Month: January 2010

Taiga Building Products resumes interest payments

Taiga Building Products has resumed paying interest on their notes. I have written about the notes earlier and pointed out the risks associated with the notes. At that time the notes were trading between 45 and 50 cents on the dollar.

After the closing of trading on January 13, 2010, Taiga announced the following:

BURNABY, BC, Jan. 13 /CNW/ – Taiga Building Products Ltd. (“Taiga” or the “Company”) is pleased to announce that due to strengthening cash flows, it will be resuming interest payments on its 14% subordinated notes, including monthly interest on deferred interest, as per Section 2.04 of the Note Indenture dated as of September 1, 2005. Interest deferred from March 1, 2009 through November 30, 2009, including interest on deferred interest, will be paid by September 1, 2010 as per Section 2.04 of the Note Indenture. The Board of Directors may choose to pay interest prior to September 1, 2010 subject to cash flow considerations.

The first reinstated interest payment date will be January 15, 2010, with respect to interest, and interest on deferred interest, accruing for the month of December 2009.

… and on the following day, announced:

BURNABY, BC, Jan. 14 /CNW/ – Taiga Building Products Ltd. (TSX: TBL & TBL.NT) announces that it will be paying the monthly interest payment of $11.6667 per $1,000 principal value subordinated Notes. Taiga will also be paying the interest on deferred interest, accruing for the month of December 2009, in the amount of $1.1233 per $1,000 principal value subordinated Notes. The payments will be made to shareholders and noteholders of record at the close of business on December 31, 2009 and will be payable on January 15, 2010.

The question for the noteholders will continue to be how the company will pay the deferred interest in light of the fact that their credit facility, as of September 30, 2009 was around $53 million and without any cash on the asset side of their balance sheet. The equity in the company is negative $82 million at this date. At the September 2010 date is the expiration of the bank credit facility, which would be senior to the notes and secured by most of the company’s remaining assets.

The market, however, didn’t seem to care. Taiga equity went up 15 cents to 60 cents a share (so its market capitalization is roughly $19.5 million) and for noteholders, the market value went from 60 cents to a high of 92 cents, closing at 91 cents.

It appears that the market is applying a very rich valuation to the notes in response to this news. If I held notes, I would be dumping them if the market rate was 91 cents.

I suspect within a year there will be some sort of recapitalization of the company’s debt balance, and the issue for the noteholders will be one of recovery, rather than yield.

Just an item of disclosure; I have never had a position (equity or debt) in Taiga Building Products. They are interesting to track, considering that they are a (relatively) local company to where I live and wish their business the best of luck in slaughtering their debt issues with a minimum of pain for everybody involved.

Bank of Canada on Canada’s real estate bubble

The Bank of Canada is very correct in saying they won’t raise rates because of the obvious real estate bubble.

The interest rate is a very crude tool which affects many more facets of the economy than just the real estate market.

Right now you can cool down the real estate market by changing the minimum leverage ratios required to purchase – the subsequent decrease in available credit will accomplish this.

Right now the law permits you to take out a mortgage with a 35-year amortization and a 5% down payment. The primary concern is the down payment fraction, and not the amortization rate (although a longer amortization will allow for a larger purchase due to a decreased payment to principal). Essentially you can buy a house on 19:1 “margin”. The most leverage you are legally allowed to use with equities is 30% down.

A simple mathematical example will demonstrate why a 5% down payment requirement is ridiculously low.

With a 5% down payment, you can buy a $400,000 house with a $20,000 down payment, so you would be borrowing $380,000. In the event you couldn’t actually afford the down payment, banks have developed convenient “cash back” mortgages that give you cash up front, but in exchange for a higher rate of interest throughout the mortgage. An example is TD’s “5% cash back mortgage“, where instead of paying a posted 4.24% 5-year regular mortgage rate, you can pay 5.49% for the cash-back option.

Let’s say you purchase this place, and then your house appreciates 5% – so you have $40,000 equity in a $420,000 home. In theory, you can then get a second mortgage on the home for $20,000, cough up another $1,000 from your VISA or Mastercard (since 5% of $420,000 is $21,000) and then buy another $400,000 home with a $380,000 mortgage. If your two homes appreciate another 5%, then you can afford two more $400,000 homes, etc.

One can see how a single person can leverage a lot of money with a 5% down payment requirement. It becomes ridiculously easy in a rising real estate market. Of course, when the real estate market goes down, your ability to borrow money stops, and you then have to face the music when it comes to paying the mortgages (or just calling it a day and default).

With a 10% down payment, it becomes a little more difficult to perform this operation – your fictional $400,000 home requires a $40,000 down payment. Your home will have to appreciate just over 10% in order to be theoretically eligible for a second mortgage that would give a a sufficient down payment to buy another equal-priced place.

The legal minimum down payment before a mortgage should be granted is set to a number higher than what it is currently. Ideally it should be linked to the Canadian government 5-year bond – a lower interest rate should require a higher minimum down payment, while a higher interest rate should require a lower minimum down payment. A more simplistic solution (and much easier to market) is just to increase it to a particular rate. The Canadian government has hinted it may increase.

