Interest rates will tell the story

It is well known that inversions in the yield curve signal bad economic times coming ahead.

Why? Typically credit is extended by financial institutions that make their money by borrowing short and lending long.

When the yield curve is inverted, financial institutions will find it more difficult to make money since the interest spread capture is narrower.

JP Morgan, for example, has announced in their last quarter that they are suspending their share buyback program. Their politically correct wording was: “In order to quickly meet the higher requirements, we have temporarily suspended share buybacks which will allow us maximum flexibility to best serve our customers, clients and community through a broad range of economic environments.”

Just remember, they’re suspending share buybacks for your safety!

Certainly when JPM is deciding to go into capital preservation mode, I get suspicious. Indeed, when I look at the Canadian banks, I think most of them have a good chance of going back to the pre-Covid levels. Second-grade financial institutions (e.g. Equitable, Home Capital, etc.) are offering GIC rates of around 4.4-4.5% for two-year money, which is the highest I’ve seen in a very long time. If they have to pay that much for their short-term capital, good luck on the duration match when they are also charging 4.59% rates for a 5-year mortgage!

Presently, I’m looking at one of the weirdest interest rate outlooks I have ever seen. The markets are predicting an increase on the July 27th Federal Reserve meeting, and another rate increase in September. However, in 2023, rates are expected to drop again, presumptively modelling this economic slowdown and recession nearly everybody and their grandmother is talking about at this point.

It is the oddest recession on the planet where you have low unemployment rates (5.1%, which is about as good as it gets here), commodities are booming, governments are raking in record corporate income taxes, etc, etc.

The Canadian rate curve has a similar trajectory – September 2022 3-month Bankers’ Acceptance Futures are trading at 3.85%, while a year later (September 2023) they are at 3.30%. Right now that rate is at 3.18%.

Since this rise in rates in 2022 and the drop in rates in 2023 is all baked into existing futures pricing, it leads one to the question – where might this actually go?

A few scenarios:

1. We get our recession, but inflation persists – banks likely have to stand pat on a relatively low rate of interest (2-2.5%) and real rates will continue being negative for the foreseeable future.

2. We get a massive recession (e.g. the asset deflation scenario with QT and everything), inflation busts out due to demand evaporation (supply chains normalize, etc.) – banks will crank rates down likely to the zero bound and you can dust off your post-Japan 1989 playbook for another couple lost decades.

3. The economy is actually fine, capital gets invested, etc. – rates will steady and possibly rise even further as this would probably be inflationary in the short-run.

Since a lot of the inflationary phenomena involves psychological expectations, it is very difficult to predict how this is going to resolve itself.

Cash (take a mild amount of duration risk for a net 370bps YTM with TSX: XSB!) might be trash, but it might be less trashy than the alternatives. Perhaps taking the real rate loss and being able to purchase assets for 20-30% of a discount from present is a possible scenario for those that are patient. Quantitative tightening has just barely begun and the typical real world economic impacts of interest rate increases will take a year to permeate – we’re now four months from the initial March 2, 2022 quarter point increase. Perhaps when the collective amounts of all of the Covid handouts have been spent, there will be a significant belt-tightening process. There are many lines of speculation about the future.

2022’s second quarter results will be great, but watch out ahead

While looking at the red ink that has accumulated in my portfolio, I’ve been doing some deep thinking lately. The story is not going to be that good.

In the fossil fuel world, the second quarter results are going to look really, really good from a cash flow perspective.

I anticipate a speculative run-up as a result prior to the announcement of such results. “Buy the rumour, sell the news” is a cliche that has tended to have a better than 50/50 success rate in my investment life.

Indeed, posted metrics will be so ridiculously good that it will attract people/capital that are otherwise only vaguely aware that cyclical industries require a different mindset.

I will use Lumber as an example. It is a commodity that is much more used to ups and downs, and their physical capability has historically been punctuated by start-up and shut-downs that wax and wane with inventory levels and overall demand.

