Category: Canada

Bank of Canada stopping quantitative easing?

Since the beginning of July, the Bank of Canada’s balance sheet hasn’t really gone anywhere. This is despite stating in the July 14th interest rate announcement that they would be continuing QE at a $2 billion/week rate.

Before COVID-19 began, the Bank of Canada historically has held about $75 billion in government bonds and $25 billion in (short term) treasury bills.

Today, the balance sheet consists of about $6 billion in treasury bills and $414 billion in government bonds.

The size of the Bank of Canada balance sheet is the same on August 11th as it was on September 1st. I would expect the balance sheet to increase slowly with QE but this hasn’t been happening.

For every asset there is either liability or equity, and in this case, the liability is the amount due to Members of Payments Canada (the big banks) – they collectively are owed about $276 billion as of the last September 1st snapshot.

We will see what happens on September the 8th when the next rate announcement is made. Given the ongoing federal election, there will be a lot of eyes on this report from non-traditional viewers.

On the US side, things still show no sign of stopping – it’s QE forever there.

This monetary froth, one way or another, ends up inflating the value of yield-bearing assets. The most obvious targets are government bonds themselves, but as money permeates up the risk spectrum, anything with a yield gets bidded up, making future returns on capital much lower, to the benefit of incumbent asset holders.

General Market Comments

The last two weeks of summer, psychologically speaking, are the two weeks before labour day weekend. Families are still on holiday (whatever types of holidays are still available with the myriad of Covid-related disruption around us), children are not at school, and the weather is usually warm enough that one wants to stay outside before the big Canadian winter freeze commences.

In the markets, this also means institutional managers are in the same boat – major policy decisions on how to steer the computerized program trading will likely be made after labour day.

So I do not put much stock in market action that is occurring, other than to observe that the TSX and S&P 500 is at an all-time high:

The Nasdaq 100 is also the same way. Both US indexes are a functional proxy for Apple, Microsoft, Amazon, etc. The S&P 500’s top 10 is about 28% of the index, while the Nasdaq 100’s top 10 is just over 50% of the index.

The TSX’s top 10 are: SHOP, RY, TD, BAM.A, ENB, CNR, BNS, BMO, CN and CP. They are about 40% of the index.

You would think the markets reaching all-time highs would generate some news headlines. It has been exactly the opposite. What do we hear about today?

1. Disaster in Afghanistan
2. Disaster in Covid-19 (take your pick: vaccines not working, variants, travel curbs, ‘fourth wave’, etc.)
3. Disaster in supply chains
4. Disaster in climate (take your pick: hurricanes, wildfires, droughts, heat waves, etc.)
5. Disaster in the Liberal Party of Canada (OK, OK, this was a joke – I will write about the Canadian election later)

The one thing that has clearly NOT been a disaster are people that have their capital in return-bearing assets. Indeed, it has been a disaster if you were NOT in the markets. The TSX is up about 17% year-to-date, while the S&P is up 21%. If you’re lagging this number, you’re effectively ‘falling behind’.

This rise in the stock market continues to be fuelled by monetary policy, with the USA and Canadian central banks still vacuuming up treasury bonds like no tomorrow; and also fiscal policy, with both governments spending like crazy.

The cash will circulate in the economy until the point where it ends up locked in bank reserves, which currently earns a very low rate of interest and will continue to do so for the indefinite future. Individuals that have satisfied their material needs have no other choice but to put their capital into the asset markets, lest they lose purchasing power.

This is the market we have been seeing post-COVID-19, until at such point we do not.

We are well into seeing the price ramifications in this monetary/fiscal regime. The front-row-center for many is the elevated cost of residential housing in urban centers. Indeed, even second and third-tier cities/towns have had an influx of capital just simply because of the people escaping the urban centres. Because of the elevation of such asset pricing, correspondingly, the cost of everything else rises to bake in the extra capital required to use the land.

We also see the impact on the stock market.

