Looking at the 52-week losers on the TSX

In these strange times where Facebook employees can’t get into their own building because of some technical issue, and half the world has to resort to the indignity of SMS because WhatsApp is down, I bring you some observations on which companies have fared the worst over the past 52 weeks.

In general, the list contains a lot of gold and silver miners that have done the worst, coupled with some biotechnology companies. Marijuana has also not done very well.

I try to avoid gold mining companies like the plague and hence I do not really want to dive into any of them, but notable names which stood out include New Gold (TSX: NGD), Sandstorm (TSX: SSL) and an old friend in Gran Colombia Gold (TSX: GCM).

Outside of this sector, the known and recognizable names on the loser lists is quite sparse. Mediagrif, now mdf (TSX: MDF) is a company that I’ve looked at in the past but have not invested in them. They were a fairly benign SaaS company (probably their most known software offering was MerX) that recently executed on a large-scale acquisition last August with a subsequent equity offering. This acquisition sucked up the cash on their balance sheet and added some leverage to purchase a company that is barely profitable. Large acquisitions very rarely work out and the stock price is certainly reflecting this. People tend to view the entire SaaS sector monotonically when in reality, there are huge valuation rifts between various software offerings – you can’t simply slap on a Constellation Software-sized price to sales ratio on every company that does SaaS!

Another name which caught my attention was MAV Beauty Brands (TSX: MAV). This is a branding reseller company (i.e. take generic products, put a brand label on them, and get them on the shelves of stores). Some of you may guess that I am not the biggest consumer of hair products. You would likely see this company represented in the shelves of Shopper’s Drug Mart. The company is mildly profitable, but they’re not exactly in the best competitive position – just go to the hair-care section at the store and you’ll see why. At a market cap of CAD$90 million they might seem cheap, but they also have a US$140 million term loan to deal with which really guts the valuation proposition.

Moving further down the list of 1-year losers, we have Ballard (TSX: BLDP) which I won’t dissect further – they continue to execute on their very successful business model of raising equity financing every decade when there is hype regarding hydrogen power: “On February 23, 2021, the Corporation completed a bought deal offering with a syndicate of financial institutions for 14,870,000 shares of the Corporation at $37.00 per share, resulting in gross offering proceeds of $550,190,000 and net offering proceeds of $527,291,000” – this will last them another 6 or 7 years!.

The first name which got me legitimately interested was Richards Packaging Income Fund (TSX: RPI.UN), which looked like they were a somewhat-COVID victim, but upon subsequent research I also tossed this one in the discards pile. If they were trading at half of what they were currently, I might have been more interested.

We all remember the toilet paper craze from Covid-19 and KP Tissue (TSX: KPT) was one of the companies that benefited from Covid-19. No longer – you can take a look at them now. They are an extremely leveraged entity.

Finally, something else that caught my attention was Saputo (TSX: SAP), the dairy conglomerate, and they are reaching 52-week lows and are likely candidates for year-end tax-loss selling. Covid-19 has disrupted the business and its profitability. While the stock is still at a healthy price, if it depreciates by another 1/3rd or so, it may get into value territory. Dairy is effectively controlled and protected in Canada by Saputo, Agropur (a co-op) and Parmalat (European-owned), which gives it some monopoly-type characteristics.

Overall, the pickings are very, very slim. The companies that have dropped over the past 52 weeks have really done so for proper reasons. I’m not finding a lot of value out there, and the low P/E names are mostly in the fossil fuel space and they have appreciated extremely.

The last chapter on Gran Colombia Gold’s senior secured notes

Quoting the press release:

Gran Colombia Gold Corp. (TSX: GCM) announced today that it has successfully priced an oversubscribed offering of US$300 million in senior unsecured notes due 2026 at a coupon rate of 6.875% (the “2026 Notes”) pursuant to Rule 144A and Regulation S of the U.S. Securities Act of 1933, as amended, (the “Act”), with closing expected to occur on or about August 9, 2021.

The proceeds from the 2026 Notes will be used to: (i) to fund the development of our Guyana operations, (ii) to prepay the remaining Gold-Linked Notes, and (iii) for general corporate purposes. The 2026 Notes have been assigned a rating of B+ by Fitch Ratings and a rating of B+ by S&P Global Ratings.

That’s a lot of money they raised, and in unsecured form! It’s quite the turnaround from years ago when they had to struggle to raise capital through the gold-linked notes (TSX: GCM.NT.U).

It looks like the remaining US$18 million of notes will finally get called out at 104.13. GCM has to provide 30 days of notice of redemption and this will likely happen once the deal closes.

(Update, August 9, 2021: This redemption notice occurred, slated for September 9, 2021).

Gran Colombia Gold Notes getting a slightly longer lease on life

Gran Colombia Gold announced some upcoming debt redemptions, including the following for (TSX: GCM.NT.U):

Currently, the aggregate principal amount of Gold Notes issued and outstanding is US$32,637,500. The next regularly scheduled Amortizing Payment of the Gold Notes, amounting to US$2,887,500, will take place on April 30, 2021, reducing the outstanding amount to US$29,750,000. The Amortizing Payment will include a Gold Premium, as applicable, based on the London P.M. Fix as of April 15, 2021.

