Normally this ETR has traded at a premium to spot gold, but for whatever reason, today they are trading at a 2% discount. I noticed this when MNT was down 3% today while gold was flat.
This is like getting a US$35/ounce discount on spot gold. Physical gold typically has around a 4% mark-up.
Redemption costs are relatively reasonable – a 10,000 ETR redemption (the minimum) incurs a 0.9% fee (to get delivered 3 kilogram gold bars plus some residual cash). Getting your gold out in 1 ounce gold coins is considerably more expensive – about 5%.
I have no idea why the discount is suddenly happening today, perhaps a fund or somebody wants to unload it into the market, especially considering the rest of the market is on fire. Gold is a yellow metal that just sits there and looks pretty, and in the form of an ETR, it is even less exciting than a cryptographically-encoded digital collectible. Gold earns a negative income sitting there, compared to Gamespot or some other instrument of legalized gambling.
Sprott has a 64% gold and 36% silver hybrid (TSX: CEF) which has an even higher discount (about 3.9%), but it is considerable more expensive to hold – 0.53% MER. Sprott’s physical gold equivalent (TSX: PHYS) has a 2% discount and a 0.45% MER.
Perhaps there is some sort of arbitrage going on between these two funds.
Gran Colombia Gold announced some upcoming debt redemptions, including the following for (TSX: GCM.NT.U):
Currently, the aggregate principal amount of Gold Notes issued and outstanding is US$32,637,500. The next regularly scheduled Amortizing Payment of the Gold Notes, amounting to US$2,887,500, will take place on April 30, 2021, reducing the outstanding amount to US$29,750,000. The Amortizing Payment will include a Gold Premium, as applicable, based on the London P.M. Fix as of April 15, 2021.
Gran Colombia also announced today that pursuant to the Gold Notes Indenture, it will complete an early optional redemption on May 3, 2021 of an additional US$10,000,000, equivalent to approximately 33.6% of the aggregate principal amount of its Gold Notes outstanding, following the scheduled Amortizing Payment on April 30, 2021. In accordance with the Gold Notes Indenture, the early redemption price will be 104.13% of the aggregate principal amount of the Gold Notes being redeemed plus accrued interest.
Following the Amortizing Payment and the early optional redemption, there will be US$19,750,000 aggregate principal amount of Gold Notes issued and outstanding.
Full details of the cash amounts to be paid in connection with the Amortizing Payment and the early redemption will be announced on or about April 15, 2021.
I was expecting GCM to redeem the entire batch of notes in one shot. They have the cash to do it – about US$90 million at the end of 2020. These notes represent extremely expensive financing for the company – with an 8.25% coupon, coupled with a quarterly payment of 3-4% (this depends on the price of gold, but if it is around $1725 it will be in low double-digits annualized), the total cost of capital for the debt to the company is about 20%.
Surely they can obtain debt financing on better terms. Why aren’t they redeeming the entire slab of debt is beyond me.
Liquidity on the notes is also harder and harder to find – trading has been very light since February. After May 3rd, the notes will certainly trade closer to the call price due to the looming threat of being cheaply called out.
Unless the notes trade ridiculously high, I’m very happy to have them mature. It is nearly risk-free money at this point with only a question of whether the company will slowly redeem the residual value over the quarters.
Teledyne (NYSE: TDY) is undergoing the process of acquiring FLIR (Nasdaq: FLIR) for half-cash, half-stock.
The cash component is about US$3.7 billion.
They have a credit facility for $1.15 billion and they performed the following bond offering for $3 billion total:
$300 million aggregate principal amount of 0.650% Notes due 2023
$450 million aggregate principal amount of 0.950% Notes due 2024
$450 million aggregate principal amount of 1.600% Notes due 2026
$700 million aggregate principal amount of 2.250% Notes due 2028
$1.1 billion aggregate principal amount of 2.750% Notes due 2031
Needless to say, considering the 10-year government bond yield is around 155bps, this is cheap financing.
