Marijuana companies – smart moves

Marijuana companies have to know at this time their primary objective is the following: obtain real assets other than market goodwill, and do it quickly as possible.

To this effect, you have companies raising cash like mad. Canopy Growth (TSX: WEED) raised $175 million earlier this year. Aurora (TSX: ACB) is buying other marijuana companies like crazy with its inflated stock.

The recipients of these gushes of cash are the ones that will be making the better deals. Here’s an example: Today, an announcement that Aurora is buying nearly 25% of Liquor Stores NA (TSX: LIQ) with warrants to buy more of the company if the stock goes higher.

This works very well for Liquor store management, who will be getting a huge cash injection at an equity price well above market. It works for Aurora, who is trying to desperately diversify into other assets beyond their own stock price.

How did Aurora pay for it? A $200 million bought deal convertible debt financing, earlier in January! Some people have money to throw away I guess!

General Comments – Canadian Debenture Market

I’ve finished my comprehensive sweep of the Canadian debenture market. Nothing much has changed except a bit of price weakness which can likely be attributed to the volatility seen this week. Very broadly, I’m not finding anything overly attractive in this marketplace.

On the TSX side, the exceptional items on the radar include the question of when Lanesborough (TSX: LRT.DB.G) will be formally going belly-up – you can buy their zero-yielding debt for under 10 cents on the dollar. Another luminary is Discovery Air (TSX: DA.DB.A), where you can gamble that the controlling entity (who controls most of the senior secured debt outstanding) will be generous enough to let the unsecured debentureholders get away with some cash.

There are quite a few of the smaller oil and gas issuers that are showing signs of financial stress. This is likely due to the fact that Alberta and Saskatchewan oil producers are facing a CAD$22/barrel selling price deficit with no signs of this going away. It turns out that it’s really difficult to sell crude oil when you can’t transport it anywhere! I’m guessing the majors (Suncor, etc.) are just licking their lips and are preparing for an acquisition spree once the less solvent juniors are forced into CCAA submission. I still maintain, for now, that fixed income investors in fossil fuel producers will be likely to make more money (or perhaps lose less of it) than the equity side.

It is also interesting to see how Kinder Morgan Canada Limited (TSX: KML) has not traded down much given the news from British Columbia’s government that will be implementing further regulations on the transport of diluted bitumen. The payload is in the last line of the backgrounder of the release:

In order to protect B.C.’s environmental and economic interests while the advisory panel is proceeding, the Province is proposing regulatory restrictions to be placed on the increase of diluted bitumen (“dilbit”) transportation.

KML does continue to operate the existing Trans Mountain pipeline (map), and since there is effectively a moratorium on long-distance fossil fuel pipeline building in the country, it does make existing pipeline infrastructure more valuable.

This hostility to fossil fuels is one reason (high taxation is another) why retail gasoline prices in Vancouver are the highest in Canada, short of remote northern areas. This will continue to go higher as the provincial government will be raising carbon taxes over (at least) the next four years.

As an interesting side note, retail gasoline in Vancouver, BC is currently at $1.43 per litre, while a little down the border in Washington State, it is US$2.68 per gallon, which works out to about 87 cents per litre.

General comments – market weakness

Another ranting post with little direction.

With marijuana-related equities and cryptocurrencies plummeting, the market for speculative investments appears to be topping. Probably the next short squeeze that occurs will be the best time to be shorting these instruments. Implied volatility on the options sadly are high, and the borrow rate on WEED, APH, ACB, etc., are astronomical.

I also note Aimia (TSX: AIM) has sold off one of their divisions today and most of the negative news is buried in a later paragraph concerning the tightening of their senior credit facility – this is basically part of the slow march to zero. The company is happy to cite the amount of cash on their balance sheet, but not so happy to cite the balance of their deferred revenues, which represents future commitments that will be offset by cost of goods sold – hence the cash reserve. Using an insurance analogy, they are running off their insurance book with little capacity to collect premiums written after Aeroplan expires in 2020.

There’s a lot of young people out there that have witnessed nothing but rising markets and low interest rates and the financial mindset is fixated on these two conditions. There is going to be a lot of financial roadkill along the way, similar to what happened in 2000-2002 where a lot of people got wiped out for believing the dot-com bubble.

Incidentially, 2002-2003 was the perfect time to invest in the inevitable winners of that technology boom (Amazon and Priceline being two great examples). There will have to be winners out of blockchain software, but it could just as equally come from a major player. Very difficult to say at this point in time as I still have not seen any functional system operating with blockchain that doesn’t have a parallel system that is better – unless if you believe that cryptocurrency’s best application is evading monetary authorities.