A random example of this would be the Jimmy Pattison-controlled Canfor (TSX: CFP), with my annotations on their earning history and estimated earnings:

You can see on this chart that an astute purchaser would have been able to pick up shares of Canfor at (the Covid crisis peak) half earnings. Yes, a P/E of about 0.5x.

Of course, hindsight is 50/50. Many people (myself NOT included) thought the world was about the end in March 2020. But instead, Covid created a huge boom for the underlying commodity price because of a huge culmination of factors: nobody was producing, inventory levels were already low, the supply chain was wrecked, and demand was increased because many decided that building a deck or doing home renovations in the summer of 2020 was a great idea while everybody was on lockdown.

With retrospect (which would have triggered at the Q2-2020 results), the shares were trading at around $16/share – about the price that Pattison tried to take over the minority shareholders.

The acceleration of lumber pricing continued and eventually the shares normalized at around $28, or roughly 2x earnings, but normalized to 2023’s estimate, about 5.5-6x earnings. Also note how the chart hardly moved despite the “second wave” of lumber pricing from end of Q2-2021 to Q4-2021.

The earnings multiple on a cyclical company is notoriously difficult to predict – whether it is the cash flow, reserves, perceived scarcity, etc., all have a bearing on the multiple the market decides to give.

The actual cash flows that are generated, however, is internal to the company and their capital allocation scheme determines whether shareholders actually receive any monies or not. In the case of Canfor, they repaid some of their debt and engaged in some acquisitions.

Going back to the fossil fuel world, most of the Canadian complex is trading around 5x free cash flow to EV, based off of US$100 oil.

We will be seeing very different capital allocation schemes going forward. Nearly all companies are aggressively paying down debt (Whitecap is the big exception), and some are engaging primarily in dividends as a return mechanism, while some are choosing buybacks (looking at MEG Energy), and some are engaging in a hybrid approach. Investors can align their approaches to capital allocation with the managements of the various companies out there, in whatever blend they so choose. For instance, I like where Cenovus (TSX: CVE) is going, by spending cash flow to concentrate their ownership in their assets, running them well, having an integrated production and refining business, keeping a modest debt level, and then balancing out buyback/dividends. It’s a good all-in-one stock.

However, all of this might be overshadowed by one gigantic blade over the necks of the market, and that is central bank monetary policy.

Central banks are clearly in panic mode. There is a “real” component to inflation, but the “psychological” component of inflation, just like in the marketplace, is nearly as relevant. Take a look at the Home Capital Group (TSX: HCG) fiasco half a decade ago for a good example how psychology is very relevant in markets.

The theory is simple. If people believe that inflation will be higher for longer, their behaviour will be changing in conjunction with the expectations. Wage demands will increase (a good example of how this is playing out is the upcoming strike with the BC Government Employers’ union where the government offer vs. the union demand is way out of line – who the heck wants to take a 3% increase in wages when CPI is printing at 8%????). People will be spending more money today than tomorrow because the rate of interest they receive for their capital is lower than the posted CPI rate. It is like a milder version of Argentinian economics, where you discover when you go to the grocery store to buy a bundle of toilet paper, that you can only buy one roll instead of a package because the storekeeper knows that the toilet paper bundle can be sold for more just by waiting.

At a certain point, it doesn’t matter whether the actual money supply is contracting (or at least holding flat), and it doesn’t matter whether the supply chains are restoring, and it doesn’t matter how much crap gets stuffed on the shelves of Costco, Walmart and Target – if the psychology is in an inflationary mindset, it is very difficult to shake off.

This is why central banks, in theory, are regarded as independent entities, and generally are regarded as knowing what the heck they are doing to keep inflation in check (their sole mandate). They are the ones to adjust the monetary levers accordingly to keep the currency relatively level, and this stability generally breeds confidence that businesses need to make long-range spending plans.

This confidence has been badly shaken over the past couple years. First, there was “no danger of inflation”, then it was “transitory”, and now of course it is full-blown “Oh ****, we really screwed this up and really have to fix things” mode.

