Technical analysis of gold

Here is a chart of spot gold prices over the past 6 months. I have added in three “trendlines” to the chart, which was a rough hack job:

For technical analysis fans, here are some questions:

1. Is it a foregone conclusion that gold will continue rising, or at least no lower than $1260, plus a few dollars each day?
2. If so, what is the proper trendline to use?

Technical analysis also suggests that if the trendline “breaks” that you can no longer assume the trendline exists, and that there is some other trend that is occurring. How do you figure this stuff out without using the chart as a retrospective explanation?

The only reason why I look at charts is a measure of sentiment over time, rather than trying to derive future prices from chart movement.

How capital gains taxes impact investment decisions

There are four ways that investments are directly taxed in Canada:

1. Interest income – treated as fully taxed income;
2. Eligible Dividend income – treated as income multiplied by a gross-up factor (2010: 44%, 2011: 41%, 2012: 38%), and the net amount is reduced by a dividend tax credit (2010: 25.88% of actual dividend);
3. Non-Eligible Dividend income – treated as income multiplied by a gross-up factor (25%), and the net amount is reduced by a (lower) dividend tax credit (2010: 16.6667% of actual dividend);
4. Capital gains taxes – taxed at half the rate as ordinary income.

For this post, I will just concentrate on capital gains.

The cost basis of an investment should only be considered in the context of taxation. In all other circumstances, fair market value must be considered. The only value that the cost basis of your investment has is with respect to how much of a penalty (for gains) or reward (for losses) you will incur if you dispose of it. In a registered account (e.g. RRSP/TFSA), the cost basis of an investment is irrelevant.

Let’s take a hypothetical investment between two securities. Security ABC is a perpetual bond, paying $10 per unit. Security DEF is a perpetual bond of the same issuer, with substantively the same seniority/call provisions as ABC, paying $8 per unit. Your marginal rate (to make the math easy) is 50%.

Let’s pretend you bought ABC for $80, netting a pre-tax yield of 12.5% and after-tax yield of 6.25%. If ABC is now trading at $100/share, what price does DEF have to be in order for the decision to be a net positive? Assume frictionless trading costs, and capital gains taxes are payable immediately upon disposal.

I will answer this in a non-algebraic format to make this “readable”:

Step 1: Calculate how much capital you have at work. The answer is $100, not $80.
Step 2: Calculate how much capital you will have at work after disposal. Since your gain is $20, you will be taxed 50% of $10, which is $5. So the answer is $95 of capital.
Step 3: Factor in the yield differential. For this to be a break-even transaction, your $95 in after-tax dollars must equal the income of the prior portfolio, mainly $10. $10/$95 = 10.53%, so you must buy DEF below $76/unit in order for your transaction to make financial sense.

Note that if the market was efficient, when you bought ABC at $80/unit, you were receiving a 12.5% pre-tax yield. At this same time, DEF should have been trading at $64/unit. So when ABC appreciated 25% to $100/unit, DEF should have appreciated 25% to $80/unit. Instead, the frictional cost of the capital gains tax has required the optimal re-allocation of capital to $76/unit. If DEF, for example, was trading at $78/unit, it would be capital-efficient to swap out of ABC to DEF on a pre-tax basis (ABC = 10.0% pre-tax, DEF = 10.26% pre-tax), but not an after-tax basis.

This is why capital gains taxes result in capital mis-allocation. The larger the capital gain tax, the higher the mis-allocation. It gives investors an incentive to hold onto winning investments longer than they should.

Note this argument works in the other direction – if you had a capital loss situation on ABC, you would have received an incentive for purchasing a less efficient DEF to capture the proceeds of the capital loss despite taking a lesser percent yield.

The Canadian Dollar see-saw

Attached is a chart of the last six months of trading of the Canadian dollar, relative to the US dollar:

One issue I have with technical trading is that in retrospect it is obvious there are “trends” and “momentum” factors as participants try to load up (or dump) the product in question, but when does the party end? Today? Tomorrow? Next week? How will you know the party ends? Right now, “sell at 98, buy at 95″ seems to be the optimal algorithm. We will see if that’s the case or not.

Even though I’ve got exposure to both currencies, I will only be watching this from a distance. It’s very difficult to know whether the Canadian dollar is “fairly” valued or not – how do you even begin to construct a fundamental model? This is why a lot of currency traders are primarily technical – hop on the bandwagon, and hope others are still keeping the cart going before you dump your trade.

Why I will never invest in China

John Hempton has a classic story of his research on an “online” travel agency.

My rule of “Never invest in a jurisdiction that does not have English as its primary language” holds very, very true. I am sure there are a lot of wildly profitable companies in China, just that you can be absolutely sure that minority shareholders’ interests (i.e. the suckers that buy a few hundred shares to have a “China play”) will never be in alignment with the board of directors or management. In this particular case, UTA looks great on paper, but is likely their accounting and reporting is completely crooked.

In their last 10-K filing, you even had the auditors (a firm I’ve never heard of in New Jersey) saying in their audit letter the following:

A material weakness is a deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, in internal control over financial reporting, such that there is a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the company’s annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis. The following material weaknesses were identified:

The Company’s policy documentation of all controls identified during their assessment and remediation process was incomplete.

Lack of technical accounting expertise among financial staff regarding US GAAP and the requirements of the PCAOB, and regarding preparation of financial statements.

These material weaknesses were considered in determining the nature, timing, and extent of audit tests applied in our audit of the 2009 consolidated financial statements of the Company as of and for the year ended December 31, 2009.

Translation: “We have no idea whether these guys were lying to us when they provided us with alledged ‘proof’ of the revenues, expenses and balance sheet items you see here. Good luck!”

