BC Property Tax Deferment

The BC government in the previous budget is now enabling people that own homes and financially supporting somebody that is 18 years old or younger to defer their property taxes, at the rate of interest of the bank prime rate. Previously only seniors (55 and older) were able to exercise this option.

Essentially homeowners are given the option of borrowing money (the amount of their yearly property taxes) at the prime rate, and will only have to repay this amount when your property is transferred (i.e. you sell the place).

Almost everybody that is financially sophisticated that is eligible to do this should be exercising this option. Getting money at the prime rate outside a mortgage is not that easy, and at the prime rate you can very likely make an investment that would give a higher rate of return.

The trick is making the interest amount tax-deductible, and if you use the deferred property tax amount for income-generation purposes then in theory you should be able to deduct the interest.

Timing is everything – and a brief trading lesson

Don’t believe anybody that says that market timing is not an important element of successful investing. Timing is a crucial part of it – basically you have to know when to buy (identifying when the prices are low) and know when to sell (identifying when the prices are high). I have historically found it more difficult to know when to sell than when to buy, presumably because markets crash quicker and harder than they go up. I have been actively working on this part of my investment experience for the past few years. I still do not feel comfortable with my exit tactics.

It is a very, very frustrating part of investing when you know you had the timing correct, but were unable to execute on any trades. Two days ago, on May 25th, I wrote:

I am generally of the opinion that the markets at this time are greatly oversold, with presumably most of the selling done across the Atlantic Ocean in Europe by panicked investment bankers and hedge funds. Unfortunately (or fortunately), I am still looking for areas to safely deploy cash.

I had placed a smattering of orders, starting at roughly 3% below the May 25th market close, but they probably won’t be executed now since the markets seemingly have reversed. I wanted to get about 10% equity exposure to the fossil fuel industry and I only have about 5% exposure on the debt side. Since the whole Canadian crude market has skyrocketed in the past couple trading sessions, I’m going to have to re-evaluate the short-term entry or hope for one more shock-wave coming out of Europe (which would be nice). My general thought is that while I don’t believe in the “10% of your portfolio in Gold” inflation-hedging technique, I do solidly believe that having a claim to future cash streams from Canadian oil and gas companies with significant reserves will be a good capital preservation technique over the long run – at least until crude prices rise to the point of unsubsidized alternative energy production costs.

After describing my inability to execute on what should have been a short-term winning trade, now is the time for a trading lesson to describe why the process I employed is correct.

Whenever I place orders, it is always with limit orders, and broken into price increments that are scaled below the initial point. I very, very rarely buy at the ask and sell at the bid unless if dealing with illiquid securities and somebody posts something juicy.

As an example, if a share is trading at $10/share and I was interested in purchasing 1,000 shares and thought market volatility would take it roughly 10% below current price levels before bottoming out, a simple execution would be to break it into five branches, such as the following:

Buy 200@9.80, 200@9.60, 200@9.40, 200@9.20, 200@9.00

The total cost of the order, excluding commissions, would be $9,400; a lot cheaper than just putting in an order for 1000@10. However, the cost of such a decision is that you may not get your desired quantity (or any at all) if there is not sufficient volatility in the marketplace. In the case of my fossil fuel equity trades, this is exactly what happened – market volatility took the market price up and not down as I expected.

Inherent with the breaking of such orders is the assumption that you don’t know what “the bottom” will be. I have learned many times over that predicting the exact bottom is impossible and that breaking orders into smaller quantities is the best way to capture value from this admission.

Using a real brokerage (e.g. Interactive Brokers) keeps trading costs of breaking orders into small bite-sized amounts cheap; a price-making order on the TSX incurs around 52 cents of commission for 100 shares. The increase in commission is inconsequential to the likelihood of saving capital costs with the lower-priced purchases. Even using a less sophisticated brokerage, you can still obtain significant price savings.

This same heuristic can also be employed with an exit of a position.

