You can’t start and stop a commodity like a light switch

Apparently the German government (one of the coalition parties is ironically the Green party) is now clearing the way to fire up the coal power plants again in order to save natural gas for the winter.

For whatever reason, they cannot seem to get their nuclear power plants up again, so barring that option, coal is a reasonable policy option. Apparently opening up more solar and wind farms wasn’t on the docket.

However, there are considerable logistical issues to solve. Perhaps the internet has caused most people to think that you can start and stop things with a switch. Physical markets take a much longer time to start and stop than most think.

Let’s take some basic facts from the EIA and run some simple math.

It takes 1.12 pounds of coal to generate a kilowatt-hour of energy. This is the energy equivalent of one kilowatt of power during an hour. Most standard microwaves, when running, consume 1.2 kilowatts. Most hot water kettles use 1.5 kilowatts.

If you wanted that kilowatt of power for an entire day, you need 26.88 pounds of coal.

If you wanted that kilowatt of power for an entire year, you need 9,811 pounds of coal. To give some perspective of what 9,811 pounds is, think of three Toyota Corollas with a couple average-sized passengers each.

A kilowatt is not a large amount of power in the grand scheme of things. Power plants run into the hundreds of megawatts of capacity. Viewing the coal power map of Germany, say they wanted to re-start a 800 megawatt plant. This would replace 52 billion cubic feet (yearly) of natural gas. How much is 52 billion cubic feet? It is about the amount of natural gas that can be carried by 10 large LNG tankers.

An 800 megawatt coal plant would require the daily consumption of 21,500,000 pounds of coal and yearly consumption of 7,840,000,000 pounds of coal. These numbers, when written out wholly, are a bit ridiculous, so we say 10,700 tons and 3.92 million tons, respectively.

Over land, coal is typically shipped by rail. A coal rail car carries 116 tons of coal. Thus, your typical 800 megawatt coal plant needs approximately 92 rail cars of coal to operate, daily.

Needless to say, this is a gigantic amount of mass for one coal power plant. You need specialized machinery and the people with the appropriate training to haul it out of the ground, transport it, and get it into a boiler furnace.

When you tell an entire industry for over a decade that they are no longer needed, competent managers will operate the business on a run-down mode. Capital investment is minimal, and worker training programs are halted. Unions tend to prefer seniority, so younger people in the business go elsewhere. Know-how gets lost and things start to atrophy.

Now the message is “get started, but after you’re done bridging the gap while we solve the problem with our LNG capacity issues we’re going to shut you down again after a few years”, it is hardly confidence-inspiring. Nobody will want to invest time and energy into the industry unless if there is a huge financial incentive to compensate for the blade that is still over the necks of the coal mining industry.

There will still be a huge lack of capital, both monetary and knowledge, to ramp up an operation to produce 7,840,000,000 pounds of coal yearly in the name of saving natural gas. An entire industry cannot be turned on and off like a light switch.

The result is that the domestic price of coal will skyrocket.

Mechanics of price volatility in markets

I would be lying if I said the past week was pleasant, but one of the reasons why your portfolio decisions have some form of fundamental underpinnings is to just look at the quantitative situation instead of getting swayed by the emotions when you see the market value of the asset drop. Readers of Thaler (Misbehaving) can get a simple explanation of this mechanism – the pain of loss feels worse than the pleasure of gains.

One reason why people invest in real estate is because they do not have to concern themselves with a “mark to market” valuation of their properties on a daily basis. They take some form of comfort that their book value of their property remains the same, although the market is always acting on their pricing – just that there is no liquid market to shove the actual market value in front of your face all the time. I deeply suspect, for example, that many participants in the Vancouver and Toronto condominium markets know that the valuation of their properties have dropped in the past four months, but until they start seeing comparables, they are not mentally realizing it.

Private market equity has been another asset class that pension funds love to invest in because they can pretend to avoid market losses – you don’t lose money if you can’t sell it for a loss, right? Right???