The physical world is where things get interesting with regards to the impact of monetary/fiscal policy. Although most of what happens in finance is a transaction of electrons, the physical world is messy. Primary industries produce the raw materials necessary for the functioning of society, and this includes food, energy and minerals. Somebody needs to produce this. As the debasement of currency continues, it stands to reason that the elevated cost structure will result in these commodity prices elevating.

Almost everything (with the exception of gold and silver) has risen since the start of the Covid pandemic.

The result of the increase in commodity prices will be a price transmission on the physical side of the economy that we will have not seen since the 1970’s. This will likely continue until we see a market dislocation event. I do not know what or how this will take place, but when it occurs, it will be like a 9.0 Richter Scale earthquake right next to where you live. And just like earthquakes, it will be very difficult to predict.

Until then, and especially as the conventional media has completely tuned the masses away from the rising stock market, the major indexes are most likely to continue their existing trajectories.

Brilliant marketing for yield-challenged investors

The chase for investment returns in our zero interest rate environment incentivizes the creation of all sorts of financial products to give one the perception of yield.

Indeed, I can promise you today a 10% yield. Just give me $100 and I will give you a 10-year yield of 10% a year, starting with a 10% distribution 365 days from now. Boom, guaranteed yield!

But hold on, it isn’t enough that I hold onto your capital for a decade, I want to charge some management expenses.

So how about you give me $100 today, and I’ll give you a target 8.5% yield. That might change if I can’t actually generate the returns, or if I can’t find more people to give me money to pay you.

A good example of yield-promotion financial instruments are split-share corporations, which appear to no longer be in vogue. There has to be new financial products that promote high yields!

Cue in the marketing geniuses at Hamilton, who have spammed the media with their “Target yield of 8.50% with monthly distributions” fund!

I couldn’t resist looking at the detail of the financial wizardry to make it happen.

This is a fund-of-funds:

And the strategy: “The fund seeks to replicate a 1.25 times multiple of the Solactive Multi-Sector Covered Call ETFs Index (SOLMSCCT), comprised of equal weightings of 7 Canadian-listed sector covered call ETFs.”

In other words, there is some person that puts in a buy order for 7 ETFs, and does it with 20% margin (i.e. buy $125 of funds with $100 of equity).

The geniuses at Hamilton don’t even have to program any software to manage the covered calls or the index balancing – they leave it to the constituent funds to doing so. The fine-print prospectus references a semi-annual rebalancing to equal-weight the funds, and to keep the leverage between 123% to 127%.

The 8.5% indicated yield is not in the prospectus, but it is clearly the marketing pitch. 8.5% divided by 1.25 is 6.8%, which is the basis for this yield claim.

For this, they charge 65 basis points.

A pretty good business for them.

I find this phenomena of covered call ETFs and the promotion of covered calls to be highly over-rated. Most retail people perceive covered calls to be free money (“even if I do get called out, it is at a price that I would have wanted to sell anyway”), but there is a significant exchange of future upside capital appreciation for a “yield” today. This yield is not free, especially during times of low volatility. Implied volatility of options tend to drop when the underlying price appreciates, and vice-versa. The best time to get the highest option yields (when implied volatility is the highest) is typically during a market crash, which is precisely the time you do not want to be selling the capital upside of equities.

Conversely, at that exact moment tends to be the ideal time to sell put options, but few people in the heat of a market crash want to do so, and indeed, selling puts during a market crash is not the most financially productive activity since the amount of upside you capture is limited to the put premium. There is no free lunch in this game although slick marketing makes it appear to be the case.

The TSX 60 currently yields around 2.7%. At 125% leverage, it would yield around 3.4% ignoring the interest cost. If you got rid of Shopify (about 10% of the index now!) that yield rises to about 3.7%. Is it a stretch to think the capital component of the TSX will rise 5% in the future? Maybe. But the sale of 2-month at-the-money covered calls on the TSX right now is 1.4% and that more or less locks in a (unleveraged) 4% return with only capital downside. The 2-month covered call option yield if you wish to retain about 2% capital upside is about 40 basis points. When you include a friction of 65bps MER, I don’t see how the math works at all.

