2022’s second quarter results will be great, but watch out ahead

While looking at the red ink that has accumulated in my portfolio, I’ve been doing some deep thinking lately. The story is not going to be that good.

In the fossil fuel world, the second quarter results are going to look really, really good from a cash flow perspective.

I anticipate a speculative run-up as a result prior to the announcement of such results. “Buy the rumour, sell the news” is a cliche that has tended to have a better than 50/50 success rate in my investment life.

Indeed, posted metrics will be so ridiculously good that it will attract people/capital that are otherwise only vaguely aware that cyclical industries require a different mindset.

I will use Lumber as an example. It is a commodity that is much more used to ups and downs, and their physical capability has historically been punctuated by start-up and shut-downs that wax and wane with inventory levels and overall demand.

A random example of this would be the Jimmy Pattison-controlled Canfor (TSX: CFP), with my annotations on their earning history and estimated earnings:

You can see on this chart that an astute purchaser would have been able to pick up shares of Canfor at (the Covid crisis peak) half earnings. Yes, a P/E of about 0.5x.

Of course, hindsight is 50/50. Many people (myself NOT included) thought the world was about the end in March 2020. But instead, Covid created a huge boom for the underlying commodity price because of a huge culmination of factors: nobody was producing, inventory levels were already low, the supply chain was wrecked, and demand was increased because many decided that building a deck or doing home renovations in the summer of 2020 was a great idea while everybody was on lockdown.

With retrospect (which would have triggered at the Q2-2020 results), the shares were trading at around $16/share – about the price that Pattison tried to take over the minority shareholders.

The acceleration of lumber pricing continued and eventually the shares normalized at around $28, or roughly 2x earnings, but normalized to 2023’s estimate, about 5.5-6x earnings. Also note how the chart hardly moved despite the “second wave” of lumber pricing from end of Q2-2021 to Q4-2021.

The earnings multiple on a cyclical company is notoriously difficult to predict – whether it is the cash flow, reserves, perceived scarcity, etc., all have a bearing on the multiple the market decides to give.

The actual cash flows that are generated, however, is internal to the company and their capital allocation scheme determines whether shareholders actually receive any monies or not. In the case of Canfor, they repaid some of their debt and engaged in some acquisitions.

Going back to the fossil fuel world, most of the Canadian complex is trading around 5x free cash flow to EV, based off of US$100 oil.

We will be seeing very different capital allocation schemes going forward. Nearly all companies are aggressively paying down debt (Whitecap is the big exception), and some are engaging primarily in dividends as a return mechanism, while some are choosing buybacks (looking at MEG Energy), and some are engaging in a hybrid approach. Investors can align their approaches to capital allocation with the managements of the various companies out there, in whatever blend they so choose. For instance, I like where Cenovus (TSX: CVE) is going, by spending cash flow to concentrate their ownership in their assets, running them well, having an integrated production and refining business, keeping a modest debt level, and then balancing out buyback/dividends. It’s a good all-in-one stock.

However, all of this might be overshadowed by one gigantic blade over the necks of the market, and that is central bank monetary policy.

Central banks are clearly in panic mode. There is a “real” component to inflation, but the “psychological” component of inflation, just like in the marketplace, is nearly as relevant. Take a look at the Home Capital Group (TSX: HCG) fiasco half a decade ago for a good example how psychology is very relevant in markets.

The theory is simple. If people believe that inflation will be higher for longer, their behaviour will be changing in conjunction with the expectations. Wage demands will increase (a good example of how this is playing out is the upcoming strike with the BC Government Employers’ union where the government offer vs. the union demand is way out of line – who the heck wants to take a 3% increase in wages when CPI is printing at 8%????). People will be spending more money today than tomorrow because the rate of interest they receive for their capital is lower than the posted CPI rate. It is like a milder version of Argentinian economics, where you discover when you go to the grocery store to buy a bundle of toilet paper, that you can only buy one roll instead of a package because the storekeeper knows that the toilet paper bundle can be sold for more just by waiting.

At a certain point, it doesn’t matter whether the actual money supply is contracting (or at least holding flat), and it doesn’t matter whether the supply chains are restoring, and it doesn’t matter how much crap gets stuffed on the shelves of Costco, Walmart and Target – if the psychology is in an inflationary mindset, it is very difficult to shake off.

This is why central banks, in theory, are regarded as independent entities, and generally are regarded as knowing what the heck they are doing to keep inflation in check (their sole mandate). They are the ones to adjust the monetary levers accordingly to keep the currency relatively level, and this stability generally breeds confidence that businesses need to make long-range spending plans.

This confidence has been badly shaken over the past couple years. First, there was “no danger of inflation”, then it was “transitory”, and now of course it is full-blown “Oh ****, we really screwed this up and really have to fix things” mode.

