working in the future.

One of these playbooks is a sacred tenant of portfolio management. It states that a correctly managed portfolio will have an equity and bond split, say 60/40. If you are young and want to take more risk, then 70/30 or even 80/20, but the point is there is some bond component. The notion is that when equities fall, bonds will rise, and if you maintain a consistent percentage, you will be able to rebalance and extract better value in the process.

We insert in the new macroeconomic reality where inflation is running hot and fast, and your bond portfolio is still trading at a negative real yield. This means that the bond component of the portfolio is losing purchasing power for the investor and only depends on other people purchasing bonds to keep its capital value in the event of an equity drawdown.

With the Bank of Canada, US Federal Reserve, and soon the EU engaging in quantitative tightening, coupled with increasing yields (that would also be impacted by QT in addition to inflation), bonds are going to be terrible investments if the next logical conclusion comes. What is this?

Continued monetary debasement. Amazingly despite everything, because the US dollar is the last one standing, it still wins by default. For now.

This brings up a rather interesting quandary for most institutional fund managers. You can’t hold cash (real negative yield, not to mention that you are hired as a portfolio manager to deploy cash and not stuff it in your mattress). You can’t hold bonds (take a look at the idiots that bought Austria’s 100 year bond with a 50bps coupon for twice par!). You can’t hold equities (take a look at the S&P, for example) although this is the least worst of the three options. Don’t even get me started on cryptocurrency as an asset class – although I do see that Luna is CAD$0.000101 a piece, so perhaps you want to buy one of these as an inflation hedge.

There is no escape at an institutional level. One workaround has been to shovel money into private assets and real estate and infrastructure, but these asset classes are very sensitive to rate increases although of course they do not mark them to market until it is too late. Private assets are a brilliant way to defer those losses, however!

Interest rates themselves are another matter. There has never been a point in history where we have seen such monetary manipulation to the point where real rates of interest have been driven this low without massive reverberations. The “consensus” scenario is that we’ll get a 50bps rate hike in July and then some more minor tightening before things ‘normalize’ and are back to normal.

But consider that your baseline input to the economy (energy) is at sky-high levels with no real material notions that more capacity is being brought online – what if this input to inflation keeps rising further? Everybody cites ‘demand destruction’, and indeed there will be a point where energy inputs will become so expensive that collectively we will be forced to stop using them, but until that point, we will see the trickle-down (or perhaps rain torrent) effect of these costs getting baked into everything we consume.

Likewise, salaries will be escalating, and inflation will start on its trajectory of a self-fulfilling prophecy – labour costs will rise because of inflation, and inflation will drive up the cost of labour supply. Already in British Columbia, we are seeing the seeds of this with the upcoming strike vote by the main BC Government Union – they are apparently miles apart from the government. This is one of many cases that will be resulting in significant wage increases going forward.

In a recent Bank of Canada speech (one day after the June 1st 50bps rate hike), we had the deputy governor talk about inflation. They’re now now talking about “avoiding entrenchment” of inflation. Note that derivatives of the word “entrench” is like the new “transitory”.

You don’t avoid entrenchment with small steps. You need shock and awe – something that goes beyond letting the market guess whether the next rate increase will be 50bps or 75bps. An example would be having an unplanned rate announcement with a 150bps increase “to get things back to the neutral rate”. The current short-term policy rate of 150bps is still at near-record lows (historically), and still below the ambient level the Bank of Canada had before Covid-19 (which was 175bps). The big mistake that people can make is this natural assumption of the “regression to the mean”, and currently that scenario right now is the bank will raise to 300bps and keep things there.

Consider the scenario where they will need to raise even further, to around 600 to 700bps to achieve the destruction of this “entrenchment”, and figure out the financial consequences. I am not saying this will happen, but it is definitely something that one should keep in their minds going forward – that inflation will be running away, just like how global warming activists claim that an increase in the Earth’s CO2 beyond a threshold point will cause a run-away greenhouse effect. Ask yourself what components of your portfolio get killed in a world where short-term rates are 700bps, we live in an inverted yield curve where the 5-year mortgage rate is 600bps and almost every asset out there is slashed in half. It isn’t pretty – practically everything other than cash loses in such a scenario (yes, including fossil fuels).

I am not entirely sure what is going to happen. Things are incredibly fluid right now, and I continue to remain very cautious. If there is any general prescription I could give to people, it is the following – if you’re leveraged, get at least flat.

Prepared to act more forcefully

The title of this post were the words used in the last sentence of the Bank of Canada’s interest rate announcement.

They did not surprise many with a 50bps increase (to a 1.50% target) although the yield curve regardless jumped up a little bit across the entire tenor.

Barring any catastrophic events, it is highly probable that July 13th will feature another 50bps rate increase. The yield curve continues to flatten.

Reading the BAX futures, over the next 12 months we have another anticipated 150bps or so of rate increases – instigated likely by ‘forcefully’. Today the 3-month banker’s acceptance rates is 195bps (98.05) and the December 2022 futures have it at 96.61, a 144bps difference. This very roughly corresponds to 3 50bps rate hikes (July 13, September 7, and October 26) before the Bank of Canada decides enough is enough.