Ordinarily all it took for central banks to have their desired effect was to talk big – because people took them seriously and with authority, central banks could talk market expectations in a particular direction.

But now their credibility has been shot and they’re desperately playing catch-up, not on interest rates, but rather to restore their credibility. This is probably the reason why we got a 100bps increase instead of a widely-expected 75bps.

The Federal Reserve might mirror this increase in the July 27th fed meeting announcement (right now the August Fed Funds Futures are a “lock” at a 75bps increase).

However, will this be enough to shake the psychology of increasing inflation? People normally associate fiscal competence with the elected bodies (in this case “I don’t think about monetary policy” Trudeau and “mental lapse” Biden), and confidence in both are at very low levels. Despite posting record revenues (especially as they are nominal and not real dollars), governments are still posting deep deficits. As they are heavily indebted, as they roll over their bond books, they will be paying higher and higher interest expenses out of the fiscal end.

At this point, the central banks at this point have little choice other than to keep increasing interest rates until they have broken the psychology of inflation expectations. I had argued in a prior post they had to “surprise”, and the Bank of Canada judged that going 25bps over a widely anticipated 75bps was a sufficient shock. I will claim it is not enough.

Currently, we have the expectations showing that 2022 will feature a few more interest rate increases (say to 3-3.25%) but in 2023 there is an expected easement of rates, in anticipation of a recession.

The question is whether this is sufficient to break the psychology of inflation expectations. I don’t believe it will, at least over the next half year. Just looking at the price of energy, there is still going to be higher year-to-year pricing of commodities going forward until probably February 2023 – while inflation may simmer, it will be nowhere close to the 2% target level – noting that inflation is measured as a year to year comparison.

This means in order to quell the psychology, rates needs to rise even higher, and this will surely initiate huge economic troubles going forward – a deeper recession than most people probably will figure at this point.

This does not impact North America only – it affects most of the world economy, where US-denominated transactions dominate foreign trade contracts, and when the US dollar is as strong as it is, it acts like a 16 pound bowling ball ramming through the economies of the world as they desperately seek US cash – which explains the state of the Euro, Yen and other third-world currencies.

Canadian currency has somewhat of a buffer because of its trade links with the USA and commodity exposure, but if the world economic picture erodes to the point where energy consumption declines below the supply levels, surely fossil fuel commodity prices will drop and this will not be good for Canadian currency.

Also, with the rise of interest rates, both floating and fixed rate mortgage payers alike, especially for those that purchased properties in the past couple years, will be causing a lot of financial stress in the market. Your typical 25-year amortization mortgages that are up for renewal will also be paying more on this credit cycle, and perhaps people over-leveraged will be forced to sell properties. If the projected interest rate increases go higher than expectations, this will surely create some scenarios where you may see financial institutions that specialize in non-insured mortgages see financial stress and this will create more ‘interesting times’ financially.

Ultimately this depends on reading the psychology of the masses, definitely an art and not a science.

It is incredibly difficult to foresee how this plays out other than to be aware of the scenario. All I know is that caution is warranted. Especially nearing the end of this year, we might see a situation where a lot of good-quality equities out there are going to get flushed down the toilet both for tax-loss selling reasons and also because liquidity is tightening up so badly (interest rates plus QT) that players are forced to reduce leverage.

Cash is the only defense in this scenario. Everything else (gold, bitcoin, commodities, corporate debt) will take a dive, with perhaps the exception of short-dated government debt.

However, there is likely to be a “bull-whip” effect if there is such a flush-out, where those extraordinary circumstances that initiated a panic selling will likely lead to impressive gains going forward. Now is the time to compile companies on your watchlists that will likely survive the upcoming carnage.

When the market punches you this badly, step back and think a bit

When you get into an investment, you should always have some sort of view and pathway that will guide you to your valuation assumptions.

Clearly in the past month, a commodity-heavy investor has gotten punched very hard in the face. What we have seen is a February/March 2020-style of trading in the commodity complex – indiscriminate amounts of selling. Back in February/March 2020, it took me about a month to get my act together during Covid (when I realized that people were truly losing their minds over it) before I was able to adapt.

