Canada – Page 17

Canadian Dollar vs. US Dollar

This chart has grabbed my attention over the past couple weeks:

The market is trading CAD up presumably on hopes that Canada and the USA can iron out some sort of trade deal on the NAFTA front. I’d be skeptical. The politics does not work very well for both President and Prime Minister for a quick agreement.

The other drivers of the Canadian currency are interest rates and the state of the commodity markets, and relative to the USA, neither appear to be favouring the Canadian dollar at the moment.

That said I do not pretend to understand all the nuances of Canadian dollar trading, so perhaps some other enlightened individuals can chime in.

Canadian Dollar, Genworth MI and Residential REITs

This will be a rambling post in no particular order.

1. The Canadian dollar has tumbled with Donald Trump beating the war drums on the trade portfolio:

This will keep going lower and lower until the Government of Canada realizes that a lower currency doesn’t mean you’re more competitive when you’ve basically killed your own industry. Normally there is correlation between oil prices and the Canadian dollar but this linkage has now been considerably more muted because of WTIC to Alberta oil differentials. Investment has been flowing away from Alberta/SK oil and everything is on maintenance mode.

This will clear the way, however, for the Bank of Canada to raise interest rates another quarter point.

Domestically, this is going to be a disaster for general Canadian standards of living. It seems to be that our largest urban export is continuing to be real estate.

2. Speaking of real estate, bearish market participants in Genworth MI are going to face a short squeeze:

I’m not sure why anybody would want to use Genworth MI as a proxy for Canadian housing when there are so many more other investment vehicles to express this sentiment, ones that are trading well above book value and are making nowhere close to as much money as Genworth MI is on their insurance portfolio.

I’ll send a “hat tip” to Tyler, who writes infrequently at Canadian Value Stocks, for the brief mention of my continuing analysis of Genworth MI. The best analogy I can give is “picking up hundred dollar bills in front of a steamroller” instead of the usual cliche of “picking up nickels”. Genworth MI is claimed to be poised to have a giant collapse, but the variables required to make that happen seem distant at this point in time. Hint: Pay attention to China.

3. Speaking of real estate, the most hyped investment seems to be mortgage REITs and also residential REITs. The cap rates received by purchasers are incredibly low. Example press release linked here, key quotation in the first paragraph:

Northview Apartment Real Estate Investment Trust (“Northview”) (TSX:NVU.UN) today announced that it has agreed to acquire a 623 unit portfolio of six apartment properties (the “Acquisition Properties” or the “Acquisition”) from affiliates of Starlight Group Property Holdings Inc. (“Starlight”). The aggregate purchase price of the Acquisition Properties is $151.8 million (excluding closing costs), representing a weighted average capitalization rate of 4.5%.

A 4.5% cap rate? Do I even need to open a spreadsheet to know that the purchasing side of the transaction is wholly reliant on capital appreciation of the underlying properties for this to make financial sense?

The big favourite in this market is Canadian Apartment Properties (TSX: CAR.UN) and they probably can’t even believe how much their equity has traded up over the past year. They did a secondary at $35.15/unit and probably feel like idiots since just three months later they’re trading at $43/unit.

We drill down into their financials and see that from the last quarter, extended to 12 months, their normalized funds flow through operations (recall that accounting rules will add gross amounts of volatility in REITs due to mark-to-market rules when properties are re-appraised and this difference will be added or subtracted from income, making standard income statement comparisons incomprehensible without going through mental gymnastics) results in a net yield of about 4.3%.

An investment in CAR, therefore will expect to receive 4.3% plus the variable components of changes of rental amounts, property values, financing and operating expenses, and vacancy rates. Will these variable components be enough to give a rational equity investor a higher rate of return as surely nobody would want to take equity risk for a measly 4.3% gain?

The Canada-USA trade war is not going to end well

The US administration is using a tariff on steel and aluminum imported from Canada, Mexico and the EU. They had threatened to do that before in March, but exempted Canada and Mexico during that round (notably Prime Minister Justin Trudeau took “credit” for this). Now the tariffs are in place, effective yesterday.

Presumably this is part of a negotiation concerning NAFTA which hasn’t gotten the results the US administration wants.

Canada’s response is here, which they claim to consist of CAD$16.6 billion that the USA will levy against Canadians.

Included is not only steel and aluminum, but other household products. This includes yogurt, roasted coffee (although not decaffeinated!), strawberry jam, non-frozen orange juice… in other words, my breakfast is going to get 10% more expensive!

Here’s the big problem with the “tit-for-tat” strategy that Canada is employing: The USA has a lot more money than Canada does. If the USA decides to raise the stakes and put on another $50 billion in tariffs, what US imports are Canada going to go after next?

It’s pretty clear where this end-game is going to go – the purchasing power of the Canadian dollar will drop.

My other comment is that Ontario is the most sensitive province to steel and aluminum import tariffs. They are also undergoing a provincial election at the moment which has a strong possibility of a minority government (which means paralysis). Finally, Ontario is 40% of Canada’s GDP, so the US tariffs hit the correct part if the USA wanted to make some political impact. They clearly know what they’re doing.

Short-term Canadian Interest Rates

The Bank of Canada’s next interest rate decision will be on May 30th.

Pundits are saying the bank will stand pat, citing various economic statistics, trade uncertainty with NAFTA, lunar cycles, etc.

There is one other statistic that matters much more than others, and it is the following chart (10-year government bond yield):

As long as the spread between short-term rates and the 10-year yield remains greater than a percentage point, this gives them clearance to raise rates, especially when lock-step with the Federal Reserve.