From their GAAP earnings, FLIR earned $1.60/share diluted in 2020 and at an acquisition price of US$56/share (assuming TDY at $390), that’s 2.9% without growth or synergies.
There’s still a bit of a merger arbitrage (about $1.30/share) which is a moving target because TDY has been gyrating since the merger announcement, but I am looking to dispose of the stock eventually once I have found a more suitable USD target for capital.
I don’t talk about IPOs very often, but this one caught my attention because of its presence in the agricultural space. Farmer’s Edge (TSX: FDGE) went public at an IPO price of $17/share, raising $125 million in gross proceeds ($117.5 net), and started trading on the TSX on March 3rd. Unlike many other technology IPOs, they have at a modest premium to their offering price:
There is a customary 30-day option by the underwriters to purchase more shares, which at the current market price of CAD$18.80 is likely to happen. I will assume so – the company will have 41.8 million shares outstanding if this happens.
Fairfax (TSX: FFH) owns 60% of the company after the offering and is the only 10%+ shareholder.
(Update March 8, 2021: The stock is now trading under CAD$17/share, that was quick… FFH will own 62% without the exercise of the over-allotment).
(Update March 9, 2021: Underwriters have exercised the over-allotment option – gross proceeds $143.8 million).
Company’s Operations
FDGE offers a package called FarmCommand. It is a piece of software which integrates with provided hardware (CanPlug) which facilitates a data conduit to the software relevant to measuring grain weight by location during a harvest. The software beams the information to the cloud using cellular data, and the software crunches the metrics and presents it to the end-user. Likewise, they also sell weather probes and soil moisture probes that can send data to the server (and this data can be used to make correlations at future times). Finally, they do have a soil sampling service that looks painfully manual and will test the soil for composition, using their own lab equipment. This information can be used later to suggest fertilizer solutions.
They use Google to store the data to the cloud, and Airbus to provide satellite imagery.
Revenues are obtained by selling farmers the FarmCommand package on a per-acre-per-year basis and also collecting such data to sell to crop insurance companies.
Relevant quotes:
FarmCommand is sold on a subscription basis, per acre per year, and is offered in five principal tiers. We focus on selling our $3.00 Smart package but offer price points starting at $1.50 for a basic Smart Imagery package, scaling to $6.00 for our comprehensive Smart VR package, with these list prices and packages varying marginally by geography. Our customers have historically subscribed to four-year contracts. Recently, we have introduced our Elite Grower program which allows our customers to trial our platform for free for up to one year before subscribing to a four-year contract.
…
Crop insurance partners form part of our go-to-market strategy and we expect them to sell our subscription products to their agriculture customers. Once our program is deployed on the farm by a crop insurance company, Farmers Edge will be able to provide reporting, analytics and predictive modeling to the crop insurance industry players on demand.
This reminds me of car insurance companies getting people to voluntarily put a device in their car dashboards for the purpose of insurance assessments. If you are a “safe” driver, as in you don’t drive that much and when you do, you drive at low speeds, then the insurance company will give you a discount. In reality, they will use this information to determine more accurate pricing, which is why there is a significant degree of selection bias with such offerings.
I also believe certain farm operations have proprietary methods that they would not want to disclose, which would work to the detriment of FDGE.
FDGE states they estimate at the end of Q4-2020, they have 23.4 million acres of subscribed farmland, and an estimated revenue of $45-47 million for 2020. 54% of this was Canada, 28% was USA, and 13% was Brazil, and the remaining 5% is Australia and Eastern Europe.
Keep in mind rough estimates are that Canada has 90 million acres of cropland, the USA has 250 million acres and Brazil 150 million. The total addressable market in these geographies assuming 100% penetration and the $3/acre package would be about $1.5 billion a year in revenues.
The company claims it adds value:
The ROI our solutions provide farmers vary by product and region. As additional examples, corn farms implementing our solutions earned farmers roughly $52 more per acre in Nebraska, and $36 more per acre in Kansas, compared to state averages, in 2019.
