Watch, but not trade volatility

I have discussed this before, but it bears watching. Volatility is at a relative low point in relation to the past thee years:

The events in late 2008 strictly related to the financial crisis (the downfall of Bear Stearns, Lehman), and volatility remained relatively high through the first half of 2009 before calming down.

The markets reached some sort of complacency in the first quarter of this year, before volatility rose again with the advent of the European (Greek) sovereign debt crisis. This resolved, and volatility is dipping again.

It may lower even further, but traditionally volatility is anti-correlated to index performance – the higher volatility goes, the lower the underlying index. Some people have the misconception that the VIX is predictive; it is not, but it can be used as a barometer of market’s future expectations of volatility.

One might be lead into believing that buying and selling volatility itself, compared to the underlying index, may be the financially wise way of playing this. Unfortunately, it is not so easy – the above chart is equivalent to a “spot rate” on volatility – mainly the volatility over the next 30-day period. There are products that are designed to trade volatility directly (VIX futures), but in order to sustain a position, you must take rollover risk.

For example, if you think volatility is going to rise in December, you can buy the December future. But if the volatility does nothing between now and the December expiry (third Friday in December), you must sell your December position (or settle it with cash) and then purchase the January future, which may have a significantly different price than December.

There is an exchange-traded fund, (NYSE: VXX) which performs the same function (for a 0.85% management expense ratio):

As you can compare with the first chart in this post, there is correlation, but during “dull” moments, the ETF is absolutely destroyed by the rollover process. This is similar to most natural resource ETFs (e.g. UNG) which are also destroyed by traders picking away at the automatic rollover.

Rollover risk is somewhat mitigated by the (NYSE: VXZ) ETF, which uses futures that are dated roughly 6 months in advance, but this has tracking error with existing volatility – current volatility may spike, but the future 6 months out might not track the current action.

There is clearly no free lunch in trading volatility – it is not as easy as looking at the VIX chart and thinking you can “buy” it, thinking you are buying low and preparing to sell high. Almost like options, not only must you get the direction correct, but you must get the timing correct, which is not easy.

Traders might be allured by past price action (e.g. this year, doubling your money buying in April, and selling in May), but your timing must be absolutely sharp. There is no way to determine that buying at 75 and selling at 150 was the proper decision except purely in hindsight.

You can even buy options on VXX, but note that the traditional implied volatility calculation (based on the Black-Scholes model) has little to do with properly valuing options on volatility futures – more so with this option than traditional equity options!

Thirst for yield – FortisBC

Via James Hymas’ daily report…

FortisBC (a subsidiary of Fortis, TSE:FTS) sold CDN$100 million worth of the most mis-named “Medium Term Notes” which, according to the shelf prospectus filing, are unsecured debentures. The yield was 5.01%, a spread of 135bps over government, and the term was… 40 years.

I know utility companies are supposed to be rock-solid stable, but this thirst for yield is becoming a bit too much to handle. Capital is racing to purchase income at any cost. Equity in the master company (Fortis Inc.) at current prices and past 12 months of earnings ($1.60 EPS) is 5.1%, so assuming any sort of natural growth for inflation and rising prices would lead one to suspect that the equity would be the cheaper option, even when you factor the elevated prices for utility company equity. Fortis’ common shares hardly budged even during the peak of the late 2008-early 2009 economic crisis.

Unloading some more long term debt

One of my corporate long-term debt holdings in R.R. Donnelley (NYSE: RRD) has been trading significantly higher since my purchase point in 2009. I had invested in the 6.625% October 2029 debenture, via a trust preferred security (NYSE: PYS), which has a coupon of 6.3%.

Although I had been sitting on large unrealized gains on the issue and was intending to dispose of it in 2011, the trading above 24 proved to be too tempting so I unloaded it and realized gains. Although it’s entirely possible the bonds will continue trading this high in a couple months, I didn’t want to take the gamble.

Mathematically, assuming a continuous yield (which the trust preferreds do not trade as; they trade “as-is”), the PYS security would have a pre-tax current yield of 6.5% and an implied capital gain over 18.9 years of 0.2%. This is below what you can get with some shorter duration fixed income securities, so disposing of this will be a good decision assuming I can deploy capital more efficiently in the future.

The equity in RR Donnelley at this moment appears to look like a better investment than its long-term debt – the company’s cash generation is significant and its debt is termed out properly and has been managed well, so there is unlikely to be a liquidity risk with the operation. Even if you assume they do absolutely nothing but earn income at the rate they have been doing in the past 9 months (a false assumption due to seasonality in their business), the equity will be yielding a minimum of 7.6% at present prices – a compensation of about 1% over debt. When you factor some very conservative growth assumptions, it skews significantly in favour toward the equity relative to the debt.

In terms of overall portfolio movement, my long-term debt holdings have shrunk again and cash has increased. If/when long-term government bond yields start to rise this should prove to be a good move.

An extra $100,000 for TFSA room?

The Senate Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce is one of the more functional committees in Parliament that hasn’t dissolved into a partisan morass.

In one of their recent reports (October 19, 2010), one of the committee recommendations was that Canadians should receive a $100,000 contribution room to their TFSAs:

The federal government amend the Income Tax Act to establish, in addition to the existing annual contribution room, an amount for lifetime contributions to a Tax-Free Savings Account. The amount of the lifetime contribution room, which should be increased annually in accordance with changes in the Consumer Price Index, should initially be $100,000.

Moreover, the existing ability to carry forward unused annual Tax-Free Savings Account contribution room should continue.

Although this policy is unlikely to be enacted by the government, if they did it would be a non-trivial method of sheltering income. The actual committee report (page 35 onward) goes on to state that most Canadians are very unaware of how to use TFSAs, and that such accounts are typically used to store GICs or other equivalently conservative investments, rather than stocks or bonds.

Anybody investing in the marketplace should be trying to maximize their TFSA as quickly as possible, as it is truly the only “free lunch” that the government gives to people in terms of taxation. Mathematically speaking, the power of compound interest kicks in if you can competently manage the investment portfolio for a long duration of time. Assuming the government does not change the tax advantage of the TFSA, it removes one of the largest risks of financial planning, mainly the future income tax rate.

General Motors IPO trading on the market

It was a virtual guarantee that General Motors would start trading above its IPO price ($33/share); given that this company is purely a political entity at this point, it would have been disastrous for the IPO to crash on the initial day in the marketplace.

Given the fact that GM has not really solved any of its fundamental business problems (high costs, inferior products) it will be able to successfully use its government-held ownership to bend rules toward its favour.

Suffice to say, I would avoid this company by a long mile.