Canadian Fixed income review – end of August 2023

I’ve been reviewing the fixed income situation in Canada. Some observations:

1. The yield curve is still heavily inverted, and the inversion has gotten even wider over the past week. The half-year bond is at around 525bps and the 10 year is at 359bps as I write this. There is a general anticipation of the rise of the short-term interest rates stopping, but this anticipation has been present now for almost half a year. Time will tell.

2. There hasn’t been a new TSX debenture issue since Fiera Capital a couple months ago, and issuance this year has been very light. Previously you would typically see companies issue new debt and call existing debt with half a year to a year left of maturity, but now they are letting debt run to near-maturity – probably because the coupons they are paying today are less than what they can roll over for, coupled with everybody and their grandmothers waiting for rates to decrease!

3. Preferred share markets are very thin, but if you do not anticipate the 5yr government bond yield changing materially for a year, there are many high-credit names that are trading at 10% rate resets. There are too numerous to mention, but for example, pretty much all of TransCanada’s (TSX: TRP) are trading above 10% at the current 5-yr rate reset value. It becomes an interesting situation for an income investor whether they want to roll the dice with equity, get a 7.6% yield currently or to play the relatively safer preferred shares and clip about 300bps more out of it. There’s even one really trashy financial issuer that has a reset yield currently north of 15% which I’ve looked at, but I value my sanity over yield at the moment.

4. Risk-free cash continues to remain extremely competitive against much out there. The only way to rationalize more speculative equity investments out there is with implied growth or implied expectations of interest rates dropping. We are not going to get this interest rate drop as long as market participants are obviously stalling for it.

Strange times

This is a post without much direction.

Canadian Macro

Perhaps the largest surprise to occur in the past two weeks was the Bank of Canada deciding to resume interest rate increases. I generally believe that this is an attempt to shake up complacency in the marketplace and that we are approaching the point of diminishing returns. By increasing future implied interest rate expectations, however, is in itself a form of interest rate increase. So we continue to have the triple barreled approach – actual rising interest rates, threatened future interest rates, and quantitative easing. Interest rates started rising on March 2, 2022 and we are about 15 months into the program. As capital hurdle rates have increased and projects that otherwise would have been initiated stall out, we’re probably going to start seeing this slowdown occur pretty soon.

The yield curve remains heavily inverted – right now you can get a 1yr GoC yield of 5.07%, while 10yr is 3.40%, a 167bps difference.

GST/HST inputs, from fiscal 2021-2022 to 2022-2023 (table 2), only rose 2.7% year-to-year, which is a negative real growth in GST-able consumption. This does not bode well overall.

I look at the inflation inputs and it seems intuitive that cost increases will continue to rise above the 2% benchmark – especially on shelter. The interest rate environment (in addition to other roadblocks) is seriously constraining supply, yet demand continues to remain sky-high (one of the effects of letting in a whole bunch of people into the country, including students, which massively raises rental rates in cities).

Inefficient spending

One of the problems of using GDP is that it doesn’t account for unproductive expenditures vs. productive expenditures. If you paid somebody a million dollars to move a pile of dirt from one location to another, and then back again, you would have a million dollars added to the GDP, but the wealth of the country has gone nowhere. That money could have been used for something more productive. If you get enough of this inefficient spending, it starts to show itself in other components of the economy – namely demand for goods/services that clearly are not being supplied because you’ve tasked too many people with moving piles of dirt from one location to another and back again. Those people could have been employed in another activity, say road building, which is a more skillful (and productive) use of moving dirt from one location to another.

It is pretty much the reason why much government spending is inefficient – it gets directed to segments of the economy which are for political purposes rather than productive purposes. Do this enough, and you eventually get inflationary effects in the things that people really need.

A lot of what we have seen over the past 15 years or so can likely be attributed to the cumulative effects of this. While governments are the chief culprit, the private sector as well has significant bouts of inefficient capital allocation (e.g. look at the value destruction in the cannabis sector, or most cryptocurrency ventures, etc.). The “slack” of the misdirection of resources has been exhausted after Covid, and the cumulative impact is truly obvious – a lot of people are going to suffer as a result, and collectively our standard of living will be declining.

Nifty 50 re-lived

The nifty 50 were the top 50 stocks in the US stock market in the 1970’s. Today, the top 10 stocks of the S&P 500 consist of about 30% of the index and many comments have been made about the effect of these stocks on the overall index. In particular, the rebound in technology stocks since November 2022 has caught many fund managers by surprise, and it is to the point where essentially if you did not own them (Facebook/Meta, Nvidia, etc.), most closet index fund managers would have badly underperformed. Perhaps it is sour grapes from somebody like myself (where I am barely treading water for the year), but this just does not look healthy.

