Liquidating Bitcoins is not easy!

People should have seen this a mile away, but MtGox (the exchange that at one point facilitated the vast majority of Bitcoin transactions for real currency) finally packed it in and documents claimed that there was a gaping hole of about 744,408 Bitcoins due to some technical issues with the exchange software that accumulated over a couple years (not to mention a net of about US$33 million cash owed to customers!).

My hypothesis is more plausible: fraud. Anybody running an exchange operation like this would be looking at their account balances like a hawk, hourly, and have proper built-in mechanisms to ensure that there are no leaks in the system. Claiming a loss like this over a period of a couple years is simply incomprehensible.

One of the great things about how Bitcoin works is that the entire transaction ledger (the blockchain) is in public view, and some enterprising people will likely be able to reconcile what happened from publicly available data. 744,000 Bitcoins is about 6% of the entire amount in circulation.

Considering the underlying value of Bitcoin is zero, it is still amazing to see that one can still sell these things for US$500 a piece on other exchanges. This is assuming, of course, they won’t go under either.

I didn’t know how high the hype would go for Bitcoin. Guessing when the tops of markets occur is a tricky endeavour and is simply that, guesswork. My initial guess was “no higher than US$10,000 per bitcoin”, but I subsequently revised that to closer to US$900 than the $10,000 mark.

Now I’ll come with an even starker prediction: Bitcoins will never reach its all-time high (US$1,200) ever again. The hype is gone and the true weaknesses of Bitcoin have more or less been shown to make the entire system unusable except as a novelty.

Bitcoins to currency almost reminds me of what gift cards are to currency: like cash, except worse. If you truly want to invest in something that is relatively immune to the machinations of evil central bankers world-wide, this is the chart of the commodity that I think has profited the most from Bitcoin’s collapse:

gold

Right now a bitcoin is US$516 on Bitstamp (the now leading exchange for Bitcoin volume). You can get an ounce of gold for 2.6 bitcoins. An easy decision for those that still want to believe in hyper-inflationary theories.

Disclosure: No bitcoins, no gold!

More research, nothing found

Spent a bit of time today mining the equity haystack out there.

Nothing of note found at prices that would want to make me dive in. I did get the chance to educate myself on a couple obscure areas of the technology industry that would not make for very interesting cocktail conversation.

I have to keep telling myself that deploying cash for the sake of deploying cash is a good way to lose it.

And no, I’m not even interested in Bitcoins at US$160!

Bone-headed valuations marking the end of the cycle

The big headline is the deal Facebook made to acquire WhatsApp for an absurdly large piece of change – $4 billion cash and $12 billion in stock. There was also $3 billion in extra restricted stock that vests over four years, but really, $3 billion is a rounding error.

The owners of WhatsApp should be given a massively huge congratulations for extracting a huge pound of flesh and hopefully they will have the foresight to start hedging their stock so they’ll be able to live in luxury forever.

I highly suspect in five years or so that the guys at Snapchat and Instagram are going to be kicking themselves for not dumping their businesses at equally absurd valuations. They’ll probably end up being like Friendster when they are superseded by some other up-and-coming application service.

I am not a user of either technology, either Facebook or WhatsApp (or Snapchat and Instagram for that matter!). Today was the first time I ever heard of WhatsApp, and just looking at the Wikipedia summary, it looks like a well-used and functional version of BBM crossed with Skype.

This also explains why Blackberry is up today – if WhatsApp can fetch $16 billion, why can’t BBM?

Media is already panning the deal and I seriously have no idea whether this makes any sense for Facebook strategically – eventually they will want to fold the WhatsApp’s not insubstantial user base into Facebook in some seamless transition, but one can just ask Google how things went with Google+ and you’ll easily see it is a lot easier to do that on paper than it is in practice.

Financially, of course $16 billion is a huge price to pay. Even if you assume the stock component of the deal is worth zero, the $4 billion in cash is a huge investment. Putting that $16 billion in a 30-year treasury bond will reliably spin off $600 million a year in pre-tax income for 30 years and does anybody seriously think that WhatsApp will contribute that incremental income to Facebook’s bottom line?

This acquisition reminds me of what happened when Yahoo acquired Broadcast.com (from Mark Cuban), or the mergers that occurred in the optical networking space in the last couple years of the dot-com boom where you had massive equity-for-equity transactions (in particular, JDS, Uniphase, and SDLI come to mind).

Acquisitions like these highly suggest the 20-times-sales valuation hype is going to end sooner than later. I don’t know when, but I’m staying far, far away from this territory and letting the insiders and lucky day trader-types make their killing to the detriment of those that will be holding the bag when the party ends.

