Economics – Page 2

Interest rates controlling the key to everything

Most of the financial world tries to anticipate what actions Jerome Powell and the Federal Reserve decide to make with monetary policy.

For the past year, markets have been trying to anticipate the so-called “pivot”, i.e. the point in time where the Federal Reserve will stop raising interest rates and eventually lower them. The thinking is that lower costs of capital will usher in a new era of demand and we can party like it is 2009 with a rush of quantitative easing.

One problem, however, is there is a deeply psychological component to the inflation going on. The inflation expectation itself is a determinant of real interest rates. I’ll give a very simple example.

Let’s say the nominal interest rate is 5% and inflation is 2%. The real rate of interest is +3%.

However, if you expect inflation to be +4%, the real rate goes down to +1%.

The higher the inflation expectation, the lower the real rate.

An extreme example would be if you anticipated your currency turning into Argentinian paper, with a 50% inflation. Your real rate of interest goes very negative, very quickly and you suddenly will have a very large incentive to spend everything you can today.

We fast forward to today, where you still have the chairman of the Fed saying that inflation is too high. In Canada, Tiff Macklem more or less said as much.

There is the makings of a chaotic system. While nominal interest rates are elevated and real interest rates are still quite positive in relation to past norms, the inflation expectation (the Bank of Canada has referred to this as “entrenched expectations”) continues to render the effective real rate down, if not negative. However, market participants are anticipating a halt in the increase of nominal interest rates and the Fed Funds Futures suggests that there will be 100bps in cuts by the end of next year.

It is precisely this expectation of lower interest rates that is preventing the nominal increase of interest rates to have their desired effect by central banks. As a result, demand is still high because inflation expectations remain high – practically speaking, the real rate of interest in the minds of a lot of people is negative. When the purchasing power of your cash continues to erode, why not spend?

The chaos factor is anticipating when there will be a turnaround in expectation. Psychological whims are fickle – much more so than nominal interest rates.

To use a science analogy, the economy is feeling like a super-saturated solution – one minor intrusion away from reverting into another state of matter. I can’t anticipate when this will occur. However, when it does, it will be relatively swift. I don’t want to use the word “crash” to describe it, but there is a possibility, albeit I would not rank it as probable at the moment.

What are some defences to this scenario? Holding cash is good, although my gut instinct says it is a crowded trade. The trade is crowded enough that it will probably buffer the impact of lower prices. A scenario I see more likely is the long-term (10 year) risk-free rate rising to a point that suppresses equity valuations like a wet blanket on a campfire. Although this is hardly a scientific sample, stable royalty income trusts such as the Keg (TSX: KEG.un) have recently exhibited some degree of price contraction, likely due to the yield competition with cash. Why bother holding risky units in a steakhouse chain when you can just hold onto (TSX: CASH.to)? Is that truly worth a 250bps equity premium? It even looks worse for A&W (TSX: AW.un), which is at a 50bps premium at the moment. Maybe I should be shorting it!

Finally, let us not discount the slow impact of quantitative tightening. In Canada, we have $23.9 billion in government treasuries maturing on September 1, and another $558 million in mortgage bonds maturing on September 15. This is about 7.75% of the Bank of Canada’s balance sheet of treasuries and mortgage bonds. Funds parked at the Bank of Canada by banks remain plentiful, however – nearly $157 billion is still parked at the BoC at last glance. Credit is still available – you just have to pay a lot more for it.

Strange times

This is a post without much direction.

Canadian Macro

Perhaps the largest surprise to occur in the past two weeks was the Bank of Canada deciding to resume interest rate increases. I generally believe that this is an attempt to shake up complacency in the marketplace and that we are approaching the point of diminishing returns. By increasing future implied interest rate expectations, however, is in itself a form of interest rate increase. So we continue to have the triple barreled approach – actual rising interest rates, threatened future interest rates, and quantitative easing. Interest rates started rising on March 2, 2022 and we are about 15 months into the program. As capital hurdle rates have increased and projects that otherwise would have been initiated stall out, we’re probably going to start seeing this slowdown occur pretty soon.

The yield curve remains heavily inverted – right now you can get a 1yr GoC yield of 5.07%, while 10yr is 3.40%, a 167bps difference.

GST/HST inputs, from fiscal 2021-2022 to 2022-2023 (table 2), only rose 2.7% year-to-year, which is a negative real growth in GST-able consumption. This does not bode well overall.

I look at the inflation inputs and it seems intuitive that cost increases will continue to rise above the 2% benchmark – especially on shelter. The interest rate environment (in addition to other roadblocks) is seriously constraining supply, yet demand continues to remain sky-high (one of the effects of letting in a whole bunch of people into the country, including students, which massively raises rental rates in cities).

