Mortgage insurance rule changes and a small example

The government announced today some changes to the minimum criteria required in order for mortgage insurance to be offered on housing. The details are here.

This is fourth in a series of changes that the government has taken (the others being in October 2008, February 2010 and January 2011).

The more stringent requirement for retail people on the street will be the amortization requirement – from 30 years to 25 years. Plugging some sample numbers on a calculator, using a 3.00% rate, a 25-year amortization requires $473.25 in monthly payments per $100,000 mortgaged. A 30-year amortization would require $420.60 in monthly payments per $100,000 mortgaged, or about a 12.5% increase in the monthly outlay between 30 years and 25 years.

More relevantly for mortgage insurance, after a 5-year fixed period, at a 25-year amortization, approximately 14.5% of the loan would be paid off. At a 30-year amortization, about 11.1% of the mortgage is paid off. Presumably this would significantly reduce the risk of mortgage default after the typical 5-year fixed term.

Notably, the minimum down payment for a new owner-occupied residential purchase in Canada that will still qualify for mortgage insurance is still 5%. As a result, a residence purchased at 5% down, with a 3%, 5-year fixed mortgage at 25 year amortization will have about 18.8% amortized at the end of the 5-year term.

The tightening of mortgage credit will undoubtedly have a marginal economic effect of taking out higher-risk clients out of the housing market, which will have a marginal suppression on housing prices. I do not believe this will have a strong effect – that will be reserved for an increase in interest rates.

Position sizing

The question of how large a position to take in various securities has generated a lot of literature in financial academia. I won’t bother repeating it here, but specifically, the analysis deals with how to mitigate systemic and non-systemic risk, and diversification is one method to reducing non-systemic risk.

The concept is pretty simple – if all your eggs are in one basket, if you drop that basket then you are hooped. But if you have two baskets then you at least still have half your eggs left in case if you trip.

I noted on Gannon on Investing (somebody that writes very well and comes from a similar background as mine in Finance, mainly through self-teaching) that he believes in big concentration. Specifically, he wrote the following:

My Most Controversial Investing Belief: Extreme Concentration Works

I buy very few stocks. Again, this comes from personal experience. By far, the worst losses to my portfolio came in years where I held the most stocks. The best performance came from 25% or bigger positions in my portfolio that I chose to hold longer term.

I’ve made a lot of money by:

Sticking around for the buyout
And having more than 25% of my portfolio in the stock when that buyout came

Today, I would never buy a stock that makes up less than 10% of my portfolio. I prefer not to start a new position unless it is expected to eventually be 25% of my portfolio. I am not interested in owning more than 5 stocks at a time. I’ve done it – like with Japanese net-nets. I may do it again in similar basket type situations. But I’m a lot less likely to. So, basically I own 4-5 Warren Buffett type stocks (in terms of competitive position) bought at Ben Graham type P/E ratios.

Right now, I’m looking for a European stock to put 25% of my portfolio into. It won’t be 5 European stocks at 5% each. It’ll be one at 25%.

I will distill this principle in another manner: an individual investor can only spend so much time researching securities. Very frequently this process can be as laborious as going through a hundred companies and then throwing all of them on the watchlist and not do anything because they are trading at incorrect valuations. When you do finally have a “hit” that reaches your hurdle rate with an appropriate margin of error, why should you take something that you’ve deemed to have a good risk-reward ratio and dilute your own investment research with a small position size? Good opportunities don’t come often, so why not pounce on it with two feet when they occur?

Personally, my own position sizes are determined by my own perception of risk and a slight modification of the Kelly Criterion. If the risk is high (which would require the reward component to be extraordinarily high), then you keep your bet size small. If the risk is low, then you can afford to concentrate without incurring a blow-up. Probably the best example in my own investment history was putting a large position on Rogers Sugar (TSX: RSI) back during the middle of the economic crisis. It was a classic example of a low risk, medium reward type situation where you can afford to put capital to work.

Ultimately estimating the risk is quite an art because you also have to factor in risk that you never would have conceived of. For all publicly traded companies, such risks include management fraud, accounting misstatements, an earthquake ripping through the corporate headquarters, a plane crash with the executives on board, etc. This alone is probably a good enough reason why I wouldn’t go far above a 20% position size.

That said, if that starting 20% position doubled in your portfolio, it would become 33% of your portfolio. Learning how to pare concentrated positions that have grown due to appreciation is a skill. While I have tended to have decent skills on my entries, I still haven’t mastered the art of selling profitable positions – I typically am one to leave the party early.

Finally, the academic rules concerning position sizes tends to revolve around the management of large portfolios rather than individual investors applying their niches on the markets. The rules of diversification change when running a billion dollar hedge fund versus a relatively smaller portfolio.

Given the high amount of cash in my portfolio, it is always tempting to allocate more cash than usual into new positions, but that is a sure-fire way of losing money.

JC Penney and retail in general

I note with fascination a particular hedge fund investor’s large stake in JC Penney (NYSE: JCP) and them talking up their book massively in their past quarterly report.

First of all, talking up your book is a sign that you don’t want to accumulate any more position – why tell the whole world your investing thesis before you can capitalize fully on it? I follow a similar policy on this site – there are quite a few names I haven’t mentioned until after the point where I simply won’t accumulate any more of a position.

I took a look at JCP for interest sake, simply because I generally do not like investing in S&P 500 components and also I do not like retail companies – it should be perfectly evident to anybody that unless if the retailer is about branding opposed to product (examples: Abercrombie and Fitch, Coach, Limited Brands/Victoria’s Secret, etc.), they will continue to be exterminated by the likes of Walmart, Target and Amazon. JC Penney is in the “extermination” category. This is doubly so with their new “every-day pricing” strategy, which a high school student can figure out will put it at odds against Walmart and Target.

I also note that they brought in some high-profile management formerly from Apple last year to try to turn the operation around, but in my unprofessional estimation, there isn’t a heck of a lot they can do with the hand of cards they were dealt.

My own simplistic view of the retail world also doesn’t explain how companies like Pier 1 Imports (NYSE: PIR) actually manages to exist, but I’ll let smarter people out there explain that one. My sour grapes with Pier 1 was that I was doing some on-the-ground research on the company about 5 years ago and told myself after walking in one of their stores “Who buys this over-priced crap?”. I note that if you put in a big order to buy shares of them during the February-March 2009 economic crisis (which reached a low of $0.10 per share) that you would be a very, very rich person today. So answering my question, apparently plenty of people do buy their over-priced crap.

This leads to my final point when it comes to retail investing: Never assume your own consumer preferences are those of others.

Greek election prediction

While making election predictions is not the focus of this website, making political calls is something that I would consider to be in my core competency, and my guess is that the people of Greece will be giving a plurality of votes to the anti-austerity party, SYRIZA. My prediction is that they will receive 22-25% of the vote and with the 1/6th seat bonus that the top party gets in the legislature, this will put them at 39-42% of the seats in the Greek parliament.

This will require them to make a coalition with one of the other parties in order to have any hope of forming government. In this respect, 39% is a lot different than a 42% result – 39% will require them to form government with the socialist PASOK, but 42% will give them more freedom to likely work with one the other minor parties and strike up the best deal with them from a position of negotiating strength. If they cannot form government, the other parties are sure to not form government and there will be yet another election.

What this means in the macroeconomic scope is that there will be yet further uncertainty in Greece and this will translate into continued focus on Greek domestic impact on the entire EU.