High flying growth companies will badly damage new shareholders

The problem with having a huge amount of anticipated growth baked into your stock price is that the expectations become incredibly difficult to achieve.

High expectations result in high stock prices.

I’ll post the charts of two of these companies which are household names – Zoom (Nasdaq: ZM) and Docusign (Nasdaq: DOCU):

We will look at Zoom first.

At its peak of $450/share, Zoom was valued at around $134 billion. Keeping the math incredibly simple, in order to flat-line at a terminal P/E of 15 (this appears to be the median P/E ratio of the S&P 500 at the moment), Zoom needs to make $9 billion a year in net income, or about $30/share.

After Covid-mania, Zoom’s income trajectory did very well:

However, the last quarter made it pretty evident that their growth trajectory has flat-lined. Annualized, they are at $3.55/share, quite a distance away from the $30/share required!

Even at a market price of $180/share today, they are sitting at an anticipated expectation of $12/share at sometime in the future.

Despite the fact that Zoom offers a quality software product (any subscribers to “Late Night Finance” will have Zoom to thank for this), there are natural competitive limitations (such as the fact that Microsoft, Google and the others are going to slowly suck away any notion of margins out of their software product) which will prevent them from getting there.

The point here – even though the stock has gone down 60% from peak-to-trough, there’s still plenty to go, at least on my books. They are still expensive and bake in a lot of anticipated growth which they will be lucky to achieve – let alone eclipse.

The second example was Docusign. Their great feature was to enable digital signing of documents for real estate agents, lawyers, etc., and fared very well during Covid-19. It’s an excellent product and intuitive.

They peaked out at $315/share recently, or a US$62 billion valuation. Using the P/E 15 metric, the anticipated terminal earnings is about $21/share.

The issue here is two-fold.

One is that there is a natural ceiling to how much you can charge for this service. Competing software solutions (e.g. “Just sign this Adobe secure PDF and email it back”) and old fashioned solutions (come to my office to scribble some ink on a piece of paper) are natural barriers to significant price increases.

Two is that the existing company doesn’t make that much money:

Now that they are reporting some earnings, investors at this moment suddenly realized “Hey! It’s a long way to get to $21!” and are bailing out.

Now they are trading down to US$27 billion, but this is still very high.

There are all sorts of $10 billion+ market capitalization companies which have featured in this manner (e.g. Peleton, Zillow, Panantir, etc.) which the new investors (virtually anybody buying stock in 2021) are getting taken out and shot.

This is not to say the underlying companies are not any good – indeed, for example, Zoom offers a great product. There are many other instances of this, and I just look at other corporations that I give money to. Costco, for example – they trade at 2023 anticipated earnings of 40 times. Massively expensive, I would never buy their stock, but they have proven to be the most reliable retailer especially during these crazy Covid-19 times.

As the US Fed and the Bank of Canada try to pull back on what is obviously having huge negative economic consequences (QE has finally reached some sort of ceiling before really bad stuff happens), growth anticipation is going to get further scaled back.

As long as the monetary policy winds are turning into headwinds (instead of the huge tailwinds we have been receiving since March 2020), going forward, positive returns are going to be generated by the companies that can actually generate them, as opposed to those that give promises of them. The party times of speculative excess, while they will continue to exist in pockets here and there, are slowly coming to a close.

The super premium companies (e.g. Apple and Microsoft) will continue to give bond-like returns, simply because they are franchise companies that are entrenched and continue to remain dominant and no reason exists why they will not continue to be that way in the immediate future. Apple equity trades at a FY 2023 (09/2023) estimate of 3.8% earnings yield, and Microsoft is slightly richer at 3.2%. Just like how the capital value of long-term bonds trade wildly with changes of yield, if Apple and Microsoft investors suddenly decide that 4.8% and 4.2% are more appropriate risk premiums (an entirely plausible scenario for a whole variety of foreseeable reasons), your investment will be taking a 20% and 25% hit, respectively (rounding to the nearest 5% here).

That’s not a margin of error that I would want to take, but consider for a moment that there are hundreds of billions of dollars of passive capital that are tracking these very expensive equities. You are likely to receive better returns elsewhere.

Take a careful look at your portfolios – if you see anything trading at a very high anticipated price to cash flow expectation, you may wish to consider your overall risk and position accordingly. Companies warranting premium valuations not only need to justify it, but they need to be delivering on the growth trajectory baked into their valuations – just to retain the existing equity value.

Apple – assimilating the S&P 500

Look at this chart since the COVID crisis period (March):

With a market capitalization of $2 trillion, they are now 6.75% of the S&P 500. You buy $100 of S&P 500, $6.75 goes into Apple automatically, without regard to its price.

Along with Microsoft, Google, Facebook and Amazon, that’s 23% of the index in 5 companies.

This is a well known fact. However, portfolio managers that are measured by performance relative to the S&P 500 will find it difficult to keep up if these five companies are the only ones appreciating while the rest are stagnating – so they’ll hedge by putting 23% of their assets in these five while playing the stock market with the other 77%.

Eventually this assimilation of the S&P 500 will get so large that the numbers become truly ridiculous – already rationalizing a $2 trillion market capitalization on an annualized net income of $60 billion – that’s a lot of growth expected from an already large baseline!

Canadian investors shouldn’t find much solace in the TSX either – the Composite’s top component right now is Shopify with 6.16% of the index. However, the rest of the companies aren’t the high-flying technology companies as seen in the S&P.