Ordinarily all it took for central banks to have their desired effect was to talk big – because people took them seriously and with authority, central banks could talk market expectations in a particular direction.

But now their credibility has been shot and they’re desperately playing catch-up, not on interest rates, but rather to restore their credibility. This is probably the reason why we got a 100bps increase instead of a widely-expected 75bps.

The Federal Reserve might mirror this increase in the July 27th fed meeting announcement (right now the August Fed Funds Futures are a “lock” at a 75bps increase).

However, will this be enough to shake the psychology of increasing inflation? People normally associate fiscal competence with the elected bodies (in this case “I don’t think about monetary policy” Trudeau and “mental lapse” Biden), and confidence in both are at very low levels. Despite posting record revenues (especially as they are nominal and not real dollars), governments are still posting deep deficits. As they are heavily indebted, as they roll over their bond books, they will be paying higher and higher interest expenses out of the fiscal end.

At this point, the central banks at this point have little choice other than to keep increasing interest rates until they have broken the psychology of inflation expectations. I had argued in a prior post they had to “surprise”, and the Bank of Canada judged that going 25bps over a widely anticipated 75bps was a sufficient shock. I will claim it is not enough.

Currently, we have the expectations showing that 2022 will feature a few more interest rate increases (say to 3-3.25%) but in 2023 there is an expected easement of rates, in anticipation of a recession.

The question is whether this is sufficient to break the psychology of inflation expectations. I don’t believe it will, at least over the next half year. Just looking at the price of energy, there is still going to be higher year-to-year pricing of commodities going forward until probably February 2023 – while inflation may simmer, it will be nowhere close to the 2% target level – noting that inflation is measured as a year to year comparison.

This means in order to quell the psychology, rates needs to rise even higher, and this will surely initiate huge economic troubles going forward – a deeper recession than most people probably will figure at this point.

This does not impact North America only – it affects most of the world economy, where US-denominated transactions dominate foreign trade contracts, and when the US dollar is as strong as it is, it acts like a 16 pound bowling ball ramming through the economies of the world as they desperately seek US cash – which explains the state of the Euro, Yen and other third-world currencies.

Canadian currency has somewhat of a buffer because of its trade links with the USA and commodity exposure, but if the world economic picture erodes to the point where energy consumption declines below the supply levels, surely fossil fuel commodity prices will drop and this will not be good for Canadian currency.

Also, with the rise of interest rates, both floating and fixed rate mortgage payers alike, especially for those that purchased properties in the past couple years, will be causing a lot of financial stress in the market. Your typical 25-year amortization mortgages that are up for renewal will also be paying more on this credit cycle, and perhaps people over-leveraged will be forced to sell properties. If the projected interest rate increases go higher than expectations, this will surely create some scenarios where you may see financial institutions that specialize in non-insured mortgages see financial stress and this will create more ‘interesting times’ financially.

Ultimately this depends on reading the psychology of the masses, definitely an art and not a science.

It is incredibly difficult to foresee how this plays out other than to be aware of the scenario. All I know is that caution is warranted. Especially nearing the end of this year, we might see a situation where a lot of good-quality equities out there are going to get flushed down the toilet both for tax-loss selling reasons and also because liquidity is tightening up so badly (interest rates plus QT) that players are forced to reduce leverage.

Cash is the only defense in this scenario. Everything else (gold, bitcoin, commodities, corporate debt) will take a dive, with perhaps the exception of short-dated government debt.

However, there is likely to be a “bull-whip” effect if there is such a flush-out, where those extraordinary circumstances that initiated a panic selling will likely lead to impressive gains going forward. Now is the time to compile companies on your watchlists that will likely survive the upcoming carnage.

The bank liquidity drain continues

A simple snapshot from the Bank of Canada:

I am specifically looking at June 29 vs. July 6.

Assets held in the Bank of Canada by member banks dropped from $196 billion to $175 billion (-$21 billion).

Correspondingly, assets held by the Government of Canada at the Bank of Canada rose from $94 billion to $112 billion (+$18 billion).

What happens between June 29 to July 6?

It is the milestone for calendar year-end corporate tax returns to be filed (with the remaining balance of taxes unpaid due… with interest), and also a quarterly date for CCPCs to remit their installments.

Personal income tax installments are on the 15th of each quarter, although the drop from April 27 to May 4th (when the remaining amount outstanding is due by April 30th) was $20 billion off of the bank assets.

Back on a Late Night Finance episode, I explained how the government is going to reel back liquidity through finding some ways of taxing it out of the system. I speculated that it would be done through increasing the GST, but at the rate things are going, they just need to keep the existing taxes to achieve this.

