Aphira is still deeply cash flow negative

I couldn’t resist looking at the financial statements of Aphria (TSX: APHA) since I observed the marijuana sector today has received quite the bid. Today Aphria released their quarterly results and with the following by-line:

Aphria Inc. Announces Second Consecutive Quarter of Profitability and Positive Adjusted EBITDA

Looks good, right? There’s a lot of retail investors in these marijuana stocks, and most of them don’t read the detailed financial statements.

So when glossing over them, I notice this is a textbook case of “announced profits and positive adjusted EBITDA does not mean the company is making money”. Let’s dive further – this is a pretty good case study for beginning investors to learn how companies manage to put the most positive spin on their financial statements.

Look at the cash.

We look at the balance sheet to start with. The first red flag comes in the form of the very decreased cash+marketable securities balance. Sometimes in companies they have to invest initially (e.g. property, plant, equipment) in order to make money. Sometimes companies have large debt payments.

In this case, roughly $22 million went to accounts receivables. Normally receivables should correlate with revenues, but in this case, APHA’s Q1-2020 net revenues ($126 million) were actually LOWER than Q4-2019 ($129 million). Uh-oh…

Inventories and biological assets went up $21 million and $11 million, respectively. (Notes 6 and 7, which we will dive into below).

Capital assets went up $39 million.

All of this accounts for about $93 million of the $105 million cash burn. The rest of it, while interesting, I will disregard for the rest of this analysis – it isn’t the bulk of what’s happening. We’re trying to figure out where the cash is going.

Note 6, inventory:

I will give an example of what is going on here. Just looking at “Harvested cannabis”, the company spent $15.5 million to harvest this. “Capitalized cost” means they converted it into inventory using cash, without it being considered an expense. The “Fair value adjustment” of $20.3 million is management deciding that the value of the harvested cannabis is that much higher, and it can be reflected as such on the balance sheet. The process of doing this is a gain on the income statement, which I will show later.

The questions at this point is whether:
a) Is this estimate accurate? I have no idea.
b) Can the company actually sell this harvested cannabis at or greater than the adjusted value of $35.8 million?

Accounting-wise, inventories are governed by the rules of IAS2, which roughly states that inventories are kept at the lower of cost or net realizable value. These products are distinct from the biological assets, which are governed by IAS41.

Note 7, biological assets:

The key lines here are “Changes in fair value less costs to sell due to biological transformation” and “Production costs capitalized” for $25.2 and $29.8 million, respectively. This is effectively the company deeming that their growing process is facilitating an increase in value of their inventory when it is eventually transferred to that column, but in order to realize this, they need to sell the product!

Note 9, capital assets:

This actually looks reasonable. The company spent $37.9 million on production facilities, equipment, and construction-in-progress, which makes sense if you are a marijuana producer. The quantum of expense can be debated, but the nature of these types of expenses appear in-line with the type of business they are engaged in.

So how does APHA claim profitability?

This dog’s breakfast of an analysis of the income statement drives a couple points:

1) The claimed profits are primarily on the basis of the fair value adjustments through Notes 6 and 7 in the financial statements (to the tune of $17.9 million)
2) And some finance gains on Note 27 (I will not bother getting into this).

In reality, the company is blowing a lot of money on inventory. It is very difficult to take the assertions of profitability seriously unless if you believe that the stated fair value gains on the inventory and biological assets are real and can actually be realized with real sales at the stated values.

I give no valuation opinion at this time other than to state that at $7.10/share (or $1.8 billion market capitalization at 252.7 million diluted shares outstanding) I am not interested in buying.

It took me about 5 minutes to gloss through these financial statements, but about an hour to present it in the very hurried form above. If I spent a couple extra hours, I could have really polished up the presentation, but this was enough for me. If you found this at all useful, please let me know.

General comments – market weakness

Another ranting post with little direction.

With marijuana-related equities and cryptocurrencies plummeting, the market for speculative investments appears to be topping. Probably the next short squeeze that occurs will be the best time to be shorting these instruments. Implied volatility on the options sadly are high, and the borrow rate on WEED, APH, ACB, etc., are astronomical.

I also note Aimia (TSX: AIM) has sold off one of their divisions today and most of the negative news is buried in a later paragraph concerning the tightening of their senior credit facility – this is basically part of the slow march to zero. The company is happy to cite the amount of cash on their balance sheet, but not so happy to cite the balance of their deferred revenues, which represents future commitments that will be offset by cost of goods sold – hence the cash reserve. Using an insurance analogy, they are running off their insurance book with little capacity to collect premiums written after Aeroplan expires in 2020.

There’s a lot of young people out there that have witnessed nothing but rising markets and low interest rates and the financial mindset is fixated on these two conditions. There is going to be a lot of financial roadkill along the way, similar to what happened in 2000-2002 where a lot of people got wiped out for believing the dot-com bubble.

Incidentially, 2002-2003 was the perfect time to invest in the inevitable winners of that technology boom (Amazon and Priceline being two great examples). There will have to be winners out of blockchain software, but it could just as equally come from a major player. Very difficult to say at this point in time as I still have not seen any functional system operating with blockchain that doesn’t have a parallel system that is better – unless if you believe that cryptocurrency’s best application is evading monetary authorities.

As I suggested in my previous post, the roller-coaster is just starting. No point in jumping in too early.