Coffee competition

Tim Horton’s (TSX: THI) is finally getting into the latte race with Starbucks and McDonalds.

By coffee, we are differentiating between two separate products:
1. Drip-coffee: Served everywhere. Most corporate offices have a “coffee machine” that does this. Typically, a bag of pre-ground coffee is opened and put into a coffee filter and hot water is run through it to produce coffee. Add some cream and sugar for taste (which is usually required to diffuse the generally mediocre quality that is produced) and you have a product. Sold for about $1.20/cup at McDonalds and about $2/cup at Starbucks.

2. Espresso-coffee: Whole coffee beans are ground at the moment of preparation, compressed into discs, and hot water with pressure is run through these “espresso pucks” that deliver a few ounces of coffee-infused water. This is mixed typically with milk to produce lattes and cappuccinos. This has been Starbucks’ domain for a very long time, but McDonalds recently and today Tim Hortons have been getting into the game. Sold for about $4-4.50/cup at Starbucks and about a dollar less at McDonalds.

In terms of costing, the making of espresso has been transformed into a push-button system with the advent of automated espresso machines. You can buy one at Costco or any other place that sells appliances; a good quality automatic espresso maker will set you back over a thousand dollars (e.g. DeLonghi). Disclosure: I own one of these machines – once you get one, it is very difficult reverting back to regular drip coffee!

The preparation of espresso requires somewhat more product (beans in proportion to the liquid produced) and milk, but otherwise espresso products are very high margin which would explain the major players getting into that space.

I am not sure this is such a smart business decision on Tim Horton’s part, mainly because the target demographic for Tim Hortons is different than that of Starbucks. McDonalds also got into the market recently and I do not believe it was a good decision for them either – it muddles up their product offering. I should also disclose that I have not tried a latte at McDonalds or Tim Hortons, but eventually I should get down to doing some “product research” of my own to see how it compares to my own homemade product.

One other side note is that I generally stopped going into Tim Hortons when they reverted from fresh-made doughnuts to pre-frozen doughnuts. The product quality generally went downhill from that point forward as they tried to corporatize and make their operations into a more consistent manner – they likely determined that making fresh doughnuts caused too much variability between individual franchises.

My last note is that if Tim Hortons really wanted to compete in this market, they should price the product as the same or ever so slightly higher than their regular drip coffee.

Yellow Media Q3 projections

Here are some estimates regarding benchmarking Thursday’s earnings report for Yellow Media.

(2011 / 2010 / % change)
For the 6-month period of 2011 vs. 2010, we have:
Revenues: $692.1M / $699.8M / -1%
EBIDTA: $366.5M / $402.6M / -9%
Cash Flow from Ops: $199.6M / $293.5M / -32%
Adjusted free cash flow: $206.2M / $273.2M / -25%

For the 3-month period of Q2-2011 vs. Q2-2010, we have:
Revenues: $342.7M / $360.1M / -5%
EBIDTA: $176.5M / $204.0M / -13%
Cash Flow from Ops: $87.9M / $165.8M / -47%
Adjusted free cash flow: $89.2M / $136.2M / -35%

It is this deviation from the above two that show an accelerating decay in projected cash flows. Specifically the EBITDA number is going to be an easy way of determining a hit or a miss – if this number exhibits accelerated decay beyond -17% or so from Q3-2010, then this will not be a “good thing”.

Readers should also be advised that recent releases of information include the impact of the Trader Corporation disposal such that revenues and cash flows from prior statements are not directly comparable without doing digging in the proper documents.

Specifically, Q3-2010 results excluding Trader Corporation is revenues of $355.9M and EBITDA of $193.2M.

So with that, we have the following for Q3-2011:

Better than expected – EBITDA of $175.8M or above;
Worse than expected – EBITDA of $160.4M or below.

Brace for impact.

Yellow Media Q3-2011 release

Investors are likely skittish with the upcoming release of Yellow Media’s (TSX: YLO) quarterly results. When looking at the other earnings release dates this year, we had the following results:

February 10, 2011: YLO lost -0.33%; common shares were $6.09 at the previous close and $6.07 at the close.
May 5, 2011: YLO gained 1.58%; common shares were $4.44 at the previous close and $4.51 at the close.
August 4, 2011: YLO lost -43.30%; common shares were $1.94 at the previous close and $1.10 at the close (went as low as $0.72 four trading days later);
November 3, 2011: Common shares are $0.33 at the close of November 1 trading.