Safe returns

Cash (various ETFs) return about 5.08% at the moment. For yield-based investors this is a very high hurdle. For example, looking at A&W Income Fund (TSX: AW.UN) with its stated yield of 5.3% – while you do get a degree of inflation protection, how much can burger prices rise before you start seeing volume slowdowns (and it is volume, not profitability that counts for these types of royalty companies)? Cash is out-competing much of the market right now. With every rise in the short-term interest rate, the differential widens.

Everybody looks at the charts of long-term treasury bonds in the early 1980’s and said to themselves “if only I had gone all-in on those 30-year government bonds yielding 15%, I would have made out like gangbusters”. This is almost the equivalent of saying your ideal timing into the stock market is February 2009, or March 23, 2020. The problem with such statements, other than they are entirely “hindsight is 20/20”, is that in order to get those 15% yields, such a bond needs to trade at 10%, 12%, 14%, etc., before reaching that 15% point. Valuations that would seem attractive and bought before that 15% yield point will have unrealized losses, sometimes significant, at the crescendo event. This is usually the point where most leveraged players are forced to be cashed out at the violent price action.

Parking cash is boring, and likely will result in the loss of purchasing power over periods of time (the CPI is a terrible barometer for ‘real’ consumer inflation), but better to lose 5% of purchasing power instead of 40% in a market crash!

Implied volatility

The so-called ‘fear gauge’ (the 1-month lookahead volatility of the S&P 500) is getting down to 2019 lows:

I don’t know what to make of this. Markets price surprises and probably the biggest surprise is a rip to the upside, despite all of the doom-and-gloom that the macro situation would otherwise suggest – perhaps interest rates are going to rise even further than most expect?

Either way, I’m not going to be a market hero. I remain very defensively postured and I do not feel like I have much of an edge at the moment. When you had everybody losing their heads over Covid three years ago there was a ripe moment where the reality vs. psychology mismatch created huge opportunities. Today, the normalization of this reality vs. psychology has created much more efficient market pricing. I can’t compete in this environment which feels like trading random noise. Maybe the AIs have whittled away the differential between reality and psychology – but they are only as good as the data that gets fed into them, and markets tend to exhibit random patterns of chaos now and then which will throw off the computers. So I wait.

If you ever wonder why I can’t work in an institutional environment, it is due to having some radical thoughts like the last paragraph.

An amusing moment – Reading the Bank of Canada financial statement

Reading the Bank of Canada’s 1st quarterly statement in 2023, the key table is:

Indeed, they booked a comprehensive income loss of $1.535 billion for the quarter, or about $40.13 per diluted Canadian.

The thought that immediately went into my mind was… “How come the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions hasn’t taken over this bank yet?”

It’s exactly the same situation as Silicon Valley Bank or Signature Bankcorp – you have a balance sheet that is addled with low-coupon long-term government securities, coupled with paying out most of your balance sheet with a higher interest rate. At least with SIVB and SBNY you had a positive net interest margin, while the Bank of Canada’s is running at an annualized NEGATIVE 1.6%! That’s even after having a captive audience of over $110 billion of zero-yielding deposits (in the form of coloured polymer banknotes!).

That’s government I guess!

Alberta Election 2023’s impact on oil and gas companies

I try to avoid politics on this site other than the direct impact of various policies on investment values.

That said, the upcoming Alberta provincial election, scheduled for May 29, 2023, is a significant political event risk for most of the publicly traded Canadian oil and gas companies, especially CNQ, CVE and SU.

Unlike most of the promises that both major provincial parties talk about and will never deliver on, I think it is safe to say that it is universally agreed that it is a near-certainty that the provincial corporate income tax will rise from 8% to 11% if the Alberta NDP is elected.

The oil and gas producers of Alberta continue to deliver a huge amount of corporate profits at the moment. Pretty much all of the large capitalization companies have exhausted their available tax shields. Since oil and gas production is a price-taker industry, the cost of a corporate tax increase gets directly borne by the shareholders (i.e. the companies cannot all unilaterally raise their prices, which is set by an international market).

The present value of four years of a 3% corporate tax increase on a company such as Cenovus, at WTI US$73 and everything else being equal would be about 35 cents per share.

There is other baked in assumptions that come politically (e.g. royalty regime changes, asset retirement obligation changes, regulatory changes and other indirect taxation changes on fossil fuels) which would increase costs to shareholders.

In essence, you can indirectly infer what market participants think about the election through oil and gas stock prices. The May 5, 2015 election result (caused by a significant split in the Progressive Conservative party) led to Alberta-based oil and gas equities to drop around 5-6%.

This time around, there is no significant split in the right wing of the political spectrum, which would be to the detriment of the Alberta NDP. Indeed, this election is looking to be the most polarized election since 1913, where the top two parties received 94.33% of the vote. Needless to say, Alberta has changed a lot since then.

