British Petroleum and the drilling companies

I have done nothing other than look at the summary financial statements of BP, but on paper they look undervalued. The mess in the Gulf of Mexico, however, will be costing them considerable amounts of money. I’ve projected a couple years of earnings ($40 billion) that will likely go down the tubes as a result of this environmental incident.

The market will take BP down to the point where nobody will expect, and when everybody has written off the stock, that is usually the time to buy. In essence, this is a psychological play, so it involves more game theory than financial analysis since it is likely that BP will remain a continuing entity in the future. Their balance sheet is fine – about $40 billion in debt and $7 billion in free cash flow ($20B income) in 2009, so they won’t be facing any solvency issues.

The better question is whether one should invest in the drilling companies. It is likely lease rates will drop since offshore drilling will have significant demand drops and the market has already been pricing this in. As an example, Transocean has also been slaughtered.

I generally do not look into companies that are not trading in Canada or the USA, and BP is a British company, so I will not be considering them seriously. However, the other companies (e.g. the aforementioned drillers) I will be investigating. Since there are so many eyeballs on this sector, there must be other circumstances (e.g. panic) that would be required to ensure that you are getting good value for your investment. It is also exceedingly difficult to predict when to catch the falling knife and the investment to invest in BP is essentially that – you need to place your purchase orders when everybody has gotten their hands so bloodied up trying to catch the knife that they have given up trying.

I would not bother thinking about this until BP has cut their dividend.

Apple vs. Microsoft

It was only a couple months ago that I wrote about how Apple and Microsoft’s market capitalizations are closing in on each other.

Today, Apple for the first time has a market cap higher than Microsoft, at $222 billion for Apple and Microsoft at $219 billion.

The real issue with the two companies is that Microsoft is really living off of its legacy product lines (Windows and Office) while Apple has come out with a huge stream of technological innovations, mainly the iPod and iPhone product lines (which secretly get the users to lock into their business model, similar to how software in the 90’s was “for Windows” only).

At this time, I don’t see how Microsoft can demand a market premium for its position – on the retail end, Windows has not fundamentally changed in 15 years (Windows NT 4 was the quantum leap product, and Windows XP was a great retail refinement of the Windows NT core). Microsoft Office has not fundamentally changed since the release of Office 97; everything else subsequent has been cosmetic in nature. With competitors chipping away at the cost premium that Microsoft charges (typically to large-volume corporate licensees), their ability to extract margin out of the marketplace with upgrades and obsolescence upgrades is limited. Microsoft will continue to produce cash like no tomorrow, but it is tapped out in terms of growth. Microsoft shares, as a result, trades like it – analysts expect $2.31/share in FY2011, while the stock price is $25.01/share – a yield of 9.24%.

Apple, on the other hand, has plenty of room to invade the computer marketplace, and combined with their mobile device market seemingly can command a high premium and has room to grow. As a result, they are given a premium in the stock market – analysts estimate $15.42/share in FY2011, on a stock price of $244.11/share – a yield of 6.32%.

Although Apple has competitive issues (i.e. Google is trying to invade the territory), it remains to be seen whether it can keep Google and other competitors at bay. Certainly its marketing arm continues to create users that have an almost religious-like adherence to its products.

I don’t have a position in either company and don’t plan on establishing one.

The impact of touting a stock

Jim Cramer is very well known to anybody in the financial domain as a former hedge fund manager, but also a hothead on CNBC television hosting a daily show called Mad Money, where he praises and pans every stock on the book. He knows, and the audience should know that his show is purely for entertainment value (Cramer is really an excellent host that seems to never run out of his child-like adrenaline surges), but a whole bunch of amateurs take him seriously.

It used to be when his show came to the air that whenever he made recommendations that the stocks would go up, significantly, in after-market trading, only to recede to their previous levels a couple days later. Traders would usually target this phenomenon and try to capture the demand by short selling and taking profits later.

If anything, it was a very fascinating exercise of how sharks try to eat fish, akin to a poker game – that type of stock trading was definitely zero-sum, and Cramer had the ability to attract a lot of amateurs that were also trying to make the fast dollar off of each other. It was undeniable that in the first few months of the show, Cramer had the ability to move stocks and somebody was probably able to consistently take advantage of it (e.g. being associated with somebody directing or producing the show, for example).

So it was with interest when a fellow named Controlled Greed, who has 5,514 subscribers according to Google Reader, on May 22 mentioned that he took a position in the previous week some illiquid smallcap company (XETA). It has a market capitalization of 39 million and an average volume of 6,700 shares or roughly $25,000 traded a day.

Most notably, on no news, the stock opened up Monday about 5% on 1900 shares. So his article did attract a few market buyers, which I found to be fascinating.

My econophysical studies of situations like these suggest that “immediate popularizations” of stocks has an impulse function effect on the share value, but the value of the impulse declines substantively as the value of the popularization exponentially decays, and eventually reaches a null point (where it is indistinguishable from background noise) a few days later (the decay rate being variable). But you have to wonder how many of those 5,500 readers now stick XETA on the watchlist, waiting for some sort of substantive news. I will not. One of my rules is that by the time you read about any obscure stock pick on any popular medium, it’s already too late.