This again is one of those situations that is forcing an adaptation.

The previous underlying thesis, at least as far as late 2020 went, was that there was a significant under-investment in capital expenditures (who wants to invest in oil fields when WTI is at -40?), coupled with demand increasing, especially as a function of money printing by governments.

The party went on for about 18 months and now we are on the flip side of the story, starting June 7th. The past has seen inflation, everybody is worried about it, but markets do not value they past – they value the future.

Today, the August crude oil contract is down 10%, and is down about 20% from its recent peak on June 14th, where it traded at US$121.

While letting the market be your sole guidance is always dangerous, when there is a significant breakage to expectations beyond white noise, one should always re-examine your thesis.

Now that the Federal Reserve and the Bank of Canada are drilling the stake deeper into the heart of the inflation zombie, we’re witnessing the results of the convulsions, and this guarantees in 2023 we will be seeing significantly lower levels of inflation.

I especially note what has happened to copper in the past month. If demand is high and world GDPs are high, then the price action we have seen makes no sense whatsoever in an inflationary and expansionary environment.

My crystal ball is telling me that it is probable the rest of the commodity market is going to experience what happened to the lumber industry, except in slower motion.

Dusting off my dis-inflationary playbook, it means that fixed income is your friend. In Canada, already we have seen the yield curve drop roughly 25bps across the board to roughly 300bps for long dated tenors. Fixed income markets have already priced in July 13th’s rate increase (I suspect it will be 50bps just given what’s going on in the markets), but in 2023 things will stabilize, if not head lower again when the economy starts to depress.

The playbook also suggests that the Canadian dollar will drop with a commodity price drop – perhaps on the way to 70 cents/USD??

What happened? I think there were a confluence of factors, but one obvious data point is that industrial production in Europe is going to get slaughtered due to high energy price inputs. This is going to significantly slow down consumption of industrial commodities. Given the energy starvation strategy that Russia is currently employing, this one is already in the bag.

There is also the issue of China, which has partially shut down its economy in the name of Zero Covid, but in reality there was probably a political component to this concerning the default of their major real estate developers (Evergrande and the others). The halting of construction in the country would have a massive impact on global demand, including that for metallurgical coal and copper.

Domestically, real estate construction is going to come to a halt – with 5yr fixed mortgage rates at 5% and construction financing costs equally high, this will continue to suppress activity in the sector.

It just doesn’t look good all around and the market has woken up to it.

The dis-inflationary playbook also suggests that entities with significant amounts of debt will struggle. Conversely, those that took the actions to right-size their balance sheets during the previous boom will not do as worse going forward. We’re now going to go back to the grind of low cost producers being able to out-last the transient high-cost players.

Economically this is not looking good – with margins compressing, the “E” in a typical P/E ratio will be dropping and this suggests further broad equity price compression. There will likely be some sharp rallies here and there, but the trend is now clearly down.

OMG, look at those dividend yields rise!

There are a couple ways to have your dividend yields rise, at least as a function of market price.

One is that the underlying company raises the dividend.

The second, and what has clearly gone on in the past two weeks, is that market values crater.

I have not seen this volatility in commodity equity pricing since the Covid crisis began. The peak-to-troughs since two short weeks ago has been about 25 to 30% across the board.

There is likely a confluence of events going on which results in the sell-side pressure in these stocks. One is that the momentum trade is obviously broken and funds that have bought these types of stocks on momentum are likely triggering their stops and bailing out. The second is that the fundamental metrics aren’t nearly as good at US$104 oil than it was at US$120 – all things being equal a 15% haircut in oil price will result in a higher percentage drop of cash flows for most oil equities. The third is from cost of capital concerns – money is getting tighter by the day and the easy gains to be harvested are from energy equities. The fourth is the narrative – namely demand destruction via monetary policy-induced recession and a slowdown in spending and consumption.

You add all of this up together, and when everybody decides to hit the sell button at the same time, you get a very sharp price drop as there is not enough bidding to sustain prices.