Suffice to say, I wonder if Hempton (who has probably made a small fortune shorting this thing earlier when the stock was trading higher before writing this huge article on the company) will be able to single-handedly get the stock delisted when his 2,200 readers (at least according to Google Reader) eventually hammer the stock down to the zero it probably deserves.

Just for full disclosure, I am not long or short the stock, nor do I plan on trading the stock. Trading from other people’s research is a great way to lose money – capturing real value in the market is done by performing independent research when nobody else is watching.

You get what you pay for… sometimes

An article (link) on the proliferation of finance-related sites on the internet offering all sorts of advice.

My only comment on this is that you get what you pay for. And even if you pay for it, sometimes you still don’t get what you pay for.

Your only real defense is to be able to ask critical questions and be able to correctly evaluate the people you deal with.

As for the internet, I have a high aversion to people that do not use their real names. A few anonymous sites out there are fairly well written, but when you attach your name to your writing, you are telling the world out there that you are willing to risk your reputation with your written word.

Ally doesn’t inspire confidence

I’ve written about Ally before and for the most part they have performed in a minimalistic manner, which is what they should be doing. They still have a fairly high short term savings rate (2.00%) and this is only overshadowed by a couple other obscure institutions offering 2.1%.

On their high interest savings page, I saw the following:

So is it 2% or 1.75%? I logged into my account and indeed, it was 2%.

Stuff like this makes me look at the CDIC page and read out the following passage to myself:

CDIC automatically insures many types of savings against the failure of a bank or financial institution that is a CDIC member. However, NOT all savings are insured and CDIC deposit insurance does not protect against fraud, theft or scam.

I’m really beginning to wonder if a bank failure was caused by fraud whether that would count. I don’t think it is the case for Ally, which is owned by ResMor Trust Company. In the USA, the Ally brand used to be backed by the General Motors Acceptance Corporation, while in Canada, ResMor Trust Company is a mortgage firm – very similar to ING Direct’s business model except that ING Direct uses the same name for both savings and loans.

LuluLemon’s second quarter

Headlines are being made that Lululemon (Nasdaq: LULU) beat earnings expectations and raised income estimates for the year. Their common shares were up about 13% today after their second quarter report.

Most of what I wrote about Lululemon, in terms of share valuation back in June 10, 2010 (when they announced their first quarter results) applies today – the company will have to execute high growth perfectly in order to justify their existing valuation.

It should be pointed out that despite their second quarter surprise, their valuation around the same ($2.8-$2.9 billion) as it was when I wrote my June 10 article, or about USD$40/share. They will need to continue achieving rapid growth in order to grow into the existing valuation. If not, you will see a significant haircut in the stock price.

Lululemon is a classic case of a well-run company that you do not want to own stock in.

Competition on the mortgage front

I notice that a certain local credit union is advertising a 5-year fixed mortgage rate at 3.45%, which is a very low rate considering it is about 125bps above government benchmark bond rates. Since the overnight rate is now 1%, they will not be making much margin on the transaction. This also implies they have confidence in the price stability of the local real estate market, and being in the Greater Vancouver area, makes you wonder whether this is a valid assumption.

Something that is not easily discovered is their loan criteria – for example, if getting such a rate required a 40% down payment, then the rate might be warranted since the bank would have recourse and recovery in the event of a mortgage default.

Looking at the variable rate market, the best rate I can find is 0.85% below prime (prime is currently 3.00%), but if other institutions are over-capitalized, this discount to prime will continue to increase as they compete for loans. It makes you wonder whether consumer demand for debt has slowed down.

If you put a gun to my head and forced me to choose a mortgage that would result in the lowest interest paid over a 5 year term, I would still go for the variable rate. However, that said, 5-year mortgage rates cannot go much lower than 3.45% – maybe down to 3%, but that’s about it before you really question the sanity of financial institutions offering loans at that rate.

There is some risk of short term rates rising even further in 2011 and 2012, but it doesn’t seem like such movement would be extreme if it did occur. For financial modeling purposes, the market is saying that the 2011 increase will be 0.43%. There are scenarios where this rate could skyrocket, and also scenarios where the short term rate goes back to 0.25% again (where sitting on a prime minus 0.85% mortgage is really inexpensive!).

Relative debt pricing – Yield and Quality

Noticed that AON Corporation (NYSE: AON), which is a financially stable and large insurance broker, issued some debt to fund a $1.5 billion dollar takeover of another corporation:

Of these notes, $600 million will mature on September 30, 2015 and bear interest at a fixed annual rate of 3.50 percent; $600 million will mature on September 30, 2020 and bear interest at a fixed annual rate of 5.00 percent; and $300 million will mature on September 30, 2040 and bear interest at a fixed annual rate of 6.25 percent. The offering is expected to close on September 10, 2010.

They have a convenient 5-year, 10-year and 30-year maturity, which compared to the US treasury bond is a spread of 2.05%, 2.35% and 2.52%, respectively compared to the closing quotes in September 8, 2010. AON is receiving very cheap debt financing, and the bonds were rated BBB+, although one can see by a quick look at AON’s financial statements that despite the takeover (which is roughly a $5 billion purchase, half cash, half stock that dilutes shareholders by about 20%) they should still be generating sufficient cash to pay off the debt.

So let’s pretend you are owning some 30-year corporate debt in a less solvent entity (e.g. QWest) and have a yield to maturity of 7.5% on a similar bond. Do you trade 1.25% of yield in exchange for higher credit quality? Or do you think the macro environment (e.g. the risk-free rate) will turn hostile to long bond yields and both assets will depreciate? Very difficult to say.