Large Cap Canadian Energy

A briefing note. I do not think any of this thinking below is original by any means, but it needs to be said.

On May 26, Suncor (TSX: SU) guided at WTIC US$60 in 2021 and US$55 in 2022 (which is presently US$68 and US$62 for the year-end contracts, respectively) a free cash flow of $7 billion. This is after a $3 billion capital expenditure in 2021.

The guidance was notable in that the 9 megabyte slide deck they provided went through great pains to downplay the amount of cash they actually were going to generate (in typical Canadian fashion, it is like they are embarrassed to admit they are making this much money), but let’s play along.

Suncor’s enterprise value is about CAD$60 billion, about $45 billion market value and $15 billion debt.

Let’s do some basic math. This is grade school finance.

It means if the company can produce cash at the present rate (which, in general, they can given the nature of what they are mining at the present capital expenditure rate), if directed to debt and equity, they will be able to pay off all their debt and repurchase their entire share stack (at current prices – it will rise over time) in 8.5 years.

This doesn’t include changes in the selling price of oil, which the above figure is currently below market.

This is a little more complicated to calculate the sensitivity to commodity pricing. Companies give out sensitivities and for every dollar on Brent (not quite WTIC, but deeply correlated), Suncor changes its funds flow through operations by about CAD$300 million. Very roughly, subtract royalties and taxes (no more tax shield, they made too much money already) and it is about CAD$200 million leftover.

I note that at current pricing, an $8 positive oil price difference over the model (note: do not confuse with the Canada/USA differential) changes the 8.5 years alluded to above into about 7 years.

You just need to make the assumption that oil pricing will stay steady.

If this is the case (or heaven forbid, oil rises even further), Suncor is ridiculously undervalued.

This doesn’t even factor in the WCS/WTIC differential, which is likely to close once Line 3 is completed (end of the year) and TMX is finished (2022?). This will be the freest money for all stakeholders involved. An extra US$5 off the differential (it is now about US$15) on Suncor’s capacity is about US$1.5 billion a year – suddenly 7 years now becomes 6 years.

Not surprisingly, the company is buying back stock like mad, probably because there isn’t anything else they can really do with the excess cash flow.

In the past couple months, they’ve bought back US$375 million in stock, 17.2 million shares (about 1.1% of the outstanding). They should aim to buy back the maximum they can at current pricing.

As this continues, the stock price will rise and make future buybacks less attractive. After the appreciation, they should jack up the dividend.

Normally businesses would also invest in capital expenditures, but in Canada, we are closed for business for any significant natural resource projects. We mine what we have left, which makes the decisions easy – harvest cash.

What is the thesis against this?

The obvious elephant in the room is the sustainability of oil pricing.

I have no doubt in 100 years from today that fossil fuel consumption, one way or another, will be seriously curtailed. It will likely be too expensive to use in most applications that we see today.

But in 8.5 years? Get real. Oil sands reserves are measured in decades.

The other obvious component of “Why are they letting me have it so cheap?” is political correctness in the form of ESG. Much demand is sapped because of this. Many institutions cannot touch oil and gas, including Berkshire Hathaway.

Eventually through buybacks and dividend payments, the market will adjust this.

The margin of safety here is extremely high and nothing comes close in the Canadian marketplace, at least to anything with over a billion dollar market cap.

The same reasoning above also applies to Canadian Natural Resources (TSX: CNQ) and Cenovus (TSX: CVE). They are also in the same boat in terms of their FCF/EV valuation, and also with similarities in their operations. Once they reduce leverage, they will be buying back stock like crazy if it is still at the current price. I don’t know how long this will last.

Sometimes things are so obvious in the markets you really wonder what the trick is, but with this, it is the closest thing I can think of picking up polymer cash notes on the street. Efficient market theory would tell me that those cash notes wouldn’t be there. Perhaps traditional finance theorists might be right, we will see. At least I can take some solace when I am at the gas station and seeing record-high prices.