Markets tend to have a momentum effect due to extrapolation of expectations by market participants. Strength begets strength, and weakness begets weakness. Valuations do become a corrective mechanism, but it is a very slow process to turn things around.

It is very easy to look at charts in retrospect, but nobody rings a bell when the ultimate tops are reached. Quite frankly I thought the momentum effect from all the quantitative easing would have carried forward into 2022 longer than it did, but the year to date has been a downhill march – the S&P 500 is down 23% and the TSX is down 11% year-to-date. The tech-heavier Nasdaq is down about 31%. Quantitative tightening has barely even begun, but the expectations of rate increases have clearly run its course.

Other cash-like asset classes have not fared well either – there have been few retreats other than straight cash. For instance, Bitcoin is down about 60% year-to-date. The Japanese Yen is down 15% vs. USD. Euro down 7% vs. USD. Long-term US Government debt (I will just use TLT as the proxy here) is down about 23%.

Price drops have even crept into some commodity markets. Copper is down 10%. Lumber is down about 50%.

The only remaining survivors I can find are the US Dollar (still going very strong despite inflation), Gold (roughly steady as measured in USD) and finally, oil (spot up 44%) and gas (up about 70%) are the clear outliers.

However, last week saw a very sharp correction in oil and gas. In the last week and a half, valuations of fossil fuel stocks have dropped 20% in a very short period of time.

A stock has its price drop for the simple reason that somebody is willing to unload it at a price lower than somebody is willing to purchase it. The question of why they are motivated to unload it comes generally in two forms. One is liquidity – the more motivated seller wants to sell it to the highest bidder right now, even if that high bid is at an unattractive price. These drops tend to be fueled by large hedge funds that are heavily leveraged and such drops are very sharp in nature – which is why I suspect the last week is partly fueled by deleveraging.

Another reason tends to be more valuation-focussed. In the case of fossil fuel stocks, if your raw input (commodity prices) decreases, then all things being equal, your equity value should decrease as well. So for instance, if crude oil drops 10%, your typical crude producer will drop a higher fraction due to the embedded operating and financial leverage in its business model. The announcement of the Freeport LNG facility being down for 3 months obviously did not help the North American natural gas marketplace, and hence the commodity is down about 30% from its recent highs – just under two weeks ago!

In the technology case, rising interest rates cause what I call P/E compression. If, before this bust-up, a technology company was trading at 40 times future earnings, a rise in interest rates makes such stocks look less attractive compared to the risk-free rate, and thus the company gets re-valued at 30 times. This will result in a stock price drop of 25%, all things being equal. All things are almost never equal in technology, and there is enough circular capital flowing through the various technology companies that a rise in interest rates would also cause lower amounts of technology spending (as such spending would have to be justified with larger returns) – so not only do such companies receive a lower valuation due to a lower forward P/E ratio, but also due to an absolute decrease in earnings. This is what happened to Shofify, which is down about 80% from its past November peak – it was projected to make money, and now it is no longer projected to make money until at least 2024 or beyond.

Markets rarely rise up in a straight line. It is a perfectly normal mechanic of market trading that you see dips in pricing despite the fundamental underpinnings being on the ‘correct side’. With regards to oil and gas, most of the arguments made against it stems from a demand destruction argument. There was no better world laboratory than in 2020 when the world was shut down for a few months with Covid-19 and yearly global demand dipped from 99 million barrels a day to about 91. Unless if we see some short of world shutdown scenario, there will be nothing remotely as close to such an extreme scenario occurring. On the supply side, US production is creeping up slowly again, but demand also remains strong. High prices will have the effect of reducing global marginal demand, but to what extent?

There is an embedded margin of safety within the fossil fuel stocks and that is through their low price to free cash flow ratios. For example, MEG Energy at US$80 crude will be trading at a price to free cash flow of about 7.5x, or just over 13%. While clearly not as good as what it is trading at today (23%), a shareholder will still be able to make ample total returns, either through dividends or buybacks going forward and without the benefit of P/E expansion. The one piece of caution that I would give is that now that we are approaching the middle innings of the cycle, a shift to quality would be warranted.