As I suggested in my previous post, the roller-coaster is just starting. No point in jumping in too early.

Marijuana stocks – if there was any question of over-valuation

(December 18, 2017: Article featured on the Globe & Mail: TSX short sales: What bearish investors are betting against)

This post applies to the recent December 5, 2017 press release by the British Columbia government regarding how they plan on implementing marijuana regulations in the province.

Saving you from reading the actual release, they plan on having a sole wholesaler (the BC Liquor Distribution branch) and a private/public retail distribution mechanism.

This is very similar to how liquor in other major provinces are distributed – the government gets to keep the lion’s share of the profit on the wholesale side.

In British Columbia, liquor retailers can purchase product from the government monopoly wholesaler at a 16% profit margin for licensed retail stores. These stores will have to then sell enough volume in order to pay for the usual business expenses (leasing a physical location, maintaining inventory, staffing, etc.).

Using the liquor analogy, profits from the retail end of things will be minimal. The best example is Liquor Stores NA (TSX: LIQ) which, despite booking 25% gross margins on their product, when things are good, earn a 3% operating profit margin (not before financing costs, but this is after depreciation expenses).

People following this company will shout out that they are undergoing a significant restructuring, but the central theme still sticks – it is a very low margin industry when your only supplier is government-controlled and has every incentive to maximizing its own profit and not yours.

This is a miserable business climate to be in.

Another, much smaller, example is Rocky Mountain Liquor (TSX: RUM). They operate retail entirely out of Alberta. Cherry-picking their best results in the last year, they are earning a 2% operating profit margin (and this is BEFORE financing and depreciation expenses).

Is marijuana going to be any different than liquor?

I would float the claim that retail marijuana profitability will be even worse than liquor because people can easily grow their own product sufficient for their own consumption. Federal legislation actively encourages people to grow their own marijuana plants at home (4 plants that you can now grow larger than the original 100cm proposed in the initial draft of Bill C-45).

This leaves the question of wholesale – there will need to be suppliers of this. I will also make the claim this will be a race to the bottom, with the exception that the “grow it at home” market will erode profits to the point that wholesale will nowhere near justify the 3.6 billion market capitalization seen from Canopy Growth (TSX: WEED) today – even assuming they captured the entire Canadian marijuana market.

The hype is marijuana producers will be able to achieve tobacco company margins – Rothmans was the last publicly traded Canadian tobacco company and they achieved roughly 50% operating margins (before financing and depreciation). It won’t be happening this way again – this margin will be siphoned by the government from the very beginning.

Canadian interest rate futures

There are three Bank of Canada announcements concerning interest rates for the rest of the year: September 6, October 25 and December 6.

Right now 3-month Banker’s Acceptance rates are 1.2%.

The BAX futures are signalling that there is a better than 50/50 chance that rates will increase 0.25% in the September 6 cycle, and that there is a slight chance of two 0.25% rate increases by the end of the year:

Month Bid price Ask price Settl. price Net change Open int. Vol.
Open interest: 942,178 Volume: 86,058
August 2017 0 0 98.765 0 0 0
September 2017 98.655 98.660 98.645 0.010 137,868 7,160
October 2017 0 0 98.615 0 0 0
December 2017 98.500 98.505 98.490 0.010 224,303 15,544
March 2018 98.395 98.400 98.375 0.020 163,606 19,552
June 2018 98.330 98.335 98.305 0.025 112,558 15,558
September 2018 98.270 98.280 98.250 0.030 120,395 10,055
December 2018 98.210 98.220 98.200 0.020 102,302 9,439
March 2019 98.160 98.170 98.140 0.020 45,030 5,208
June 2019 98.090 98.100 98.080 0.020 17,655 1,763
September 2019 98.010 98.030 98.010 0.010 10,774 827
December 2019 97.940 97.960 97.940 0.010 5,193 646
March 2020 97.860 97.870 97.870 0 2,199 198
June 2020 97.780 97.800 97.800 -0.010 295 108

Guessing the impact of these short-term interest rate changes I will leave as an exercise to the reader for now. The one salient fact, however, is that when short-term financing rates increase, the incentive to leveraging decreases and so marginal investments will be less viable. Parking cash in a rising-rate environment is best done with cash rather than using any debt instruments with duration (I wish I had stuck to this – my cash parked in VSB.TO has decidedly unperformed zero-yield cash!).