An actual purchase

Today one of my watchlist items fell well below what I considered to be a fair value range and I decided to nibble on a few shares. My first purchase of the year has the following metrics, without giving away what it is I’m investing in:

– Trading within 5% of its book value (about 10% if you exclude intangibles);
– No debt or abnormally large deferred revenues;
– Cash is just above 1/3rd of market cap;
– Enterprise value to sales of about a half;
– Profitable but not excessively so;
– Market took it down considerably due to the growth trajectory over the past couple years clearly abating and competitive margin pressures are rising somewhat. Clearly pessimism has set into the market – the chart has been trending down for the past half year. Most of the bad news is likely baked into the stock price;
– Short interest is relatively high.

So far this is just a tiny position, but if it continues to go down I will accumulate more shares.

(Update, February 14, 2014: I got about 1/7th of my desired position. It’s pretty clear short sellers are covering into this.)

Genworth MI – Q4-2013 review

The earnings release was about what I was expecting. There was a slight increase in the expense profile but this was due to some stock-related compensation expenses (cash flow statement has it at $11.2 million for the year) but this is due to the stock itself increasing in value.

For the year, net premiums written were $511 million, while revenues recognized were $572 million. These two will have to converge eventually. This has been the trend for the past few years now – revenues recognized was $621 million back in 2010. Premiums earned in 2014 should be around the $550 million level.

The $5.4 billion portfolio continues to remain dull (a good thing) with a 3.6% yield, 3.7 year duration.

The loss ratio continues to remain exceptionally low, at 22%. Management continues to focus on Quebec and the Toronto condominium market, which is correct.

The bottom-line operating EPS is $3.60/share. Looking at tangible book value, I get a value of $32.34/share with a diluted share count of 94.9 million shares.

Balance sheet-wise, the company continues to remain over-capitalized with 222% of its required regulatory minimum capital, and well above its 190% internal target. There are regulatory changes which I have outlined earlier that the company is awaiting for before deciding what to do with its excess capital. They bought back shares when the stock was trading lower, but now they are holding onto their cash instead of buying back shares (a smart decision).

The only item of any distinction in the financials is the following paragraph:

On December 20, 2013, the Company, through its indirect subsidiary PMI Canada, entered into a retrocession agreement with Merrill Lynch Reinsurance under which the Company assumed reinsurance risk for up to $30,000 Australian dollars if the losses on claims paid by Genworth Financial Mortgage Insurance Pty Limited, an Australian company (“Genworth Australia”) exceed $700,000 Australian dollars within any one year. The term of the agreement is 3 years. Genworth Australia has the right to terminate the reinsurance agreement after the first year of coverage.

Under the excess of loss reinsurance agreement, the Company is required to collateralize its reinsurance obligations by posting cash collateral equal to the maximum exposure under the agreement in favour of Merrill Lynch Reinsurance. As at December 31, 2013, the Company has posted $30,000 Australian dollars, equivalent to $28,482 Canadian dollars, under the agreement. The collateral is recorded as collateral receivable under reinsurance agreement on the Company’s condensed consolidated interim statement of financial position.

Re-measurement adjustments arising on translation of collateral receivable under the reinsurance agreement and any reinsurance receivable balances from Australian dollars to Canadian dollars are recognized in net investment gains.

This is functionally a bet by management that the Australian real estate market is not going to crater. While I am not thrilled that the company appears to be engaging in gambling outside of the Canadian sphere, I do note that the history of paid claims in Australia appears to be considerably below this:

2013 – AUD$185 million
2012 – AUD$287 million
2011 – AUD$112 million
2010 – AUD$171 million
2009 – AUD$173 million
2008 – AUD$146 million

It would appear that it would take a disaster for Australia’s paid claims to be above the AUD$700 million threshold, but if this was the case, then why did Genworth Australia make this agreement with a sub of Genworth Canada?

Reading between the lines on the conference call, it sounds like management is tinkering around with the idea of deploying their excess capital in reinsurance of mortgage insurers. This doesn’t sound like a bad idea, until it blows up, like it almost did for the parent Genworth (NYSE: GNW) entity.

In absence of any better investment alternatives and also in absence of any looming Canadian real estate crisis, Genworth MI is still in my portfolio as a large fraction. It is or more less a proxy for a bond fund at this point and I am comfortable with the relevant risks regarding the Canadian real estate market. I also believe the equity is in the middle of what I consider to be its fair value range. If they execute as they have in 2013, the stock should go up another 10% or so on the basis of increased book value alone.

The critical sensitivity continues to be the state of the Canadian economy. Our country is export-oriented, especially in the commodity sector. As long as this remains active, we are unlikely to see spikes in unemployment that would cause mortgage defaults. Interest rates are also projected to be low and this will not create an additional shock in the market.