While in theory people should be left alone to select their preferred debt leverage ratio, it was shown in the USA that the actions of a lot of fiscally irresponsible people (and their banks) caused genuine impact to those that could actually manage their affairs properly – savers in the current environment are basically being punished by the actions of the squanders. As such, it is an easy decision to raise the minimum down payment percentage required to obtain a mortgage.

As a matter of personal finance, people that don’t have at least 20% squirreled up for a down payment should likely not be purchasing a place. This is the minimum amount required to avoid paying any CMHC home mortgage insurance premiums, which is an absolutely unnecessary expense since you are not receiving any benefit out of the insurance (other than the ability to get cheap credit in the first place) – the bank is getting the benefit, while the public is securing it with federal taxpayers’ money.

Debt investing advice

The reason why debt is valued more highly than equity, thus giving off a smaller yield, is because of its higher ranking in the seniority chain. If the company fails to pay interest and principal according to the terms of the debt agreement, then the debtors will usually be able to take some equity stake in the firm after a bankruptcy proceeding.

The tip of the day is not to invest in an entity where it is mandatory for the existing equity owners to maintain control of an organization in order for it to operate. The leverage the debtholders have in such a situation is precisely none – if they force the organization into bankruptcy, they will be left with nothing, while if they do not, they will still be left with nothing except a promise to be paid.

A debtholder needs more than a promise to be paid – they need the ability to force the company into bankruptcy or liquidation if a default occurs.

ING Direct trying to trap capital in TFSA accounts

I noticed at the start of the year that ING Direct was offering a 3% 90-day GIC for RRSP accounts (no transfers required) and also 3% for a TFSA account, but with the rate subject to change at any time.

Anybody with an RRSP in ING Direct would do well to lock in the 90-day rate as soon as they can; even though they stated they will offer it until March 1st, they could revoke it. The difference between a 3% rate and a 1.25% rate (which is more representative of the current market rate for a 1-year GIC) is $43.15 on a $10,000 investment. It is not huge money, but it is more money nonetheless.

The 3% TFSA offer is quite a lure, but it is designed to trap as much money before they reset the rate back to a lower rate. The trick with the TFSA is that once customers have deposited their money into the TFSA, it is a lot of unnecessary paperwork to get their money out of the TFSA account once the rate resets to something lower. If customers decide to withdrawal the TFSA once the rate goes lower, then they lose the contribution room into their TFSA until January 1, 2011.

For those people that want to keep their money in a risk-free instrument (e.g. a GIC), use the ING Direct TFSA at your own peril. As a matter of financial planning, the TFSA should not be used as a risk-free account anyhow, but some people will want to use it to park idle cash.

ING Direct used to be the undisupted best place to save money, but over the past few years they have become just “normal”. They are still excellent with respect to having a no-fee operation and this works to their benefit – if money is easy to get out of them, then I feel much safer keeping money with them. For matters such as RRSP and TFSA transfers, however, there is a real bureaucratic cost associated with these and it is not worth it to capture an extra 0.5% elsewhere for the dollar amounts in question that people typically deal with.

If ING Direct wanted to raise a lot of longer duration capital, they’d do fairly well if they offered a 5% 5-year GIC.

Chasing yield is easy until the party ends

I have successfully liquidated my debentures in Harvest Energy (series D and E) for 101.5 and 102.0, respectively. Since they are trading above the 101 that will have to be offered after the takeover, it is unlikely that investors will tender the debt. I am happy to be rid of the bonds so my capital can find some more productive areas. My opportunity cost of this transaction is giving up about a 6% yield, but there are equivalent risk instruments that the money can be parked in the interim.

I have another issue (Bellatrix Exploration, formerly True Energy Trust) that has seen its equity rise about 400% over the past four months and its bonds have correspondingly traded near par. It is very close to my liquidation point and there will be a high probability it will be sold very soon.

As such, my portfolio is starting to look cash rich. While cash is good, it is also earning a return that is less than flattering (mainly zero) and while I can shift the funds into a short term savings account for 1.2% (or 2% if I shopped around) I am always looking for a better place to put my money – something that will give a yield.

In my tax sheltered accounts, I am looking for investments that will generate income. Outside the tax sheltered accounts, I am looking for investments that can generate capital gains (taxed at half the rate) or eligible dividends (taxed significantly less depending on what income bracket you are in).

Most of the income trusts have been bidded up to yields that are not representative of the risks embedded within the company – for example, a trust that is always on my watchlist (but I never get around to purchasing) is A&W – currently yielding about 8.01%. This is not adequate compensation for a company that is distributing more cash than its distributable cash allotment. It is possible that A&W could trade higher (and yield lower) but this is essentially the equivalent of gambling and could just as easily go to 8.5% ($14.82/unit) as it could to 7.5% ($16.80/unit). I do not want to get into coin flipping competitions with the market.

Since my hurdle rate is above 8%, I am forced to lower my standards if I am to seek a home for my cash. This means either accepting higher risk, or accepting a lower rate of return.

Right now if I accepted a lower rate of return, I estimate I could generate about 10% a year with debentures, but this is still a relatively low rate of return in consideration of the risk taken.

As such, I must broaden my search to more obscure securities and companies. This will also require some research and time. It will also require appropriate market conditions when people are less confident.

Fortunately, time is on my side – while the cash is sitting there, earning nearly nothing, it will at least be there when I need it. The temptation to quickly deploy cash is one of the most destructive psychological behaviours one has while investing.