Cenovus / Sunrise Oil Sand Acquisition – Analysis

Cenovus (TSX: CVE) today announced they are purchasing the remaining 50% interest in the Sunrise oil sands assets for C$600 million plus another C$600 million in contingent consideration, plus a 35% interest in the “Bay du Nord” project in Quebec, a currently undeveloped offshore project.

The contingent consideration is quarterly payments of $2.8 million for every dollar that Western Canadian Select is above CAD$52/barrel, for up to 2 years, and a maximum of C$600 million. Considering that WCS is currently at about CAD$130, this will work out to $220 a quarter. Barring a complete disaster in the oil sands, it is a virtual certainty the entire C$600 million will get paid out.

I have no idea how to value the 35% Bay du Nord project stake and will zero this out for the purposes of the following calculations.

Cenovus made a $56.20 netback in their Q1-2022 oil sands productions. Sunrise, not being the best asset on the planet, is about $15/barrel more expensive to operate and transport, so we will calculate a $41/barrel netback. However, the royalty structure is in pre-payout, compared to post-payout and hence netback will be higher by about $10/barrel. Very crudely (pun intended!) I estimate around $51 netback (estimated to last 7-8 years before the full post-payout rate kicks in). CVE will acquire 25k boe/d, so they are acquiring about $465 million of netback with $1.2 billion spent, or about a 39% return.

This does not assume that CVE will be able to scale up the operation to 60k boe/d as stated in the release, which would add another $186 million/year, or about 15% extra, ignoring the incremental capital costs of the project.

Tax-wise, CVE still has a $17.6 billion shield at the end of 2021, so the impact of income taxes will not kick in for at least a couple years. Even assuming full income taxes and ignoring the extra 10kboe/d production, CVE is purchasing something for a 30% after-tax return in today’s commodity environment. That’s pretty good for shareholders!

The strangle of higher interest rates

Both Canadian and American interest rate expectations have spiked considerably over the past two trading days.

On Wednesday it appears quite likely at this point that the Federal Reserve will raise its rate 75bps from a 0.75-1.00% band to 1.5-1.75% band. There is also an outside shot of a full 1% increase.

More relevantly, however, longer-term rate expectations have continued to creep higher:

Quantitative tightening hasn’t even gone on for two weeks and we are seeing the markets vomit.

It is not much better in Canada either, with long-term rates elevating to levels not seen since before the economic crisis.

With the 5-year bond going up another 20bps today, mortgage rates will surely climb and this is going to kill credit availability. Specifically in Vancouver/Toronto, condominium holders are going to face two ugly decisions – either they continue to incur a deeply negative carrying cost (in relation to the amount of net rental income they can earn) or they will have to take increasingly larger haircut to prices in order to be able to obtain liquidity. There is definitely going to be a short period of time where people will try to get February pricing, but it will effectively be a no-bid market at those prices.

July 13th for the Bank of Canada is increasingly looking like a 75bps raise at this point (to a 2.25% target rate).

These interest rates are still on the low end historically in the pre-2008 history. The reversal of QE and the subsequent financial reverberations are going to crush leveraged finance in all forms, and markets will be seeking US cash as the safe haven (notably not Bitcoin, which is down about 20% as I write this).

The survivors are going to be companies that generate copious amounts of free cash flow with respect to their valuations. De-leveraging is the name of the game. Those with cash – you’ll be getting your opportunities in the next few months.

The next 10% is going to be very difficult

The rules change in a tightening monetary policy environment. We saw shades of this in the second half of 2018 when the US markets started to vomit over QT and increasing interest rates, and to a lesser degree this happened to Canada.

Recall that the S&P 500 in 2019 very roughly averaged price levels that are about 25% below where it is currently trading at. When factoring in monetary debasement, one can surmise that a “2019 neutral” level would be somewhere around 3,500 but this was with much better economic conditions, coupled with a justification for a sky-high P/E ratio due to extremely low interest rate levels. The average 30-year bond yield in 2019 was lower than it is currently trading at. A more realistic level, all things being equal, would be around the 3000-3200 level (20% lower than present).

