Cinram International Valuation

I notice that Susan Brunner is doing a brief on Cinram (TSX: CRW.UN). It is in the very boring and low-margin business of printing and distributing physical media such as CDs and DVDs.

I did some fairly serious research on this company earlier this year, and came to the conclusion that while they were likely to continue to be cash flow positive, there was no way that they would overcome their debt situation without a significant recapitalization.

The primary hit in the past year was on February 1, 2010 when 28% of their revenue stream announced they were terminating a contract. The units dove about 2/3rds and got my attention when I did research.

Their big problem is that the company, as of June 30, 2010 has a $379 million bank loan (secured) and only $125 million in cash, with a business that is not generating a whole lot of cash. The bank credit facility expires on May 5, 2011. It is more than likely that the secured creditors will take over the equity, which implies that the current value of $1.00 per unit (total market capitalization about $54 million) is vastly overpriced.

I would only start looking at the company more seriously if they traded below 20 cents, and with the recognition that the catalyst for an equity purchase would be a bank giving them a sweetheart extension deal that wasn’t too punitive to unitholders. At this point you are really gambling as opposed to investing, which is why I am not really going to look at Cinram in the future other than as a curiousity to see how their story resolves.

Why I will never invest in China

John Hempton has a classic story of his research on an “online” travel agency.

My rule of “Never invest in a jurisdiction that does not have English as its primary language” holds very, very true. I am sure there are a lot of wildly profitable companies in China, just that you can be absolutely sure that minority shareholders’ interests (i.e. the suckers that buy a few hundred shares to have a “China play”) will never be in alignment with the board of directors or management. In this particular case, UTA looks great on paper, but is likely their accounting and reporting is completely crooked.

In their last 10-K filing, you even had the auditors (a firm I’ve never heard of in New Jersey) saying in their audit letter the following:

A material weakness is a deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, in internal control over financial reporting, such that there is a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the company’s annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis. The following material weaknesses were identified:

The Company’s policy documentation of all controls identified during their assessment and remediation process was incomplete.

Lack of technical accounting expertise among financial staff regarding US GAAP and the requirements of the PCAOB, and regarding preparation of financial statements.

These material weaknesses were considered in determining the nature, timing, and extent of audit tests applied in our audit of the 2009 consolidated financial statements of the Company as of and for the year ended December 31, 2009.

Translation: “We have no idea whether these guys were lying to us when they provided us with alledged ‘proof’ of the revenues, expenses and balance sheet items you see here. Good luck!”

Suffice to say, I wonder if Hempton (who has probably made a small fortune shorting this thing earlier when the stock was trading higher before writing this huge article on the company) will be able to single-handedly get the stock delisted when his 2,200 readers (at least according to Google Reader) eventually hammer the stock down to the zero it probably deserves.

Just for full disclosure, I am not long or short the stock, nor do I plan on trading the stock. Trading from other people’s research is a great way to lose money – capturing real value in the market is done by performing independent research when nobody else is watching.

LuluLemon’s second quarter

Headlines are being made that Lululemon (Nasdaq: LULU) beat earnings expectations and raised income estimates for the year. Their common shares were up about 13% today after their second quarter report.

Most of what I wrote about Lululemon, in terms of share valuation back in June 10, 2010 (when they announced their first quarter results) applies today – the company will have to execute high growth perfectly in order to justify their existing valuation.

It should be pointed out that despite their second quarter surprise, their valuation around the same ($2.8-$2.9 billion) as it was when I wrote my June 10 article, or about USD$40/share. They will need to continue achieving rapid growth in order to grow into the existing valuation. If not, you will see a significant haircut in the stock price.

Lululemon is a classic case of a well-run company that you do not want to own stock in.

Clearwater Seafoods facing debt crunch

Clearwater Seafoods Income Fund (TSX: CLR-UN.TO) is a financially distressed entity. The fund has an equity interest in a limited partnership. The limited partnership is the operating business that sells seafood. The units are trading at around 80 cents, with a market capitalization of about $23 million. The trust has stopped paying distributions since 2007 and is not likely to pay distributions for a long, long time.

Whenever investing in an income trust, they typically have more complicated ownership structures than corporations. You can usually get a summary of the structure in the first few pages of the annual information form. I have extracted a diagram which illustrates the relationship between the fund and the operating entity:

Whenever I see something like this, I think negatively since usually such structures exist to give certain (usually founding) entities control over the operating assets, but to distribute the economic interests to other parties that is not in proportion to voting interests. In this case, the unitholders of Clearwater Seafoods Income Fund are simply there for the ride by virtue of having a 54% voting interest in a very indirect say as to what goes on at the operating level. As a result, an investor would need extra compensation (i.e. higher reward) for the extra risk that they are taking (the risk that their interests are not going to be in alignment with the people holding the puppet strings).

Clearwater also has a debt problem – as of June 30, 2010 the operating entity has about $218 million in debt outstanding, and of this debt, the trust has lent the operating entity $45 million in exchange for partnership units (they have also done this in other instances with different terms and maturity dates). This loan matures in December 31, 2010. The operating entity also does not generate enough cash, nor are there other assets readily available to pay off the debt. As a result, the company will have to find external financing or find some method to recapitalize the debt.

There is also another $11.3 million loan that is due in September 2010.

In the management discussion and analysis, we have the following paragraph:

In December 2010 Clearwater Seafoods Income Fund has $45 million of convertible debentures that come due. These funds were invested by the Fund in Class C Units issued by Clearwater with similar terms and conditions, including maturity in December 2010. Clearwater also has approximately 1.3 billion in ISK denominated bonds, including CPI and accrued interest that come due in September 2010 (approximately Canadian $11.3 million at July 3, 2010). Clearwater is currently investigating refinancing alternatives and plans to refinance both before the respective maturity dates.

When we look at the market for the $45 million debenture, we see it is trading at 88.5 cents on the dollar. So the market is heavily betting that the debt will be refinanced at relatively favourable terms to debt investors. Recapitalization, however, appears to be out of the question since it would require relinquishing control to the debtholders and the current market value of the units is far too low to make a direct conversion worthwhile. Going into bankruptcy protection might occur if the debtholders and trustees cannot come to a mutually equitable arrangement.

Given the lackluster cash flow from operations, the complexity of the trust and underlying operating entities, and obvious credit risk, I will be watching this one purely from the sidelines to see how this mess gets resolved. My cursory look at the situation would suggest that the debt and equity are both overvalued.