Inefficient spending

One of the problems of using GDP is that it doesn’t account for unproductive expenditures vs. productive expenditures. If you paid somebody a million dollars to move a pile of dirt from one location to another, and then back again, you would have a million dollars added to the GDP, but the wealth of the country has gone nowhere. That money could have been used for something more productive. If you get enough of this inefficient spending, it starts to show itself in other components of the economy – namely demand for goods/services that clearly are not being supplied because you’ve tasked too many people with moving piles of dirt from one location to another and back again. Those people could have been employed in another activity, say road building, which is a more skillful (and productive) use of moving dirt from one location to another.

It is pretty much the reason why much government spending is inefficient – it gets directed to segments of the economy which are for political purposes rather than productive purposes. Do this enough, and you eventually get inflationary effects in the things that people really need.

A lot of what we have seen over the past 15 years or so can likely be attributed to the cumulative effects of this. While governments are the chief culprit, the private sector as well has significant bouts of inefficient capital allocation (e.g. look at the value destruction in the cannabis sector, or most cryptocurrency ventures, etc.). The “slack” of the misdirection of resources has been exhausted after Covid, and the cumulative impact is truly obvious – a lot of people are going to suffer as a result, and collectively our standard of living will be declining.

Nifty 50 re-lived

The nifty 50 were the top 50 stocks in the US stock market in the 1970’s. Today, the top 10 stocks of the S&P 500 consist of about 30% of the index and many comments have been made about the effect of these stocks on the overall index. In particular, the rebound in technology stocks since November 2022 has caught many fund managers by surprise, and it is to the point where essentially if you did not own them (Facebook/Meta, Nvidia, etc.), most closet index fund managers would have badly underperformed. Perhaps it is sour grapes from somebody like myself (where I am barely treading water for the year), but this just does not look healthy.

Safe returns

Cash (various ETFs) return about 5.08% at the moment. For yield-based investors this is a very high hurdle. For example, looking at A&W Income Fund (TSX: AW.UN) with its stated yield of 5.3% – while you do get a degree of inflation protection, how much can burger prices rise before you start seeing volume slowdowns (and it is volume, not profitability that counts for these types of royalty companies)? Cash is out-competing much of the market right now. With every rise in the short-term interest rate, the differential widens.

Everybody looks at the charts of long-term treasury bonds in the early 1980’s and said to themselves “if only I had gone all-in on those 30-year government bonds yielding 15%, I would have made out like gangbusters”. This is almost the equivalent of saying your ideal timing into the stock market is February 2009, or March 23, 2020. The problem with such statements, other than they are entirely “hindsight is 20/20”, is that in order to get those 15% yields, such a bond needs to trade at 10%, 12%, 14%, etc., before reaching that 15% point. Valuations that would seem attractive and bought before that 15% yield point will have unrealized losses, sometimes significant, at the crescendo event. This is usually the point where most leveraged players are forced to be cashed out at the violent price action.

Parking cash is boring, and likely will result in the loss of purchasing power over periods of time (the CPI is a terrible barometer for ‘real’ consumer inflation), but better to lose 5% of purchasing power instead of 40% in a market crash!

Implied volatility

The so-called ‘fear gauge’ (the 1-month lookahead volatility of the S&P 500) is getting down to 2019 lows:

I don’t know what to make of this. Markets price surprises and probably the biggest surprise is a rip to the upside, despite all of the doom-and-gloom that the macro situation would otherwise suggest – perhaps interest rates are going to rise even further than most expect?

Either way, I’m not going to be a market hero. I remain very defensively postured and I do not feel like I have much of an edge at the moment. When you had everybody losing their heads over Covid three years ago there was a ripe moment where the reality vs. psychology mismatch created huge opportunities. Today, the normalization of this reality vs. psychology has created much more efficient market pricing. I can’t compete in this environment which feels like trading random noise. Maybe the AIs have whittled away the differential between reality and psychology – but they are only as good as the data that gets fed into them, and markets tend to exhibit random patterns of chaos now and then which will throw off the computers. So I wait.

If you ever wonder why I can’t work in an institutional environment, it is due to having some radical thoughts like the last paragraph.

TMX – How much does a pipeline cost?

Just reading the revelation that when the government manages a project, it will triple the cost that it should probably otherwise take to complete – the TMX expansion is running now at a $30 billion capital cost.

The government doesn’t care about the price tag – it’s just another reason to hand out the slush to favoured entities that managed to game the system. The government, despite being the owner of the project, actually doesn’t “pay” for these inflated costs! A simple economic analysis suggests that the pipeline will be so valuable as it is an inelastic service – the WCS differential to the USA vs. shipping it out to Asia will be very extreme, and this differential will be captured with pipeline tariffs. It will be the customers of the pipeline that are captive to the final cost – essentially CNQ, SU, CVE, etc. are paying another tax.

So how much does it cost to send oil out on the existing Transmountain? It is captured in the tolls and tariff bulletin.

A cubic meter of heavy oil from Edmonton to Westridge (just northwest of Simon Fraser University at the water) costs CAD$26, or about CAD$4.20 a barrel.

The TMX expansion will be increasing the flow of oil by 590,000 barrels a day. It is a guarantee that 100% of the available capacity of the pipeline will be utilized – there is simply too much demand for heavy oil to fuel the refineries in places like India, and companies will be able to receive near-Brent crude pricing on WCS.