Gran Colombia also announced today that pursuant to the Gold Notes Indenture, it will complete an early optional redemption on May 3, 2021 of an additional US$10,000,000, equivalent to approximately 33.6% of the aggregate principal amount of its Gold Notes outstanding, following the scheduled Amortizing Payment on April 30, 2021. In accordance with the Gold Notes Indenture, the early redemption price will be 104.13% of the aggregate principal amount of the Gold Notes being redeemed plus accrued interest.

Following the Amortizing Payment and the early optional redemption, there will be US$19,750,000 aggregate principal amount of Gold Notes issued and outstanding.

Full details of the cash amounts to be paid in connection with the Amortizing Payment and the early redemption will be announced on or about April 15, 2021.

I was expecting GCM to redeem the entire batch of notes in one shot. They have the cash to do it – about US$90 million at the end of 2020. These notes represent extremely expensive financing for the company – with an 8.25% coupon, coupled with a quarterly payment of 3-4% (this depends on the price of gold, but if it is around $1725 it will be in low double-digits annualized), the total cost of capital for the debt to the company is about 20%.

Surely they can obtain debt financing on better terms. Why aren’t they redeeming the entire slab of debt is beyond me.

Liquidity on the notes is also harder and harder to find – trading has been very light since February. After May 3rd, the notes will certainly trade closer to the call price due to the looming threat of being cheaply called out.

Unless the notes trade ridiculously high, I’m very happy to have them mature. It is nearly risk-free money at this point with only a question of whether the company will slowly redeem the residual value over the quarters.

Gran Colombia Gold notes

A minor update on (TSX: GCM.NT.U), they will amortize another 8% of their notes effective October 31. (Press release)

They also received a credit rating increase from B to B+ on their senior secured notes. Considering that after the quarterly amortization that they will have US$35.5 million outstanding, coupled with a positive net cash balance, this isn’t surprising. However, Fitch is very correct in identifying that the life of the Segovia mine (which is substantially most of their cash flow) is quite limited and they will need to find additional reserves, and that ore grade levels are depleting. Even if the mine were to shut down tomorrow, the remaining cash balances will be sufficient to pay off the debt (albeit the equity holders will suffer greatly).

They’ll call off the notes on April 30th. In the meantime, holders continue to enjoy a disproportionately large coupon. The notes are trading in a tight bid-ask where it doesn’t make sense to either buy or sell them. I really wish somebody would bid them up into the one hundred plus teens. It hasn’t been the case – lately the bid/ask has been 108/109. So I’ll continue holding until maturity.

Gran Colombia Gold’s confusing capital allocation strategy, part 4

(Part 1 on June 12, 2019; Part 2 on November 16, 2019); Part 3 on February 7, 2020)

This just gets better and better.

On February 6, 2020, after raising CAD$40 million in an equity offering (at CAD$5.60/share with a healthy dose of 3-year warrants at CAD$6.50) they announced they will be repurchasing 30% of their senior secured notes (TSX: GCM.NT.U) which I thought was a good use of capital (their rate of return will be in the teens for this repurchase).

They spun off their Marmato mine into an entity called Caldas Gold (TSXV: CGC) – this mine is going to require a ton of capital investment to ramp up gold production (it produces about 2k ounces per month prior to this investment). On March 17, they announced they spent $2.4 million to purchase off the open market stock in Caldas.

Then things get a little weird. On May 5, they announced they were going to invest in a solar project. The capital cost of this project is $8 million, and “may be financed by up to 70% through local banks”. Although this isn’t going to cost the company too much, it does seem like a deviation.

Then the company on May 11th announced they were proposing to merge with Gold X (which they held a 19% interest in) and Guyana Goldfields (TSXV: GLDX and TSX:GUY), which would have rendered existing GCM shareholders with 60% of the company. The justification was that the mines involved in Guyana were 50km apart and they were able to realize synergies between them. My quick take, without much mining engineering knowledge, was through a simple Google Satellite view of where both mines would operate and I realized that it would be a monumental undertaking to join them together. GCM shareholders avoided disaster on May 25th when there was a superior offer floated by a competing entity and they decided to drop the bid.

So this wasn’t enough. On June 30, GCM announced they invested another CAD$14 million in Caldas to pursue a project called the Juby Project, which is approximately 15km WSW of Gowganda, Ontario. To acquire this interest, they had to give shares of Caldas to the point where GCM has a 57.5% equity stake in Caldas.

This is very puzzling to me since it isn’t clear that the Juby Project will actually generate a dollar for the company. All that was advertised is they will do drilling in 2021, after “incorporating machine learning and other studies”.

Finally, today (July 19), GCM announced they invested another $1.4 million in Western Atlas Resources (TSXV: WA) to bring their ownership to 25.8%.

What’s the conclusion here? Gran Colombia, by virtue of their Segovia operation and a US$1,800 gold price, is making plenty of cash flow. However, they are proceeding to blow it on everything else at a rapid pace, probably for the reason that grades in Segovia are going to decrease and the economic utility of the mine is continuing to drop and they need to start selling promise rather than actual results.

In particular, I believe they objective with Caldas Gold is to get their ownership in the company under 50% so that way they no longer have to consolidate their expenses (and losses) in their main financial statements. Watch out for another acquisition using Caldas stock to achieve this purpose.

I don’t own any GCM stock, but I do own the notes (GCM.NT.U) which I expected to be called away on or shortly after March 31, 2021. I still think at present prices GCM (and Caldas) should be raising equity capital while the going is good. If for whatever reason gold makes a sustained decline, history will be repeating itself with this firm.