Unloading illiquid shares

Just a side note in the portfolio, I unloaded the last 100 shares of a company that was relatively illiquid (market cap under $20 million). The algorithmic order I set was placed in early October and the execution finished today.

The whole trade (in and out) ended up losing the portfolio less than 2%, but obviously the story after the investment was made changed which triggered my exit order. Getting in and out of illiquid stocks is a real pain, and unless if the potential risk-reward ratio is disproportionate, such transactions should be valued explicitly with a discount acknowledging the lack of liquidity.

Throughout my history my dabbling in illiquid stocks has been less than spectacular – my sweet spot of investing has tended to be small cap stocks ($100M-$1B capitalization) instead of microcaps.

Lululemon again

Lululemon (Nasdaq: LULU) is up to US$61/share, nearly at its all-time high upon announcing that it made more money in the fourth quarter than analysts expected.

I have written about LULU before and am continually amazed at their ability to “surprise” in such a fashion. The most valuable asset such companies have is their branding, and LULU has been able to strike the sweet spot in women’s fashions for quite some time – although there is competition encroaching, they have still been able to keep surprisingly ahead.

At a market cap of 8.8 billion, it makes you wonder how much higher they can go – looking at what that capital can purchase, instinctively I would not want to put a single penny of that into Lulu given existing valuations. That said, I thought the same thing when it was trading at $4 billion. Tells you know much I know about fashion trends.

A reminder on yield chasing

One other conviction that I have compared to the host of “I don’t know”s I gave in my 2011 year end report is that everybody is chasing yield. In a low interest rate environment, capital is shifting towards securities that can spin off safe income – just imagine if you are a pension fund manager and need a targeted return – formerly you could bank on 30-year treasury bonds giving you a ~6% yield in the first five years of the century, but the zero interest rate policy has pushed down yields to currently 3%. If your mandate is to make 8%, formerly if you had a 50/50 bond/equity allocation you would need to make 6% on the bonds and 10% on the equity. With bond yields presently at 3%, the same allocation forces you to make 13% on equity – a much more difficult task for a fund manager. Suddenly placing bets on that speculative pharmaceutical research firm seems to make financial sense.

How do you make up the yield difference on the fixed income side? By investing in treasury bond-like securities and this means climbing up the risk spectrum – provincial/state debt, municipal debt, corporate debentures, and even preferred shares.

Everybody is chasing yield and prices today reflect this. Just be warned that the markets might face a Europe-type situation where the underlying entity no longer can pay out such cash flows – even when European banks are getting interest-free loans, they are still choosing to put their capital into safer 10-year German bonds at 1.9% compared to Italian debt (7.15% currently). Measuring the ability of corporations and sovereign states to actually pay the income is always a vital calculation. As the cliche goes, it is about return of investment, not return on investment.

This could be an explanation why certain large cap stocks are trading at very low P/E ratios – albeit, it makes no difference (taxation differential between dividends and capital gains notwithstanding) whether a corporation makes a 10% after-tax return and retains it, or gives it out in a dividend. Somebody would look at both companies and likely favour the one actually giving out the dividend. The true answer is whether the company can deploy its retained capital as profitably.

The opportunities presenting themselves currently seem to be very narrow and opportunistic and off the radar. It’s not like buying shares of Starbucks under $10/share back during the economic crisis.

Petrobakken trying to find the cash

On December 13, 2011, Petrobakken (TSX: PBN) released more information with respect to their 2012 plans and numbers.

The two salient snippets are as follows:

We are also pleased to announce our initial capital plan for 2012, which allow us to build on our 2011 operational success. We anticipate capital development expenditures of approximately $700 million, primarily focused on horizontal drilling and completions, predominantly in the Bakken and Cardium light oil plays. We expect that this drilling-focused activity will generate a 2012 exit production rate of between 50,000 and 54,000 boepd. Our estimated year-over-year average production growth will exceed 15%, on an absolute and per-share basis. We expect this initial 2012 program to be executed entirely from funds from operations, with surplus cash flow available to fund dividends and debt repayment.

For 2012 we estimate that our corporate base decline rate will be in the range of 30-35%. In 2010, our base production declined approximately 40%, while the 2011 base decline rate is now forecast at approximately 35%. We have been encouraged by the results of our recently completed wells, and we are also beginning to see the benefit of the continued maturation of our producing assets with a significant proportion of our production now coming from older, shallower decline, horizontal wells.

As part of our ongoing balance sheet management, and to reward continuing support from existing shareholders, we are pleased to announce the implementation of a DRIP. The DRIP provides eligible holders of common shares resident in Canada the opportunity to reinvest their monthly cash dividends in PetroBakken shares at a 5% discount to the then current market prices. Petrobank (59% shareholder of the Company) has indicated an intention to participate in the DRIP with respect to 50% of their PetroBakken shares, which will amount to $53 million in additional liquidity to the Company on an annual basis. Subject to the receipt of approval of the Toronto Stock Exchange, the DRIP will be implemented for the January 2012 dividend, which is payable in mid-February 2012. Additional information regarding the DRIP can be found below.

The company is planning on spending $700M in capex in 2012, which is a decrease from projected 2011 capex numbers of $900M. The capital budget for 2012 will be slightly below their operating cash flow for the year, assuming current oil prices remain steady (a 12-month extrapolation of 2011 figures for the first nine months is $650M, noting that WTIC prices were lower then than they are now).

It still leaves one wondering when the company is actually going to generate significant amounts of cash in excess of capital expenditures – when you add the $180M of dividends projected in 2012 (minus the ~$53M that Petrobank will re-invest for Petrobakken equity), it does not leave much for them to pay off their February 2013 debenture, which holders have a one-day put option to redeem (and given the small coupon and the credit profile of the company, they most certainly will unless if there is a sweetener given to them in the interim).

The DRIP decision in itself is rather interesting – it effectively starves half the cash flow that Petrobank will receive from Petrobakken in exchange for further equity. Since Petrobank owns 59% of Petrobakken, it will result in Petrobank foregoing $53M/year in dividends in exchange for further equity. Assuming a $13/share price for Petrobakken, this will mean Petrobakken will issue 4.3M shares to Petrobank over 2012 – a cost of capital of 7.8% for Petrobakken, assuming the dividend is not cut. This is expensive capital for the company.

The company has hedged a significant amount of oil (20,000 boepd, about 40% of its expected production) with existing high prices which I think is a smart decision. Still, they are extremely leveraged and their only salvation is continued high oil prices. If there is any significant contraction in the price of oil, they will be in clear financial difficulty, especially when it comes to negotiating with the $750M debenture that is effectively due in February of 2013.