Bank reserves in the Bank of Canada are at their lowest levels since the week of April 15, 2020. Quantitative easing started on the week of March 11, 2020.

The next upcoming maturities out of the Bank of Canada government bond portfolio is August 1 with $16.8 billion, and September 1 with $6.8 billion. The monetary noose continues to tighten, albeit very slowly in relation to the $397 billion in bonds outstanding. Over the next 12 months, a total of $92 billion is scheduled to mature, along with a billion in mortgage bonds.

Why the focus on macroeconomics?

It might be a sign of the times that over the past half year or so I have been less focused as of late on my investment research looking at individual companies, and more about playing the role of “closet macroeconomist”, hence the focus of my posts being mostly about macroeconomics lately.

I am not intentionally trying to hide secrets (although there are a couple picks here and there in the non-oil and gas space that are still sitting on my research queue after passing my initial smell test) but in an environment where my baseline investment criteria is that it can earn 25% free cash flow to enterprise value, what’s the point in looking for other stocks?

The answer of course is there will be a time that fossil fuels will become politically correct once again (perhaps when all the lights and crypto farms shut off) and one will then have to dip into the watchlist bucket for other suitable investment candidates. That said, fossil fuels are still going very strong and hence why bother when the thesis I wrote back in 2020 (roughly summarized as being long anything ‘real’ and avoiding anything ‘financial’) is still very much intact?

The reason for the macro focus is simply because it is increasingly a dominant variable in today’s investing climate. To give an analogy, let’s say your choice was investing in established large cap gold miner X and gold miner Y. Ultimately you can talk about mine reserves, operating practices, all-in sustainable costs, capital structure, and on and on, but the dominant variable is much more simpler – the price of gold.

Likewise, the macro situation is creating a dominant variable environment where if you cannot get on board with the correct solution, it doesn’t matter what else you invest in – for instance, back in November 2021, it did not matter one bit which portfolio component of ARKK you invested in – you would have lost money no matter what. Perhaps the magnitude of loss would have been different had you chosen wisely, but it would have been a loss nonetheless.

The macro focus that requires meticulous attention is monetary policy and energy economics. Both right now are more dominant than ever as we are experiencing ‘the turn’ that has caught people flat-footed (including Covid, and the sudden realization of geopolitical instability in eastern Europe), coupled with an incredible amount of monetary mismanagement and dismissal of energy physics that has all translated into really terrible policy. Playbooks that worked in the past will not be working in the future.

One of these playbooks is a sacred tenant of portfolio management. It states that a correctly managed portfolio will have an equity and bond split, say 60/40. If you are young and want to take more risk, then 70/30 or even 80/20, but the point is there is some bond component. The notion is that when equities fall, bonds will rise, and if you maintain a consistent percentage, you will be able to rebalance and extract better value in the process.

We insert in the new macroeconomic reality where inflation is running hot and fast, and your bond portfolio is still trading at a negative real yield. This means that the bond component of the portfolio is losing purchasing power for the investor and only depends on other people purchasing bonds to keep its capital value in the event of an equity drawdown.

With the Bank of Canada, US Federal Reserve, and soon the EU engaging in quantitative tightening, coupled with increasing yields (that would also be impacted by QT in addition to inflation), bonds are going to be terrible investments if the next logical conclusion comes. What is this?

Continued monetary debasement. Amazingly despite everything, because the US dollar is the last one standing, it still wins by default. For now.

This brings up a rather interesting quandary for most institutional fund managers. You can’t hold cash (real negative yield, not to mention that you are hired as a portfolio manager to deploy cash and not stuff it in your mattress). You can’t hold bonds (take a look at the idiots that bought Austria’s 100 year bond with a 50bps coupon for twice par!). You can’t hold equities (take a look at the S&P, for example) although this is the least worst of the three options. Don’t even get me started on cryptocurrency as an asset class – although I do see that Luna is CAD$0.000101 a piece, so perhaps you want to buy one of these as an inflation hedge.

There is no escape at an institutional level. One workaround has been to shovel money into private assets and real estate and infrastructure, but these asset classes are very sensitive to rate increases although of course they do not mark them to market until it is too late. Private assets are a brilliant way to defer those losses, however!

Interest rates themselves are another matter. There has never been a point in history where we have seen such monetary manipulation to the point where real rates of interest have been driven this low without massive reverberations. The “consensus” scenario is that we’ll get a 50bps rate hike in July and then some more minor tightening before things ‘normalize’ and are back to normal.

But consider that your baseline input to the economy (energy) is at sky-high levels with no real material notions that more capacity is being brought online – what if this input to inflation keeps rising further? Everybody cites ‘demand destruction’, and indeed there will be a point where energy inputs will become so expensive that collectively we will be forced to stop using them, but until that point, we will see the trickle-down (or perhaps rain torrent) effect of these costs getting baked into everything we consume.