My prediction, if it wasn’t obvious by the tone of the previous writing is, that barring some major change or news over the next week, the Bank of Canada will raise the short-term target rate to 1.5% (up 0.25%) on May 30th of this year.

Right now the 3-month Bankers’ Acceptance is at 1.69% which translates into 98.31 on the futures contract. Currently the June 2018 BAX Futures are trading at 1.81% (98.19), which also factors in some interest rate probability concerning the July 11, 2018 decision.

(Update, May 29, 2018: Given that 2, 5 and 10 year rates have dropped significantly in the past week, I’m withdrawing my prediction. Next cycle will depend on the rate spread between short-term and 10-year yields.)

The case to short Genworth MI

I very much like reading the short sale cases of anything I hold. It forces you to check your own analysis and compare conclusions. I remember dissecting a post back in October 2016 that was posted on Seeking Alpha (David Desjardins said he bought January 2018 put options at a strike price of 18 – if held to maturity they would have expired out of the money).

The newest case I’ve read is from Tim Bergin, who wrote extensively about it on his website and even won the runner-up status in an investment idea contest (something to be fairly proud about considering the quality of presentations that go into these sorts of things – there is a large amount of raw financial brainpower that want to be noticed by hedge fund managers).

I agree with some of Tim Bergin’s analysis of Genworth MI (TSX: MIC), but there are some missing elements of the analysis. This post may appear to be a bit critical and if Tim – you’re reading this – please note I appreciate your work much more than what this post is letting on!

Items I agree with

* I generally agree that the maximum upside (as a short-seller this would be downside), in the short-term time horizon, is about 20-30%.

* I also agree that if the facts in his thesis materialize (specifically: 5-15% mortgage default rates, 20-40% housing price declines) that the price of Genworth MI will drop 60-100%. I believe that his projections are actually conservative if this occurs (i.e. the numbers he presented will be worse).

* B-20 will impact housing prices. What this will typically result in, however, is that would-be buyers would shop for lower valued properties that can fit the financing parameters.

* The correlated risks in the investment portfolio (e.g. debt/preferred share investments in financials that would presumably be linked to real estate credit markets).

* Using LTV and amortization is not a sound way of pricing an insurance product, but this is due to consumer simplicity and also just matching whatever CMHC charges – in any event, if the market was actually competitive, based on loss ratios, mortgage insurance premiums would be much lower.

Items I disagree with

* The analysis seems heavy on severity and not frequency. The trigger point for frequency is not debt ratios, but rather employment (something not discussed in the presentation).

* The most fatal flaw in the presentation: The “soft-landing” scenario (slide 26). Reading the slides, I don’t get the impression the author is differentiating between revenue recognition and premiums written. Cash intake (premiums written) in FY2017 was $663 million. Even if the company only recognized revenues on a 10-year basis (this modelling is also flawed), in a “soft landing” scenario, the revenue recognition would normalize to the rate that premiums were being written. There is no explanation for why premiums written would drop by 60%.

* The conversion to “actual loan-to-value (LTV)” (slide 19) is a very creative way to bloat the ratio and implies the liability book is larger than it may seem, but ultimately it doesn’t mean anything – the fact that it takes money to dispose of delinquent properties is known and banks also incur the same risks, or in any industry where there is collateral backing loans.

* The 10-year revenue recognition suggestion doesn’t make sense. Looking at FY2017 year end, the average transactional mortgage insurance LTV is 62% – each and every year after the mortgage loan is amortized even further, reducing risk. So even in the event that housing prices drop 25% universally, the LTV still is 83% – defaults that occur will not be severe, unless if the defaults are part of a (my terminology) “cascade selling” where selling of defaulted properties causes further price drops. What would the accounting basis be for delaying recognition of revenues that has an incredibly high probability of never incurring further cost? It’s pretty self-evident that the further the LTV drops (whether it is due to appreciation of property or amortization of debt) the less risky the insurance written is. Of course in a declining housing price environment, LTVs may go above 90% and then it becomes reliant on the mortgage holder to continue paying down the mortgage and amortizing debt instead of having the safety valve of just selling the property (which would explain how Home Capital Group and others got away with sloppy underwriting).

* In relation to US mortgages (strategic defaults), recourse in Canada is quite powerful.

* That MIC’s insurance portfolio is weaker because of the reduced (90%) government backstopping. Performance data between CMHC and MIC (loss ratios) would suggest otherwise. I agree I don’t know why this is the case, but it would suggest that MIC does have better screening techniques.

Items that should be in the analysis but isn’t mentioned

* That as long as CMHC profits from mortgage insurance that Genworth MI will as well and any “crash” scenario will also greatly affect the government (with even more political consequences than financial ones), thus the federal government has a high incentive to preventing a crash scenario from occurring.

* If mortgage insurance was such a crappy deal for MIC (and by extension CMHC), would they not have a justification to raise insurance rates even further, just like how they did when the OSFI raised mortgage insurance capital requirements?

* MIC’s data from the 2008-2009 economic crisis seemed to suggest that even in a sour economy that they can still make money.

* Genworth Financial’s 57% ownership in MIC is a big question mark considering the China Oceanwide merger process (that has been going on for over a year).

* What if MIC just said the following tomorrow: “We’ve stopped writing mortgage insurance. We will be letting our existing insurance book run to expiry and distribute the remaining free equity to shareholders.” – what is the terminal value of MIC in this case?

Closing Thoughts

I’ll be happy to let Tim Bergin borrow my shares of MIC if he wishes to short it. The market currently asks 2.4% for a borrow, plus 4.7% carrying costs for quarterly dividends.