Opinion polling would suggest that the UCP is going to win, but inevitably the makeup of the voter turnout in “swing seats” (i.e. in certain parts of Calgary, and outer fringes of Edmonton) will determine the outcome of this election. Pretty much all the messaging of the two major political parties is geared towards this mostly sub-urban geography.

My political projection has the UCP winning with about 55 seats (44/87 needed for a majority). The NDP will do much better on popular vote because the remnants of the Alberta Liberals and Alberta Party will coalesce into the “not UCP” camp, but even with around 45% of the vote, it will be insufficient due to the extreme polarization this election.

Losers of the TSX, year to date

Rank ordering year-to-date, losers on the TSX, with a minimum market cap of $50 million:

What strikes out at me?

Canfor Pulp (CFX) – What a miserable industry pulp and paper has been over the past four years. Their profitability last decade has been quite good, and then 2019 hit and that was it. Now they are closing down core assets in British Columbia (their Prince George mill is a considerable producer). Most of their production is destined for export to Asia and the USA, and if there is ever a poster child for how BC is a high-cost jurisdiction to conduct forestry, this one is it. CFP owns 55% of CFX. Contrast this with Cascades (TSX: CAS) which the common stock continues its usual range-bound meandering (remember – they were one of the prime recipients of demand for toilet paper during the onset of Covid-19!). If there is any sense of regression to the mean on CFX, however, it would be a multi-bagger stock. The question would be – when? Solvency is not too particular a concern – they’ve got their lines of credit extended out sufficiently.

Verde Agritech (NPK) – A foreign fertilizer firm, notably one of their board members got cleared out of half of his position in the company on April 24th on a margin call. I have no other comments on this other than my professed non-knowledge about Potash and the fertilizer industry. I note that Nutrien (NTR) has been trending down for over a year.

Corus Entertainment (CJR.b) – They cut their dividend, and are realizing that their degree of financial leverage is really going to hurt their cash generation, especially in an industry that is becoming more and more questionable for advertising revenues (broadcast television). The risk here is obvious.

VerticalScope (FORA) – How they managed to get over a half-billion valuation when they went public is beyond me. Rode the 2021 “web 3.0” bubble for the maximum (right there with Farmer’s Edge and the like). Given the organic business is marginally profitable and unscalable at best, and given their existing debt-load, good luck!

Vintage Wine (VWE) – This is a US/Nasdaq entity, I don’t know why this went on the TSX screen, but I checked it out anyway. Sales issues (declining), cost containment, and a large amount of debt plague this company. However, if you shop around any of their wineries, they do offer a “Platinum Shareholder Passport“, where if you own 1000 shares (which is now US$1.08/share, not too steep), you qualify for “25% discount on any wine purchase made at Vintage wineries and web stores.”, which quite possibly might be even larger than a $1,080 investment, depending on how much wine you end up buying. Now that’s a non-taxable dividend you can drink to!

Autocanada (ACQ) – How the mighty have fallen. After blowing a considerable amount of capital on share buybacks (the latest substantial issuer bid at $28 – stock is now $16) in 2022, they are finally feeling the pinch of margin erosion, especially from their last quarterly report. There are macroeconomic headwinds in place here, in addition to a not inconsiderable amount of debt. On their balance sheet, they did something smart by financing a $350 million senior unsecured note financing in early 2022 at 5.75% at a 7-year maturity, but there is still $1.2 billion in other floating rate debt on the books, which needless to say is getting very expensive. Even worse yet is the impact when you have to pass these costs onto your customers in financing charges, so suddenly your Land Rover that was a low $799 per two week payment is now $999! At some point, customers walk away and then decide they want a Toyota Corolla, which is also inconveniently unavailable everywhere. See: Gibson’s Paradox.

… a bunch of Oil and Gas drilling companies are on the list. No comment – it is pretty obvious why.

Brookfield (BN) – A surprising name to see on the list. I have a “no investment in entities named Brookfield” policy simply because of complexity. There are so many interrelationships between the various Brookfield entities that I do not want to make it my full-time life to keep appraised with it all.

51 on the list was Aritzia (ATZ) – I have long since given up on predicting women’s retail fashion trends. I note that Lululemon (LULU) is still sky-high in valuation (forward P/E of roughly 30). Victoria’s Secret (VSCO) is trading at a projected P/E of 5. Aritzia has kept a relatively decent balance sheet (only material liabilities is the retail leases they have committed to) and the projected multiple is 20. If you can get into the minds of the clientele, you would probably get more visibility on the future sales of this company. How do institutions do it? Should I go stick out like a sore thumb and go outlet mall shopping?

Anything else strike out at you?