Market musing while being inactive

I hate to sound like a broken record, but I’ve still been doing nothing other than research but nothing worth investing in at the moment except for one illiquid play mentioned in an earlier post.

Here is a series of miscellaneous observations:

* I note that Apple (AAPL) continues its slide down to the point where I am wondering if they are pricing that the company is not going to be able to keep its premium pricing strategy. On paper, they are still massively profitable, but if competition continues to chip away at their product line (mainly through Samsung on the phone front and a variety of other realistic competitors on the tablet front), they might run into revenue growth problems. The company in their last fiscal year (ended September 2012) made $156.5 billion in revenues and this year the analysts are projecting an average of $182.8, which is a $26.3 billion increase year-to-year. This is a huge amount of growth and the law of large numbers will likely be catching up to Apple in short order.

* CP Rail (CP.TO) is trading at absurdly high valuations at present. They performed a change in management and the market is giving the new CEO a lot of credit, but the railroad business is very mature and I don’t have a clue why they are giving the equity such a huge premium at the moment. I’d be a seller at this price range (the C$130 mark).

* Anybody remember the big scare about rare earths a couple years ago when China started restricting the supply and most of those stocks went crazy? The big play here, Molycorp (MCP) has continued to slide into the gutter now that the market reality of the perceived shortage has completely gone away. The substitution effect is very powerful and MCP shareholders are holding the bag.

* Likewise, most other fossil fuel commodity companies, including my favourite company that has been so overrated by many, Petrobakken (PBN), are continuing to suffer. It is similar to how most gold mining companies are not faring nearly as well as the underlying commodity – it costs an increasing amount of money to extract the resource, so even if the commodity price is increasing, if your costs are increasing, you are not going to make much money. Even Crescent Point Energy (CPG.TO) is starting to lose its lustre.

* The other commodity market that is continuing to get my curiousity up is currency trading – the US dollar has continued to outperform most of the other global currencies. The only way that I play this is that I try to hedge my portfolio by having some US-denominated securities rather than using leveraged speculation.

* The two Canadian Real Estate financing proxies, Home Capital (HCG.TO) and Equitable Group (ETC.TO) warrant a further look. HCG has faded somewhat off of its 52-week high, but Equitable is still there. If people are still hyper-bearish on the Canadian real estate market, these two companies should be the first on anybody’s short selling list. Non-performing loans are still around the 0.3% level and currently still do not show any real signs of distress in the market. I am still riding the wave on Genworth MI (MIC.TO) and believe there is still a reasonable percentage gain to be realized from current price levels. The loan companies, however, are hugely leveraged and I’m finding it difficult to see value there when book values are so significantly below market prices.

* Long term interest rates have also taken a nose dive – the Canadian 10-year bond was skirting at the 2% yield a month ago, but now they are back down to 1.8%. The world is awash with capital and there are few places to deploy it where you’ll generate yield at an acceptable risk level. Eventually the leverage party will end and the fallout is going to be very brutal. Whether this happens in 2013, 2014 or later, nobody knows. But there will be fallout, and figuring out how to brace yourself for the fallout will be a big financial challenge over the next decade.

Projections about the iPhone 5

Articles like this make me skeptical: IPhone 5 Sales Could Offer Big Boost to GDP.

I look at a 30-second Apple promotional video of the iPhone 5 and what I really see is the killer feature is the “virtual keyboard” around 10 seconds in the video clip:

One of my largest complaints about cell phones and other digital tablets without keyboards is that content creation on them truly is a pain in the rear. While sending text messages is fine due to the brevity of them, I would not want to be typing in something as complicated as this post, for example. In fact, when I use a friend’s iPhone 4, I find the keyboard on it to still be a pain in the ass compared to my own flip-out phone with the keypad. I guess I just like the tactile feel of the keyboard. I’m not sure how this virtual keyboard concept will work in terms of speed and accuracy, but if they get it “right” then I can see the feature being useful for people like me that need a keyboard.

However, this is not Apple’s target market – will they capture people non-iPhone users like myself, and will they be able to give a technological incentive for people to upgrade from their older iPhones? We will see.

Apple running up against the law of large numbers

Apple’s 3rd quarter results: I find it funny when analysts report a company making $8.8 billion in net income from $35 billion in sales to be a “miss”, but indeed that is what they are reporting today. Sales figures on notebooks, desktops, iPods and iPhones appear to be flattening out. The iPad continues to exhibit significant growth and is probably in the midpoint of its growth trajectory before it finally starts to taper out.

Apple has grown so large that it will become more and more difficult to post high percentage growth figures. Before this release, the market is saying that the entity is worth about $560 billion (noting that at the end of June the company now has $117 billion in cash on its balance sheet). In after-hours trading, the stock is down 5%, so that shaves off about $30 billion off of its capitalization, to about $530 billion.

Extrapolating the last quarter’s results into a full year gives a P/E of 15, or if you subtract the cash stack, a P/E of 12. When you factor in that growth will not quite come as easily for the company, one can get a semblance of how this $530 billion capitalization is not going to become a trillion dollars anytime soon. Still, when you ask yourself if Apple is going to go the way of the dodo like Nokia and Research in Motion, the answer is instinctively no, but nobody thought those other companies would be surpassed so quickly either. Apple has one huge asset in its advantage that its competitors currently do not: it is a fashion icon.