After the July 13th rate hike is where things get interesting. There is this pervasive prediction of an inflationary course of mean reversion, under the theory that the inflation is caused by supply chain disruptions, Russia going to war and the like. Making this assumption can be hazardous to one’s financial health. For instance, if interest rates rise and inflation continues to remain elevated, the central bank will have no recourse other than to continue raising rates further (and possibly at a more rapid pace) to bat down inflation to a 2% target.

The temporal aspect of measuring inflation has an odd effect – for instance, in year 1 if the price of bread is 10 cents, and in year 2 the price is 20 cents, you’ve just experienced a 100% inflation. If the price of bread is 20.4 cents in year 3, you can declare victory as you’ve met your “2% target”, but the damage has already been done – that bread is going nowhere close to 10 cents no matter what your monetary policy is!

I suspect this is what will happen (get used to those high prices remaining… forever!), but there are some economic scenarios where we really start to see some very strange distortions, where despite high rates and monetary policy liquidity withdrawals we still will see rising long term interest rates. Right now the 5 year government bond yield is 289bps, but what if this goes to 400bps, 500bps or even 600bps? The implication of the real estate market seeing a 7% mortgage rate would completely crush the market and negative equity headlines would become rampant in the media. I’m not saying this will happen, but it is in the list of possibilities. After the summer of post-Covid fun is over with, there is going to be a sobering period which will be painful for many, even more so than what we are seeing today.

Be prepared to act more forcefully in the event that the landing is not so soft.

Bank of Canada Quantitative Tightening – May 25th edition

On April 27, 2022 the liability of the Bank of Canada (Members of Payments Canada) was $221 billion. On May 18th this was $193 billion and on May 25th, $189 billion.

Another $3 billion of government debt matures on June 1st and $270 million of mortgage bonds mid-month.

The US Federal Reserve’s incarnation of QT starts on June 1st.

Birchcliff Energy – hiding in plain sight

Sometimes an investment stares at you in the face and it is so obvious that it makes you wonder why others do not see it this way.

This is the case with Birchcliff Energy (TSX: BIR). Now that it has appreciated well beyond its Covid lows, I’ll write a little more about it in detail. I’ve been long shares of this (both common and preferred) for quite some time.

In 2022 it will produce about 79,000 boe/d equivalent (exit 2022 at approx. 82,000 boe/d), of which 80% of it is in the form of natural gas. All of this production is in the northwestern Alberta area, right up to the BC border.

Thus, the primary driver for this company is the state of the natural gas market. It has exposure to Dawn, Henry Hub and AECO.

Birchcliff is an unusual company in that they do not host quarterly conference calls. Instead, they issue information through large press releases and make it very easy to look at the assumptions. Although I have no problem sharpening my pencil and doing the leg works to do a proper pro-forma projection given various commodity price environments, Birchcliff expedites this process considerably.

There is some fine print to wade through, but the point is that BIR will generate $910 million in “excess free funds flow” (effectively cash flows after capex and projected dividend payments) with the average commodity prices as displayed in the release.

Notably, spot WTI and the spot Henry Hub price is well above their assumptions (US$114 and US$9.2 as I write this). Dawn typically tracks Henry Hub. Let’s ignore that spot is higher than modeled rates in the press release.

$910M of “excessive free funds” translates into $3.43/share.

At Wednesday’s closing price of $11.56, that is 3.4x or a yield of about 30%.

Normally companies are constrained with leverage and debt servicing. At the end of 2021, Birchcliff had $539 million in net debt (which includes BIR.PR.C) and another $50 million for the redemption of BIR.PR.A. The redemption of the preferred shares will result in a $6.8 million annualized savings on dividends (3 pennies a share, every bit counts!).

This will leave the company with a positive net cash amount of $270 million at the end of the year (the “Surplus”), unless they decide to blow some money on acquisitions and the like. Importantly, the math does not have to be adjusted for a leveraged return (indeed, it has to be corrected in the opposite direction).

The company will also be making enough money to eat through most of its tax shield ($1.9 billion at the end of 2021) and start paying income taxes in 2023, if the current price environment continues. Still, at US$88 oil, and US$5.50 Henry Hub for 2023 assumptions, the projection is for $535 million or about $2/share in free cash flow.

The stated policy on what to do with the cash surplus is to dividend it out beyond that which is to be used for strategic purposes. Management does not appear to be big on share repurchases other than to offset dilution that which has been issued from option plans (which is a real cash cost and will drag cash flows accordingly).

They will increase the dividend to $0.80/year in 2023, which is a $212 million outflow. This dividend can be maintained at price levels that are unlikely to be seen barring a great depression.

If they dividend the rest of their cash flows, when plugging in current commodity prices, they can give out far more than $0.80/year in dividends. It would be closer to around $2.80, or about $0.70 per quarter. Needless to say, if this is what they did, the market would find the yield (24%) tough to resist.

This is a very similar situation to Arch Resources (NYSE: ARCH), where the company will be giving out half of its free cash flow as a dividend and the other half to buy back shares. Considering its Q2 dividend will likely be around US$11/share, the obvious value of a share buyback is apparent. I wish Birchcliff would more actively consider it, at some cut-off threshold. For example, they can buy back shares until the price gets to a point where it is at 15% projected long-term free cash flows, a very conservative metric for a beneficial buyback. Right now that would imply that buying back below $15/share will clear that hurdle. At 12%, that number is about $19/share. There’s quite a way to go from current market prices.

None of this is a huge secret. It’s all in plain sight. It all relies on elevated commodity prices.