Likewise, salaries will be escalating, and inflation will start on its trajectory of a self-fulfilling prophecy – labour costs will rise because of inflation, and inflation will drive up the cost of labour supply. Already in British Columbia, we are seeing the seeds of this with the upcoming strike vote by the main BC Government Union – they are apparently miles apart from the government. This is one of many cases that will be resulting in significant wage increases going forward.

In a recent Bank of Canada speech (one day after the June 1st 50bps rate hike), we had the deputy governor talk about inflation. They’re now now talking about “avoiding entrenchment” of inflation. Note that derivatives of the word “entrench” is like the new “transitory”.

You don’t avoid entrenchment with small steps. You need shock and awe – something that goes beyond letting the market guess whether the next rate increase will be 50bps or 75bps. An example would be having an unplanned rate announcement with a 150bps increase “to get things back to the neutral rate”. The current short-term policy rate of 150bps is still at near-record lows (historically), and still below the ambient level the Bank of Canada had before Covid-19 (which was 175bps). The big mistake that people can make is this natural assumption of the “regression to the mean”, and currently that scenario right now is the bank will raise to 300bps and keep things there.

Consider the scenario where they will need to raise even further, to around 600 to 700bps to achieve the destruction of this “entrenchment”, and figure out the financial consequences. I am not saying this will happen, but it is definitely something that one should keep in their minds going forward – that inflation will be running away, just like how global warming activists claim that an increase in the Earth’s CO2 beyond a threshold point will cause a run-away greenhouse effect. Ask yourself what components of your portfolio get killed in a world where short-term rates are 700bps, we live in an inverted yield curve where the 5-year mortgage rate is 600bps and almost every asset out there is slashed in half. It isn’t pretty – practically everything other than cash loses in such a scenario (yes, including fossil fuels).

I am not entirely sure what is going to happen. Things are incredibly fluid right now, and I continue to remain very cautious. If there is any general prescription I could give to people, it is the following – if you’re leveraged, get at least flat.

Prepared to act more forcefully

The title of this post were the words used in the last sentence of the Bank of Canada’s interest rate announcement.

They did not surprise many with a 50bps increase (to a 1.50% target) although the yield curve regardless jumped up a little bit across the entire tenor.

Barring any catastrophic events, it is highly probable that July 13th will feature another 50bps rate increase. The yield curve continues to flatten.

Reading the BAX futures, over the next 12 months we have another anticipated 150bps or so of rate increases – instigated likely by ‘forcefully’. Today the 3-month banker’s acceptance rates is 195bps (98.05) and the December 2022 futures have it at 96.61, a 144bps difference. This very roughly corresponds to 3 50bps rate hikes (July 13, September 7, and October 26) before the Bank of Canada decides enough is enough.

After the July 13th rate hike is where things get interesting. There is this pervasive prediction of an inflationary course of mean reversion, under the theory that the inflation is caused by supply chain disruptions, Russia going to war and the like. Making this assumption can be hazardous to one’s financial health. For instance, if interest rates rise and inflation continues to remain elevated, the central bank will have no recourse other than to continue raising rates further (and possibly at a more rapid pace) to bat down inflation to a 2% target.

The temporal aspect of measuring inflation has an odd effect – for instance, in year 1 if the price of bread is 10 cents, and in year 2 the price is 20 cents, you’ve just experienced a 100% inflation. If the price of bread is 20.4 cents in year 3, you can declare victory as you’ve met your “2% target”, but the damage has already been done – that bread is going nowhere close to 10 cents no matter what your monetary policy is!

I suspect this is what will happen (get used to those high prices remaining… forever!), but there are some economic scenarios where we really start to see some very strange distortions, where despite high rates and monetary policy liquidity withdrawals we still will see rising long term interest rates. Right now the 5 year government bond yield is 289bps, but what if this goes to 400bps, 500bps or even 600bps? The implication of the real estate market seeing a 7% mortgage rate would completely crush the market and negative equity headlines would become rampant in the media. I’m not saying this will happen, but it is in the list of possibilities. After the summer of post-Covid fun is over with, there is going to be a sobering period which will be painful for many, even more so than what we are seeing today.

Be prepared to act more forcefully in the event that the landing is not so soft.

Bank of Canada Quantitative Tightening – May 25th edition

On April 27, 2022 the liability of the Bank of Canada (Members of Payments Canada) was $221 billion. On May 18th this was $193 billion and on May 25th, $189 billion.

Another $3 billion of government debt matures on June 1st and $270 million of mortgage bonds mid-month.

The US Federal Reserve’s incarnation of QT starts on June 1st.