Alibaba IPO – thoughts

If you ever had any thoughts of investing in Alibaba (NYSE: BABA), I will just summarize it in this following chart:

94-047

The most relevant footnotes are as follows:

(1) Includes approximately 70 subsidiaries and consolidated entities incorporated in China and approximately 120 subsidiaries incorporated in other jurisdictions that are not illustrated in this chart. In addition, the entities pictured in this chart hold, directly and indirectly, an aggregate of approximately 40 additional subsidiaries and consolidated entities incorporated in China and approximately 40 additional subsidiaries incorporated outside of China not pictured in the chart.
(7) Each of these variable interest entities is 80%-owned by Jack Ma and 20%-owned by Simon Xie, other than Zhejiang Taobao Network Co., Ltd., which is 90%-owned by Jack Ma and 10%-owned by Simon Xie.

Good luck figuring out what is beyond the first layer of the corporation and what these variable interest entities are all about. I am reasonably sure insiders will do quite well as long as they are continued to be sanctioned by the state.

Make no mistake – Alibaba is an incredible commercial operation on the level of Ebay and lesser to Amazon, but the people that are going to get rich out of this operation are not going to be the people investing in Alibaba Group Holdings Limited (Cayman Islands) common shares.

Signs of a crash coming up

I don’t like using this sort of language (mainly predicting a crash), but the following are some tea leaves that I am reading in the teacup:

* The market has completely baked in the fact that the money spigots from the Federal Reserve is coming to a close. Yields are rising (take a look at the Bank of Canada).

* Speculative issues (specifically on housing, and small-cap venture type firms) are getting dumped away. Just look at the TSX Venture, or anything resource-based on the TSX (including most commodity issues).

* Likewise, leveraged financial products (e.g. most REITs, financials) are trading down. For example, Genworth MI (TSX: MIC) has traded down over the past month from its highs of about $40/share (where I was fortunate enough to get rid of a bunch of it). I will be able to attribute this due to the implied real estate market risk in Canada, combined with an anticipated increase in interest rates. Compared to the financing firms (HCG, EQB), I would view mortgage insurance as being relatively better in terms of continuing to provide earnings and cash flows. Tangible book value is $34.11 from the previous quarter so the company is still not a huge bargain at present prices.

* The strength in the US currency is now starting to weigh in on commodity prices and this is not good for Canada’s economy in general.

* Liquidity appears to be entirely centered around large cap issues.

So here are some general ideas with the assumption that you’re going to bank on a market crash (or less dramatically, a correction):

* Volatility futures – I bring to your attention the following 3-year chart of the VIX, which is correlated deeply to the implied volatility you get on short-dated S&P 500 index futures:

vix

Be warned that it is not unusual for this index to be well below 20 for extended periods of time (e.g. a long-dated chart is here).

* Buying puts on the Russell 2000 (IWM). If there is a flight to liquidity, almost by definition less liquid small-cap issues are going to receive the brunt of increased demand to offload them into the marketplace, resulting in lower prices.

You do pay for this, however – a January 2015 at-the-money put on the Russell 2000 is at about 18% implied volatility, while the S&P 500 is at 12%. The S&P 400 midcap (considerably less liquid) is around 14.5%.

* Buying long-dated treasury futures.

* Or even more conservatively, just holding onto plain old cash and brace for impact.

In general, it appears that we’re headed to some sort of decompression of the utilization of leverage, which will have ripple effects.

Fine-tuning the operations of a restaurant

One of the more interesting SEC filings I’ve gone through lately is that of Starboard Value, who is attempting to replace the board of directors of Darden Restaurants (NYSE: DRI).

I will warn you this is a 130 megabyte download, but a very educational one that makes me appreciate the complexity of operating a restaurant business (something I would never want to do).

One example is the following slide. Apparently they don’t put salt in the water they use to boil pasta because it will invalidate the warranty they have on their cooking pots. This is amazing to hear simply because anybody that has half a brain in the kitchen knows to salt the water that you cook pasta with. Not only does it marginally increase the temperature of the boiling water, but it imparts better flavour on the pasta itself.

Image1

I’ve been to an Olive Garden once in my life and never felt the need to ever return.

Blackberry making a comeback?

I’ve written before about Blackberry (TSX: BB), but with a relatively large difference: I’ve been using a Q10 (the one with the keyboard) for a few months.

My mobile phone usage patters are relatively spartan, but I needed something with a keyboard on it. There was amazingly few options to choose from, so I picked up a Blackberry since it was the only thing available in Canada. I also do not feel compelled to be locked into a cell phone plan (which are all considerably more expensive than what I have presently, so would be functionally deferring the payment of the hardware device in the form of monthly cell plan payments), so I picked an unlocked phone for CAD$299 directly from Blackberry’s site. Surprisingly, the phone came a couple days after clicking on the purchase through FedEx. I also had concerns regarding second-hand phones (mainly that they were stolen and their IMEI would be blocked) and thus didn’t feel compelled to go down that route.