The cash flow generation currently for all of these companies is still very positive. Most have stated policies of a mix between debt reduction and buybacks/dividends, and as long as the commodity price environment continues it will continue being highly beneficial for shareholders – but never in a straight line up!

Just as an example, Canadian Natural Resources (TSX: CNQ) is slated to generate about $20 billion in free cash flow for the year (about $18/share with a current market price of $65/share) with oil at US$104. Half is slated for debt reduction and half is for dividends and buybacks. Between Q2 to Q4, they should be able to get their debt down to around $7-8 billion by years’ end and buy back another 5% of their own stock or so, along with paying their $0.75/quarterly dividend. Even if oil traded down another 25% of its present price, the buyback wouldn’t be as large but it would still be around another 2-3% of the shares outstanding. Lower prices increase the long-term impact of share buyback programs – assuming the underlying cash generation of the companies are intact, this is a positive for existing shareholders.

Needless to say, however, the last two weeks have felt like the financial equivalent of getting punched in the face! It was bound to happen, but I wasn’t expecting it to be as sharp as it was.

You can’t start and stop a commodity like a light switch

Apparently the German government (one of the coalition parties is ironically the Green party) is now clearing the way to fire up the coal power plants again in order to save natural gas for the winter.

For whatever reason, they cannot seem to get their nuclear power plants up again, so barring that option, coal is a reasonable policy option. Apparently opening up more solar and wind farms wasn’t on the docket.

However, there are considerable logistical issues to solve. Perhaps the internet has caused most people to think that you can start and stop things with a switch. Physical markets take a much longer time to start and stop than most think.

Let’s take some basic facts from the EIA and run some simple math.

It takes 1.12 pounds of coal to generate a kilowatt-hour of energy. This is the energy equivalent of one kilowatt of power during an hour. Most standard microwaves, when running, consume 1.2 kilowatts. Most hot water kettles use 1.5 kilowatts.

If you wanted that kilowatt of power for an entire day, you need 26.88 pounds of coal.

If you wanted that kilowatt of power for an entire year, you need 9,811 pounds of coal. To give some perspective of what 9,811 pounds is, think of three Toyota Corollas with a couple average-sized passengers each.

A kilowatt is not a large amount of power in the grand scheme of things. Power plants run into the hundreds of megawatts of capacity. Viewing the coal power map of Germany, say they wanted to re-start a 800 megawatt plant. This would replace 52 billion cubic feet (yearly) of natural gas. How much is 52 billion cubic feet? It is about the amount of natural gas that can be carried by 10 large LNG tankers.

An 800 megawatt coal plant would require the daily consumption of 21,500,000 pounds of coal and yearly consumption of 7,840,000,000 pounds of coal. These numbers, when written out wholly, are a bit ridiculous, so we say 10,700 tons and 3.92 million tons, respectively.

Over land, coal is typically shipped by rail. A coal rail car carries 116 tons of coal. Thus, your typical 800 megawatt coal plant needs approximately 92 rail cars of coal to operate, daily.

Needless to say, this is a gigantic amount of mass for one coal power plant. You need specialized machinery and the people with the appropriate training to haul it out of the ground, transport it, and get it into a boiler furnace.

When you tell an entire industry for over a decade that they are no longer needed, competent managers will operate the business on a run-down mode. Capital investment is minimal, and worker training programs are halted. Unions tend to prefer seniority, so younger people in the business go elsewhere. Know-how gets lost and things start to atrophy.

Now the message is “get started, but after you’re done bridging the gap while we solve the problem with our LNG capacity issues we’re going to shut you down again after a few years”, it is hardly confidence-inspiring. Nobody will want to invest time and energy into the industry unless if there is a huge financial incentive to compensate for the blade that is still over the necks of the coal mining industry.

There will still be a huge lack of capital, both monetary and knowledge, to ramp up an operation to produce 7,840,000,000 pounds of coal yearly in the name of saving natural gas. An entire industry cannot be turned on and off like a light switch.

The result is that the domestic price of coal will skyrocket.