Lululemon again

Lululemon (Nasdaq: LULU) is up to US$61/share, nearly at its all-time high upon announcing that it made more money in the fourth quarter than analysts expected.

I have written about LULU before and am continually amazed at their ability to “surprise” in such a fashion. The most valuable asset such companies have is their branding, and LULU has been able to strike the sweet spot in women’s fashions for quite some time – although there is competition encroaching, they have still been able to keep surprisingly ahead.

At a market cap of 8.8 billion, it makes you wonder how much higher they can go – looking at what that capital can purchase, instinctively I would not want to put a single penny of that into Lulu given existing valuations. That said, I thought the same thing when it was trading at $4 billion. Tells you know much I know about fashion trends.

A reminder on yield chasing

One other conviction that I have compared to the host of “I don’t know”s I gave in my 2011 year end report is that everybody is chasing yield. In a low interest rate environment, capital is shifting towards securities that can spin off safe income – just imagine if you are a pension fund manager and need a targeted return – formerly you could bank on 30-year treasury bonds giving you a ~6% yield in the first five years of the century, but the zero interest rate policy has pushed down yields to currently 3%. If your mandate is to make 8%, formerly if you had a 50/50 bond/equity allocation you would need to make 6% on the bonds and 10% on the equity. With bond yields presently at 3%, the same allocation forces you to make 13% on equity – a much more difficult task for a fund manager. Suddenly placing bets on that speculative pharmaceutical research firm seems to make financial sense.

How do you make up the yield difference on the fixed income side? By investing in treasury bond-like securities and this means climbing up the risk spectrum – provincial/state debt, municipal debt, corporate debentures, and even preferred shares.

Everybody is chasing yield and prices today reflect this. Just be warned that the markets might face a Europe-type situation where the underlying entity no longer can pay out such cash flows – even when European banks are getting interest-free loans, they are still choosing to put their capital into safer 10-year German bonds at 1.9% compared to Italian debt (7.15% currently). Measuring the ability of corporations and sovereign states to actually pay the income is always a vital calculation. As the cliche goes, it is about return of investment, not return on investment.

This could be an explanation why certain large cap stocks are trading at very low P/E ratios – albeit, it makes no difference (taxation differential between dividends and capital gains notwithstanding) whether a corporation makes a 10% after-tax return and retains it, or gives it out in a dividend. Somebody would look at both companies and likely favour the one actually giving out the dividend. The true answer is whether the company can deploy its retained capital as profitably.

The opportunities presenting themselves currently seem to be very narrow and opportunistic and off the radar. It’s not like buying shares of Starbucks under $10/share back during the economic crisis.

Petrobakken trying to find the cash

On December 13, 2011, Petrobakken (TSX: PBN) released more information with respect to their 2012 plans and numbers.

The two salient snippets are as follows:

We are also pleased to announce our initial capital plan for 2012, which allow us to build on our 2011 operational success. We anticipate capital development expenditures of approximately $700 million, primarily focused on horizontal drilling and completions, predominantly in the Bakken and Cardium light oil plays. We expect that this drilling-focused activity will generate a 2012 exit production rate of between 50,000 and 54,000 boepd. Our estimated year-over-year average production growth will exceed 15%, on an absolute and per-share basis. We expect this initial 2012 program to be executed entirely from funds from operations, with surplus cash flow available to fund dividends and debt repayment.

For 2012 we estimate that our corporate base decline rate will be in the range of 30-35%. In 2010, our base production declined approximately 40%, while the 2011 base decline rate is now forecast at approximately 35%. We have been encouraged by the results of our recently completed wells, and we are also beginning to see the benefit of the continued maturation of our producing assets with a significant proportion of our production now coming from older, shallower decline, horizontal wells.

…

As part of our ongoing balance sheet management, and to reward continuing support from existing shareholders, we are pleased to announce the implementation of a DRIP. The DRIP provides eligible holders of common shares resident in Canada the opportunity to reinvest their monthly cash dividends in PetroBakken shares at a 5% discount to the then current market prices. Petrobank (59% shareholder of the Company) has indicated an intention to participate in the DRIP with respect to 50% of their PetroBakken shares, which will amount to $53 million in additional liquidity to the Company on an annual basis. Subject to the receipt of approval of the Toronto Stock Exchange, the DRIP will be implemented for the January 2012 dividend, which is payable in mid-February 2012. Additional information regarding the DRIP can be found below.

The company is planning on spending $700M in capex in 2012, which is a decrease from projected 2011 capex numbers of $900M. The capital budget for 2012 will be slightly below their operating cash flow for the year, assuming current oil prices remain steady (a 12-month extrapolation of 2011 figures for the first nine months is $650M, noting that WTIC prices were lower then than they are now).

It still leaves one wondering when the company is actually going to generate significant amounts of cash in excess of capital expenditures – when you add the $180M of dividends projected in 2012 (minus the ~$53M that Petrobank will re-invest for Petrobakken equity), it does not leave much for them to pay off their February 2013 debenture, which holders have a one-day put option to redeem (and given the small coupon and the credit profile of the company, they most certainly will unless if there is a sweetener given to them in the interim).