Note that it is very easy to modify this into a workable algorithm. When working with institutional quantities (e.g. millions of dollars), you typically employ algorithms to randomly time entries and exits depending on ambient market conditions and the volume seen in order to get the best execution on the entire order. When working with large amounts of dollars, masking the intention of your order is critical in order to be able to successfully accumulate or distribute share holdings.

One major advantage a retail investor has over the institutions is the ability to get in and out of positions with the click of a mouse button, as opposed to employing complex algorithms to do the same over the period of days or weeks.

The reason why you hold cash

The reason why you hold cash, as opposed to yield-bearing investments, is to take advantages such as times as this one and be able to purchase securities at low prices.

Right now, the markets are trading heavily down, presumably as a function of some fallout of the European economic situation and a not-so-hot US jobs report.

In the 21st century world, at least in western countries, the reality is that employment is not a proxy for corporate profitability. An investor invests to get a claim on a company’s cash flows or assets.

The following is a monthly chart of the S&P 500 volatility index, which is at around 45 right now:

The volatility of the main indexes are such that are equaling what happened during 9/11 and the Enron/Worldcom blowup. The only bigger spike in volatility was when Lehman Brothers went belly-up. This European sovereign debt crisis is nothing close to what happened during the Lehman Brothers time (late 2008). Although Greece is a canary in a coal mine, it is not that important in the grand scheme of economics.

The one thing I do know about markets is that there will never be a grand pronouncement that this volatility spike is ending. It could go to 50, or 60, or 70, but it could just float down from this point. One never knows. If I was going to guess, this financial soap opera has another month of legs left in it.

What a good investor does, and a good investor holds onto cash for this reason: to pick off the targets on your watchlist, that are being sold by international financial institutions carte blanche, that are trading well below what your assumed fair value for the securities are.

Activating a credit card – telemarketing spam

Since my Starbucks Duetto card was discontinued by Starbucks and/or Royal Bank of Canada, my intention was to take the new credit card RBC delivered and just use it as a backup card (after cashing out the 3000 points for gas money). When calling the credit card activation number, I was fully prepared for the script. You punch in your credit card number over the phone, get transferred to a person that then asks you for your credit card number (presumably because the information doesn’t get passed onto his computer screen?), name, birthdate and then says “While the activation is processing, as a valued RBC customer, I would like to offer you……..” and then went through a bunch of legal gibberish about their “balance protector insurance”. I have heard this spiel before. The guy’s accent (obviously Indian) was so thick that I had difficulty listening to him. He spoke it so fast that I’m amazed anybody would be able to understand him.

However, what was interesting was how they phrased the last question. “So, Mr. Peter, do you believe that maintaining your credit rating in the event that you cannot pay your credit card balance is important?”. This was a new way of phrasing it. Before they just simply asked “Would you like balance protector to protect yourself against your inability to pay a credit card if there is a life-threatening hurricane in your area?”

Most people have a huge psychological difficulty in saying “no”. I am not sure why, but it is taking advantage of the old-style Victorian culture of politeness. Most charities and aggressive marketers always love phrasing questions in such ways that it is very difficult to say no – from political life, “can I count on your support?” is the typical question asked. As soon as you answer in an ambiguous manner, they draw you in for more.

Anyhow, I said “NO, I am not interested in the offer” and left it at that. The fellow on the phone continued, “Because RBC values your opinion, tell me why…” – as much as I would like to get into an argument with the call center guy, I know it would be just a waste of time. First of all, RBC doesn’t care what I think. In fact, I know what RBC and all credit card companies think – I’m part of a statistical pool, and they don’t care what I think at all, as long as I pay the balance (with or without interest, preferably with interest) occasionally. The even more insulting part is that the line “While the card is activating, let me sell you this crap” is complete garbage, simply because activation happens as soon as the guy clicks a button on the keyboard and doesn’t take one minute to go through the system. The guy just says it to launch into a marketing pitch that his employer tells him to.

I can’t believe that people actually agree for the ancillary garbage, but since they have it on the books, they must be able to get enough suckers to warrant annoying the 97% of people that just want the card activated and to get on with their lives.