590,000 barrels a day works out to 215 million barrels per year, assuming no pipeline outages (a false assumption – there will be maintenance periods which will eat into this amount). But let’s work with the theoretical maximum.

At the existing tariff, the incremental heavy crude will generate $900 million in revenues.

Now we look back at the TMX expansion. We have $30 billion in capital costs. Let’s assume the cost of capital is at 5% – pricing in a 180bps spread on “A” rated credit. That’s $1.5 billion/year in interest costs alone. (I am simplifying this considerably by ignoring the fact that there is some equity in the project, I am assuming it is entirely debt-funded – if you want to include equity returns, the revenues required goes even higher!).

In order to amortize this debt over the course of 30 years, the revenues that need to get applied directly to the debt is $1.9 billion a year. There are also other operating costs to running a pipeline (electricity, administration, maintenance, etc.), but the point is that they will need to collect at least double the rate than they are currently collecting in order to pay the debt on the capital costs.

I’m guessing with other administrative expenses baked in, you are looking at a tariff fee of CAD$9-10/barrel.

Brent is trading at US$75.50/barrel currently, while WTI is US$71.50 and WCS is US$51.

There’s about a US$20-24 differential that can be captured with an increased outlet to the Pacific.

However, at least CAD$5-6/barrel of that is going to get sucked up in pipeline costs due to the astronomical cost increases to construct the TMX expansion.

For comparison, the Enbridge Line 3 expansion cost about CAD$13 billion, and was 1000 miles in length. TMX is about 700 miles in length and is projected to cost CAD$30 billion. While the mountainous terrain is of course more difficult to work with, this is by no means a total mitigating factor the account for the cost differential – it is mostly a function of regulatory compliance, all entirely by design – the government does not have to pay for it.

If TMX was constructed for half as much, the incremental profits would go to the shareholders of the oil producers (minus the various taxes and royalties). However, in this instance, the surplus mostly goes to whoever was awarded the contracts – essentially another form of government spending that is “off balance sheet”. Sadly, this happens all the time, and is another example of how spending (which increases the GDP) does not necessarily generate productivity (the actual value you get by spending).

Progression of quantitative tightening

Bank of Canada, projected QT by year, assuming they maintain the existing trajectory:

2023 Bank of Canada Quantitative Tightening Schedule

Snapshot from January 9, 2023
Government of Canada Bonds ($368.3 billion) and Canada Mortgage Bonds ($7.7 billion)

Year	Amount	Pct
2023	$89,864,250,000	24%
2024	$55,880,720,000	15%
2025	$44,235,821,000	12%
2026	$37,432,059,000	10%
2027	$14,158,340,000	4%
2028+	$134,419,469,000	36%

US Federal Reserve, treasury bonds, with some annotations:

And, here is another important chart:

Covid masked up (intentional use of language!) what was probably going to be a recession. The overnight rate crisis was a huge signal that something was wrong in the financial world liquidity-wise and required the intervention of the Fed to keep things steady.

Today, the environment is different. The issue is that there is a general sense of foreboding. If this is sufficiently baked into pricing, then it will become a non-issue compared to the unknown unknowns that are not priced in (which could resolve to the better or worse).

However, one reason why I focus on the progression of QT is because it reflects the extinguishment of credit. There’s a couple analogies for this. One is slowly taking oxygen out of a room. Another is a poker analogy, which I will use the reverse – quantitative easing: imagine you are forced to play poker (a zero sum game) with a lot of other participants (every other person in the economy), but the dealer is consistently giving out chips to people (more chips go to the “preferred” participants such as government-connected entities). Eventually handing out these chips will permeate around the table (more likely to yourself if you demonstrate some skilled play in relation to the rest of the competition). With QT, the poker analogy is increasing the amount of “rake” (the amount of chips removed per game as a house take) and a logical consequence of this is that people (and asset prices) should become tighter.

These (QT, interest rates) are knowns, but when does it get to the point where things structurally blow up? Does it? This line of thinking would also suggest that fixed income should do better than not – although let me tell you, the prospect of lending the Government of Canada money for 30 years at 3.12% is distinctly unappealing.

Canadian monetary aggregates for the year

The last snapshot of money supply is at the beginning of October 2022, but the trend is fairly obvious:

In particular, M2++ (the broadest form of money supply measurement) has gone from $4.392 trillion at the beginning of the year to $4.467 trillion on October 1, 2022. The growth is still positive but definitely shrinking – 1.7% for the first 9 months of the year. Indeed, the September 1 to October 1 snapshot showed a mild contraction.

This chart should not be surprising. The expansion of credit is reversing and the last time the country was really in this sort of situation from a monetary perspective was back in 1995.

1995 was an interest year from Canadian economic history. Perhaps refreshing one’s memory via a 2001 speech of the Government of the Bank of Canada at the time will assist.

This is going to make 2023 quite an interesting year.