Fast forward to 2022 and we are seeing shades of late 2018 – although of course the big difference is that in 2018 central banks could reverse course because inflation back then was at a manageable level. The mandate for higher interest rates is omnipresent with the latest CPI print out of the USA at +8.6% and the latest CPI snapshot in Canada will be released in June 22 and indications definitely suggest it will be up there.

What is particularly damaging in Canada is the spike in mortgage rates. This is going to kill credit in the real estate market:

The 5-year fixed rate is the most common form of mortgage, and from June 2017 (2.4%) to June 2022 (4.3%) is a 190bps increase.

What does this mean in reality? Let’s say in June 2017 you took out $1M in credit financing at 2.4%, with typical terms (25-year amortization). At the end of June 2022 you would be sitting at an $845k balance after making $53.2k yearly payments.

You go and renew this $845k balance at 4.3%, for a 20-year amortization, and you will be paying about $59.5k/year for the next five years – about $528/mo out of your pocket.

Credit has gotten much more expensive. People can mitigate this with a variable rate mortgage, but the Bank of Canada has made it crystal clear that short-term rates will be going higher. For how much longer – who knows. There are conceivably scenarios where if central banks can not get a hold of inflation that short-term rates will be going considerably higher than the so-called “neutral” rate target of roughly 3%. If this occurs, variable-rate mortgages will be under increasing stress.

The point of the above exercise is that unless wages increase dramatically, available credit to be dumped into the real estate market is going to be more expensive and this will be depressing the prices of housing going forward. Since construction is a significant component of urban economic activity, this activity will likely be slowing down as a result – once projects complete, that will be it.

The disaster scenario is that unemployment will spike and you start seeing waves of selling due to foreclosures. It is a scenario that is the big fear for Canada’s mortgage insurers (CMHC and formerly Genworth, now Sagen owned by Brookfield) where you start seeing underwater mortgages. The Bank of Canada is clearly looking at these economic scenarios and I do suspect there is an element of a “Macklem put” in play here – the country simply cannot afford to have a mass collapse in real estate pricing.

Negative economic reverberations would hit the commodity markets as well and higher rates will be triggering this. This is going to make equity picking in the commodity market much more trickier than it has been in the past 24 months.

Even if raw commodity prices take a 25% dip from present prices (e.g. spot WTI from $120 to $90, spot natural gas from $9 to $6.75, etc.), most Canadian (edit one day later: forgot to include a very important word here: ‘energy’) equities are still well positioned to make historically large amounts of free cash flows. However, sustaining capital expenditures will inevitably get more expensive and profitability will diminish, albeit will still be ample. There is likely going to be price volatility as the market grapples between the notions of total returns (their total returns will likely be much higher than companies in other sectors), coupled with pricing in a potential future downslope of raw commodity pricing – essentially pricing the walking down of the futures curve. December 2022 oil is $107.50 as I write this, while December 2025 oil is $74.75. Clearly if spot demand is higher, then existing producers are able to claim the surplus and hedging becomes expensive.

However, the capitalization of future profits (as determined by existing market prices) will continue to gyrate. For companies that are actively involved in share repurchases, these dips are probably more welcome opportunities and shareholders will inevitably be staying at least afloat while the rest of the market continues to tank. However, capital appreciation from this point is not going to be easy – most of the returns will be of the total return type. As I illustrated with an earlier post about Birchcliff, I don’t believe that an investor should be banking on share appreciation, but rather they will be receiving a high dividend stream – in the case of BIR, a healthy double-digit return of cash at the current market rate of $11.75. As raw commodity prices fluctuate, you will see this deviate up and down and this will make for a difficult price environment where, as the title says, the next 10% is going to be very difficult. Getting out of debt and holding ample supplies of cash is going to make people feel very comfortable in this environment.