I’m guessing the selling we have been seeing in the last few days is consolidation and profit-taking after the huge run-up the stock had over the past month – it has gone from a low of 12.5 cents up to 61 cents. Preferred shares and debentures are also trading implicitly with the assumption that the company faces a high chance of going into creditor protection sometime in 2013 (which is fair considering this is the maturity of their credit facility and the beginning of the maturities for their Medium Term Notes).

Investors already know there is going to be a huge write-down ($2.9 billion) of goodwill, which will create a headline of a multi-billion dollar loss for the company. Major media outlets will probably want to report on this large headline number. However, investors must look strictly at the cash flow statement and determine whether the operating entity is generating cash that will ultimately be servicing the debt. The decay of this number will determine whether the market is likely to be correct (i.e. good luck refinancing) or whether the company can exceed low expectations (a decrease in the cash flow decay). The logical consequence of the scenario where the cash flow decline is stemmed is that they will continue paying preferred dividends and be able to chip away at their debt.

Again, this is a high risk, very high reward type scenario in the event that the company can stop the bleeding.

Yellow Media preferred differentials

As I pointed out earlier, there was a significant yield differential between Yellow Media preferred shares C and D (TSX: YLO.PR.C and YLO.PR.D). The market has closed this gap now to about 0.7% if you use the most generous bid-ask spread quotations (e.g. the ask on the C’s vs. the bid on the D’s).

The common shares have gone on a massive surge over the past couple weeks, and this has translated into strong gains for those that have held their noses and accumulated positions during the meltdown.

The closest analogy I can think of what is happening is what happened to Telus (TSX: T) back in 2002 when the whole market dumped them down to $3.50/share for no real reason other than that they had a lot of debt and old-school telecom was on its way out.

Common shareholders face the most risk and will receive the most reward in a favourable scenario, but preferred shareholders will also come out very well and continue to receive income.

Of course this can all blow up if the next quarterly report is adverse. However, you would think after inking their last credit facility that they would have had some sort of visibility on their results to prevent an early default.

Yellow Media Update

Yellow Media (TSX: YLO) common shares have climbed up from their ultimate low of 12.5 cents on October 3, 2011 to 32 cents presently. There has been no news from them other than a press release stating they have been named one of Canada’s top 100 employers for the 6th year running.

Instead, this appears to be a matter of the stock being taken down to the basement level by a stampede of funds trying to desperately get out. Now that anybody that wanted to get out did, supply in the market seems to have been alleviated and the price is now rising.

The business fundamentals remain the same after a month – the company is highly leveraged, but is cash flow positive and has a feasible plan to paying off its debt through internal operations assuming the revenue decay is not too extreme.

Preferred shares continue to trade strangely, with the Series 3 (TSX: YLO.PR.C) trading with a yield about 4.5% higher than Series 5 (TSX: YLO.PR.D). I guess nobody reads the prospectus on these things anymore.

The equity-linked preferred shares, Series 1 (TSX: YLO.PR.A) and 2 (TSX: YLO.PR.B) continue to be coupled to the price of the Yellow Media equity. Series 1 will probably be converted into shares of Yellow Media (12.5 shares per preferred share if the common stock price is less than $2.05/share) on April 2012, while Series 2 stands a good chance of being converted in July 2012, depending on financial results.

While the Series 3 preferred shares trade at around 19 cents of par, convertible debentures are at around 33 cents.

The next big data point for the company is November 3, 2011, where they have already pre-announced a $2.9 billion goodwill write-down. While this will of course result in a grossly negative earnings per share for the year, it is a non-cash charge and the remaining questions for investors will be focusing on the cash flow statement at this release date. As I have repeatedly stated, if the company can produce results that are less than disastrous, they will stand a very good chance of surviving and being able to pay generous cash flows to their shareholders that are senior to the common.

In the favourable scenario, I would expect the market would see that Yellow Media will have the capacity of being in the position of paying off its obligations through internal cash flows and be in a position to raise financing sometime in the second half of 2012. If this occurs, the common shares should trade higher, but the preferred shares should also slowly rise to the 8-10% yield level, which translates into a $17-21/share price for the Series 3. The debentures in this case would also trade 1-2% richer than the preferreds, around 90 to 98 cents on the dollar.

The risk is that they won’t be able to make these financial targets and will be forced to restructure. The preferred shareholders will get wiped out along with the common shareholders. The unsecured debenture holders will likely get very little in such a reorganization.

The risk-reward was high and very high, respectively, and this is why I continue remaining long the preferred shares and debentures of Yellow Media. This is a relatively binary outcome with little middle ground which makes it a fairly unique opportunity.