Volatile week in the markets

The markets, reeling off of last week’s volatility spike, started up Monday massively when the European Union did their trillion-dollar backing/bailout. Then later in the week, the market began to sober up again.

It is difficult to know whether the markets will continue to be volatile or not, but last Friday’s trading action took everything down for reasons that are not entirely clear other than volatility and presumably a drive to safety.

I did not perform a single transaction last week, but continue to watch intently whether there is anything worth picking up. I still don’t find anything trading below a value worth considering and thus will continue to be patient. I get sufficiently rewarded by waiting and thus am not in a hurry to deploy cash.

I do note at present that the risk-free pre-tax long-term rate is around 3.9%, and if you asked me to cobble together a portfolio that would give a relatively stable and long-term income stream, I could probably make a balanced portfolio with enough diversification that would give around 7% in about half interest income and half eligible dividends over the next 20 years. Such a portfolio would be roughly half long-term corporate debt, quarter preferred shares and quarter equity. Stable income does not equate to stable capital, however – it would be highly sensitive to rate changes, and opportunity for appreciation would be limited. At least it would beat inflation.

Valuing Western Financial Group Preferred Shares

Western Financial Group (common: WES.TO) is primarily an insurance brokerage in Western Canada. They have been able to grow their top line consistently over the past few years, while their bottom line, although profitable, has fluctuated with the market. It is likely they will continue to be making money in the future, so payment of debt and preferred securities should not be an issue, barring any huge global financial crisis.

They have an issue of preferred shares (series 5, WES.PR.C) that has the salient details:

$100 par value, 9% coupon, payable semi-annually;
Holders can convert into common at $2.81/share anytime;
Issuer can convert if common is $3.79/share or higher after September 30, 2012;
Issuer can convert if common is $2.81/share or higher after September 30, 2014.

As I write this, the common is trading at $2.87/share and gives a 4.28 cent annualized dividend (1.49% yield). The preferreds are illiquid and the bid-ask midpoint is $113/share.

To value this preferred share, you must break down the fixed income component and the embedded call option that you (a preferred shareholder) sell to the company.

The fixed income component is simply [coupon / (share price / par value)], which in this case is 7.96%.

The more difficult valuation is with the conversion component. This creates a few scenarios, and note that we assume we sell the common shares immediately after conversion:

1. If the common trades above $3.79/share on September 30, 2012;
2. If the common trades above $3.79/share between October 1, 2012 to September 30, 2014;
3. If the common trades less than $3.79/share after September 30, 2012, but trades above $2.81/share after September 30, 2014.
4. If #1, #2 and #3 do not apply and if the common trades less than $2.81/share after September 30, 2014 until X date.

Scenario 1 is fairly easy to calculate – if you anticipate this happening, you really should invest in the common shares rather than the preferred shares. If the common stock ends up at $3.79/share on September 30, 2012, you will essentially be receiving $135 of value for your preferreds, plus 5 semi-annual coupon payments. A $113 investment will result in $135 in capital gains, plus $22.50 in coupon payments over a 2.40 year period. Annualized, this works out to a 7.69% capital gain, plus a 7.96% income yield. This is contrasted with a common stock performance of 12.3% capital gains and 1.49% income yield (assuming no dividend increase) over the same time period.

In this event, the preferreds seem to be the better investment, especially when seniority is considered. If the common shares go higher than $3.79/share before 2.4 years, the returns between the preferred shares and the common will be proportionate.

Scenario 2 will result in the same absolute return, but depending on when the threshold common stock value is reached, it will result in the same absolute return in terms of capital, but the annualized yield will be less because of the extra time taken to reach the conversion threshold. As an example, if $3.79 is reached on September 30, 2013, the preferreds will have an annualized capital gain of 5.37%, and an income yield of 7.96%, while the common will have a capital gain performance of 8.52% and income yield of 1.49%.

Scenario 3 – assuming the common stock does not go anywhere (i.e. stays at $2.87/share) for the next 4.4 years, a common share investor will receive a 0 capital gain and 1.49% income yield; the preferred holder will receive a 6.4% capital loss on conversion (annualized will be 1.42% loss), but retain an income yield of 7.96%. There are multiple variables at play – when the conversion price is reached and what price occurs at September 30, 2014. For a 10% increase in common share value above $2.81, the preferred shares’ effective value on conversion also increases by 10%, but is capped to 35% when $3.79 is achieved.

Scenario 4 involves a loss – in this event, the fixed income nature of the shares will be more apparent and the conversion privilege becomes less valuable. A common shareholder will lose more capital than the preferred shareholder.

At a value of $113/share, the value of the common shares needs to be $3.18/share in order to avoid a loss of capital upon conversion. This is approximately 11% above the current common share price, but the preferred share holder is compensated for this by the higher coupon payment – they would receive payback for this difference in about one and a half years of coupon payments.

As such, somebody interested in Western Financial Group should be better off buying their preferred shares rather than the common shares as their preferred shares, for now, has a relatively high correlation to the appreciation of common shares, but will be giving out a significantly higher income stream. The only disadvantage is that the preferred shares are horribly illiquid and getting a fill at a decent price and/or size is not easy when nobody is trading.