My previous phone could only be described as a very basic messaging phone that ran a proprietary Samsung operating system (not Android). It did the job until its touchscreen decided to slowly crap out. I have had little experience with the iPhone other than borrowing a friend’s on occasion. With Android (which is currently the world’s most popular mobile operating system), I do use it with a tablet, but only have used it with a phone on very rare occasion.

My quick no-BS review of the Blackberry Q10 is as follows: Once you get used to the user interface, it is a surprisingly good phone. It does a very good job of email and text management, especially how it consolidates multiple email accounts. Battery life is very lengthy, to the point that one generally doesn’t think about it. The browser is fine (although not a replica of what you would see on the tablet), but the relatively large drawback is the smaller screen (which is the tradeoff of having a keyboard). When turning off data, the Wi-fi function works seamlessly well with the rest of the phone. It is an incredibly functional device and a very large step up from what I previously had.

I generally do not use many other external applications. This is probably why I don’t mind the phone, while others seem to have a need to access the millions of pieces of junk software out there that are available to download (Candy Crush, etc, etc.) on Android. Curiously, the one Android application that I found is a “killer app” (which is an offline mapping application) works perfectly on Blackberry. It was shockingly seamless to get onto the phone and operate.

I will now discuss the investment analysis of Blackberry. Despite the fact that they are going to launch another (larger) phone with a keyboard, it will not materially matter for the company. The mobile phone market has well progressed beyond the stage where hardware no longer matters, and everything is about software.

The analogy is very similar to when personal computers (PCs) were hitting the mass market, and the bulk of the profit margins were not made with the hardware makers (Hewlett Packard, Compaq, Gateway and Dell), but rather the software makers (Microsoft functionally winning the winner-take-all market of operating system and office suite, while the rest were left with the scraps).

The mobile phone market has considerable differences to the PC analogy.

One is that it doesn’t matter what software the phone is running, they will all connect to the cellular network. All the major operating systems have basic functionality (email processing, text messaging, phone calls, contact list management, web browsing) that all perform roughly equivalent to each other. Other than consumer taste (or in the case of Apple, an element of positional good), there is little difference between the choices in terms of functionality. The big difference between the three is the ancillary services that they are able to offer. iPhone offers the Apple ecosystem. Android offers the Google ecosystem. Blackberry offers no real ecosystem, but allows access to the Android market.

Unlike Microsoft Windows during the days when operating systems mattered (if you didn’t run it, you couldn’t access anything that made your computer productive unless if you were into Unix), mobile operating systems matter a lot less and thus their relative market power is reduced. The application market (and choice) is a somewhat relevant consideration on the mobile end, but much less so than 20 years ago when Microsoft Office was the killer product. Today, there would be a “killer product” if only one offering had a functional web browser and had a huge patent moat to prevent others from getting it, but clearly that is not the case.

Apple and Google are going to have to figure out how to prevent mobile carriers from extracting most of the economic value out of the market, but this is another topic for another day.

The point of this post is that Blackberry could come out with the best hardware phone on the planet, and it will not make much difference on their profit margin because mobile phone hardware has more or less become commoditized like PCs were about 15 years ago. Instead, the money is to be made on the software end and the sale of ancillary services.

In Blackberry’s case, this comes in the form of providing business-level integration with corporate information systems. I am not sure how they are going to make this as profitable as it once was, but there is likely a market to be made considering that Android and iPhone were not designed with corporate concerns in mind (e.g. security is often-cited, although it remains to be seen how Blackberry can restore its reputation after giving its keys away to the government of India a few years ago). Another platform which they clearly have an advantage with is the issuance and tracking management of corporate-owned mobile devices.

The QNX operating system unit does have potential with embedded systems (e.g. automobiles and other devices), but this is mostly under the radar.

Finally, BBM is often cited as having value, and in an era where Snapchat and Whatsapp can fetch billion-dollar valuations, there would surely be some market value ascribed to an instant messaging network (although if you ask me, there is far less than what the market valuations would suggest).

So in terms of raw valuation, while Blackberry is going to launch a major new product this month, I very much doubt that it will lead to bottom line improvement. This would come elsewhere in the company’s pipeline. I suspect the new CEO, John Chen, realizes this, but also knows that public perception is an integral part of restoring Blackberry’s credibility, and this includes having good hardware to support the software that will be generating the actual profits.

So at CAD$11.80 or a $6.2 billion market cap, is this a buy or a sell? Too tough to say at present. I was thinking about it earlier this year at CAD$8 (which my gut-feeling suggests is a low, but not ridiculously low valuation for the technology pieces), but did not pull the trigger.