Valuing Western Financial Group Preferred Shares

Western Financial Group (common: WES.TO) is primarily an insurance brokerage in Western Canada. They have been able to grow their top line consistently over the past few years, while their bottom line, although profitable, has fluctuated with the market. It is likely they will continue to be making money in the future, so payment of debt and preferred securities should not be an issue, barring any huge global financial crisis.

They have an issue of preferred shares (series 5, WES.PR.C) that has the salient details:

$100 par value, 9% coupon, payable semi-annually;
Holders can convert into common at $2.81/share anytime;
Issuer can convert if common is $3.79/share or higher after September 30, 2012;
Issuer can convert if common is $2.81/share or higher after September 30, 2014.

As I write this, the common is trading at $2.87/share and gives a 4.28 cent annualized dividend (1.49% yield). The preferreds are illiquid and the bid-ask midpoint is $113/share.

To value this preferred share, you must break down the fixed income component and the embedded call option that you (a preferred shareholder) sell to the company.

The fixed income component is simply [coupon / (share price / par value)], which in this case is 7.96%.

The more difficult valuation is with the conversion component. This creates a few scenarios, and note that we assume we sell the common shares immediately after conversion:

1. If the common trades above $3.79/share on September 30, 2012;
2. If the common trades above $3.79/share between October 1, 2012 to September 30, 2014;
3. If the common trades less than $3.79/share after September 30, 2012, but trades above $2.81/share after September 30, 2014.
4. If #1, #2 and #3 do not apply and if the common trades less than $2.81/share after September 30, 2014 until X date.

Scenario 1 is fairly easy to calculate – if you anticipate this happening, you really should invest in the common shares rather than the preferred shares. If the common stock ends up at $3.79/share on September 30, 2012, you will essentially be receiving $135 of value for your preferreds, plus 5 semi-annual coupon payments. A $113 investment will result in $135 in capital gains, plus $22.50 in coupon payments over a 2.40 year period. Annualized, this works out to a 7.69% capital gain, plus a 7.96% income yield. This is contrasted with a common stock performance of 12.3% capital gains and 1.49% income yield (assuming no dividend increase) over the same time period.

In this event, the preferreds seem to be the better investment, especially when seniority is considered. If the common shares go higher than $3.79/share before 2.4 years, the returns between the preferred shares and the common will be proportionate.

Scenario 2 will result in the same absolute return, but depending on when the threshold common stock value is reached, it will result in the same absolute return in terms of capital, but the annualized yield will be less because of the extra time taken to reach the conversion threshold. As an example, if $3.79 is reached on September 30, 2013, the preferreds will have an annualized capital gain of 5.37%, and an income yield of 7.96%, while the common will have a capital gain performance of 8.52% and income yield of 1.49%.

Scenario 3 – assuming the common stock does not go anywhere (i.e. stays at $2.87/share) for the next 4.4 years, a common share investor will receive a 0 capital gain and 1.49% income yield; the preferred holder will receive a 6.4% capital loss on conversion (annualized will be 1.42% loss), but retain an income yield of 7.96%. There are multiple variables at play – when the conversion price is reached and what price occurs at September 30, 2014. For a 10% increase in common share value above $2.81, the preferred shares’ effective value on conversion also increases by 10%, but is capped to 35% when $3.79 is achieved.

Scenario 4 involves a loss – in this event, the fixed income nature of the shares will be more apparent and the conversion privilege becomes less valuable. A common shareholder will lose more capital than the preferred shareholder.

At a value of $113/share, the value of the common shares needs to be $3.18/share in order to avoid a loss of capital upon conversion. This is approximately 11% above the current common share price, but the preferred share holder is compensated for this by the higher coupon payment – they would receive payback for this difference in about one and a half years of coupon payments.

As such, somebody interested in Western Financial Group should be better off buying their preferred shares rather than the common shares as their preferred shares, for now, has a relatively high correlation to the appreciation of common shares, but will be giving out a significantly higher income stream. The only disadvantage is that the preferred shares are horribly illiquid and getting a fill at a decent price and/or size is not easy when nobody is trading.