Clearly if this is the case and if they can establish this with better studies and have a proprietary advantage with their software to make it happen, then one can presume they can capture more margin than $3/acre.
In terms of competition, they list John Deere (NYSE: DE) and Bayer-Monsanto (OTC: BAYZF), but they allude to a “Point and regional solution providers” which is clearly referring to Ag Growth (TSX: AFN), but they are never named quite likely for the reason that they are the true competition.
Finances
The company has lost a lot of money over the past 3 full fiscal years. The “finance costs” is somewhat misleading as the company has been financed with debt before the IPO and this was equitized for the IPO.
In terms of raw EBITDA, and the accumulated non-capital loss for tax purposes (which is a rough proxy for true expense), we have:
2017: $53.8 million loss / $130 million
2018: $76.4 million loss / $199 million
2019: $74.2 million loss / $309 million
9 months in 2020: $42.4 million loss (annualized, $56.5 million) / tax NOLs not disclosed yet
This is also ignoring capital costs, which are not inconsiderable as the company has to get the hardware into the farmers’ hands (in addition to the installation) in order to do the data collection.
The company gave projections for 2020 and is expected to have burnt $52-56 million. Because of the renegotiation of the Google contract and the satellite imagery contract (which has been re-contracted to a subsidiary of Airbus), they are expected to save an annualized $15 million in costs (makes you wonder how they managed to negotiate the deals in the first place – this was not an inconsiderable cost savings).
The company has been mostly funded by Fairfax during inception. There are a couple other under-10% holders, one of which (Osmington Inc.) has the right to a board seat as long as they maintain at least 5% ownership.
After the IPO they will have converted all of their debt into equity, and have a pro-forma $106 million of cash on the balance sheet as of September 30, 2020 and the only significant debt being $6.5 million in future lease obligations.
They claim “break-even for Free Cash Flow in the medium term, assuming growth in Subscribed Acres remains consistent with the above expectations” (45-50% annually). Of course you will if you grow high-margin revenues at that rate! While achieving that percentage growth is indeed possible, the question remains whether they can do it profitably (it is difficult to make money giving out 1-year free trials and not cashing them into 4-year contracts), and the terminal growth rate of the business (it will not be 45-50% annually for a very long time, especially given the acreage penetration they have already achieved).
I’m not going to comment on the management suite or the board of directors, but I have reviewed them.
Some analysis on the software
There’s a lot of interesting information on how to use their product online. For instance here is one particular function within their FarmCommand software, but also as part of a series of instructional videos:
This competes with AGI’s Suretrack Compass software:
I’m finding this comparison between the two softwares to be interesting. AGI’s solutions are obviously vertically integrated with some of their products (their grain silos), while FDGE’s solutions are a horizontal turnkey solution. There is a lot of overlap. I would suspect that part of the reason why FDGE has spent a ridiculously large amount of money to date is to just get farmers aware of the software – they don’t have any inroads to the end-customers that a company like AFN or John Deere would have.
The other observation is that these Youtube videos that I linked to have views that are measured in the low hundreds. Almost nobody has watched these videos. There appears to be zero public awareness of agricultural software. If at some point these companies receive more eyeballs (heaven forbid if /r/WallStreetBets decided to hit it), there aren’t a lot of public companies in this space that would receive instant elevation to their valuations.
Consider that the weekend market capitalization for FDGE is $765 million – higher than Ag Growth’s $715 million (albeit, Ag Growth has a considerable amount of debt on their balance sheet, about $870 million), it makes one wonder how to reconcile the valuation differential. Is this attributed to FDGE as being some sort of “pure SaaS play in the Ag Space”, while Ag Growth is a much larger conglomerate (set to exceed a billion dollars in revenues), primarily concerned with the (relatively more boring) design and construction of grain towers and movers rather than having their own piece of software, which by all accounts does mostly what FDGE does?
I’m not interested in FDGE at current valuations, but I’ll watch it. If it turns out the current valuation of FDGE is “correct”, Ag Growth is incredibly undervalued.
Disclosure – I presently own shares in Ag Growth (posted here).