The DRIP decision in itself is rather interesting – it effectively starves half the cash flow that Petrobank will receive from Petrobakken in exchange for further equity. Since Petrobank owns 59% of Petrobakken, it will result in Petrobank foregoing $53M/year in dividends in exchange for further equity. Assuming a $13/share price for Petrobakken, this will mean Petrobakken will issue 4.3M shares to Petrobank over 2012 – a cost of capital of 7.8% for Petrobakken, assuming the dividend is not cut. This is expensive capital for the company.

The company has hedged a significant amount of oil (20,000 boepd, about 40% of its expected production) with existing high prices which I think is a smart decision. Still, they are extremely leveraged and their only salvation is continued high oil prices. If there is any significant contraction in the price of oil, they will be in clear financial difficulty, especially when it comes to negotiating with the $750M debenture that is effectively due in February of 2013.

Holloway Lodging REIT – debt conversion

Following up from my previous post on Holloway Lodging’s (TSX: HLR.UN) debt situation, I notice on December 22, 2011 they gave a conversion notice of their debentures to units:

Holloway Lodging Real Estate Investment Trust (TSX: HLR.UN HLR.DB.A) (“Holloway” or the “REIT”) announces that it has today given notice to the holders (the “Debentureholders”) of its 6.5% convertible unsecured subordinated debentures (the “Debentures”) that it will redeem the Debentures in full on January 23, 2012 and that it will satisfy the redemption price of the Debentures on the redemption date by issuing trust units (“Units”) of the REIT in lieu of cash, in accordance with the terms of the trust indenture for the Debentures (the “Indenture”). Any accrued and unpaid interest on the Debentures will be paid in cash on the redemption date.

…

The number of Units to be issued to Debentureholders will be determined by dividing the aggregate principal amount of Debentures outstanding by 95% of the weighted average trading price per Unit for the 20 consecutive trading days ending on the fifth trading day preceding the redemption date (the “Current Market Price”). Based on the redemption date of January 23, 2012, the 20-trading day period commenced on and included December 15, 2011 and will end on and include January 16, 2012.

…

Holloway also announces that it will not make the interest payment on its Debentures when such payment is due on December 31, 2011. Holloway intends to make such payment by January 13, 2012, as permitted by the terms of the Indenture.

This is a significant development for unitholders in that the roughly $51.8M face value of debentures outstanding (at least as reported by the TSX; this may be slightly lower due to buybacks) will be converted at the rate of approximately 7-8 cents per share, at least given existing trading patterns to date. Unit prices cratered from 20 cents to as low as 4 cents upon the announcement (currently trading at 10 cents), while debenture prices dropped from 58 cents to as low as 40 cents and is currently at 53 cents on the dollar.

Assuming an 8 cent per unit conversion price, this would mean dilution of about 94% for existing unitholders. Somebody holding $1,000 face value of debentures would receive 12,500 units, implying a unit price of about 4.25 cents post-conversion. The remaining entity will have about 670 million units outstanding and at 4.25 cents per unit it would imply a market capitalization of about 28 million.

Using the 2010 cash flow statement as a very blunt proxy for future performance, the entity without the convertible debentures will be able to pull in about $5.9 million in operating cash flow, which would put it on sounder financial footing. It could suggest that the post-conversion trading price of the units will be around 7-8 cents.

Finally, the company has decided to consolidate the remainder of its non-mortgage debt on the chairman’s company Geosam:

Holloway also announces that it has entered into a second amendment to its credit agreement dated as of June 15, 2011 among Holloway, Geosam Capital Inc. (“Geosam”), as administrative agent, and Geosam, together with such other persons from time to time party to the credit agreement, as lenders, (the “Credit Agreement”) to increase the amount of funds available for drawdown by $3.6mn for certain limited purposes. Holloway has increased the amount outstanding under the Credit Agreement by $1.8mn in order to purchase from the holders of its interest-bearing promissory notes approximately $2.8mn of such notes, representing all of Holloway’s interest-bearing promissory notes outstanding.

This is presumably linked to the resignation of the CEO (Squires) that lasted in the company longer than I expected him to after the takeover of the company by George Aryoman and Geosam.

My conclusion here is that the market is valuing the debentures and units as slightly expensive, but it is within an order of magnitude of a fair valuation. Finally, my continuing thesis is that the only entity that will make any money from Holloway will be Aryoman and Geosam by virtue of their control of the company and the secured credit facility which will continue to hive off interest income from Holloway unitholders. This will continue as the assets are stripped and sold from the trust.

In other words, this is a fun one to watch, but not to invest in. I feel fortunate to dump my debentures at the price that I got for them (roughly 60-65 cents) and get out of dodge. If unit prices go down to the 4 cent level again, the trust may be worth putting a few pennies in, but this would be one of those typical “pick up the cigar butt off the street for one last puff” type value plays.